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Tackling large informal economies is particularly challenging due to their self-
perpetuating nature and complex participatory motivations. This thesis reveals the 
strongest determinants of business tax evasion, suggesting new evidence for more 
adequate policy approaches. 
 
Literature 
The institutional asymmetry paradigm (IAP), adopted in this study, poses specific 
empirical challenges. Indeed, how to measure empirically the intrinsic circularity 
between tangible and intangible phenomena, affecting tax evasive behaviour. The 
contribution to the literature debates is through appraisal of these issues, proposing 
an economic model of partly informal entrepreneurship. 
 
Research aims 
The main research aim is to develop a holistic account of the socio-economic 
influencers of the processes of tax evasion and (in)formalisation. A comprehensive 
review of tax policy management has been conducted, exposing the three major 
environmental pressures (institutional, economic and political) on Bulgaria’s National 
Revenue Agency (NRA). It has been studied how institutional quality, procedural 
fairness and distributive justice transform into tangible economic effects on small 
businesses’ evasive behaviour. 
 
Methodology 
Mixed methods in exploratory sequential design. The in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with key NRA officials have been supplementary analysed with NVivo and 
IBM SPSS Modeler for increased findings’ objectivity. This informed a quantitative 
questionnaire to investigate entrepreneurs’ informal tactics. Utilising proven multi-
disciplinary methods (Decision trees, Neural and Bayesian networks), the study 
advances an innovative predictive socio-economic profiling of business tax evaders. 
 
Findings and contributions 
Operating in the most challenging EU economic environment, Bulgaria’s NRA 
experiences political influence for asymmetrical tax gap closure, which leads to 
unjustifiable regulative formalism within an outdated deterrence orientated approach. 
76.5% of the entrepreneurs evade taxes due to unfair competition ensuing survivalist 
reasoning. Evidently, the informal economy share is much higher than current macro-
measurement methods report (31.2% of GDP). These tough policy challenges could 





















The current socio-economic dynamics of the EU raise several welfare questions 
amongst its leaders, governments and citizens. With the most recent EU SME 
definition (European Commission, 2005, p. 8), updated in 2014 (European 
Commission, 2014), a special emphasis is put onto entrepreneurship development in 
the form of micro and small businesses. Economically SMEs are 99% of all 
businesses in the EU and for the last 5 years created around 85% of new jobs, 
providing two-thirds of the total private sector employment (European Commission, 
2016). Given the widely accepted fact that small firms engage in turnover 
underreporting to much greater extent (Kamleitner, Korunka & Kirchler, 2012; Tedds, 
2010, p. 2471) in comparison with large companies, there is a significant problem of 
lost revenues for national governments. Therefore, informal entrepreneurship and 
associated tax evasion becomes an important research field with great potential to 
improve economies. 
 
One of the biggest obstacles in tackling the informal economy has often been the fact 
that it was being “conceptually framed as a “tame” problem (i.e. a problem that is 
complicated but easily solvable, often with a discrete response that can be replicated 
anywhere)” (Williams, 2014c, p. 3). Governments tend to underestimate how 
sophisticated this socio-economic phenomenon is and to appraise the full scale of 
micro and macro participatory motivations. This is so, due to the lack of regular 
deployment of appropriate empirical inquiries seeking to establish what a country’s 
specific root causes of informality are. Although, contemporary academic literature 
accumulated sufficient evidence in recent years to support informed and effective 
policy response in most countries, it is usually unpopular or difficult to utilise by 
government officials at a policy making level. This study aims to contribute in this 
respect via a novel way of analytical tools’ deployment in an accessible and easier to 
understand way. 
 
Attempting to reduce the cost of formality many informal enterprises employ 
strategies, which position them in sophisticated interdependence links with other 
actors upward or downward in their supply chains. Some authors call this the 
“informality trap” (Institute for Market Economy, 2004, p. 61-70). This study suggests 
its own descriptive term – informal chain of interdependence (ICOI). Such phenomena 
create necessity of “tackling the barriers to formalisation” (Williams, Nadin, Barbour & 
Llanes, 2012a, 19) and becomes the most important side of the same loop – the first 
one could be described as tackling the enablers of informal entrepreneurship. Taking 
the route to formalisation asynchronously from any partnering enterprises within ICOI 
could ruin the well concealed tax evasive practice and make it very easy for tax 
authorities to recognise what is happening. So, the partly formal or informal firm 
willing to decrease the level of informality and thus their tax evasive pattern, may be 
incapable to afford that or will risk to lose a big part of their business if not the whole 
of it. Quite often micro-enterprises are driven out of the formal way of conducting their 
business or have their informality level increased by other informal business actors. 
The coping (cost-cutting) strategies of entrepreneurs with varying degree of 
informality are determined by various motivations, but the economic rationale plays 
significant role especially in transition economies. This study aims to model the 
Bulgarian informal entrepreneurship in its dynamics of economic reasoning. How 
entrepreneurs, who operate micro or small businesses, take decisions to reduce the 
costs of formality and thus face the costs of informality, which also need appropriate 
coping strategies. 
– 7 – 
The main research aim in this study was to develop a holistic account of the socio-
economic influencers of the processes of business tax evasion, formalisation and 
informalisation and as a result to inform adequate policy responses. This task 
required emergence of two investigative levels – institutional and entrepreneurial. The 
first research level was attained with a qualitative method to achieve an in-depth 
understanding of the institutional context with a focus on tax policy management. In 
particular, revealing how the three major environmental pressures (institutional, 
economic and political) affect NRA’s role in revenue raising policies and the 
associated institutional asymmetry. The main qualitative research question pursued in 
this thesis can be expressed as follows: How does a national revenue agency try to 
tackle tax evasion in an institutional context that makes operating within the informal 
economy a practically-viable alternative to operating in the formal economy? Full 
operationalisation of this research objective is available in chapter 4 (see Figure 5). 
To explore this central question, four lines of inquiry have been reported: discovery 
and exploration of agency strategies; agency operational approaches and the 
predominant type in the mix of policy measures; and the triggering procedures and 
methods of enforcing control and compliance – tax audits and inspections. The 
analysis and findings have been presented in chapter 5. The second investigative 
level was attained with a quantitative method (a business survey) deployed amongst 
entrepreneurs. The main quantitative research questions can be expressed as follows: 
What the strongest determining factors of business tax evasion are and whether the 
intrinsic circularity between tangible and intangible socio-economic phenomena is 
affecting tax evasive behaviour? Full operationalisation of this research objective is 
available in chapter 4 (see Figure 5).This research task required the development of 
an empirical instrument capable to appraise the root causes for partial informality 
amongst micro and small businesses. In doing so, the employed questionnaire and 
associated analysis contribute in two main aspects. Firstly, it advances the so called 
predictive economic profiling of business tax evaders exploiting an innovative 
application of proven multi-disciplinary analytical methods. Secondly, the quantitative 
empirical instrument enriches the literature debates about informal economy 
measurement’s approaches – still arguing about the superiority of either macro or 
micro-economic methods. 
 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter Two: Literature review 
The chapter appraises the literature on various definitions of the informal economy 
and entrepreneurship. As will become evident, there is lack of consensus and this has 
specific complications in regards to measurement, main drivers and policy responses 
to the informal entrepreneurship. A review of contemporary policy approaches and 
size estimation methods has been conducted to outline the current state of knowledge 
and establish areas of worthy contributions.  
 
Chapter Three: The Bulgarian informal economy 
The chapter presents the major Bulgarian socio-economic indicators characterising 
the research context. Bulgaria is the least developed EU state with the lowest OISC 
index. This is of particular importance to the understanding how entrepreneurs decide 
their informal strategies given the social and business setting in which they operate 
and what the policy response should be. 
 
Chapter Four: Methodology 
Chapter 4 starts with presentation of the research aims and objectives from within the 
philosophical perspective of the study. The study employs mixed methods in 
exploratory sequential design. The chapter explains the rationale behind the particular 
research design choices, methods’ utilisation and the empirical strategy required to 
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investigate this sensitive topic. The presented empirical instruments’ development and 
analytics are considered to be methodological contributions in their own right as this 
enables discovery of important findings in the latter chapters. The main research aim 
is to develop a holistic account of the socio-economic influencers of the processes of 
business tax evasion, formalisation and informalisation and as a result to inform 
adequate policy responses. 
 
Chapter Five: Findings of semi-structured in-depth interview 
Chapter 5 addresses the first out of two investigative stages to achieve this. The key 
qualitative contribution of this research is unveiling the three major environmental 
pressures upon NRA’s strategic and operational approaches in tax policy 
management characterised by institutional incongruence status. While the first two – 
economic and institutional environments are amongst the worst in socio-economic 
terms within the EU, the political influence for asymmetrical tax gap closure as well as 
consequential misuse of collected revenue, appear to have the most significant 
impact on the agency’s work. In particular, this creates two major types of difficulties – 
firstly, this impedes the work of senior officials who want to modernise tax policy in 
order to secure a greater level of operational independence and thus higher 
procedural fairness. Secondly, the findings indicate that current institutional practices 
disturb the social feeling for procedural fairness to such a degree that the institutional 
asymmetry and entrepreneurial informality are being progressively deepened. 
 
Chapter Six: Findings of business survey 
Based on analysis of a business survey, chapter 6 has two major parts: the summary 
statistics for individual variables and the so called modelling (predictive analytics). 
The second investigative level has been attained with a questionnaire, which was 
deployed amongst entrepreneurs to research their informal tactics. It was studied how 
institutional quality, procedural fairness and distributive justice transform into tangible 
economic effects on small businesses’ tax evasive behaviour. Applying proven multi-
disciplinary analytical methods (Decision trees, MLP Neural and TAN Bayesian 
networks), the quantitative analysis advances an innovative predictive socio-economic 
profiling of business tax evaders. The quantitative analysis utilised Multinomial 
Logistic Regression to verify the key findings. It has been demonstrated that unfair 
competition from informal businesses is the most frequent and strongest predictor of 
tax evasion. In addition, entrepreneurs exercise tax evasion in order to survive and as 
a corresponding response to the poor tax and administrative policies, which cause 
them to spend more valuable resources than deemed acceptable. 
 
Chapter Seven: Discussion of findings and contributions 
While the previous chapter concentrates on quantitative findings with the emphasis on 
the rationale and strengths of the methods, this final chapter appraises the 
significance of the results in relation to the extant literature. In doing so, it becomes 
evident that Bulgaria’s NRA operates in the most challenging economic environment in 
the EU. Within its limited manoeuvrability, the agency experiences political influence 
for asymmetrical tax gap closure, which leads to unjustifiable regulative formalism 
within an outdated deterrence orientated approach. It was discovered that 76.5% of 
the entrepreneurs underreport their turnovers with the purpose to evade taxes (mainly 
to survive). This amounts to a significant proportion of the country’s GDP and 
suggests that the proportion of GDP in the informal economy is much higher than 
current macro-measurement methods report for Bulgaria (31.2% of GDP). The 
logically clear and transparent decision trees and neural networks unveiled that unfair 
competition is the most frequent and strongest predictor of business tax evasion in 
conditions of very high real cost of doing business. The discovered high frequency of 
societal involvedness in the informal economy multiplied by high Intensity of societal 
involvedness constitutes a tough policy challenge. It could be tackled only through 
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inducing financially and socially efficient voluntary tax compliance. Indeed, to 
increase tax compliance and reduce the share of the informal economy, a 
qualitatively new policy approach is required to decrease the institutional asymmetry, 
based on two pillars. Firstly, to achieve a widely acceptable level of procedural 
fairness, namely equivalent treatment of everybody trough equal rules enforcement in 
the tax management domain. Secondly, to address the major deficiencies in the 
distributive justice mechanisms and in particular the perceived value of public goods 
and services as a function of the collected taxes. In order to achieve an appropriately 
sustainable social and economic system, the taxpayer should feel that they bear a 




 Research context. 1.1
 
Brief political-economy history of Bulgaria. 
 
In 1945, after the Second World War, Bulgaria became a communist state with a 
Soviet-style planned economy. The communist regime continued for 45 years until 
1990 when the government allowed multi-party elections. They were unsurprisingly 
won by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP – a new name of the Communist Party). 
Twenty-seven years later the “Transition” period to open market economy still 
continues, although some politicians would argue that it has been successfully 
completed. The processes of initial creation of business capital were corrupted in 
their genesis, so that they resulted in tarnished capitals installation schemes, which 
were deeply concerning the Bulgarian society. Private economic activity was not 
allowed during the communist era, so there was no private seed and working capital. 
Instead, the Bulgarian Communist Party entitled selected individuals (from their upper 
echelon) with the privilege to use state sourced funds for private business. As a result, 
powerful oligarchic circles emerged with strong political embeddedness, which 
continues to impress even nowadays. Their political influence was enabling legislative 
development in support of their economic interests. 
 
Some main socio-economic indicators. 
 
In socio-economic perspective, Bulgaria was accepted as a full EU member state in 
January 2007. Unfortunately, the country remains one of the least developed 
economies in the EU27. Bulgaria has a 7.33 million population (Eurostat, 2013). The 
volume index of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) is the lowest 
while the risk of poverty is the highest in comparison with the other EU member states 
(see Appendices 2 and 3). Furthermore, the social cohesion index (OISC) is one of 
the lowest in the EU, while the shadow economy is the highest (Figure 4). 
 
 Rationale: need for this research, its importance and significance. 1.2
 
There is growing interest amongst academics about entrepreneurs’ economic motives 
in choosing their level of informality. In particular, why and how business owners 
decide to offset the expenses associated with formality and consequently pursue 
informal strategies. This study aims to fill that gap and provide an empirically verified 
explanation of these phenomena. Pursuing such research aims requires specific 
methodological choices and it is proposed that Bulgaria satisfies them for the 
following reasons: 
 
 Bulgaria has very high costs of formality and as such provides highly distinctive 
grounds for studying the main corresponding phenomenon – costs of 
– 10 – 
informality. The entrepreneurs’ coping strategies are more explicit and subject 
to more idiosyncratic economic reasoning. 
 
 Bulgaria is the least economically developed EU member state (see Appendix 
2 and 3) with the highest shadow economy share (Buehn & Schneider, 2011). 
Thus the findings of this study would be highly relevant and beneficial – to 
inform adequate and necessary policy response. 
 
The earliest trace to inventing the two central research concepts (“cost of formality” 
and “cost of informality”), leads to De Soto’s seminal work (1989, p. 132-177). He 
argues that cost of formality is dependent on two corresponding concepts coined by 
Instituto Libertad Democracia (ILD): “the costs of access” to an economic activity and 
the “costs of remaining” in it. It is how much financial resource and efforts the 
entrepreneurs are required to spend to establish themselves formally in business and 
remain in compliance over time. De Soto’s findings are that decisions to conduct 
informal activities are largely based on rational evaluation of the cost of formality. 
Furthermore, informality is discovered to “involve tremendous costs” (De Soto, p. 152), 
which people attempt to offset in inadequate ways. Based on De Soto’s conceptual 
definitions, it becomes clear that they could not be looked at in isolation since they are 
strongly correlating phenomena. 
 
In order to outline the significance of the research it needs to account for the following 
worthwhile implications: 
 
 Cost of formality and cost of informality have been identified and studied 
conceptually and to certain degree empirically, but has not been 
operationalised in transition economies like the Bulgarian one. This is an 
important investigation considering that the economic challenges for the least 
developed EU state due to the largest informal sector might be the greatest. 
Most importantly, the main object of these concepts – the entrepreneur – has 
not been able to benefit from academic developments in the area. This needs 
changing through enabling the entrepreneurs to consume practicable 
applications of such academic work. 
 
 In essence, there is concrete necessity to equip policy responses to the hidden 
economy with analytical tools, which would enable the inducement of 
financially and socially efficient voluntary tax compliance. 
 
 The social importance of informality needs constant re-evaluation in relation to 
cost of formality and informality. Such an appraisal would be different for 
different economies. It could be argued that in less developed economies both 
cost of formality and informality are higher in comparison with more developed 
countries. That is why studying those phenomena have particular importance 
for Bulgaria and the potential for extrapolating of the findings to other 
transition economies is feasible. 
 
There is always an implicit cost of transacting informally, which is difficult to predict by 
entrepreneurs who chose this mode of doing business. The main research aim of this 
study is to explore the relationship between the level of cost, time, and procedures, 
which push entrepreneurs to function partly/fully informally or impede formalisation 
and how these variables affect their tax evasion behaviour. We can observe an 
increased effort by governments and their policy units to influence and measure 
“shadow activities”. The Italian tax authorities have recently created a self-diagnostic 
application (Redditest) to tackle the average tax evasion, which is widespread. The 
Australian Tax Office created an “Online Business Viability Assessment Tool” in their 
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effort to limit the risk of non-payment of tax debt. The Latvian Confederation of 
Employers launched a campaign “Against the shadow economy – for fair competition”. 
It included an online test for measuring the impact of an individual’s “shadow” activity. 
While this study’s rationale is parallel to those initiatives, it develops a new 
methodology in predictive diagnostics and profiling of business tax evaders. The 
thesis aims to build a holistic account of the main determinants of entrepreneurs’ tax 
evasive decisions as a function of the socio-economic environment in which the 
studied small firms operate. In doing so, it contributes by showing that intangible 
phenomena (such as institutional quality, procedural fairness and distributive justice) 
transform into tangible economic influencers of compensatory evasive behaviours. 
 
 
 Theoretical framework and important research insights. 1.3
 
The study appraises various theoretical frameworks, which explain the problems and 
root causes of informality (see section 2.3, 2.4). They all have different deficiencies in 
offering adequate theory to describe engagement with informal economic activities. 
The lack of contemporary explanatory framework until recently has been attributed to 
a couple of issues. With some exceptions (Williams, Horodnic & Windebank, 2015a; 
Williams & Horodnic, 2015d) the institutional theory on tax evasion have neglected 
studying empirically the interdependence of formal and informal institutions 
(Gërxhani, 2004b, p. 741). Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p. 727) description of formal 
and informal institutions has been selected as the most applicable to this study: 
"informal institutions as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. By contrast, 
formal institutions are rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and 
enforced through channels widely accepted as official. This includes state 
institutions..." Therefore, institutional asymmetry meaning is to be understood as “the 
misalignment between formal and informal institutions” (Williams & Vorley, 2014d, p. 
2). Adopting IAP, this study argues that large institutional asymmetry is guaranteed by 
default in transition economies (such as Bulgaria), which logically leads to significant 
tax evasion. Institutional asymmetry is now widely recognised as being positively 
correlated with informal economic activities – both at entrepreneurial and employment 
level (Williams et al., 2015a; Williams et al., 2015b; Williams et al., 2015c). In 
comparison with previous theorisations of informality, IAP is much more holistic in its 
appraisal capabilities. In particular, with its integrative understanding that tax evasive 
behaviours are emergent to a complex set of phenomena such as the socio-economic 
dynamics of the environment in which tax payers exist, as well as the dynamics of 
their perceptions for injustices and inequalities (procedural fairness and distributive 
justice). 
 
However, precisely this holistic capability of IAP to explain the root causes of 
informality, poses specific empirical challenges from research perspective. Indeed, 
that is to discover and measure empirically intangible phenomena, which relate to 
social actors and enterprises involved in illicit economic activities. This thesis 
contributes to the developing literature debates in that regard, through 
operationalisation and investigation of the main concepts underpinning what appear to 
be a distinctively visible institutional asymmetry in a transition setting. To achieve this 
task, the study employed mixed methods in exploratory sequential design. Firstly, it 
investigated the formal institutional framework with specific focus on the National 
Revenue Agency and tax policy management. Secondly, it appraised how intangible 
phenomena such as institutional quality, procedural fairness and distributive justice 
transform into tangible economic effects on small businesses’ tax evasive behaviour. 
 
Given the largest informal economy share, perceived institutional corruption and the 
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poorest socio-economic environment in the EU (see chapter 3, Figure 14, 15, 16, 
Appendices 2 and 3), it is not surprising that most small businesses must exercise 
huge effort to just maintain economic viability. It has been discovered that the most 
frequent motive for tax evasion is to simply survive economically (see sections 6.2.1 
and 7.1). Evidently, the problems of self-perpetuating informality are affecting the 
fundamental constructs of the public contract in the Bulgarian society. One of the 
challenging circularity effects is that the individual cost of being honest in a corrupt 
society becomes significantly higher in comparison with societies where most 
individuals are honest (Andvig & Moene, 1990). This affects horizontal and vertical 
trust between economic actors and the state, fuels even greater tax evasion and the 
so called informal chains of interdependence (ICOI). An important contribution to 
knowledge is the appraisal of the real cost of doing business and how in particular this 
affects firms’ economic behaviour, depending on their (in)formal economic status 
(see Figure 26, section 7.3). It has been discovered that (section 6.2.3, Table 22, 
Appendix 35) the strongest predictor for participation in ICOI is the disagreement with 
fair expenditure of tax money. 86% of all firms willing to formalise from within ICOI 
have full disagreement with how tax money is being spent and opinion that they are 
not treated in a fair and professional manner by the state institutions. Informality 
chains of interdependence are one of the significant self-perpetuating mechanisms of 
spreading informality and simultaneously obstructing formalisation via the power of 
their economic coercion. This turns them effectively into enablers of informality and 
barriers to formalisation. The study offers empirically informed policy solutions to two 
of the most challenging problems in regards with ICOI’s economic coercion towards 
informalisation (see section 7.3). 
 
In terms of cost of doing business, there are four substantial drivers of tax evasion, 
which develops as a responsive-compensatory strategy at entrepreneurial level. 
Firstly, unfair competition from fully informal or partly informal businesses is the most 
frequent and strongest predictor of business tax evasion. The current institutional 
capacity to tackle this issue and provide a levelled business environment is clearly 
inadequate. Secondly, the problem with institutional corruption at all levels, which 
causes unfair and expensive public service delivery – the so called significant costs of 
“getting things done” from entrepreneurial perspective. Considering the fact that small 
firms are highly likely to engage in corrupt activities within low institutional efficiencies 
(Tonoyan, Strohmeyer, Habib & Perlitz, 2010), this contributes to increasing 
informality. Thirdly, the high cost of doing business according to the rules due to 
bureaucratic inefficiencies as a result of poor tax and administrative policies. Lastly, 
there is a political influence, which affects formal institutions and the perceived 
procedural fairness and distributive justice amongst business tax payers. This study 
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Chapter Two 
 
2. Literature review. 
 
This chapter unfolds with a discussion on the complexities and lack of consensus on 
defining what the informal economy and entrepreneurship is, including the emerging 
theoretical consequences. It gradually builds the argument that the best way of 
defining the informal economy and entrepreneurship is to employ a modular principle, 
depending on a widely accepted definition, which is fine-tuned to reflect a particular 
research context. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, to enable an accurate and 
exhaustive definition of the various informal economies, which tend to differ 
substantially across national borders by their nature of existence. Secondly, to enable 
appropriate design of tackling policy measures. Development of adequate policy 
approaches therefore is subservient on precise definition and comprehensive 
understanding of the root causes of informality at a national level. A working definition 
of informal entrepreneurship was developed for the purpose of this study. 
 
The literature appraisal for the purpose of this study is constructed around the so 
called systematic literature review to ensure higher level of objectivity and precision in 
the positioning of the main arguments. To enhance research transparency and 
replicability a detailed description of how this has been achieved is subsequently 
offered including supporting appendices. Given the research aim to understand 
entrepreneurs’ informal strategies and the basis of their choices to conceal economic 
activities, an account of the main competing literature theorisations is then presented. 
It will become evident, that neither of the current explanatory paradigms are 
sufficiently adequate. A group of scholars started to address the need of a new 
holistic theorisation, suggesting the institutional asymmetry paradigm (Williams et al., 
2015a; Williams et al., 2015d; Williams et al., 2014d). Adopting IAP, this study aims to 
address its empirical challenges – indeed, how to measure empirically the intrinsic 
circularity between tangible and intangible phenomena, affecting tax evasive 
behaviour. The contribution to the literature debates is via appraisal of these issues, 
proposing an economic model of partly informal entrepreneurship through innovative 
socio-economic profiling of business tax evaders. 
 
Estimating the real size of a shadow economy has implications about what policy 
responses should be utilised. In consideration of the self-perpetuating nature of a 
large informal economy (namely the Bulgarian one) a review of current macro and 
micro economic measurement methods was developed. As a result, the reader is 
enabled to appreciate the measurement capability of the specifically designed 
quantitative instrument in respect of its measurement potential. The final part of the 
literature review is dedicated to introducing the main socio-economic indicators 
characterising the research context. It aims to equip the reader with an understanding 
of how the studied informal entrepreneurship strategies and their institutional 
framework relate to their native setting. 
 
There are currently three major literature streams studying and explaining informal 
entrepreneurs’ motives to engage in shadow activities. These could be classified as: 
the literature on informal economy and entrepreneurship, literature on tax evasion and 
non-compliance, and economic psychology literature on taxation. Each of these 
streams inform corresponding policy measures based on its findings, but there are 
very few attempts to integrate their research approaches and findings into a holistic 
policy response to the problems of informality. Djankov, Lieberman, Mukherjee and 
Nenova (2003) were amongst the first authors who looked to develop cost-benefit 
analysis of informality. Their main rationale is that “All informal activity has one 
common feature: the entrepreneurs who operate in the informal economy perceive the 
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benefits of doing so to outweigh the costs of going formal” (p. 63). Simeon Djankov is 
the inventor of the World Bank’s Doing Business report and the methodology being 
used in the report’s series is similar. The authors calculate business registration time 
and attempt to establish full-cost measure of the entrepreneurs’ time to comply 
however there is no explicit quantifiable model of this. Of course, we need to be aware 
that rational cost-benefit reasoning could be limiting in explaining entrepreneurial 
behaviour. This study aims to reveal the economic rationale behind informal strategies 
and choices, while recognising that that there are socio-psychological motives, which 
could be even predominant. However, it is argued that in a less developed 
entrepreneurial environment cost-benefit reasoning may have bigger weight in the 
decisions for involvement in informality. 
 
According to a study of the Institute for Market Economy (2004, p. 18) “Whenever the 
costs of operating in the formal sector exceed those of operating ‘in the shadows’, 
there are grounds for informal economy expansion”. Oviedo (2009) introduce 
stimulating argument about an increased number of theoretical papers, which 
motivates the existence of informal entrepreneurs as the result of rational economic 
choices. This study will build upon what has been discovered so far in costing 
formality and informality, but will aim to develop more practicable contribution in the 
entrepreneurial domain. In particular, revealing the root causes and motivations for 
entrepreneurial informality via innovative application of analytical methods. 
 
There is an increasing interest towards the so called systematic literature review 
(SLR) and its significance for management research. In discussing the advantages of 
systematic literature review, Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012, p. 113) consider 
that it will ensure that the report is clear, allowing others to assess the strength and 
weaknesses of the study. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson (2008, p. 46) further 
clarify the point that the review criteria should be rather systematic than simply 
personal choice and “transparent for others to see what you have done and so to 
judge the relevance and substantive nature of your review.” Both groups of authors 
base their discussion on an earlier paper of Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003, p. 
220) who believed that a “systematic review can be argued to lie at the heart of a 
“pragmatic” management research, which aims to serve both academic and 
practitioner communities”. SLR main advantages are most easily visible when there is 
too much or too little literature in a specific research area (see Table 1, Appendix 4). 
The literature on informal economies increased substantially in size over recent years, 
hence the SLR approach is a sensible method to engage with such a field. Mishkov 
(2012) provides a pragmatic example of SLR applied within a small scale 
management research study. It is a particularly useful approach in providing evidence 
base for policy and practice in social sciences (ESRC, 2001). 
 
Obviously, every SLR has certain limitations (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006), which 
emerge from the very nature of the approach. It is important to note, that this study 
appreciate that fact and aims to present an example application of SLR on the topics 
of interest. Each SLR is dependent to the research perspective of the author. Although 
SLR bears the potential of a much less biased interpretative approach, we should be 
aware of the risk that SLR could create a very well structured subjective analysis. If 
this happens, then it is easily visible to the detached reader. SLR is being used to an 
extent to discover the relevant areas of the study and position the research efforts 
with sufficient precision and justification. This means that the power of SLR is utilised 
at different stages selectively in an attempt to avoid the constraints, which SLR may 
impose on the research direction and creativity. Every possible attempt is made to use 
all advantages of a SLR approach, but giving priority rather to creativity, research 
flexibility and value than to the literature reporting frame. 
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 Literature review – systematic research protocol. 2.1
 
The guidelines of Petticrew et al. (2006) presented in Appendix 1 have been used in 
constructing the SLR approach. The literature review of this study is developed around 
three scoping literature screenings (SLS) and four conceptual thematic areas, which 
as every other part of the protocol will be updated accordingly. 
 
Scoping literature screenings: 
1. Key expressions (see Table 2) 
2. Peer-reviewed journals (see Table 3). 
3. Key authors (subjectively/thematically determined). 
 
Conceptual thematic areas: 
1. Definitions of the informal economy. 
2. Explanations – theorisations. 
3. Methods estimating the size of the hidden economy. 
4. The Bulgarian informal economy. 
 
The initial SLS were executed in Primo Central and ScienceDirect. Full list of all the 
databases included in Primo central is provided by University of Sheffield (2013). The 
searches were implemented without date of publication restriction and with syntax to 
include all words from each search expression. This means that every result set 
contained every word from each expression. The approach led to discovery of 104 
journals containing relevant publications. The generated search results (journal 
articles) were examined to ensure that each included journal contain at least one 
thematically relevant publication, which has a discussion in regards to a key 
expression. Most of the journals contained several relevant papers. Particular sets of 
interconnected articles have been selectively appraised to focus the scope of the 
emerging literature review. Some articles and journals accordingly, have been 
excluded, because the discussion of the topic was only marginal. 
 
 
 Definitions of the informal economy and entrepreneurship. 2.2
 
It is of central importance to this study to develop its arguments based on analytical 
appraisal of the literature on various definitions of the informal economy and 
entrepreneurship. As will become evident, there is lack of consensus and this has 
specific complications in regards to measurement, main drivers and policy responses 
to the informal entrepreneurship. The specifically designed systematic research 
protocol has been used to achieve maximum objectivity and rigour in evaluation of the 
various viewpoints. 
 
Keith Hart is recognised to be the first author (Chen, WIEGO, 2012, p. 2; Gërxhani, 
2004a, p. 269) defining the concept of the informal sector, which was done in a study 
of a Third World context. His understanding of the informal sector is that one is a 
participant based on whether their income is generated in a wage rewarding job or it is 
coming from an outside source like from self-employment (p. 68): “The distinction 
between formal and informal income opportunities is based essentially on that 
between wage-earning and self-employment”. Hart (1973, p. 68-69), developed the 
earliest typology of the informal sector acknowledging the difference between 
legitimate and illegitimate activities. 
 
Despite of the early contribution of Hart, it is widely considered (Batini, Levine, Kim & 
Lotti, 2011, p. 30; Bromley, 1978, p. 1036; Chen, WIEGO, 2012, p. 2; Gërxhani, 2004a, 
p. 269; Huang, 2009, p. 406; Mead & Morrisson, 2004, p. 1617; Peattie, 1987, p. 853; 
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Siggel, 2010, p. 94) that the founding research on the informal sector is done by the 
International Labour Office (1972). With the empirical evidence they present it 
becomes clearer that the informal sector activities could be “economically efficient 
and profitmaking, though small in scale and limited by simple technologies, little 
capital and lack of links with the other ("formal") sector” (ILO, p. 5). ILO has an 
intriguing view to encourage a positive attitude of governments towards the promotion 
of the informal sector. This view is grounded in “wide range of low-cost, labour-
intensive, competitive goods and services” (ILO, p. 21). 
 
Gershuny and Pahl (1979, p. 127) develop an interesting argument about the genesis 
of the informal economy. It starts from the technological advancement in industrial 
production and hence consequential unemployment due to the lower demand for 
labour. So, the only way to keep the same level of employment is through 
restructuring to the service sector and increase in public expenditure. The authors’ 
prediction is that we cannot escape the development of a dual economy, but we need 
to control it in an acceptable form. 
 
It is inquisitive to trace the transformation of how Feige (1979, p. 6) chose to call the 
“irregular economy”. He decided to employ this term from the sociologist Louis 
Ferman and thought that terms like "subterranean" or "underground" are too readily 
prone to journalistic sensationalism. According to Feige “The term "irregular economy" 
is used to refer to those economic activities that go unreported or are unmeasured by 
the society's current techniques for monitoring economic activity.” Some 11 years 
later, Feige (1990, p. 991) acknowledged that there is no single underground 
economy, but there are many. 
 
Gërxhani (2004a) developed a thorough study of the literature to provide a 
comparative account for the contributions on the informal sector in developed and 
less developed countries. The paper focuses on the criteria used in the literature by 
different authors to define the informal sector, the relationship between the formal 
and informal economy, tax evasion, and public choice analysis. The author stresses 
that the distinction between the two types of countries is of key importance in regards 
to how the informal sector is defined. Despite the strengths of Gërxhani’s general 
overview of the contributions on the informal sector literature, it is surprising not to see 
evaluation in the analysis of two of the key authors on the informal economy – Colin 
Williams and Friedrich Schneider. 
 
Wallace and Latcheva (2006) adopt more locally specialised approach when defining 
what the informal economy is in the transition countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. They acknowledge that defining the informal economy should be done at a 
country level, since this could differentiate significantly. A particular trend in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe is the fact that various activities become 
legal and illegal (frequent legislation changes) in a pace that is impossible to build into 
the typology model the authors develop (p. 85). 
 
There is an excellent account of informality definitions (ILO & WTO, 2009, p. 51-54) , 
which incorporates how actually the concept has become more operational. The 
supported viewpoint in this joint study of ILO and the WTO is that informality could be 
defined at the level of production units or firms, or at the level of workers. The main 
criteria being used to define informal enterprise are their size and their registrations 
status. Under the upgraded statistical definition of the informal sector (called later the 
informal economy) – “informal employment” is understood to include all remunerative 
work – both self-employment and wage employment – that is not recognized, 
regulated or protected by existing legal or regulatory frameworks and non-
remunerative work undertaken in an income-producing enterprise” (p. 53). It is 
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emphasized by ILO&WTO that due to the broadening of the definitions in time and 
associated consensus difficulties, a new integrated approach is currently arising 
based on the idea of multi-segmented labour markets. The main idea of this approach 
is that the informal economy is constituted of different segments that are occupied by 
different actors (p. 45). This appears to be highly potent literature trend, which is 
recognised and supported by ILO&WTO. 
 
Andrews, Sánchez and Johansson (2011) review the informal economy through cross-
country research perspective in order to expose the link between informality and 
corresponding public policy. They argue that “There is no unique definition or measure 
of the informal economy. It typically refers to economic activities and transactions that 
are sufficiently hidden so that they are unmeasured or untaxed, and it is presumed 
that economic agents are at least passively aware that bringing these activities to the 
attention of authorities would imply tax or other legal consequences.” Andrews et al. 
support a popular perspective (in accordance with Feld and Schneider, 2010; Easton, 
2001) that the informal economy’s definition that is most useful depends on the policy 
concern that motivates the analysis and data availability. 
 
Two distinguished authors on the informal economy Schneider and Williams (2013, p. 
23-27) provide excellent and concise discussion about definition of the shadow 
economy. The authors underline the important fact that correct measurement is 
dependent on a clear definition. In order to avoid any ambiguities and controversies 
they developed a table of “Sample activities and the shadow economy” (p. 26), which 
provides very useful example activities included or excluded from the shadow 
economy. For the purpose of the measurement methods in their monograph, 
Schneider and Williams accept that the shadow economy: 
“includes all market-based production of legal goods and services that are 
deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons: 
• to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes; 
• to avoid payment of social security contributions; 
• to avoid having to meet certain legal labour market standards, such as minimum 
wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc.; and 
• to avoid complying with certain administrative obligations” (p. 25) 
The authors exclude illegal underground activities and the informal household 
economy. This narrower definition fits and corresponds to earlier definitions, see for 
example (Williams & Round, 2007a, p. 426; Williams, Round & Rodgers, 2007b, p. 
403; Williams & Windebank, 2002, p.232). Defining entrepreneurship and its informal 
modes is a difficult task, which has been addressed by various authors, but there is 
lack of consensus (Williams, 2007, p. 2; Williams, 2008, p. 1042). Grilo and Thurik 
(2004, p. 2) also confirm that fact and provide excellent literature review on 
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Figure 1: Literature review of entrepreneurship in Europe 




It could be argued that the definitive approach to informal entrepreneurship should 
mirror the specific considerations we have when providing definition of the informal 
economy. Informal entrepreneurship should be considered and evaluated in 
correlation with the local socio-economic norms. In appraising the entrepreneurs’ 
involvement in off-the-books activities Williams (2008, p. 1041) makes an important 
claim that studies “have so far failed to evaluate the involvement of entrepreneurs in 
off-the-books work”. He finds prevalence of those practices amongst early-stage 
entrepreneurs and in later co-authorship work develops arguments about theories of 
informal entrepreneurship and evaluation of their motives. In their study of Russian 
informal entrepreneurs, Williams and Round (2009) discovered that both necessity 
and opportunity-drivers were co-existent in the decision to start up a business. 
Moreover, there is a shift towards opportunity-drivers with the better establishment of 
the business. Williams and Nadin (2010b, p. 363) suggest a definition of informal 
entrepreneurship: 
“Informal entrepreneurship, in sum, is here defined as involving somebody actively 
engaged in starting a business or is the owner/manager of a business that is less than 
42 months old who participates in the paid production and sale of goods and services 
that are legitimate in all respects besides the fact that they are unregistered by, or 
hidden from the state for tax and/or benefit purposes.” 
 
An example definition of informal entrepreneurship in the Bulgarian context is 
suggested: 
 
Informal entrepreneurship is dynamics of economic activities exercised by the 
entrepreneur or other people managed by them while acting on their behalf. These 
activities are legitimate in all respects, but their resulting economic profit is either 
fully or partly unregistered for the purpose of tax evasion. 
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Based on the literature debate about defining the informal economy and 
entrepreneurship, there are some important remarks to be made. There is no 
consensus on a single definition of the informal economy or informal 
entrepreneurship, but there are more widely accepted definitions, which are supported 
by the majority of authors. It is argued that the best way in defining the informal 
economy and entrepreneurship is to employ a modular principle. One could start from 
a general widely accepted definition, which is applicable to various country specific 
scenarios and then add set of descriptive characteristics to fine tune the definition to 
the research context. As a result, certain set of definitions of the informal economy 
would be more appropriate for developed countries in comparison with other 
definitions, which are more suitable for less developed countries. Therefore, defining 
the informal sector should be done with careful consideration of country specific 
factors. As informal entrepreneurship is phenomenon within the informal economies 
across the world, it is logical that the definitive approach should mirror the specific 
considerations we have when developing definition of the informal economy. 
 
Another important definition related factor is the comparative cross-country analysis. 
In particular, scholars should depend on more widely accepted definitions, which is 
more likely to produce accurate results and satisfy the academic audience in terms of 
contributions’ validity. Some authors present an argument for the nonexistence of 
systematic data available to research the informal sector phenomena and hence the 
difficulties to invent a single definition. However, there is substantial empirical 
evidence that there is need of country specific definitions to reflect on many regional 
factors of economic and socio-legal aspect. For instance, designing and undertaking 
economic activities for the purpose of tax avoidance could be legal in one country and 
illegal in another. The informal economy is not a separate phenomenon – it is not just 
another economy. It is rather part of the socio-economic country specific dynamics. 
This includes the state of the national economy, tax and business legislation, 
institutional and regulative quality, tax morale. In this perspective, the informal sector 
in any country will always respond to changes of the socio-economic dynamics. 
 
 
 Theorisations of informal entrepreneurship. 2.3
 
In order to understand entrepreneurs’ informal strategies and the basis of their 
choices to conceal economic activities we need to be aware about the different 
explanations of informal entrepreneurship in the literature. These competing 
theorisations emerge from the diverse perception of the entrepreneurs’ 
characteristics, types, motives and role in the economy. Williams et al. (2010b, p. 365) 
find out that different theories of entrepreneurship apply more in some populations 
than others and introduce key types of informal entrepreneurs – wholly or partly 
trading off the books. As soon as they become more established in business, we could 
distinguish between those entrepreneurs who become “serial users of informal trading 
practices and those whose enterprises are in transition toward legitimacy”. According 
to Williams and Nadin there are 4 perspectives on the existence of informal 
entrepreneurship in economies, which will be reviewed below: 
 Modernisation perspective. 
 Structuralist perspective. 
 Neo-liberal perspective. 
 Post-structuralist perspective. 
 
 
2.3.1 Modernisation perspective. 
 
It was widely accepted that the formal economic configuration and organisation of 
– 20 – 
labour specialisation will take over the traditional production of goods and services. In 
essence, the informal entrepreneurship would be a diminishing mode of production, 
which would not fit into the modern economic system characterised by the enterprise 
culture. Consequently, the existence of informal entrepreneurship was considered to 
indicate under-development, since the demand for formal work by the modern 
enterprise should absorb the output of informal entrepreneurs and thus formalise 
them. Lewis (1955) developed a political economy perspective on the entrepreneurs, 
taking into account “The will to economise”, “Economic institutions” and “Capital 
requirements”. His modernisation view of the theory of economic growth makes him 
introduce the term “backwardness” (p.136, 153, 204) – where this condition of certain 
economies could enable spectacular growth based on the desire for countries not to 
fall behind others. Fallers (1963, p. 158-220) present a similar argument reviewing the 
entrepreneur from the prism of structural modernisation. Indeed, he makes the 
development distinction between the “owner-entrepreneur” and the “the modern 
corporation” accounting for the agent theory (i.e. ownership and management 
division). In Faller’s view the modern occupational structures are those, which would 
bring welfare-state policies for the workers and help them out of their traditional 
informal work mode. 
 
Gilbert (1994, p. 57-75) argued that the absence of the welfare state (in Latin 
American context) is forcing people to participate in the informal sector either at a low 
or higher skilled level. Due to rapid industrialisation and urbanisation too many people 
became involved in low productivity economic activities, a process identified as 
“tertiarisation” (p. 60) or remained unemployed. Their effort to earn a living had to 
inevitably include informal economic activities. The state did not manage to intervene 
adequately providing support and achieving a more balanced development process in 
order to catch up. This implies that the informal entrepreneurs are a phenomenon 
supposed to disappear in developed economies. It is well known that the level of 
informality is comparatively lower, but they still exist. The informal economy and 
entrepreneurship (Dickerson, 2010; Jütting & De Laiglesia, 2009; Minard, 2009) are 
expanding and developing diverse forms in many countries. Evidently, the 
modernisation perspective is inadequate to explain the growth of informality, so other 
theorisations need to be considered. 
 
 
2.3.2 Structuralist perspective. 
 
This is the first school of thought to recognise that the informal sector and 
entrepreneurship are fostering and expanding in the conditions of open unregulated 
economy. While the structuralists perceive the informal entrepreneurs as insecure, 
low paid and reliant self-employed, they appreciate that there is a realistic and 
dynamic interdependence of the formal and informal sector. The informal workers are 
viewed as “survival experts” and “survivalist entrepreneurs” (Gallin, 2001, p. 531-532; 
Valenzuela, 2001, p. 349). The accumulation of economic wealth in the capitalist 
organisation of production leads to a level of informality through the demand for 
labour. Consequentially, that creates survival and choices’ necessities for certain 
workers forced to become part of the informal economy in order to sustain a living or 
to pursue their values. 
 
 
2.3.3 Neo-liberal perspective. 
 
The neo-liberal perspective interprets the growth of informality in the light of 
burdensome and expensive bureaucratic framework of existence for entrepreneurs 
and their logical wish to exit the over-regulated economy. In reasoning that, De Soto 
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(1989, p. 131-177) argued the concepts for costs of formality and informality. 
Through an experiment of actual business settlement, fulfilling all legal requirements, 
the author demonstrated that an individual’s access to a small formal industry is 
prohibitively high. Further evidence is presented to support that informal 
entrepreneurs are choosing informality to reduce oppressive administrative 
regulations and the associated time and effort (Small Business Council, 2004, p. 35). 
Perry and Maloney (2007, p. 2) based on Hirschman, 1970, developed a cost-benefit 
analysis with bi-directional perspective to explain attitudes towards 
formalisation/informalisation. They come to the conclusion that firms and individuals 
undertake careful cost-benefit analysis to decide which mode is worthwhile and to 
what extent. The neo-liberal prism, which emphasises the economic rationale, is 
highly relevant to transition economies (like the Bulgarian one). 
 
 
2.3.4 Post-structuralist perspective. 
 
Until recently, the scholars interested in the growth of informal entrepreneurship were 
presented with the choice between the first three theories (Williams, Nadin & Rodgers, 
2012b, p. 7). However, a better understanding of the entrepreneur’s existence in the 
increasingly complex social environment has led to the development of the post-
structuralist perspective. Some of the properties of this explanation are that informal 
entrepreneurship is exercised for: closer relationships, more for social reasons than 
for financial profit (Round, Williams & Rodgers, 2008; Williams, 2004), as a response 
and resistance to exploitation (Kudva, 2009) or new individual and identity motivations 
(Snyder, 2004). Some later contributions (Evans, Syrett & Williams, 2006; Williams & 
Nadin, 2010a) pursued a more advanced and integrative approach. It has been 
identified (Williams et al., 2010a, p. 361) that “different theorisations of informal 
entrepreneurship apply more in some populations than others”. In their future 
development the post-structuralist theorisations will need to account not only for the 
more refined economic and social stratification, but for the micro motives of the 
informal entrepreneurs in that regard. 
 
Some authors began to recognise that integration of entrepreneurship theorisations 
will reflect the reality better and that structuralist explanation might apply to relatively 
deprived entrepreneurs while enterprise leaning theorisations would describe more 
affluent groups (Evans et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2010a, p. 350-355). Williams et al. 
(2012b, p. 8) acknowledged that there is no explicit evaluation of the validity of these 
competing theorisations. The authors filled that gap proposing a typology of informal 
entrepreneurship that joins together the contrasting theorisations. Most importantly 
however one entrepreneurship’s theorisation would not remain static – the 
entrepreneur’s rationale changes over time (p. 16). It could be argued that the 
Bulgarian informal entrepreneurs in early stages possess survivalist characteristics 
from a structuralist perspective. As they become more established, the cost-benefit 
analysis (from neo-liberal perspective) dominates their level of informality. 
 
 
 Institutional asymmetry as a contemporary explanatory theory. 2.4
 
Despite the existence of extensive theoretical literature, until recently the institutional 
theory on tax evasion have neglected studying empirically the interdependence of 
formal and informal institutions (Gërxhani, 2004b, p. 741) in that regard. See (Williams 
et al., 2015a; Williams et al., 2015d) for some later notable exceptions. The economic 
and particularly economic psychology literature has recognised in the recent past the 
lack of sufficient research for the effects of socio-economic environments on tax 
evasive decisions (Cowell, 1992, p. 522): “In particular, it neglects the possibility that 
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people’s participation in evasion may be driven by their perceptions of injustices or 
inequities in the tax system, or inequity in the system of economic rewards on which 
the tax system has been based.” Some of the constructs of contemporary institutional 
asymmetry explanations of informal economies rely on concepts described by the 
theory of optimal tax evasion behaviour (Benjamini & Maital, Gaertner W and Wenig A, 
1985). Where the two central aspects to individuals’ decision to evade taxes are the 
subjective probability bias and perception of other people’s behaviour. 
 
Criticising the capability of optimal taxation theories to explain the decision to evade 
due to the lack of empirical support, Gërxhani (2004a, p. 288) draws attention to the 
explanatory importance of public choice theory where “all agents involved are 
assumed to be rational utility maximizers”. The supporters of this school of thought 
come to the conclusion that individual evasion is higher the bigger the difference is 
between the expected public goods’ provision and the actual one. Investigating tax 
evasion in a transition from socialism to capitalism Vihanto (2000) asserts the view of 
inherently disturbed social contract, which is consequential to the fundamental 
conflict “with the common opinion and interests of the people leaving extensive 
distrust of the government”. Therefore, the status of institutional asymmetry is argued 
to be guaranteed by default in transition economies, which logically leads to 
significant evasion. This study builds upon previous findings in the area of how 
institutional environment influences the development of entrepreneurship in its formal 
and informal forms (Williams et al., 2014d) and advances a new methodological 
approach for measuring, predicting and tackling tax evasion. 
 
Moving onto the definition of formal and informal institutions, Helmke et al. (2004, p. 
727) description is selected as the most applicable to this study: 
"informal institutions as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. By contrast, 
formal institutions are rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and 
enforced through channels widely accepted as official. This includes state 
institutions..." Therefore, institutional asymmetry meaning is to be understood as “the 
misalignment between formal and informal institutions” (Williams et al., 2014d, p. 2). 
 
In consideration of the intrinsic circularity (Casson, Della Giusta & Kambhampati, 
2010) between institutions’ quality and economic development, it is obvious that in 
many instances the informal rules supersede the formal ones in terms of coping 
strategies. The less advanced an economy is the more likely informal norms would be 
superior to behavioural compliance with the formal institutional framework. Taking the 
case of Bulgaria as an example, since the move to market economy after the 
communist regime fell, a great effort was invested in advancing the formal institutions, 
but as argued by Williams et al. (2014d, p. 2) the reform of informal institutions has 
lagged behind. This process deepened the institutional asymmetry while major socio-
economic indicators were deteriorating, thus making economic survival a challenge 
both in entrepreneurial and employment perspective. As a result, the choice of 
whether to comply with formal rules became non-existent for the majority of economic 
actors as their informal practices presented the only viable alternative. Adopting the 
institutional asymmetry explanatory theory, this study hypothesises that entrepreneurs 
in transition setting adopt fairly rational economic decision approach in their informal 
strategies. IAP's advantageous holistic appraisal capacity, in comparison with previous 
theories, poses specific empirical challenges from research perspective. Indeed, that 
is to discover and measure empirically intangible phenomena, which relate to social 
actors and enterprises involved in illicit economic activities. This thesis contributes to 
the developing literature debates in that regard, through operationalisation and 
investigation of the main concepts underpinning what appear to be a distinctively 
visible institutional asymmetry in a transition setting. 
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Having reviewed the key theorisations of informality, the next sections will critically 
appraise the socio-economic significance of informality and tackling policies. The 
direct and indirect measurement methods for estimating shadow economies’ sizes will 
be discussed, evaluating their strength and weaknesses. In order to provide clarity 
about the business environment into which informal entrepreneurs operate, the most 
important socio-economic indicators, characterising the Bulgarian research context 
will be then discussed. This is necessary to put into perspective their choice of 
particular informal strategies and suggest appropriate tackling policy response. 
 
 
 Socio-economic significance of informality and tackling policies. 2.5
 
It is widely accepted that informal economy is not only a widespread phenomenon and 
growing relative to the formal sector in emerging markets, but also in Western 
societies (Thai & Turkina, 2013, p. 14). Almost two thirds (1.8 billion) from all 3 billion 
workers in the world are informal (Jütting & Laiglesia, 2009, p.17-26), while informal 
commercial activities account for an estimated 30% of economic activity around the 
world (Thai et al., 2013). From a more regional perspective, the cumulative informal 
economy share amongst EU countries in recent years is estimated to be 
approximately 20% from their GDP by MIMIC method (see Figure 3). This section 
offers a critical appraisal of the policy approaches used to deal with informality. 
 
2.5.1 Wider economic and societal significance of informality. 
 
In the light of the reported facts, the economic impact of shadow economies across 
the world is therefore clearly significant in terms of loss of tax and associated public 
goods and services. There is convincing empirical evidence that higher informality is 
recognised to increase income inequality, lower average GDP growth and reduce 
international trade (ILO et al., 2009, p. 88). Larger informal economies tend to have 
self-perpetuating nature due to their degenerative effects on social cohesion, 
procedural fairness and distributive justice. One of the problematic circularity effects 
is that the individual cost of being honest in a corrupt society becomes significantly 
higher in comparison with societies where most individuals are honest (Andvig et al., 
1990). As it will be revealed in the case of Bulgaria, the relatively low OISC, horizontal 
and vertical trust between economic actors and the state, fuels even greater tax 
evasion and the so called informal chains of interdependence. 
 
Evidently, the problems of informality are reaching out to the fundamental constructs 
of the public contract within societies and hence the necessity to appraise them 
accordingly in a holistic way. Unsurprisingly, economic psychology literature 
increasingly recognises the significance of social variables such as procedural 
fairness and distributive justice on tax compliance behaviour (Van Dijke & Verboon, 
2010). Logically, the vast majority of tax compliance studies evaluating procedural 
fairness issues includes aspects of distributive justice (Hartner, Rechberger, Kirchler 
& Schabmann, 2008, p. 138), because the two concepts are closely related. While in 
earlier studies, procedural fairness has been appraised from authoritative and 
citizens’ decision making perspective (Tyler, 1988), later studies included the group 
value model of procedural justice and the relational model of authority (Hartner et al., 
2008, p. 139). In the context of this study, procedural fairness refers to the extent to 
which people believe that they are paying their fair share compared with others and 
receive fair treatment by institutions (Williams, 2014c, p. 26). Distributive justice refers 
to the feeling that everyone pays their fair share of taxes (not too much or too little), 
simultaneously exercising equal access to publicly funded resources (Verboon & van 
Dijke, 2007). Therefore, it is important to investigate whether institutional practices 
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disturb the social feeling for procedural fairness and distributive justice, henceforth 
increasing the institutional asymmetry, and informality accordingly. 
 
Understandably, governments across the world have strong incentives to tackle their 
informal economies in an attempt to foster economic development and international 
competitiveness. It is however, important to recognise that informal economies are 
multi-faceted socio-economic structures, with a level of systemic dynamism and 
cultural embeddedness. There is an increasing body of scholars appreciating the 
intense relationship between formal and informal activities and the fact that “informal 
economic activity in general remains an important and growing element of 




2.5.2 Policy approaches to informality. 
 
One of the biggest obstacles in tackling the informal economy has often been the fact 
that it was being “conceptually framed as a “tame” problem (i.e. a problem that is 
complicated but easily solvable, often with a discrete response that can be replicated 
anywhere)” (Williams, 2014c, p. 3). Governments tend to underestimate how 
sophisticated this socio-economic phenomenon is and to appraise the full scale of 
micro and macro participatory motivations. This is so, due to the lack of regular 
deployment of appropriate empirical inquiries seeking to establish what a country’s 
specific root causes of informality are. Although, contemporary academic literature 
accumulated sufficient evidence in recent years to support informed and effective 
policy response in most countries, it is usually unpopular or difficult to utilise by 
government officials at a policy making level. This study aims to contribute in this 
respect via a novel way of analytical tools’ deployment in an accessible and easier to 
understand way. 
 
It has been already argued that the best way in defining the informal economy and 
entrepreneurship within it, is to employ a modular principle, depending on a widely 
accepted definition, which is then fine-tuned to reflect a particular country specific 
context. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, to enable an accurate and 
exhaustive definition of the various informal economies, which tend to differ 
substantially across national borders by their nature of existence. Secondly, to enable 
appropriate design of tackling policy measures. Development of adequate policy 
approaches therefore is subservient on precise definition and comprehensive 
understanding of the root causes of informality at a national level. One of the aims of 
this thesis is exactly that – to suggest effective tackling policy solutions against typical 
informal economy from a transition setting (namely Bulgaria). In order to cultivate the 
theoretical argument, a review of the various options available to policy makers should 
be firstly carried out. 
 
Williams (2014a; 2014c) created a typology framework of policy measures arguing 
that a paradigmatic shift is required to achieve the desired effects in tackling the root 
causes of shadow economies. In accordance with the conceptual framework, policy 
approaches could be direct or indirect ones. The so called direct controls are of two 
types: deterrents (“sticks”) and incentives (“carrots”). For instance, such policy 
measures are data matching and sharing, increasing sanctions, advertising penalties, 
simplify compliance, direct and indirect tax incentives, supply chain responsibility, 
support and advice to start-ups, supply-side incentives e.g., society-wide amnesties, 
voluntary disclosure, smoothing transition to formalization. The indirect controls are 
directed towards change of formal institutions (laws, regulations and codes) and 
informal ones (values, norms and beliefs) with the aim to reduce the institutional 
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incongruence. This way, decreasing the share of the informal economy. Typical policy 
initiatives from this type are aimed at tax education, normative appeals, awareness 
raising of benefits of declared work, procedural fairness and justice, redistributive 
justice, wider economic and social developments. From the perspective of the policy 
maker there are four hypothetical policy choices (Williams, 2014a, p. 65) – doing 
nothing, deregulating the declared economy, eradicating the shadow economy and 




Policy makers could potentially choose to do nothing against the informal economy. 
One of the possible rationales for adopting this approach is that a shadow economy is 
simply relatively small and cost-benefit analysis indicates unfavourable return to 
expensive institutional and policy interventions. However, there is no clear evidence 
what share of informal economy is relatively small in order to offset the financial 
rationale of seeking to increase otherwise lost tax revenue as a result of tackling 
policy efforts. To a certain extent informality could assist entrepreneurship in its early 
start-up phase (Andrews et al., 2011) and thus nurture enterprise development. 
However, at the same time leaving the informal sector to flourish creates unfair 
competition to legitimate businesses while making employment conditions worse and 
leaving consumers’ rights exposed unprotected. Adopting the “do nothing” approach is 
therefore socially and economically unacceptable. Such policy attitude could be 
justifiably engaged towards micro enterprises and the small scale paid favours’ sector 
which is “arguably a source of active citizenship in contemporary monetized market 
societies” (Williams, 2014a, p. 66). 
 
 
De-regulating the formal economy 
 
De-regulating the formal economy as a policy approach option rests on the neo-liberal 
theorisations of informality. Indeed that the growth of informality is due to burdensome 
and expensive bureaucratic framework, which increases the cost of formal economic 
activities. As argued by De Soto (1989, p. 131-177) individual entrepreneurial access 
to a small formal industry could be prohibitively high and therefore push economic 
actors to informality. There is evidence that informal entrepreneurs are choosing 
informality to reduce oppressive administrative regulations and the associated time 
and effort (Small Business Council, 2004, p. 35) and that easing the processes will 
enable formalisation. Another aspect of informalisation processes due to perceived 
high cost of formal economic activities is the pressure towards the use of the so 
called envelope wages. This is quite popular practice in transition economies where 
some employers offset the high costs of doing business according to the rules via 
underreporting the real remuneration in their firms and therefore materialise savings. 
An employee may receive an official salary and an additional sum (“paid in an 
envelope”). This leaves room for the employer to pay only partial social contributions 
on the basis of the reported official salary. 
 
De-regulating the formal economy could have positive economic impact in terms of 
reducing the cost of doing business in multiple aspects and as such might reduce 
informalisation while encouraging formalisation. However, it has to be accounted that 
the significance of regulations for informalisation decisions is different in different 
economies. For instance the importance of taxes, regulations and financial 
constraints to informalisation decisions in developing countries is reduced in 
comparison to the crucially important quality of legal systems (Dabla-Norris, Gradstein 
& Inchauste, 2008). Therefore, the wider socio-economic gains from deregulating the 
formal economy could be questionable when taking into consideration the negative 
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effects on employment relations in terms of working conditions and fair remuneration. 
If reducing the tax rates is considered as one possible deregulatory measure, there is 
evidence suggesting no significant association between tax rates and the extent of 
unofficial activity in Eastern Europe (Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan & Woodruff, 
2000). It could be argued that deregulating as a policy option would be more 
beneficial in tackling shadow activities in economies with higher costs of doing 
business. Such policy choice should be always carefully appraised in terms of its 
impact on levelling down the working conditions and utilised with complimentary 
measures to reduce such negative side effects. 
 
 
Eradicating the shadow economy 
 
This option looks attractive from a government perspective particularly when taking 
into consideration potential benefits in tackling the well-known negative effects of 
informality. However, one practical problem exists (Williams, 2014a, pp.69-70) relating 
to the fact that beyond a certain point the cost of eradication may far outweigh the 
benefits of doing so. In addition, as already discussed, it must be considered that 
small share of informal economy acts as an entrepreneurial incubator environment 
and thus has positive economic effects. What share of informal economy would be 
economically useful to a given society is currently unclear. Arguably, that would be 
correlated to the development level – the more advanced an economy is the smaller 
share of informality would be beneficial. Pursuing an eradication strategy from formal 
institutional perspective is traditionally perceived via the utilisation of deterrence 
policy measures. However, there is convincing literature evidence (Hofmann, Hoelzl & 
Kirchler, 2008; Van Dijke et al., 2010) suggesting that direct tax compliance 
enforcement through increased penalties and audits is less effective than cultivating 
dynamics of mutual trust between the state and the taxpayers. 
 
To evaluate what is the predominant mix of policy measures being used in Europe, a 
review of EUROFOUND (knowledge bank of policy measures against informal 
practices) has been conducted. The general policy imperative becomes clearly visible 
– indeed that EU governments use primarily direct control policies (deterrents and 
incentives) and rarely rely on indirect controls (changing formal and informal 
institutions). It is obvious, that the preferred tackling approach against non-compliant 
economic behaviour is still firmly deterrence and punitively grounded. At the same 
time, several EU economies are still facing larger shares of informality than 
economically viable (see Figure 2 and Figure 4). EUROFOUND was created by 
Professor Colin Williams (with Regioplan) and consists of 186 policy initiatives from 33 
countries including all EU member states. This is the only source of ‘good practice’ 
policy measures available to governments throughout the world and as such is also a 
very good source for analysis of policy makers’ attitudes towards tackling informality. 
Appendix 37 presents detailed classification of all policies by type and target with a 
summary of conclusions. 
 
Given the discussion of facts above, an eradication policy approach should not be 
employed alone as the ultimate solution to informal economy phenomena. On the 
other hand, it could be successfully utilised as part of a more holistic answer – such 
as one, which combines direct and indirect policy measures in a responsive way. 
 
 
Moving the shadow economy into the declared economy 
 
While moving the shadow economy into the declared economy is theoretically 
possible, it should be noted that practically (after a certain point) it could be only 
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partially achieved via securing a great level of voluntary compliance. There are 
several justifications to invest institutional efforts into such direction and their dualistic 
nature could be reviewed from the perspective of the benefit or detriment caused. 
 
From a business perspective, an immediate benefit to fully compliant enterprises 
would be the reduction of unfair competition. At the same time, ex semi of fully 
informal firms would benefit from their formalisation in terms of not having to pay the 
real costs of informality. Such as lack of access to bank credit, proper marketing 
channels, commercial enforcement of contracts. Obviously, previously evaded taxes 
would be payable in order to access the privileges of fully compliant business. Quite 
often smaller, fully or partly informal firms absorb higher costs of informality without 
knowing it – in fact greater than the costs of full compliance. Formalisation would 
benefit those formerly providing they labour in the undeclared economy. Employees 
who have been receiving supplementary “envelope wages” could see them converted 
to fully paid social security contributions in addition to an increased industrial 
protection and working rights. At the same time, full conversion of the shadow 
economy into the declared economy will eliminate the entrepreneurial testing 
environment for start-ups and could lead to a reduced entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Another perspective is this of the customers of products and services of informal 
economies. Inevitably, they would be deprived from the ability to consume lower 
priced goods and services as the full cost of legitimate production must be paid. 
However, consumer rights would be significantly improved in terms of quality, 
guarantees, standards of service and adherence to commercial contracts with 
potential for appropriate enforcement. 
 
Governments’ rationales for converting the informal economy into the declared one 
are multifarious. Most obviously, it would improve revenue (Evans et al., 2006) and 
thus enable social integration and mobility to be pursued (Williams & Windebank, 
1998). There would be an increase in provision of jobs, which are easier to control in 
terms of work conditions. However, governments would need to invest more into 
entrepreneurship start-up schemes to compensate for the lack of a test bed, which 




Towards a mixed approach 
 
As argued by Williams (2014c) the current debate is not so much over whether to use 
direct or indirect controls to tackle informal economies, but rather which specific 
policy measures are most effective and in what combination. Shifting shadow 
economy into the declared economy is indeed the most viable approach and it should 
be achieved via overarching strategy combining “responsive regulation approach” with 
the “slippery slope framework” (Williams, 2014a). The policy focus should be firstly on 
the use of indirect policy controls to induce compliance in a voluntarily and engaging 
manner. Only when this does not work, resorting to incentives, followed lastly by 
deterrents should be employed. 
Synergies of potentially effective policy mixes would need to be customised in regards 
with any target country context. A key prerequisite to achieve success is the ability to 
investigate and diagnose the various motivations of the socio-economic actors in any 
given society. This thesis advances a qualitatively new methodology to acquire and 
appraise specifically entrepreneurial rationales for operating in the informal economy. 
The suggested analytical techniques offer the so called reverse predictive probability 
to diagnose informality with the associated motivations and could be utilised by formal 
institutions, policy makers and scholars interested in the field. 
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 Methods estimating the size of the shadow economy. 2.6
 
Different economies have diverse structures of their shadow economies and require 
appropriate measurement methods accordingly. Estimating the real size of a shadow 
economy has implications about what policy responses should be utilised. Moreover, 
measurements could provide answer to the question about cost of informality, but this 
time from the perspective of the society, not the entrepreneur. Large informal 
economies pose comparatively much more complex challenges to tackle beyond their 
existence and impact on the relevant economic domains – such as deep institutional 
asymmetries and low levels of social cohesion. The self-perpetuating nature of such 
big informal economies also changes the motivations at a wider societal level for 
participation including the processes of informalisation and formalisation. For that 
reason, studying the various motivations of partly informal entrepreneurship should be 
undertaken with close attention to the magnitude of a given informal economy size. 
While this study does not aim to measure the size of the Bulgarian informal economy 
directly, its quantitative empirical instrument has an embedded capability to do so 
amongst the small and medium sized businesses. It demonstrates a significant 
difference between what contemporary macro-measurement approaches report and 
the latest findings derived here. Therefore, it is important to outline the main macro-
economic estimation methods and later on appraise the value of the suggested micro-
economic method. 
 
There are inherent difficulties, which emerge from the fact that it is problematic to 
measure what is being hidden by the participants. Schneider (2005) made a 
significant contribution to the discussion of various measurement methodologies. He 
generalised that there are three main groups of methods: direct, indirect approaches 
and the model approach. The purpose of this section of the thesis is to provide details 
about the different estimation methods, their advantages, disadvantages and relevant 
critique. It is important to note that the different measurement methods and in 




2.6.1 Direct approaches. 
 
In general, the direct approaches are micro-economic approaches, which “employ 
either well designed surveys and samples based on voluntary replies or tax auditing 
and other compliance methods” (Schneider, 2005, p. 619). Surveys with different level 
of representativeness are used in various countries to estimate the size and 
involvement in the shadow economies. Isachsen and Strom (1985) have extensively 
used the survey method and found that is extremely difficult to arrive at a precise and 
reliable estimate of the shadow activities not only in Norway, although they had 70% 
participation rate. Direct survey methods should always employ a particular 
questionnaire strategy, which accounts for the regional and cultural characteristics of 
the respondents. For instance, the concealment level in Eastern Europe is quite higher 
and thus the questions should be more indirect. 
 
Another way of producing estimates of the hidden economy is via comparison of the 
declared income for tax purposes and that captured through selective tax audits. The 
discrepancy will be indicative for the size of the hidden economy. However, there are 
specific weaknesses, which need to be accounted for. As noted by (Schneider, 2005, 
p. 620) this method could employ possibly biased sample from the population. 
 
A mutual weakness of the described direct approaches is that they lead to estimation 
of only part of the shadow activities, which then should be extrapolated to the entire 
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population. But their narrowness also provides capability for detailed stratification of 
the different hidden activities. In summary, all micro measurement methods are 
methodologically pre-disposed to exhibit substantial errors, but if designed and 
deployed correctly could also achieve good veracity. 
 
 
2.6.2 Indirect approaches 
 
The indirect approaches are based on macro-economic and other indicators, which 
reflect the development of the hidden economy. Currently there are 5 widely 
recognised approaches which are also called indicators (Schneider, 2005; Schneider 
& Enste, 2000). Over the next paragraphs these macro-economic approaches will be 
discussed with their advantages and disadvantages. 
 
2.6.2.1 The discrepancy between national expenditure and income statistics. 
 
In principle, there should be parity between the national income (GNP) and the 
national expenditure part of GNP, but this is not so in practice. This gap could be used 
as a measure of the informal sector. However there is tendency that the national 
accounts will be statistically adjusted as suggested by Feige (1989, p. 30), so the 
discrepancy would appear smaller than it is in reality. The national accounts’ 
managers will also inevitably embed a standard error in the calculations due to their 
general complexity and inability to account for everything in a balanced way. This 
would cause an additional deviation. Therefore, it is suggested that the first estimate 
is taken as the most accurate representation of the informal economy size 
(Schneider, 2005, p. 620). It could be argued that more developed economies have 
systems for more precise calculations of the both sides of the GNP equation – the 
expenditure and the income. That provides advantages for the application of this 
approach in developed compared to developing economies. 
 
 
2.6.2.2 The discrepancy between the officially registered and actual labour force. 
 
This is quite self-explanatory macro approach in terms of measuring the spread 
between officially registered work force in the formal economy and its potential 
outflow. However, any economy could have decline in the formal work opportunities 
due to other economic dynamics, but not only limited to an increasing informal sector. 
For instance, the officially registered workers are those reported by companies to be 
part time or full time workers. The actual labour force is consisted of all social actors 
free of health related work impairments and those who are temporarily disabled to 
work with legitimate health reasons. Both numbers (officially registered workers and 
actual labour force) could be usually obtained through the offices for national 
statistics or commercially licensed companies, which sell such information. In cases 
where an outflow from the officially registered work force is observed, without relevant 
demographic reasons, it could be argued that this is in favour of informal workers ’ 
increase. 
 
Using this method, Contini (1981) proposed a definitional equation, which employs 
some simplifying assumptions about the Italian labour market in order to compensate 
for the inherited methodological weaknesses. A good example of the method in 
American context is presented by O'Neill (1983) who attempted to measure the 
unregistered underground employment and concluded that the US underground 
unemployment is actually less than what other researchers implied. Nastav and 
Bojnec (2007) discovered that the shadow economy that relates only to 
unemployment discrepancies in Slovenia amounts on average to around 6 % of the 
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official economy. Simultaneously, a more detailed activity-level unemployment 
analysis gives much higher values of up to 20%. Therefore, the authors conclude that 
this approach should not be used for policy development. Another disadvantage of 
this method (Schneider, 2005, p. 621) is the ability of workers to have a formal job and 
be involved in informal activities as a second complementary part time job. Therefore, 
the labour discrepancy approach should be considered with particular care in the 
context of its flaws. In countries similar to Bulgaria, with particularly well developed 
envelope wages culture and only partial registration of employment contracts, the 
applicability of this method would be very limited. 
 
This is so, because we can actually talk about the share of the formal economy and 
not the other way round (see the findings and discussion of findings). This rare 
phenomenon amongst EU member states in combination with the methodological 




2.6.2.3 The transactions approach. 
 
This method was best developed by Feige (1996). Intriguingly Schneider (2005, p. 
621) argued that the approach is based on the well-known Fisherian equation: 
M*V=p*T (with M money, V velocity, p prices, and T total transactions). However, 
upon closer examination of Feige’s work, I have failed to find any use of that equation. 
Feige has built his hypothesis from empirical evidence looking at the US underground 
economy. In the centre of the approach is a puzzling macroeconomic anomaly called 
“currency enigma”, which consists of a stock and flow component. In general, there is 
missing currency, which in the case of US is 300 billion dollars. Feige’s core argument 
to that approach is that bigger proportion of that missing (not in banks) currency is 
held abroad for transaction purposes, but the other part is kept domestically and is 
being used to pay for underground economic activities. Estimating the domestic 
currency component will result in estimation of the shadow economy size. There are 
two sub-methods suggested to calculate the currency proportions held domestically 
and abroad: the monetary demographic model and note ratio model. Without going 
into greater detail suffice it to say that the transaction approach needs to employ 
significant number of assumptions in order deploy its reverse logic and arrive at an 
estimate. That results in extremely high empirical requirement should we want to 
reduce the number of assumptions or make them less significant. The use of the 
approach in practice should account for those characteristics. 
 
Thomas (1999, p. 382) provided detailed criticism based on the fact that the approach 
rests on three “heroic assumptions”: “First, a year (or quarter, depending on the 
available data!) must be identified in which the black economy did not exist. Secondly, 
transactions in the black economy are carried out exclusively using cash. Finally, the 
velocity of circulation of cash is the same in both the nonblack and black economies.” 
Rejecting these assumptions Thomas quoted Windebank and Williams (1997) who 




2.6.2.4 The currency demand approach. 
 
The currency demand approach was firstly used by Cagan (1958) to evaluate the 
shadow economy. His concept emerges from the well-known public demand for 
currency (cash) as a relative function to the total money supply. This results in a 
currency ratio into whose behaviour and determinants Cagan was interested. A key 
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element of the concept (from informal perspective) is the variable rate of tax and its 
effects on transactions and in particular the proportional correlation with 
cash/currency demand – the higher the income tax is the higher demand for currency 
would be, which consequentially results in lower currency ratio. The financial 
institutions like banks will be left with smaller supply of currency in relation to the total 
supply of money. Providing that the tax rate is only one variable affecting the currency 
ratio, it becomes questionable what part of the increased demand for cash is caused 
by unregistered businesses activities. As Cagan reflected, such an estimate could be 
subject to a considerable error. 
Nineteen years later Gutmann (1977) used the same approach, but without statistical 
verification. His logic is based on the composition of the stock of money. As one 
economy is more developed, more transactions are executed intangibly without the 
exchange of real paper money, which means that the “demand deposits” outgrows the 
necessity for currency. Again, the discrepancy could illustrate the underground 
economy size. However, this leads to questions about applicability of this 
measurement method to traditionally more cash orientated economies. For instance, 
the Bulgarian SMEs are known to use predominantly cash payments where velocity of 
exchange is important for the limited cash flow potential of those micro and small 
enterprises. It could be argued that the bigger the cash aspect of an economy is the 
more influenced the measurement results would be. 
Tanzi (1983) made significant improvements of Cogan’s approach further into a multi-
variable equation, but it does not seem that he has fully acknowledged Cogan’s 
contribution. Tanzi claimed that he has provided estimates for the US during 1930-80 
using a method developed by himself (p. 283): “Briefly, as the level of taxation rises, 
individuals are encouraged to engage in tax-evading activities that are facilitated by 
the use of currency, as this practice leaves no traces; therefore, the use of currency 
rises” (p. 290). Intriguingly, there is a fierce critique of Tanzi’s approach by (Feige, 
1986), which could be traced to Tanzi’s reply to Feige, Thomas and Zilberfarb (Tanzi, 
1986). In principle, Feige states that Tanzi failed to “state clearly precisely what he 
sets out to measure, and finds fault with several of the assumptions that underlie his 
procedure” (p. 768). 
 
One of the main assumptions of the currency demand approach typical for all authors 
is that the unrecorded transactions are executed exclusively with cash. As we have 
already seen above, Windebank and Williams (1997) presented evidence against that. 
However that seems to be one of the most commonly used approaches, which has 
been applied to many OECD countries (Schneider, 2005, p. 622). 
 
 
2.6.2.5 The electricity consumption method. 
 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) developed and tested the macro-electric approach in 
post socialist economies and in particular Ukraine. This method rests on the 
assumption that official GDP is good measure of the formal economy output since 
informal economy has remained unaccounted for by official statistics. Empirical 
evidence from across the world is available that electricity consumption is in straight 
correlation with the increase of GDP with elasticity close to one. Electrical 
consumption growth represents economy growth (formal and informal). However, 
some informal activities require less electrical power and thus even their significant 
increase will have only marginal effect. In summary, this is an attractive method 
providing it could be estimated what bias the unit elasticity would impose on the 
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2.6.3 The model approach and discussion. 
 
As we have seen all measurement methods concentrate on a single indicator or 
correlation to capture the scale of the hidden economy. But the shadow economies 
affect labour recourses, production potential and money/cash flows simultaneously. 
The amount of taxation as a problem is taken as a predominant cause with bigger 
weight than other typical causes. This creates the necessity for completely different 
measurement viewpoint, which in turn could generate different and more adequate 
approaches. 
 
To address some of those issues Frey, Weck and Pommerehne (1982) developed the 
so called “soft modelling” approach based on Kofler and Menges’ (1976) 
mathematical theory (Limited Probability Information). The strength of the approach is 
in the ability to give appropriate weights (rankings) to the different contributing factors 
and hence adjust the model to a particular economy. With no earlier traces from the 
literature, it appears that in one of their later papers, Frey and Weck-Hanneman 
(1984) have been the first to analyse the size of hidden economies as an 
“unobservable variable”. They have proposed radically different approach emerging 
from the “statistical theory of unobserved variables which considers multiple causes 
and multiple indicators of the phenomenon to be measured” (p. 35). Following Frey 
and Weck-Hanneman’s seminal work, Dell’Anno (2003) applied the Multiple Indicators 
and Multiple Causes (MIMIC) on the Italian economy. The model is able to estimate 
the size of the shadow economy (as a latent variable) based on a number of 




The figure is reproduced exactly as it is from Dell’Anno (2003, p. 8). 
 
To summarise, it is argued that the micro-economic approaches are more locally 
sensitive in terms of questionnaire design and sampling. Direct questionnaire design 
should be used with care since it might greatly affect the quality and quantity of 
captured information. It should be accounted for cultural characteristic of the general 
population where the micro approaches are deployed. It becomes evident that using a 
carefully designed business survey (i.e. micro-economic approach) the potential to 
derive a more realistic evaluation of the shadow economy is greatly enhanced. This 
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thesis presents evidence (see discussion of findings) that the actual share of the 
Bulgarian informal economy is significantly bigger than what current macro-economic 
measurements report. The macro-economic approaches tend to rest on multiple 
assumptions, which are either very broad or very difficult to be verified empirically. But 
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Chapter Three 
 
3. The Bulgarian informal economy. 
 
This chapter is opening the discussion with some highly disturbing figures and 
comparisons from Bulgarian perspective. It aims to provide the reader with the major 
socio-economic indicators characterising the research context. Highlighting the 
following important aspects of the economic environment is necessary to establish 
grounds for the discussion of findings. In particular, how entrepreneurs chose their 
informal strategies given the social and business setting in which they operate and 
what the policy response should be. As we can see from Figure 2 and 3 (on the next 
page) the following conclusion could be made: 
 
 In comparison with 27 European countries, Bulgaria has the highest share of 
informal economy as a percentage from its GDP. The estimation is done by the 
MIMIC method and shows that the Bulgarian shadow economy is 31.20% from 
GDP in 2013 (Figure 2). 
 
 The Bulgarian shadow economy is well above the 27 European countries’ 
averages for all years in 2003-2013 term (Figure 3). It is 1.6 times higher in 
2002 and 1.7 higher in 2013. 
 
 For a 10 years period (2003-2013) the share of the Bulgarian hidden economy 
dropped only with 4.7 points (35.90%-31.2%, Figure 2). 
 
 A decrease of the informal economy is observed from 2003 to 2013 for all 
countries, but for most of them, it is negligible (Figure 2). 
 
 As Schneider (2012, p. 2) report “we have an increase of the size of the 
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 Socio-economic facts, figures and trends. 3.1
 
Figure 2: Size of the shadow economies of 27 European Countries over 2002 – 
2013 in % of GDP by MIMIC. 
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Figure 3: The Bulgarian informal economy in comparison with 27 EU countries' 
averages – % of GDP by MIMIC method. 
Note: This figure is produced by the author based on data from Schneider (2012); (Schneider, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 4: Simple correlation between shadow economy size and overall index of 
social cohesion. 
Note: This figure is produced by the author based on data from Schneider (2013) for the shadow 
economies’ sizes and data from Dragolov, Ignácz, Lorenz, Delhey and Boehnke (2013) for the overall 
index of social cohesion. 
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Some very intriguing results are presented in Figure 4. It embodies a simple 
correlation between shadow economy size and overall index of social cohesion 
(OISC). The correlation is developed based on data from Schneider (2013) and a very 
topical study by foundation Bertelsmann Stiftung (Dragolov et al., 2013). The authors 
developed a definition of social cohesion to measure a quality of society comprised of 
nine dimensions: “A focus on the common good manifests itself in the level of 
solidarity and helpfulness, people’s willingness to abide by social rules and the extent 
to which they participate in society” (p. 13). The nine dimensions have been measured 
by 58 indicators and are sub-entities of 3 top level spheres: Social relations, Focus on 
the common good and Connectedness. Dragolov et al. (2013) conducted a 
comprehensive international study, which lead to development of overall social 
cohesion indices for the EU and Western OECD countries. 
 
For the analytical purpose of Figure 4 only 27 EU countries with their social cohesion 
indices are selected to correlate with the data on their shadow economies. Dragolov 
et al. (2013) used coloured ranking scheme in their work for each country, but for the 
purpose of building the functional analysis and graphical representation this needed 
numerical codification. The X-axis shows the values of the overall social cohesion 
index, where 1 represents the highest value and 5 the lowest social cohesion. The 
values on the X-axis are in inverted order – the higher the number the lower the value. 
The 0 and 5.5 values are outside of the used measurement (which is 1 to 5) and have 
only illustrative role. The following comments and conclusions could be made: 
 
 In general, there is significant correlation between the social cohesion index 
and the size of the shadow economy. As a general trend, a higher social 
cohesion index correlates positively with lower share of the informal economy. 
However, there are countries with higher social cohesion index, which have 
bigger share of the shadow economy than others with lower social cohesion 
index (for instance Sweden and United Kingdom). 
 
 Bulgaria exhibits the highest share of informal economy and the lowest OISC. 
Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania (Figure 2) are the 3 countries with biggest 
informal economy share in descending order. It is obvious from Figure 4 that 
they have the lowest social cohesion index. 
 
These results outline some contemporary research questions about the connection 
between the sizes of the shadow economies and the quality of those societies 
measured by their OISC. Two major areas of future research could be drafted: 
 Why and how a lower OISC of a society leads to a bigger shadow economy? 
 Why and how certain societies still have smaller shadow economies, although 
their OISC indices are relatively smaller than others? This is contrary to the 
observed general correlation. 
 
Before continuing with the discussion, a short historical overview will be provided to 
enlighten potential causes of why Bulgaria might have the lowest social cohesion 
index. Around 1388 after several smaller invasions, Bulgaria was conquered by the 
Ottoman Empire (modern Turkey nowadays). Bulgaria entered very dark era of 
suppression, planned elimination of the intellectual class and misgovernment, which 
continued for 500 years. During that period, many Bulgarians were forced to surrender 
their Christianity and accept the Muslim religion or otherwise face death penalty. 
During that catastrophic period, the Turks were using various usurpation methods to 
rule Bulgaria in every possible aspect, but most importantly culturally. They have 
favoured and comprehensively rewarded certain Bulgarians who were prepared to 
work as spies helping the Turkish cultural assimilation. Most of them were given a 
simplified choice to accept the offer to serve or be exterminated. This process 
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created gradually strong community mistrust and solidarity between the members of 
the Bulgarian society in their effort to survive. The Russian-Turkish war brought 
liberation to the country in 1878. In the period between 1878 and 1945, Bulgaria has 
participated in the Balkans wars and in the 2 World Wars, but managed to progress 
significantly in economic and cultural aspect. With the communist regime (1945-1990) 
and the methods of the State Security agency (DS/ДС) the grounds of social mistrust 
were resurrected with great success. The Bulgarian people were greatly stratified in 
their well-being between the communists and the rest of the people. Special DS 
agents were spying on people’s lives, their “contributions” to communism and majority 
of the intellectual class were killed in special secret camps similar to those in 
Germany during the World Wars. All these historic processes made the cultivation of 
social cohesion very difficult and contributed to its current very low level. It could be 
argued that the Bulgarian shadow economy, in addition to the well-known causes of 
this phenomenon, has very strong cultural foundation. In the given context, the cultural 
aspects of the hidden economy require specific tackling approaches to account for 
the lowest OISC in Europe. An overview of some specific measures and initiatives 
against the Bulgarian shadow economy will be provided over the next paragraphs. 
This review is based on the knowledge bank against the undeclared work developed 
by an EU body called Eurofound – the European Foundation for the Improvement of 




Joint effective control on undeclared work 
 
The Bulgarian labour law has been recently changed with the updated Labour Act and 
the Labour Inspection Act (from 15.02.13 and 01.01.2011 accordingly). The purpose 
of the legislation changes was to equip labour inspectors and government bodies with 
stronger sanctioning tools and authority. This affected their rights to inspect how the 
legislation is applied in practice and to enforce penalising procedures. Article 414 
from the Labour Act defines severe financial penalties for all failures to adhere to the 
law, which includes the lack of employment contract. The fines (if heavier penalties 
do not apply) are from 1500BGN to 15 000BGN for the employer and 1000BGN to 10 
000BGN for the employee. These are substantial fines in relation to the Bulgarian life 
standard – 1GBP = 2.2BGN. This legislative counter-measure is aimed at all 
undeclared work practices, but is particularly addressing a popular labour legislation 
violation. Employees were often working full time, while being registered on part-time 
contracts. This is being done for social security and tax evasive purposes benefiting 
predominantly the employer. The labour inspectors have also the authority to stop 
temporary the business of the offending company. 
 
The new legislative changes have led to better integration and coordination of special 
government control agencies and trade unions. The following government bodies and 
labour unions are able to be more effective in their mutual effort against undeclared 
work: 
 General Labour Inspectorate (GLI) 
 National Revenue Agency (NRA) 
 Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (CITUB) 
 Confederation of Labour Podkrepa (CLP) 
                                               
1
 Eurofound asked Professor Williams to expand the knowledge bank to 31 European countries and he was 
awarded the European Commission contract to evaluate the feasibility of establishing a European platform for 
tackling undeclared work (University of Sheffield, 2012). Based on Eurofound (2013c) the initiatives and measures 
against undeclared work and the informal economy in general are in 6 spheres: 
 Joint effective control on undeclared work 
 Connecting fiscal devices to the National Revenue Agency 
 Mandatory registration of individual employment contracts 
 ‘Come into the light’ initiative 
 Rules for Business Centre 
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As reported by (Eurofound, 2013b): “The coordinated approach (based on GLI’s 
cooperation agreement with the trade unions and joint inspections with the NRA) to 
detect and prevent undeclared work proved to be successful. As a result of the joint 
inspections of the NRA and GLI, over 30 000 people have passed from a part-time 
(four-hour) contract to a full-time labour contract, and 10 361 workers detected to be 
working without a contract have signed written contracts. Social security contributions 
made as a result of the joint inspections of the NRA and GLI are over BGN 20 million.” 
 
Connecting fiscal devices to the National Revenue Agency 
 
Bulgaria has been severely affected by the economic crisis of 2008 and this resulted 
in high revenue losses and higher level of tax evasion. This was partly due to decline 
in income from existing businesses, limited start-ups and increased effort by 
enterprises to underreport turnover. In order to address the situation the government 
imposed new legislative rules with Ordinance 18/2006 from Minister of Finance (lastly 
updated on 12.10.12). All businesses should connect their fiscal devices with NRA. 
There was gradual approach in implementing the requirement. The reporting of all 
fiscal transactions is done in real time via a mobile connection – this practically 
eliminates discrepancies between real amounts of cash transactions and accounted 
for amounts. However, the new approach still cannot detect cases where the trader or 
enterprise decides to conceal a business transaction without issuing the compulsory 
fiscal receipt from their fiscal device. This measure proved to be more effective for 
bigger enterprises where there is greater difficulty to do business without the 
compulsory issue of fiscal receipts. As reported by (Eurofound, 2013a) “The NRA 
registered growth in the taxable VAT base, with BGN 4.3 billion for the second quarter 
of 2012 (since all companies were connected) compared to the same period of 2011. 
According to the tax administration, the main reason for this increase is linking fiscal 
appliances with the NRA.” However, the remote fiscal connection as a policy 
response, applied reverse pressure on smaller businesses that are biased not to issue 
sales receipts to trusted clients. It could be argued that part of the increased tax base 
amongst bigger companies is offset by decreased tax base for bigger number of 
smaller companies. 
 
Mandatory registration of individual employment contracts 
 
With the changes to the Labour Act (article 62) and Ordinance 5/29.12.02 the 
Bulgarian government introduced mandatory registration of the employment contracts 
with NRA. The purpose of this measure was to reduce the number of workers without 
employment contract and those with not-corresponding contracts – the envelope 
wages phenomenon, see (Williams, 2010a). This practice also increased the social 
insurance base and tax revenues. 
“As a result of the negotiated new levels of contributions, in 2003 the revenues from 
the social security contributions in the state social security insurance funds – as a net 
effect of negotiations – increased by about BGN 405 million (€206 million) compared 
with 2002. In 2004, these revenues increased by BGN 305 million (€155 million) 
compared with 2003, and in 2005 by BGN 183 million (€93 million). It is expected that 
the revenues will amount to over BGN 500 million (€255 million) in 2009” (Eurofund, 
2009). 
While this proves to be an effective measure, the administrative burden in registering 
the contracts increases the employers’ expenses in terms of time and effort. It also 
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‘Come into the light’ initiative 
 
This initiative was established in 2007 by two of the largest representative employer 
organisations in Bulgaria (CITUB and CLP), supported by eight national media and 
government agencies. A dedicated web site was developed (www.nasvetlo.net) where 
special publications are made available for the benefit of the employers, employees 
and the state. The main aim of this initiative is to bring to the attention of the wider 
public the substantial grey economy problem, which starts to cause alarming damage 
to the national economy. 
 
Restriction and Prevention of Informal Economy – Rules for Business Centre 
 
This special project (14.09.2009 – 31.10.2014) is implemented by the Bulgarian 
Industrial Capital Association (BICA) with the financial support the Operational 
Program Human Resources Development, co-funded by the European Social Fund 
under contract BG051PO001-2.1.05 (see Rules for Business Centre). The project 
research and results have various dissemination channels, but it is still early to judge 
upon their impact. There are extensive publications over 1000 pages (see for instance 
the main report by the Bulgarian Industrial Capital Association (2013)) on the various 
aspects of the informal economy, methods and policies for tackling it. 
 
 
 Some concluding remarks. 3.2
 
Bulgaria has one of the lowest GDP in the EU (Dragolov et al., 2013, p. 41), which 
correlates to low social cohesion index as well. Due to the reported socio-economic 
factors and trends, it could be argued that the economic rationale is the predominant 
one in determining informal practices. This is assumed to be so in informal 
employment and for tax evasive purposes in the case of informal entrepreneurship. In 
support of this argument, although concerning the first part of it, Williams (2013) 
discovered that informal employment is smaller in countries with higher levels of GDP 
per capita. Therefore, studying the economic motives of informal entrepreneurs who 
engage in shadow activities and in particular how they take such decisions is 
important. That would help in developing policy responses to influence all those 
decisions leading to informality, which are having the greatest weight in entrepreneurs’ 
decisions. Based on the literature review, the research agenda will be to review how 
informal entrepreneurs decide their level of informality. In that process, they are 
assessing the connected costs of formality and the consequential costs of informality 
quite logically. It is expected that the knowledge to be derived would be highly relevant 
to other transition economies with similar characteristics to the Bulgarian one. 
 
Evidently from previous studies (Bitzenis & Nito, 2005; Valdez & Richardson, 2013) 
macro-level institutional environment is significantly associated with entrepreneurial 
patterns in a given country’s context. At the same time the likelihood of small firms to 
engage in corrupt activities is strongly influenced by low institutional efficiencies 
(Tonoyan et al., 2010) particularly in Central-Eastern Europe. Xheneti and Bartlett 
(2012, p. 618) argued that entrepreneurs who successfully learn to weave their way 
through a corrupt institutional environment, acquire a competitive advantage over 
others and experience business growth as a result of corruption. Obviously, this 
illustrates precisely one of the self-perpetuating aspects of large informal sectors, 
such as the Bulgarian one, in respect of poor formal institutional framework. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that development of enterprise policy in Bulgaria 
experienced the so called policy implementation gap – where consecutive 
governments failed to transfer and align working EU programs to the local context. 
Similarly to another transition economy, various programmes have been adopted for 
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the wrong rationales (Xheneti, 2017; Xheneti & Kitching, 2011) doing little in solving 
the problems of the business community. The described socio-economic environment 
is expectedly predominantly oppressive to micro and small businesses. This study 
suggests insights, which could serve improved policy efforts aiming to address 
deficiencies from the recent past. 
 
To reinstate the key points from the literature review, it is important to note that the 
current lack of consensus on a single definition of the informal economy or informal 
entrepreneurship has specific implications. It has been already argued that the best 
way in defining the informal economy and entrepreneurship within it, is to employ a 
modular principle, depending on a widely accepted definition, which is then fine-tuned 
to reflect a particular country specific context. This is important for two reasons. 
Firstly, to enable an accurate and exhaustive definition of the various informal 
economies, which tend to differ substantially across national borders by their nature 
of existence. Secondly, to enable appropriate design of tackling policy measures. 
Development of adequate policy approaches therefore is subservient on precise 
definition and comprehensive understanding of the root causes of informality at a 
national level. A working definition of informal entrepreneurship was developed for the 
purpose of this study. 
The main competing theorisations of informal economies and entrepreneurship have 
been discussed, emerging from the diverse perception of the entrepreneurs’ 
characteristics, types, motives and role in the economy. It became evident, that 
neither of the current explanatory paradigms are sufficiently adequate. A group of 
scholars started to address the need of a new holistic theorisation, suggesting the 
institutional asymmetry paradigm (Williams et al., 2015a; Williams et al., 2015d; 
Williams et al., 2014d). Adopting IAP, this study aims to address its empirical 
challenges – indeed, how to measure empirically the intrinsic circularity between 
tangible and intangible phenomena, affecting tax evasive behaviour. The contribution 
to the literature debates is via appraisal of these issues, proposing an economic 
model of partly informal entrepreneurship through innovative socio-economic profiling 






























This research project aimed to build an integrative account of the main determinants 
of entrepreneurs’ tax evasive decisions as a function of the environment in which the 
studied small firms operate. Chapter 4 sets the research aims and objectives 
underpinning the study along with the philosophical perspective of the study. It 
explains the rationale behind the particular design choices and methods’ utilisation. 
The chapter offers a comprehensive justification of the empirical strategy at 
qualitative and quantitative level in order to secure the desired research access to 
carefully guarded institutional information. A detailed discussion of the employed 
analytical software solutions then unfolds to justify how the use of the best industry 
tools enabled an enhanced analytical rigour and findings accordingly. 
 
In order to fulfil the research aims of the study, it is required to integrate quantitative 
and qualitative methods. The research objectives are at two levels – institutional and 
entrepreneurial level. Therefore, there is need for three layers of investigation – 
exploration, explanation and integration of findings. Figure 5 below visualises the 
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 Research aim and objectives, philosophical perspective of the study. 4.1
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The main research aim of this study is to explore the relationship between the level of 
costs, tax, time, and procedures, which push entrepreneurs to function partly/fully 
informally or impede formalisation and how these variables affect tax evasion 
behaviour. In that regard, the research aim is rather based on evaluating the economic 
rationale than on other types of motivations while investigating the entrepreneurs’ 
decisions for their level of informality. Building a model of the entrepreneurial 
economic rationale to operate in the shadows would serve for future research to 
incorporate other types of motivation and hence enable reflection of the reality with 
higher precision. It is also a theoretical aim of the study to consider the applicability of 
such an informality model at a policy level, so that formalisation efforts will become 
more effective. In some occasions enablers of informality and barriers to formalisation 
could overlap as we can see from the study of Johnson et al. (2000) who discovered 
that bureaucratic corruption is significantly associated with hiding output. This is a 
distinctive phenomenon for countries like Bulgaria and these characteristics would 
need parallel exposition and analysis. 
 
At the first level of investigation, it is required to explore the rationale of the 
institutional response (National Revenue Agency – NRA) to factual and suspected 
informality. To critically appraise the risk management strategy of the NRA and in 
particular their attitude towards controlling informal entrepreneurship activities. What 
are the triggering mechanisms and methods of enforcing control and compliance – tax 
audits, license and regulations’ compliance audits. NRA’s has institutional 
advantageous position in terms of actionable tax intelligence, which makes them the 
leading coordinating body in investigating and controlling informal economic activities 
in Bulgaria. Therefore, the policies, which they develop, constitute powerful stimuli for 
formalisation-informalisation practices and thus affect economically productive 
entrepreneurship. This research aims to contribute as one of the most comprehensive 
studies of NRA’s tackling policy strategy. Therefore, the empirical focus asserts a 
qualitative approach as appropriate and necessary. Building upon in-depth interviews 
with the key NRA officials, involved in risk management policy creation, it has been 
aimed to reveal how policy attitude connects with the local entrepreneurship 
environment. In order to foster entrepreneurship and increase formalisation levels it is 
required to create more responsive and objective risk assessment system. Therefore, 
a relevant policy effort should be informed by an exhaustive exploration of the 
institutional response to factual and suspected informality. 
 
At the second level (entrepreneurial), it is required to discover the economic rationale 
employed by entrepreneurs to exercise a preferred or imposed level of informality. In 
doing so, it is necessary to expose the causal relationship of their strategies to reduce 
costs of formality and consequentially informality. The third set of objectives is to 
discover and incorporate the causal relationships between the first two sets of 
objectives into an economic model of informality. This would enable understanding of 
the entrepreneurs’ economic rationale to operate in the shadows and how their 
behaviour may trigger institutional response. A study offering such an integrative 
inquiry, deployed simultaneously at institutional and entrepreneurial level in a 
transitional economic setting, provides a degree of exhaustiveness, which is required 
to fully appraise these complex phenomena. The utilised empirical strategy allowed 
gaining research access to carefully guarded institutional context, which informed the 
quantitative stage and enabled the generation of valuable findings. The next 
paragraphs will provide an account for the philosophical stance of the study before 
justifying the implemented methodological approach. 
 
It is important that this study makes its philosophical assumptions and perspectives 
clear to the reader. This will allow the author to expose his thinking and findings for 
others to interpret through the relevant theoretical and methodological commitments. 
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The research design and methods should emerge from: 
 The philosophical stance of the researcher. 
 The research questions and objectives. 
 The necessity to acquire maximum reliability and validity of the empirical data 
in support of the anticipated findings. 
 
The challenges in front of social science research grow proportionally with the 
increasing sophistication of social phenomena. Hence, the importance for 
researchers to justify their philosophical stance – if not always explicitly, then at least 
quite clearly from the argumentative body of their work. This would constitute the 
required transparency and rigour of their work. The ontological and epistemic 
affiliation of the researcher brings certain methodological commitments and when one 
is not adhering to them, they should provide a good reason for that. 
 
The clear distinction between quantitative and qualitative methods loses grounds and 
the complementary use gain greater popularity. Echambadi, Campbell and Agarwal 
(2006, p.1816) argue that qualitative methods allow discovery of new variables, which 
were not accessible in previous quantitative studies. But this leads us to another 
contemporary issue in management research to which we need to pay attention if we 
would like to be engaging social researchers – the different forms of “reflexivity – 
each with distinctive implications for the role of the management researcher in terms 
of aims, processes, and outcomes” (Johnson & Duberley, 2003a, p. 1279). The 
awareness and openness towards the issues discussed above would allow for the 
creation of more relevant and impactful research. The rationale for positioning this 
study in the perspective of critical realism is the natural perceptive association with its 
main philosophical beliefs and in particular that: 
 
 “the defining feature of realism is the belief that there is a world existing 
independently of our knowledge of it” (Sayer, 2000, p. 2) 
 
 “Critical realism distinguishes not only between the world and our experience 
of it, but between the real, the actual and the empirical, defining these in a 
special way” (Bhaskar, 1978). 
 
 “Furthermore, critical realism argues that the world is characterized by 
emergence, that is situations in which the conjunction of two of more features 
or aspects gives rise to new phenomena” (Sayer, 2000, p. 12). 
 
These philosophical assumptions appear highly relevant and capable to enlighten a 
research perspective, which is the most suitable to study the domain of the informal 
economy. We have already drawn the parallel between use of methods and their 
emergence from our philosophical stance. Some additional important remarks to be 
made are that “no methodology can be constructed as epistemically superior to any 
other – all are partial and fallible modes of engagement”. So that, even if one equip 
themselves with ”epistemic reflexivity” in their effort to avoid the trap of “inevitable 
circularity of epistemological issues”, the best that could be done is to develop a 
better constructed knowledge claim without the right to declare it superiorly valid 
(Johnson & Duberley, 2003b, p. 168, p. 187, p. 177). 
 
To justify why critical realism perspective is ideally positioned to advance this study 
theoretically and empirically, we should consider one of the major characteristics of 
large informal economies. Indeed, this is the fact that they tend to be self-emergent 
and as such are progressively fuelled by the deepening conflict between the three 
social world stratums, which they further incite – in the sense of Bhaskar (1978) 
understanding of the real, the actual and the empirical. “The real” is the existing social 
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structures and causal powers, which can create events or how a given society is 
organised. “The actual” is the real world events, which are happening and “the 
empirical” is the social agents’ experiences. Obviously, due to incongruities (or 
institutional asymmetries) between the “the real” and “the actual” layers of the world, 
there are emerging individual empirical experiences, which could be socially 
polarising. The Bulgarian economic environment makes a distinct case to 
demonstrate and study exactly that. As evident from the findings (see 7.2), social 
actors (entrepreneurs in this study) appear to be strongly dissatisfied by their 
“empirical” experience of “the real” institutional framework including tax and 
administrative policies. Key state institutions (such as NRA) fail to actually exercise 
their powers in a fair and equalising manner and thus affect procedural fairness and 
distributive justice. This leads to raising the costs of formal entrepreneurship to levels 
deemed unacceptable and logically small firms engage in informal compensatory 
strategies. As a result, the development of informal chains of interdependencies and 
unfair competition act as strong influencers of even larger informal economy. 
Therefore, the individual stratification of reality due to the emergent social system 
entities in the sense of O'Mahoney, Vincent and Edwards (2014, p. 9), provides logical 
environment for the construction and deployment of mixed methods design, which is 
the intended approach in this project. This serves adequately the usual complexity of 
management research into which mono method research approaches are not always 
sufficiently rigorous. Mingers (2006, p. 202) argues “that multimethodology (the 
combination of a plurality of intervention of research methods) is an appropriate and 
complementary methodology” in critical realism. Given the fact that critical realism is 
regarded almost as a methodological tradition within economics (Fleetwood, 1999, p. 
128), it is appropriate to appraise the socio-economic influencers of tax evasive 
behaviours through this philosophical stance. 
 
 
 Research design and methods. 4.2
 
In appraisal of the research design choices for this study, it is required to review 
certain integrative issues, which may arise. Incorporating qualitative and quantitative 
research requires careful consideration of the rationale to do so and quite often 
mixing methods does not reflect the methods themselves (Bryman, 2006). This leads 
to a loss of participants’ time, research resources and interpretation difficulties. In 
order to justify the utilised approach in this study, two important queries should be 
taken into consideration – what is the role of the research question in terms of 
methods’ superiority and what the quality criteria for mixed methods are. There are 
two major discourses discovered amongst researchers and their attitude towards the 
research design. Particularistic discourses (Bryman, 2007) are part of the traditional 
view where mixed methods are considered suitable only when this is determined by 
the research question. Whereas the universalistic discourse accepts the superiority of 
the mixed methods and that they will “provide better outcomes more or less regardless 
of the aims of the research” (p. 8). 
The research questions of this study demands the use of mixed methods in terms of 
discovery of causalities and information, which the researched participants are 
expected to wish to withhold. This formulates the rationale for use of mixed methods, 
which implicitly employ features of the universalistic and particularistic discourses in 





Before explaining the planned research design and methods into greater detail, we 
need to account for some important general characteristics. Miller and Tsang (2011, 
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p. 151) argue that “Mixed designs combine both extensive and intensive designs, 
thereby utilizing their complementary strengths and weaknesses.” From one 
perspective, this study would like to expose certain generalities through quantitative 
method (extensive approach) and from other perspective, it needs to uncover 
explanatory mechanisms of certain entrepreneurship’s behavioural causalities 
(through intensive qualitative approach). 
 
There are particular challenges in collecting primary data from respondents involved 
in shadow activities and usually that involves specific inference techniques. These 
difficulties spread over the design of the methods and how each data collection 
procedure needs to occur. In recognising those issues, this study will build upon two 
tested approaches. The International Labour Organization (2012) suggests specific 
order of questions deployment and gradual approach in the data acquisition steps. 
This is to minimise the respondents’ stress from sensitive data disclosure and 
increase the information quality. Another study (Institute for Market Economy, 2004) 
done in Bulgarian context employed similar strategy at firms’ level, i.e. to detect 
informality with series of indirect questions. Specific combinations of answers 
indicated informal activities. 
 
In the research context of the study, it could be argued that exploratory sequential 
design will be best suited for its purpose. A qualitative method (in depth semi-
structured interviews) has been used to collect primary data from key revenue 
officials. The collected intelligence has been analysed to inform the creation of 
quantitative method – a survey was used to collect data from entrepreneurs and small 
business owners. The rationale for using this particular research design is evident 
from the overarching structure of the two main research questions (Figure 5), which is 
one of the two common approaches (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, p. 133). Obviously, 
the qualitative method is required to provide enhanced information leading to ability 
for constructing more comprehensive account of the studied phenomena. 
Furthermore, that would enable triangulation of the findings – to compare quantitative 
and qualitative findings for corroboration. Looking at the institutional level of the 
empirical collection phase, the practicable rationales are: 
 
 There is a specific research question at institutional level, which requires 
qualitative approach – semi-structured interview with institutional officials in 
order to gather information about their practices and attitudes. This part of the 
study aims to explore NRA’s risk management and control policies. 
 
 Instrument development and enhancement – the results from the in-depth 
interviews will assist in fine-tuning the survey for entrepreneurs. 
 
These mixed-methods have been designed right from the outset to be mutually 
informative in order to enable integration of the findings. It is projected that this data 
collection strategy will allow development of an economic model of informality – 
incorporating entrepreneurial and institutional strategies to deal with the costs each 





The following data collection methods have been used: 
1. Collection and analysis of secondary data from: 
 Government web sites (National Revenue Agency, National Statistical 
Institute, Ministry of Finance), reports and publications. 
 Existing legislation, regulations. 
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 Media accounts, newspapers. 
 European Union publications – including survey based secondary data 
like Eurobarometer. 
 Findings of other similar studies. 
 
2. Collection and analysis of primary data from: 
 Semi-structured in-depth interviews with institutional officials. 
 A survey to entrepreneurs. 
 
The questionnaire (survey) – entrepreneurial level 
 
Contemporary data collection tools need to be flexible and capable to acquire 
maximum information with minimum efforts from the respondents. Participants should 
see only questions, which apply to their specific circumstances. In order to select a 
suitable provider, 23 leading data collection software developers were compared. 
They were also screened to find out if their software solution is capable to meet the 
following criteria (Mishkov, Maguire DS, 2012, p. 25-30): 
 
1. Display logic. 
2. Skip logic 
3. Branching logic 
4. Custom web pages visualisation based on responses. 
 
In the presence of the above criteria, it appeared that Qualtrics possess all these 
features in their academic research suite and they seem to be most easily accessible 
and customizable. Therefore, this was the choice of survey software. 
 
 
 Semi-structured in-depth interviews with key NRA officials. 4.3
 
The section provides explanation for the development and design of the first 
component of the mixed methods methodology – the in-depth interviews with NRA 
officials. A brief review of the institutional context and the revenue agency is offered 
in order to navigate the reader into the method’s choice and design. Justification of 
the empirical strategy, the development of the semi-structured interview questions as 
well as the choice and use of text analysis software solutions have been deployed in 
that order. 
 
The semi-structured interviews with institutional officials were conducted in order to 
acquire in depth information about institutional practices in tackling tax evasion as a 
result of informality practices (including risk management and control strategy). All 
senior NRA officials who are involved at decision management level in policy 
development have been interviewed in order to achieve maximum representativeness. 
The relevant NRA directorates are: Risk Management and Control. 
 
The three main institutions responsible for developing and implementing control 
functions in regards with the informal economy in Bulgaria are the National Revenue 
Agency (NRA), the General Labour Inspectorate (GLI) and National Social Security 
Institute (NSSI). The strategic cooperation between the three institutions is established 
in the so called Agreement 85 (General Labour Inspectorate, 2010). Dzhekova and 
Williams (2014, p. 64-67) provided detailed discussion about their role, functions and 
main performance indicators. What becomes evident is the fact that NRA has 
implemented a huge amount of operational checks during 2011, 2012 for which data 
is already publicly available. Even though the high amount of imposed sanctions, the 
overall efficiency remains questionable – if it is accounted for the collected income 
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and expense per check for that period. Over the past few years, the Bulgarian 
Revenue Agency (NRA) has become more sensitive to enhancing its efficiency and 
operational capacity. Its current inspection and auditing decisions are based upon a 
‘selection process’ (risk assessment and profiling) incorporating a number of risk 
indicators as well as systematic selection procedures. Furthermore, NRA has started 
implementing a contemporary software solution based on the same platform used by 
HMRC, UK – Oracle Business Intelligence Enterprise edition Plus. The software 
system should have been implemented by September 2014, but it is expected that the 
configuration process will spread over at least a couple of years’ period. Amongst its 
diverse features, it would enable: 
 Actionable tax intelligence and real time responses. 
 Tax non-compliance diagnostics – calculation of cost. 
 Tax compliance enforcement – calculation of cost. 
 Ad hoc Analysis and Interactive Reporting. 
 Proactive Detection and Alerts. 
 Lesser subjectivity in enforcement of checks and audits. 
 Scorecard and Strategy Management. 
 
At this moment of time, even before the implementation of the new IT system, NRA is 
the leading coordinating body in investigating and controlling informal economic 
activities in Bulgaria. This is due to its advantageous position in terms of its actionable 
business intelligence. However, it should be also noted that despite these innovations, 
NRA experiences shortages of qualified and well-trained analysts, which may 
compromise the potential effectiveness of the system. Particularly financial 
investigations of complex tax evasion cases require significant improvement in terms 
of operational and analytical capacity, while political intervention with high-profile 
investigations remains a serious problem. At the same time, the NRA has become 
much more service-oriented towards taxpayers. Recently it has released four new e-
services for companies, including access of companies to documentation with 
regards to ongoing control and audit procedures, as well as electronic submission of 
relevant documents within audit procedures (Dnevnik, 2014). This enables better 
communication between taxpayers and the NRA and greater transparency and 
accountability in relation to its control function. These ongoing efforts should be 
reinforced through learning from successful similar experiences of other countries, in 
order to improve objectivity of control activities, greater use of e-services by taxpayers 
in the communication with the tax office, as well as more targeted investigations and 
risk assessment. 
 
Procedural fairness (Williams, 2014c, p. 26) refers to the extent to which people 
believe that they are paying their fair share compared with others and receive fair 
treatment by institutions. It is worthwhile noting, that the appreciation of procedural 
fairness amongst Bulgarian individual and small business tax payers is below the 
acceptable social minimum (see section 7.2). For instance, big tax payers often 
receive much more favourable treatment by the tax authorities and that they could 
even avoid situations (not paying the lawful amount of tax) while the smaller tax payer 
would be treated to the letter of the law and exposed to much more institutional 
scrutiny. The reasons behind these phenomena lie in the domains of high level of 
corruption (see Figure 16, Appendix 17) and doubtful political protection for specific 
tax payers (Noutcheva & Bechev, 2008). While procedural fairness is an intangible 
social phenomenon, it has tangible footprint on the business tax payers and 
consequently affect the economic aspect of their rationale to engage in tax evasive 
practices. That is why it is highly desirable and applicable for Bulgaria to achieve 
greater level of automation and objective detection in its institutional control and 
enforcement measures (via NRA), starting from more responsive risk assessment 
system. 
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Figure 6 summarises how the main research aim at NRA level is materialised via three 
investigative lines of inquiry embedded in the qualitative instrument. 
 
 
Figure 6 – research aims – NRA. 
 
 
4.3.1 Empirical strategy. 
 
This section provides rationale and explanation for the chosen empirical strategy, 
which is based on secondary and primary data and in particular, how the access to 
this data was acquired. The secondary data has been used as evidence base to 
inform the development of a semi-structured interview in terms of questionnaire 
formulation, sequence and precise wording. 
 
According to the Bulgarian law, access to institutional information could be provided 
based on a specific request submitted usually in writing (Bulgarian National Assembly, 
2011). Public information is all information created, collected and managed, by 
institutions except in the cases where this information is protected by another law – 
for instance personal data, classified information. While all requests for access to 
public information should be treated in alignment with what the law dictates, 
sometimes institutions may process different information request in their own view. In 
such cases where the organisational response is not satisfactory, the enquirer has the 
right to escalate their information request through a legal procedure. 
 
The main task of the Bulgarian National Audit Office (BNAO) (2014) is to “control the 
reliability and truthfulness of the financial statements of budget-funded organisations, 
the legality, efficiency, effectiveness and economy of the management of public funds 
and activities, as well as to provide the National Assembly with reliable information 
thereof.” In order to implement its main functions BNAO has been granted auditing 
authority over any government institution. BNAO could acquire access to internal 
documents and information, which then serve as evidence base for the creation of 
various extensive audit reports published on their web page. Therefore, it is an 
The research aim is to explore 
the rationale of the 
institutional response to 
factual and suspected 
informality 
Discovery and exploration of 
NRA strategies – high level 
policy approach in tackling tax 
evasion. 
What are the triggering 
procedures and methods of 
enforcing control and 
compliance – tax audits and 
inspections? 
Investigation of NRA 
operational approaches and 
the predominant type in the 
mix of measures. How 
effective the current measures 
are and what are the feedback 
mechanisms. 
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effective empirical strategy to commence a study in a particular area of research with 
reading the evidence base utilised by these reports. They usually contain specific 
information, which is difficult to be accumulated or acquired otherwise. 
 
The most relevant to this study and up to date BNAO audit report is called “A 
performance audit of the control and enforcement actions undertaken by the National 
Revenue Agency to enforce compliance with the tax and social security legislation” 
(Bulgarian National Audit Office, 2012). This report is produced using extensive 
evidence base of documents and empirical information acquired from NRA. The best 
possible way to a rigorous development of an interview questionnaire intended for key 
decision makers is to conduct an independent research analysis of the extensive 
evidence base of internal documents. Following this empirical strategy there were two 
possible lines of action: 
 
1. To submit access to information request to NRA. 
2. To submit access to information request to BNAO for the same documents. 
 
Considering the sensitive nature of the information in question, it was decided that it is 
rather unlikely that NRA should process favourably such an information request. They 
might have refused to provide evidence based documents on the grounds that some 
of them are classified as a professional secret. In principle, each information request 
submitted in accordance with the Law for access to public information (Bulgarian 
National Assembly, 2011), is processed by the legal department of the relevant 
institution to ensure it meets the requirements of the law. The legal department also 
guarantees that their decision is legally grounded. BNAO is the ultimate public control 
body and this implies higher level of accountability in comparison with other 
institutions in front of the society. 
 
It was decided to submit an information request (IR) to BNAO instead to NRA 
assuming greater chance of acceptance. Both written information requests specified 
explicitly that the information is required in regards with PhD research, although there 
is no such a legal requirement – to explain the reasons for the demand of public 
information. The purpose of this statement was to openly provide the legal reviewers 
with the genuine purpose of the enquirer, which is to use all the information for 
conducting academic research and eventually disseminate the findings. The first 
information request asked for an electronic copy or a paper copy of the information. 
BNAO granted only visual access to the required information, although most of the 
data was available in electronic form. This means that the enquirer has the right to 
review the authorised documents in an electronic or paper form (as they are 
available) in a dedicated room. After an initial review of the documents, it became 
evident that: 
 
 There are about 440 files – predominantly excel and word files. The massive 
amount of evidence made the visual access at BNAO unfeasible. 
 
 It has been discovered that there are some more documents of interest not 
specified in the initial information request. They were included in the second 
one. 
 
During the visual access following the first IR, the two BNAO institutional officials 
responsible for providing the access to information raised several inquiries about the 
role and intentions of the researcher. A good working rapport was established during a 
couple of a few hours’ sessions (visits). Consequentially, the researcher was advised 
to prepare and submit a new IR. The second IR had to specify the newly discovered 
relevant documents and an electronic form of access to all sources where possible 
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Step 1 
Appraisal of information access request (IR) submission. Selection of the 
institution and strategy. 
Step 2 
Submission of the 1
st
 IR to BNAO – electronic and hard media. 
Step 3 




BNAO granted only visual access in response to the 1
st
 IR. Execution of multiple 
visits and study of the electronic and paper archives. Preparation for submission 
of the 2
nd
 IR. Informal credentials verification and development of professional 
trust. 
Step 5 
BNAO honoured the 2
nd
 IR. Acquisition of the data in electronic form completed. 
with paper versions in case that there are no electronic versions. BNAO has approved 
the second IR within the lawful time limit. The originals of the first and second IR are 
presented in Appendix 10 and 11. This is a partial description of what evidence base 
the IR has been authorised to receive access to – each data stream (folder) has 




 Tax and social insurance methodology 
 Risk management 
 Investigation of special cases 
 Modelling and design of business processes 
 Annual program for compliance and minimize risk in the NRA for 2010, 2011 
and 2012 
 Analysis of the assessment and management of risk in the NRA 
 Analysis of the process of establishing violations, development of 
administrative proceedings and issuance of sanctioning orders in during 
inspections by the revenue department of the «Operational checks» 
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4.3.2 Development of semi-structured interview questions. 
 
Given the project’s overarching aim to develop an in-depth understanding of tax policy 
management within institutional incongruence setting, nine in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with key NRA officials have been conducted. The average length of the 
interviews was 55 minutes each. The transcribed text in English is approximately 41 
150 words. NRA headquarters are organised in directorates and the two ones 
responsible for developing and implementing policy approaches are Risk 
Management and Control Directorate (NRA organisational structure is presented in 
Appendix 9). Each of these departments has a director, deputy director and two senior 
officials. These high level executives are responsible for collaborative development of 
the risk and control management strategies of NRA, which represents the core 
mission of the organisation. Thus, the interview schedule includes all key executives in 
order to collect information from everybody involved in risk and control management 
policy – 9 people in total. In pursuit of such specific research findings, it could be 
argued that the only feasible methodology is a semi-structured interview deployed 
amongst all key decision-makers in the area of study. 
 
The conducted interviews were semi-structured and were deployed using the 
questionnaire outlined in Appendix 7. The semi-structured element allowed for some 
implicit and relevant issues, which were not on the interview schedule, to be explored 
further using additional clarification questions. Some of these issues were raised by 
the respondents and some of them provoked by the interviewer. As it is evident from 
the research objectives and Appendix 7, the interview questions are focused to collect 
business intelligence on specific aspects of NRA attitudinal approach – in terms of 
developing and implementing risk and control management strategies. Such 
information is not publicly available and it is very carefully institutionally guarded. 
Specific aspects of the sought business intelligence, for instance the concrete criteria 
for attracting audits and inspections of suspected non-compliant firms, is protected by 
law (Bulgarian National Assembly, 2013, article 14, paragraph 14). For this reason the 
wording and the sequence of the questions are developed with particular care using 
graduated approach, so to: 
 
 Collect as much information as lawfully possible. 
 Expose the anticipated findings from multiple angles (the same respondent 
answering nuanced questions across the interview). There is some intended 
question overlapping to achieve this purpose (up to 10%). 
 
The graduated approach is a special well-known approach in investigating sensitive 
topics (International Labour Organization, 2012; International Labour Organization, 
2013; Kazemier, 2014; Kazemier & van Eck, 1992). The interview questions were 
informed by thorough analysis of the information gathered with the authorised IRs by 
BNAO. All these files are electronically available as part of this thesis, however 
access to them needs to be properly documented and authorised, because of obvious 
legal reasons. Appendix 8 provides explanation for each question of the semi-
structured interview: rationale/justification of the question, what type of information it 
is designed to collect and its interconnectivity with other questions. All questions are 
developed emerging from the study of the extensive evidence base – accessed via the 
authorised information requests. 
The initial section of the interview consists of four introductory and general questions, 
so to put the respondent in comfort mode and establish rapport with the interviewer. 
The aim of this section is to gather information about the main tasks, responsibilities 
and methods being used to perform them by the two NRA directorates. An additional 
implicit purpose of the first interview section is to explore the cohesion level in terms 
of intra-organisational understanding of these tasks, responsibilities and methods 
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accordingly. It is aimed to discover the actual level of alignment amongst the key 
decision makers’ opinions and thus to build a picture of departmental role cohesion 
and potential related issues. 
The next seven questions are part of the so called “Special block of questions” aiming 
to collect the most sensitive intelligence. This section’s purpose is to reveal NRA 
response upon discovery of non-compliance, but most importantly how systematic it is 
in reality as well as objective and adequate to contemporary evasive practices. 
The last part of the questionnaire presents an opportunity for cross verification of 
previous and impending questions with the formerly provided answers. This last 
section aims to reveal additional aspects of NRA tackling tactics with an accent on the 
type of action from policy perspective. Furthermore, it also asks some questions to be 
used for later correlation analysis when additional primary data is collected from a 
business survey amongst entrepreneurs. 
 
 
4.3.3 Choice and use of text analytics software. 
 
The use of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) is 
acquiring significant credibility in qualitative data research and this could be 
correlated to the amount of publishing activity over the last 15 years (Rademaker, 
Grace & Curda, 2012, p. 3). The purpose of this section is to briefly review some of 
the advantages of CAQDAS software in qualitative analysis and provide rationale of its 
use on this occasion. It only considers two representatives of this type of software and 
in particular NVivo and IBM SPSS Modeler. The reasons for this are that NVivo is 
perhaps the most popular and widely used solution in social science research utilising 
statistical algorithms in text analytics. In doing so, we could talk about partial 
quantification of qualitative research as a contemporary trend. At the same time IBM 
SPSS Modeler is the pioneer of advanced linguistic technologies and Natural 
Language Processing (NLP), which is being used to rapidly process unstructured text 
data. IBM describes in the help documentation of their product how this modern 
technology works: 
 
“IBM® SPSS® Modeler Text Analytics relies on linguistics-based text analysis. This 
approach offers the speed and cost effectiveness of statistics-based systems. But it 
offers a far higher degree of accuracy, while requiring far less human intervention. 
Linguistics-based text analysis is founded on the field of study known as natural 
language processing, also known as computational linguistics.” 
 
Both software products in question demand intervention from the analyst in terms of 
building and applying the analytical means, but at significantly different levels. NVivo 
uses statistics-based algorithms while IBM SPSS Modeler employs natural language 
processing capability. With both software solutions the researcher needs to bring his 
own understanding during the analysis but this may happen at different times. The two 
main differences could be summarised: 
 
 NVivo requires involvement of the researcher from the very beginning and all 
justifications are statistically based on frequencies of speech parts. There is 
no artificial intelligence involved. 
 
 IBM SPSS Modeler employs artificial intelligence and NLP and thus allows for 
the analyst to advance the study much quicker. The product allows 
involvement of the researcher from the very beginning or at a later analytical 
stage. IBM SPSS Modeler tends to understand more like a human will do and 
machine learning and training could improve this process for a particular area 
of analysis. 
– 55 – 
 Once the initial key concepts (categories/nodes) are identified the 
visualisation capabilities of NVivo appear to be more developed than IBM 
SPSS Modeler ones. This provides better grounds to present the findings to 
the readers. Said differently, the justifiable explanations could be presented in 
a more visually appealing manner using NVivo. 
 
CAQDAS software offers a range of benefits, which increase the rigour of analysis. 
Some of the advantages of using CAQDAS software relates to the creation of an 
“auditable ‘footprint’ of the progressive dialogue between the researcher and their 
data” (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012, p. 5). Employing CAQDAS solution allows building 
and conceptualising of a qualitative study in a structured way, which is not otherwise 
possible – for instance when a manual approach is adopted. The analytical approach, 
which characterises CAQDAS solutions, could be discussed in the following aspects: 
 Provision of standardised coding schemas with high level of legitimacy. 
 Development of justifiable explanations – quantification of qualitative analysis. 
Escalation from descriptive to analytic stages – from concepts to categories 
and text link analysis. 
 
Provision of standardised coding schemas with high level of legitimacy 
 
Majority of CAQDAS qualitative analyses, independently from the source types, start 
with the creation of an initial coding scheme. This is the stage where the main 
concepts are being discovered using various methods (automated and non-
automated). These main concepts are then grouped in categories, sets, hierarchies. It 
is important to note that the different software solutions have different working 
terminology and approaches accordingly, but their principle of generalisation is quite 
similar – this is the escalation from low to advanced level of study through concepts, 
categories, themes and models. Utilising an industry standard text analytics solution 
secures higher level of investigative legitimacy. The use of CAQDAS software 
provides the researcher with a better understanding of the analysis process 
undertaken (Wickham & Woods, 2005, p. 687), which arguably increase the quality 
and quantity of meaningful insights. Any relevant line of inquiry could be traced and 
verified by an external reader to the lowest level of descriptive nugget and then could 
be traced forward to the emergence of advanced level explanations. Inevitably, this 
increases the validity of research and analysis. 
 
Development of justifiable explanations. 
 
The development of justifiable explanations is possible through the so called partial 
quantification of qualitative analysis (ability to apply statistical and/or NLP algorithms 
in qualitative analysis) – offered by CAQDAS. Otherwise, analysis of qualitative data 
would remain exposed to the subjectivist biased questioning from the critics. As Ryan 
(2009, p. 158) argues such software solutions “enable researchers to make visible 
their methodological processes for a more 'trustworthy' study”. Furthermore, partial 
quantification of qualitative analysis is the only method to date which contributes to 
lesser subjectivity in qualitative analysis through the use of software. The below figure 
7 illustrates what is a typical workflow of text analytics in IBM SPSS Modeler. 
Following an industry approved data mining workflow creates explanations with widely 
recognised justifiable potential. 
 
 
Figure 7 – IBM SPSS Modeler workflow adapted from (IBM, 2014, p. 7) 
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The ultimate purpose of employing the so called dual solution software rationale (click 
here for more details) is to achieve maximum validity of findings, transparency and 
objectivity. To achieve this task, both industry benchmark products (Nvivo and IBM 
SPSS Modeler Premium) have been utilised in dual mode. At the same time, it is 
important to note that they have been engaged from the perspective of being 
analytical research enhancer tools. All findings and the software inquiries to derive 
them have been double and triple verified via software to software logic comparison 
and software to researcher’s logic and knowledge simultaneous appraisal. It is the 
author’s view that this dual solution approach is in itself a methodological contribution 
to the way qualitative analysis might be conducted. It allows quicker, deeper and 
higher level analysis to be implemented in a very visible and trustworthy way. Chapter 
5 and the associated appendices contain the fine detail of this process. 
 
 
4.3.4 Integrative qualitative analysis with IBM SPSS Modeler and NVivo. 
 
In recognition of the substantial amount of interview data (in excess of 41 000 words) 
and for the purpose of achieving maximum validity of findings, transparency and 
objectivity, a dual software solution approach has been employed with two of the 
industry benchmark solutions. In particular, IBM SPSS Modeler and NVivo as major 
representatives of CAQDAS, have been utilised from the perspective of being 
analytical research enhancer tools. Headings 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 provide extended 
rationale for the respective choices. This section consists of two parts: first analytical 
phase using IBM SPSS Modeler and second analytical phase using NVivo. The 
discussion of findings takes place in chapter 5. This section presents the rationales 
and technicalities of the qualitative analysis, while the next chapter discusses the 
findings in regards with the research context and summarises the relevant 
conclusions. The dualistic, integrative application of the two software suites enabled: 
 
1. Utilisation of specific advantages and functionalities of these products at each 
stage of analysis – NLP and visualisations for instance. More details are 
provided later in the section (here). 
2. Facilitation of cross-verification and objectivity of the coding and thus 
increased validity of the findings. 
 
First analytical phase using IBM SPSS Modeler. 
 
The qualitative analysis of the in-depth interviews started with the so called concept 
extraction from within IBM SPSS Modeler Premium (v. 16). It is based on a 
combination of linguistic and statistical methods. The linguistic algorithms of the 
product deal with ambiguities of the language and help the processing stage in terms 
of providing artificial intelligence during extraction and interpretation. Simultaneously, 
the statistical algorithms are responsible for classifying/ordering the extracted key 
concepts. Such an algorithmic combination guarantees high level of objectivity in 
terms of key concept extraction in comparison with manual coding. The key concepts 
represent the essence of information the texts contain and are generally the simplest 
analytical construct. 
Text analytics with IBM SPSS Modeler is based on several stages – the next section 
will briefly describe what steps have been implemented for this particular qualitative 
analysis. The level of explanatory detail is quite low in comparison with the product 
user manual of approximately 336 pages – it provides concrete information for every 
capability, so that the researcher could take an informed decision about which ones 
are suitable and how to use them. Every qualitative analysis with IBM SPSS Modeler 
fits into the embedded workflow – CRISP-DM, which stands for Cross-Industry 
Standard Process for Data Mining (see Figure 8 below). That is the industry-proven 
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way to guide data mining efforts and it is spanned over several semi-structured 
stages. There is a certain level of flexibility in terms of approaching and conducting 
this process, but it is limited to ensure that the analyst follows a benchmark industry 
standard. 
 
Figure 8 – The data mining life cycle (based on IBM SPSS Modeler Premium v. 16 
product help guide) 
 
Stages of the text mining approach with IBM SPSS Modeler: 
 
1. Extraction of key concepts. 
 
2. Creating and assigning types to the extracted key concepts. Several passes of 
extraction and prioritisation of key concepts. 
 
3. Building and refining of categories, based on key concepts. 
 
 
Stage 1: Extraction of key concepts. 
 
In order to extract the key concepts from the in-depth interviews multiple IBM SPSS 
techniques have been employed (text tokenization, text normalization, candidate term 
extraction, part of speech tagging). Consequentially about 387 key concepts were 
extracted from within approximately 41 150 words of interview texts. 
 
 
Stage 2: Creating and assigning types to key concepts. 
 
During the second stage majority of the concepts have been assigned a specific type 
(see Figure 9). A certain amount of concepts has been left without an assigned type 
due to the decision that they are insignificant for the analysis. This decision has been 
taken using a cumulative assessment based on three criteria: 
 
1. What is the percentage of appearance of a particular key concept in 
comparison with the others. 
2. In how many transcribed interview documents a given key concept presents 
itself. 
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3. A subjective expert assessment by the researcher about the significance of a 
given key concept. 
 
In principle, the necessity to assign a “type” to key concepts relates to some later 
stages of the text analysis and in particular discovering patterns and relevant text links 
(text link analysis – TAP). A “type” in IBM SPSS Modeler terminology is a higher-level 
concept that contains one or more terms – several key concepts may belong to one 
“type”. There are some default types (like organisation, product, person, and location) 
however, the researcher must create custom types for every particular text analysis. 
In doing so, the relevant IBM SPSS Modeler language libraries are being updated and 
accustomed to the specific analysis scenario. When a new extraction phase of key 
concepts is implemented again, the freshly created types are assigned as per the 
linguistic interpretation by the software engine (statistical algorithms might be used 
too). This means that the researcher trains the artificial intelligence of the software to 
assign certain types to certain key concepts. This leads to the so called interactive 
working mode of several passes for key concept extraction, which makes every later 
stage more accurate and intelligently educated by the software algorithms. For 
illustrative purposes, the following picture is an example of what types were assigned 
to some of the top key concepts. There is a colour correspondence between key 
concepts and their relevant types. This is what have been followed for this particular 
analysis. 
 




An important phase (as a sub-stage of Stage 2) is to assign all important concepts to 
a category. This has been done manually exercising the expert knowledge of the 
texts. Most of the concepts have been already automatically assigned by IBM SPSS 
Modeler using categorisation rules. This could be seen in the column “In” where there 
is an icon available (Figure 9 above). This automated category assignment has been 
verified by the researcher and this has been done on several passes. 
 
 
Stage 3: Building categories 
 
At this stage, the process of text mining included building advanced level themes – 
categories. These represent the information, which is considered important from the 
responses. A category is “a group of closely related concepts, opinions, or attitudes” 
(IBM, 2010, p. 60) and it could also include specific conditional rules to recruit key 
concepts. The so called key concepts, types and patterns from the previous stages 
are the building blocks of the categories. It is very important to select and apply the 
most adequate categorisation approach, considering that the software product offers 
several ones to suit different analytical scenarios. The correct categorisation 
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technique(s) should be based on the following selective methodology, which was 
adhered to in this qualitative analysis: 
 
1. The researchers familiarise with what each categorisation method offers in 
terms of functionalities. 
 
2. Different sets of method combinations are then applied in several independent 
passes according to their suitability. The categorisation results are inspected 
by the researcher against their expert knowledge of the targeted texts for 
analysis. 
 
3. The researchers elect these categorisation methods, which are likely to 
produce categories reflecting the expected analytical outcome. There is an 
expert subjectivism involved in this selection process and the analysis could 
have different bias grounded in the different choices made. However, 
independently of the categorisation algorithms mix employed, there will be a 
high level of linguistic and statistical justification of the various categories 
created. 
 
Even the most relevant categorisation approach will generate categories, which will be 
imperfect with different combinations of inaccuracies in their names and hierarchical 
structure. The researcher will then need to change names, create rules of 
inclusion/exclusion, merge categories, delete or create new ones. This is lengthy 
process and it predetermines the quality of findings. This is the process of building 
and improving a categorisation model and it was implemented for the purpose of this 
study. Implicitly, during that process, several categorisation passes have been 
implemented and every later one generated better results. In general, there are two 
major categorisation approaches, which could be utilised – linguistic techniques or 
frequency techniques. The latter employ statistical algorithms to group key concepts 
into categories and as such are better suited for structured data like survey 
responses. The four linguistic methods (concept root derivation, semantic network, 
concept inclusion) provide a natural language-based approach to categorisation. A 
fourth technique (co-occurrence) uses co-occurrence rules to discover and group 
concepts that are strongly related (IBM, 2010, p. 60). It is important to note that 
utilising only the four linguistic methods one could generate approximately 16 different 
sets of categorisations in accordance with combining the different techniques with 
each other. A rigorous analytical approach would demand that the researcher 
evaluate and select from between all these. The suitability of “which technique when” 
is discussed in great detail in one of the product guides (IBM, 2010). 
 
It has been found that in the given text analysis scenario the simultaneous use of the 
three linguistic methods generates the most adequate categorisation, so this 
approach has been used. There are three tasks which have been completed in the 
categorisation refinement: 
 
1. The first one is to visually inspect and edit categories – their names, 
hierarchies and what concepts are being included. This is a process of 
improving the categorisation adequacy. During the implementation of this task 
some categories should be deleted and others created including processes of 
merging relevant ones. It is important to note that this involves changing the 
descriptors of each category and in doing so their significance and priority for 
later stages of the analysis. 
 
2. The second task is to review again all remaining key concepts, which have not 
been included into categories to this moment of time. They need to be 
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manually assigned to the relevant categories. Return to task 1 and re-
implementation. 
 
3. The final task is to run the categorisation process once again, since this is 
about to generate slightly different results. A final adequacy review needs to 
be applied by the researcher, so that it could be verified that the newly 
generated categories are appropriate and precise. 
After several categorisations passes the following 17 top categories have been 
created with their relevant number of descriptors: 
 
Figure 10: Top categories from interview analysis. 
 
 
The top 17 categories contain 89 sub-categories down to heading 3. Full 
representation of all categories is available in Appendix 13. The next important step is 
to create a custom Text Link Analysis package (TAP) from the results, so far. Text 
Link Analysis is a pattern-matching technology that can find relationships between the 
concepts in the text data based on user-defined patterns (IBM, 2010, p. 166). The 
initial categories and key concept have been created with IBM SPSS Modeler. Several 
passes have been implemented using various automated techniques (extraction 
algorithms) to refine the categories. Furthermore, the process was supported by 
exploration of Text Link analysis (TLA), which provides a way to identify and extract 
patterns from the texts and then use the pattern results. Subsequently, each key 
concept, category and pattern was analysed for appropriateness by the researcher. 
This was achieved using the expert knowledge of field - appraising the accuracy of 
the artificial intelligence analysis through the perspective of the author and making 
adjustments where required. 
 
Second analytical phase using NVivo. 
 
This phase involves NVivo 10, which have been used for the rest of the analysis. The 
rationale behind this dual solution approach ensures a couple of important 
advantages for the analysis. Explained differently that could be described as the best 
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of both worlds strategy. The two accents, which need consideration, are: 
 The initial stages of key concept recruitment and categorisation have been 
implemented with IBM SPSS Modeler employing the most advanced NLP and 
extraction techniques available. Certainly, this is advantageous in comparison 
with the statistical algorithms, which NVivo uses exclusively for coding 
purposes. The differences have been already commented earlier in the thesis. 
 
 The higher level study and representation of analysis is implemented using 
NVivo’s superior project visualisation and query capabilities. 
 
The technical process of exporting the project from IBM SPSS Modeler 16 to NVivo 
10 is possible through some advanced features available in the latest versions of the 
two products. In particular, this includes the following major steps and functionality 
utilisation, which minimises the efforts’ cost of this approach: 
1. Key concepts and categories have been exported in csv and excel format from 
within IBM SPSS Modeler. They have been consequently imported into NVivo 
as nodes with the corresponding number of sub-nodes. 
 
2. Depending on the researcher’s knowledge of the topic and the analysed 
interviews, a few subsequent passes of coding and verification for 
adequateness have been implemented from within NVivo. The hierarchical 
structure of categories (nodes using NVivo terminology) has been further 
refined through merging into updated hierarchies, which led to a reorganised 
version – available in Appendix 14. It includes 9 top categories (nodes) and 67 
sub-categories. 
 
3. The coding process from this moment forward has been performed using an 
advanced innovative feature available in NVivo 10. It is called “Automatic 
coding using existing coding patterns”. In general, the analyst must do some 
manual coding to “train” NVivo in which nodes to which parts of the text should 
refer – that is creating patterns. This manual coding level should be done for 
all nodes and their relevant sub-levels according to the technical requirements 
of the product. Once the process is completed, the automatic coding feature 
could be employed to examine all target texts and to deploy the required 
coding depending on pattern recognition and replication. Upon 
accomplishment, the researcher must perform random verification with 
sufficient level of detail to find out whether the auto coding feature performed 
with the right precision and relevancy. This has been done through exploring 
the newly created model of nodes with their relevant sources and references. 
Having implemented all these steps, it was discovered that the auto coding 
feature executed its functionality with high precision. 
 
 
 Survey development and design. 4.4
 
The section provides justification for the development and design of the second 
component of the mixed methods methodology – the business survey. In doing so, 
some key aspects of available survey methods will be reviewed here, which have 
development relevance to the quantitative empirical instrument. These could be 
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1. Choice of data collection strategy. 








1. Gradual versus direct approach. 
2. Relevance of the survey to the research aims 
and questionnaire’s rationale 




4.4.1 Evaluation of data collection methodologies. 
 
Choice of data collection strategy 
Survey methods are being increasingly employed to evaluate various aspect of the 
undeclared economy. Some notable cross-national direct surveys of participation in 
the undeclared economy emerged (Eurobarometer, 2007; Eurobarometer, 2014). 
They share the same definitions and statistical methodology in all EU member states, 
which provides important cross-country comparability and standardisation. While 
earlier studies had their accent on measurement of shadow activities, later ones 
became better equipped to discover the nature of the informal economy, the 
characteristics and motives of the participants – both on the supply and demand side 
of such illicit activities. Such is the aim of the employed business survey design in this 
study. In order to avoid variable errors, a particular attention is paid to “translating 
complex concepts into operative, communicable questions placed in the best context 
and sequence” (International Labour Organization, 2013, p. 80). 
 
The data acquisition probability in direct surveys on the informal economy is greatly 
influenced by the unit of analysis and how they are approached. The substantial 
differences between surveys on the informal sector with the household as a unit of 
analysis and those with the enterprise instead, demand specific strategies designed to 
cope with such complexities. Direct approaches interested in non-business 
respondents have been available for several decades and have been extensively 
used. Reasonably, it could be argued that such methods are in advanced stage of 
development (scientific maturity) and generate reliable data, which is in synergy with 
the findings of macro-economic methods. However, direct surveys intended for the 
informal enterprise should be considered to function in their own comparatively 
underdeveloped domain. A significant consideration when studying the informal 
economy, and activities, is the sensitive and expensive nature of approaching 
business entities in comparison with households. This is a weighty consideration, 
particularly when surveying sensitive topics such as tax evasion. Informal economic 
activities are considered more socially acceptable when exercised by individuals and 
the other way round when undertaken by businesses. Domestic interviewees are 
therefore much more likely to be less secretive and hence anticipated to disclose 
potential involvement in the undeclared economy (Jones, Ram & Edwards, 2004; 
Williams, 2001; Williams, 2004). Simultaneously, partly or fully informal enterprises 
are logically much more likely to attract institutional attention if they chose to reveal 
evasion behaviour, which could easily result in negative consequences for the 
business. The questionnaire design for the purpose of this study recognises and 
accounts for these issues’ involvedness – it is presented exactly how later in the 
chapter. 
 
Williams (2006) analysed the first direct survey (in the advanced economies) of 
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business perceptions regarding the magnitude of the shadow economy. An important 
methodological implication is the way of asking about involvement in shadow 
activities. Instead of asking the question directly, the respondents are instead 
enquired about involvement in cash-in-hand transactions by other businesses from 
their sector. Since then, this indirect evaluation approach becomes the standard 
method of inquiring about illicit activities where the enterprise is the unit of analysis. It 
is also successfully implemented in this study, signifying notably bigger share of 
informal economy in comparison with the one established by macroeconomic 
methods. In the comparative evaluation of data collection techniques Williams (2015a, 
p. 6), comes to the conclusion that there is no “clear-cut conclusion that can be 
reached from the experiments with different data collection techniques so far 
conducted, about which is most effective to use.” It could be argued that the choice 
and design of empirical instruments to study the informal economy should take into 
consideration the socio-economic and cultural characteristics of the research context 
and the actual sample of respondents. For instance, in societies with low perceived 
institutional quality, procedural fairness, justice and OISC index, it is more likely to 
engage prospective participants in fairer disclosure of sensitive information (such as 
tax evasion) if unattended forms of interviewing are being used. This was confirmed 
during the pilot cognitive testing and later again through the actual data collection 
process. 
 
A major line of methodological criticism regarding surveys is the reduced confidence 
that they would fulfil their primary purpose – collect data about tax evasive practises, 
which are supposed to be kept secretive by the respondents. And then if they actually 
collect such data what would be its reliability and validity. In that respect, it could be 
argued that in order to determine the adequacy of direct versus indirect methods one 
has to perform a weighted findings comparison – for instance measuring the informal 
economy size with a direct nationally representative survey against the findings of 
macroeconomic methods. Whether both methods will generate similar results and if 
not, which method is more likely to better represent a given reality. However, it could 
be argued that direct methods enable exploration of motives and behavioural patterns 
in tax evasion, which remain totally inaccessible for indirect methods. Because of the 
discussed characteristics and in respect of the research aims of the thesis (see the 
entrepreneurial level in the figure below), the direct business survey appeared the 
best data acquisition approach. 
 
 
For that reason, a business survey was used to detect and evaluate informal practices 
amongst formally registered micro and small businesses, meeting specific economic 
profile criteria. It is important to underline that diagnosing a level of informality, 
together with the background motives, amongst formally registered enterprises is 
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actually the most methodologically challenging study task possible (in exploration of 
the informal economy). The businesses, which are actually reporting their economic 
activities to the authorities and only concealing part of their transactions, are exposed 
to higher risks than fully informal businesses. This is so, because fully informal 
enterprises do not bear the cost of doing business according to the rules, which is 
being paid by the registered business although not fully tax compliant. In potential 
detection scenario, a partly informal business, which benefited only marginally from 
their tax evasive behaviour could be penalised similarly to fully informal enterprise, 
which benefited to maximum effect due to the complete concealment of turnover. 
Therefore, the incentive for partly informal businesses to remain undetected is 
arguably much stronger. 
 
The best known institutionally implemented direct survey on international scale with 
modules on informality, taxes and regulations simultaneously with the enterprise as a 
unit of analysis is the one developed by the International Finance Corporation (2013) 
as part of the World Bank group. The available micro data (survey series for Bulgaria) 
includes 2002, 2005 and 2012-2013. The International Labour Organization also 
undertakes the so called “mixed household and enterprise surveys” (International 
Labour Organization, 2012, p. 60), which are “designed to obtain detailed information 
on the characteristics of the owners of informal sector units, of their enterprises and 
of the persons working with them, if any”. Both international organisations employ 
gradual approach in their questionnaire where there are a certain number of non-
contentious profiling questions gradually escalating into sets of questions intended to 
detect and evaluate informality. As a result of the pilot cognitive testing of the survey 
in Bulgaria, it was discovered that the gradual questionnaire approach delivered the 
anticipated level of informal activities disclosure. This provided rationale for this 
particular design choice in the final survey deployment. 
 
The Business Customer and Strategy unit as part of HM Revenue and Customs UK, 
conducted an extensive evaluation of quantitative methods for analysis of the hidden 
economy. They came to the conclusion that direct methods are the most favoured 
ones by experts. Based on these findings HMRC (2012, p. 3) considered possible and 
feasible to design their own business survey method in order to capture meaningful 
insights on: 
 “Hypotheses as to why businesses enter, and continue to operate in, the hidden 
economy 
 The motivations and wider social and societal drivers which drive some into the 
Hidden Economy 
 The business strategies and processes they adopt to remain hidden 
 What levers might be successful in encouraging businesses back into the formal 
economy” 
The exhaustive appraisal of quantitative methods in other relevant studies is important 
in two aspects. Firstly to review and benefit from their investigative experience of such 
sensitive topic. Secondly, to adapt and incorporate lines of inquiry, which are relevant 
to the research context and the research aims. Tables 4 and 5 are partial expression 
of this effort. 
 
Another highly relevant survey (Fries, Lysenko & Polanec, EBRD, 2003), using the 
enterprise as a unit of analysis in transition economies, was conducted by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank to 
investigate the extent to which government policies and practices facilitate or impede 
business activity. The first round of Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) took place during 1999 in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Commonwealth of the Independent States – it covered 4,104 firms (excluding 
farms) in 25 countries. The second survey round was performed in 2002 amongst 
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6,153 firms in 26 countries of the region. The analysis of quantitative measures of the 
business environment indicates strong correlation with business obstacles, added 
costs and constraints due to inefficient state governance. Based on these regionally 
relevant findings it could be argued that the high cost of doing business due to the 
inadequate business environment is a significant driver for informality amongst 
enterprises. This hypothesis is explored in greater detail and confirmed valid for the 
Bulgarian micro and small business environment. 
 
The Rockwool Foundation Research Unit has been using surveys on the extent of the 
black economy in Denmark since the end of the 1980s. During the nineties, the 
Rockwool Foundation also took interest in their neighbouring countries Sweden and 
Norway. Later on it was decided to extend this work for comparative purposes to 
Germany and Great Britain (Pedersen, 2003) addressing one of the main 
methodological difficulties in comparative measurement – the definitions of the 
observed phenomena and the way the questions have to be formulated. It was 
discovered that although the same definitions and questions’ formulation were used, 
this actually led to some variations of the respondents’ understanding and answers. 
This was due to the country specific contexts, nevertheless their similar West 
European economic profiles. However, this study is one of the few to contribute to 
cross-border comparison through adjusting the questions to fit various countries’ tax 
legislation and techniques of adding questions about activities which are taxable in 
one country but not in another. 
 
The next section will describe the sampling method, sample size and survey 
distribution. A detailed survey justification is presented afterwards – the implications 
of the gradual versus direct approach are also discussed. The relevance of the 
survey’s sections to the research aims of the thesis are illustratively presented in a 
table. The data collection rationale behind each question and its interconnectivity with 
other questions are in the business survey’s analytical matrix, which follows. Finally, 
the implications from the pilot cognitive testing are then discussed. 
 
Sampling method, sample size and survey distribution. 
 
The companies’ contact data was acquired through one of the two most reputable 
commercial data providers in Bulgaria: Ciela. Their software product Ciela Info 
combines information in real time from the various state registers – the commercial 
register, BULSTAT register, data from the registers of the tax administration, data 
from State Gazette, as well as information provided by Ciela research teams. The 
data integration and cross verification from various official and unofficial sources 
makes for the most exhaustive source on business data available. 
 
The following table represents the characteristics of the targeted population of 
businesses. As of 30.04.15 the entire population consisted of 76 298 entities. This 
includes all types of “for profit” registered businesses. 
 
Enterprise characteristics Criteria 
Legal form all types of “for profit” registered businesses 
Place of business registration Sofia 
Date of registration from 30.04.2005 to 30.04.2015 
Socially insured persons 1 – 50 
Health insured persons 0 – 50 
Business status Active 
Turn over 0 – 500 000 
Capital 0 – 100 000 
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The business registration period is from 30.04.2005 to 30.04.2015 (start of the 
survey), which means that the longest operating business from the population 
functioned for up to 10 years maximum. The longer a business operates formally 
registered the less likely it would be involved in undeclared activities. This selection 
criterion was introduced to control for businesses, which are not established for 
longer than 10 years and therefore could be characterised by significantly reduced 
possibility to be involved in off-the books transactions. The study aims to collect 
insights from within the partly informal enterprises and hence should attempt to collect 
data from as many as possible. The business status criterion excludes businesses, 
which for some reasons declared cease of economic activity – this is to ensure that all 
population members are currently operationally active enterprises. The place of 
business registration is selected to be Sofia (reasoning is available on the page 
below). 
 
The European Commission (2014) introduced an upgraded definition for micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which represents 99% of all businesses in the 
EU. For the purpose of the study the survey was distributed to micro and small 
businesses only where the level of informality could be expected to be higher 
(Williams & Martinez, 2014b; Williams, Nadin, Newton, Rodgers & Windebank, 2011). 
However, the turnover criterion was intentionally violated (explanation after the table). 
According to the EC definition (2014) the following ceilings apply: 
 
Company category  Employees  Turnover  or Balance sheet total  
Medium-sized < 250 ≤ € 50 m ≤ € 43 m 
Small < 50 ≤ € 10 m ≤ € 10 m 
Micro < 10 ≤ € 2 m ≤ € 2 m 
 
As it is evident from the economic characteristics of the targeted population in 
Bulgaria, the maximum turnover allowed was 500 000 BGN or approximately 250 000 
EUR. The number of staff remains as specified by the EC. This selective change was 
intentionally implemented to account for the fact that Bulgaria is significantly less 
developed member of the EU and its micro, small and medium-sized businesses have 
proportionally smaller turnovers. Furthermore, due to relatively cheap labour costs, 
Bulgarian SMEs tend to utilise a bigger workforce for a given profitability index. 
 
In order to estimate the adjusted sample size (confidence level of 95%, margin of 
error 5% and 50% response distribution), the following steps were performed: 
 
1. It was assumed that the response rate would be approximately 15% (85% – refusal 
to participate, unreachable, break-off, partial response or ineligible to participate). 
Response rates for web based surveys vary between 7 and 44% (LaRose & Tsai, 
2014, p. 20; Schonlau, Fricker & Elliott, 2002). In consideration of the sensitive 
study topic, it could be argued that 15% is realistic expectancy. 
 
2. A population of 76 298 needs a minimum sample size of 383 valid responses to 
fulfil the above requirements. Having more than 300 responses ensures that “test 
parameters tend to be stable regardless of the participant to variable ratio” 
according to Kass and Tinsley (1979) in (Field, 2009, p. 647). 
 
3. Assuming conservative 15% response rate, the adjusted sample size has to be 
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na is the actual sample size required 
n is the adjusted minimum sample size to achieve 5% margin error, 95% 
confidence level 
re% is the estimated response rate expressed as a percentage, in this case = 
15%. 
 
Qualtrics’ systematic random sampling procedure was used over the entire population 
in order to generate the adjusted sample for the survey deployment. This decision was 
made based on the following decision tree (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 271): 
 
Question Answer 
Must statistical inferences be made from the sample? Yes 
Must the sample represent the population? Yes 
Does the research require face-to-face contact? Yes and No 
Is the population geographically concentrated? Yes 
Does the sampling frame contain relevant strata? No 
Does the sampling frame contain periodic patterns? No 
 
All prospective participants were presented with the opportunity to be interviewed face 
to face if they so wish or if they want to meet up the principal investigator for any 
reason – such as additional information acquisition, clarification and/or identity 
verification. The principal investigator was physically present in Sofia for the entire 
data collection period to satisfy contact requests and to be able to deal with the 
survey effectively. In consideration of the scale of the required responses, options for 
face to face contact with the respondents and the limitations of the empirical 
collection capabilities within this PhD study, it was not possible to make it a nation-
wide survey. In the given circumstances, a choice of one city was required. The 
capital of Bulgaria was selected for the following reasons: 
 
 It was assumed that the informal strategies would be more sophisticated 
(therefore more valuable to study) in comparison with similar ones employed 
by SMEs outside of the capital. This assumption rests on the fact that 
institutional compliance pressure is higher on businesses operating from within 
the capital. In addition, general competition is stronger. Therefore, SMEs have 
to be more creative and secretive if they employ informal strategies – enhance 
their competitiveness and remain undetected. 
 It was assumed that SMEs in the capital have generally better conditions for 
doing business and potentially are expected to sustain a lower level of partial 
informality in comparison with other parts of the country. As a result the 
economic motives behind evasive practices were expected to be more 
meaningful for analysis and policy recommendations. According to the macro-
economic methods, the Bulgarian informal economy is the biggest in the EU. It 
was hypothesized that the actual share of the informal economy is much 
higher than what is currently known to be the case and it was attempted to 
measure it (through the survey) where it should be least pronounced – SMEs in 
the capital. That would have provided good comparative grounds on the basis 
of extrapolation – if SMEs in the capital exercise X% of turnover 
underreporting on average, then SMEs from the rest of the country are likely to 
exhibit Y% of turnover underreporting, where Y>X. 
 
The survey was deployed to the business owners (entrepreneurs) and they have been 
requested to fill the online questionnaire themselves or by a business manager 
designated by the owner to do so, on their behalf. The survey invitation contained the 
so called information sheet and information consent as per the ethics policy of 
University of Sheffield. The information sheet provides answers to several 
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standardised questions in regards with the research involved including extensive 
reasoning on anonymity and purpose of data collection. 
 
 
4.4.2 Questionnaire development and rationale. 
 
This section presents the logic behind the survey development as an empirical 
instrument and in particular its role within the thesis. The connection between the 
questionnaire’s building blocks and the research aims is mapped in a table format as 
well as the rationale behind each individual question. The advantages of the gradual 
information acquisition approach are discussed and the technicalities of pilot cognitive 
testing. The provided level of detail is intended to equip the reader with the 
background knowledge for interpretation of the quantitative analysis and discussion of 
findings accordingly. 
 
Having adopted the institutional asymmetry paradigm, this study aimed to expose and 
evaluate the asymmetries between the formal and informal institutional frameworks. 
The first investigative level appraised the formal institutions with a specific focus on 
tax management policy, revealing the major environmental pressures (institutional, 
economic and political) on NRA. The second investigative level has been designed to 
research the strongest determinants of business tax evasion, emerging from the 
dynamics between one of the most challenging socio-economic environments in the 
EU and the small firms operating from within. Given the recent development of IAP as 
a contemporary theorisation of informality, the majority of research (Williams et al., 
2015a; Williams & Horodnic, 2015b; Williams & Horodnic, 2016; Williams et al., 2015d) 
utilises existing data sets such as Eurobarometer. This study contributes with 
specifically developed empirical instruments (in-depth interviews and a business 
survey) to collect and analyse primary data at both investigative levels. 
 
IAP poses a specific empirical challenge – indeed, how to measure empirically the 
intrinsic circularity between tangible and intangible phenomena, affecting tax evasive 
behaviours. To clarify this aspect, it should be noted that formal institutional quality 
could be decomposed to several intangible properties: institutional reputation amongst 
tax payers, lack of corruption, procedural fairness, distributive justice, vertical trust. 
Tables 4 and 5 provide detailed operationalisation of the quantitative research 
objectives, explaining how each survey question relates to the extant literature and 
what its purpose is to deliver in regards with new IAP insights. These two tables also 
explain how particular groups of questions function as meaningful investigative sets. 
As evident (see sections 6.2.2, 7.2), this thesis shows that intangible formal 
institutional characteristics play strong role in determination of the diversely motivated 
business tax evasion and therefore have tangible and circular socio-economic impact. 
 
The questionnaire development and design is based on four main pillars: 
 
1. Utilisation of NRA’s extensive experience on detecting and diagnosing informal 
business practices. As every revenue agency, NRA developed a special 
methodology to detect with high probability when an enterprise could be 
involved in evasive practices. It is based on combination of regionally specific 
profiling indicators. They are developed and updated in Risk Management 
directorate with contributions from other directorates too (mainly Control). The 
information access requests (see Appendix 10 and 11 described under 
Empirical Strategy heading) granted partial access to the methodologies 
employed in the development of these indicators. Consequentially, they have 
been embedded in the questionnaire for the same purpose – to detect 
informality amongst the recruited enterprises. 
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2. Review of the established survey methods in evaluation of the hidden economy 
with a focus on these ones, which study the enterprise as a unit of analysis. 
Particular questions have been extrapolated and adjusted where necessary to 
the specific regional context. 
 
3. Development and use of own questions in combination with the above to 
supplement the data acquisition and verification process. 
 
4. Use of the so called branching, skip and display logic in order to profile the 
participants correctly and expose them only to circumstantially relevant 
questions, based on the answers provided. 
 
 
Gradual versus direct approach. 
 
The business survey utilised gradual, but not direct approach in terms of how the 
questions have been ordered and conveyed, based on the benefits revealed by 
previous studies on similar sensitive topics. The main advantage of the gradual 
approach is in building rapport with the respondent and gaining their confidence in 
terms of asking less sensitive questions first. The participants emerge into the 
practise of providing answers to the introductory questions and are then gradually 
taken into more sensitive topics. It could be argued that respondents develop a level 
of psychological engagement, trust and advancement in the questionnaire, so it 
becomes more difficult for them to leave a later question unanswered or simply drop-
off. In a study of the structure and magnitude of the hidden labour market, 
implemented by the Netherland Central Bureau of Statistics (Kazemier et al., 1992), 
eight survey variants were thoroughly appraised in terms of suitability to obtain valid 
information. The gradual approach in the questions presentation was found to acquire 
the highest participation rates. Later studies on the same topic (Kazemier, 2014, p. 
39) were successfully utilising the gradual approach and also signified that "The 
outcomes do not differ between face-to-face and online surveys". Comparing the 
Eurobarometer survey’s results with other relevant studies, Williams (2015a, p. 7) 
presents evidence in support of the gradual approach’s capability to elicit higher 
response rates due to lengthier priming questions instead of a shorter lead-in. 
 
Utilising the gradual approach in the current business survey, it consisted of 8 blocks, 
containing 31 questions in total. The first survey block is the introduction and informed 
consent, while block 8 is the end of the survey with the “Thank you” page. Effectively, 
the actual data collection is carried out in blocks 2 to 7 inclusive. Appendix 18 
represents the entire questionnaire. It is important to note that neither the block names 
nor the branching logic was available to the participants – they have been exclusively 
created for the purpose of the study and its audience. Survey block 2 contains 
general profiling questions and therefore serves the gradual approach purpose – to 
lead-in participants to more particular questions later in the questionnaire. The 
questions from the block sound very insensitive to participants, however most of them 
are actually NRA’s informality indicators – they are designed to detect high probability 
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Table 4: Relevance of the survey to the research aims and questionnaire’s rationale. 
The table below briefly describes the connection of each survey section to the research aims of the thesis. 
Block 1 – Introduction and informed consent. 
 
 
Block 2 – General business profile and initial 
informality indicators. 
 
Main purpose is to profile the business and diagnose probability for informal economic activity 
with special lead-in questions. Use of NRA’s informality detection questions in combination with 
some World Bank Enterprise survey’s questions. 
 
Block 3 – Institutional quality and fair use of 
public money. Procedural fairness and 
distributive justice. 
 
Provides opportunity to voice dissatisfaction with the institutional quality and NRA specifically, 
their service to businesses and the way public (tax) money are being spent. Proactive, 
engagement of the respondent with the topic and good purpose of the survey – data collection 
towards a positive change. 
 
Block 4 – Diagnostics of informality, motivations 
and perceptions. 
 
Investigates the economic motives for a given level of informality. Detection and evaluation of 
turnover underreporting. Cost-benefit analysis for the reasons for informality. Studies the 
tolerance towards tax evasion and bribery and their interdependence. 
 
Block 5 – Interdependence of informal 
businesses (informality chain of 
interdependence). 
 
Detection of informality chains of interdependence – economic barriers to formalisation. 
 
Block 6 – External business environment and 
cost of doing business. Taxation, regulations 
and licensing frameworks. 
 
What level of taxation/licensing is acceptable by the entrepreneurs. Attempt to cost the 
entrepreneur's time – institutional cost of doing business. Perceived level for customer service 
and policy approach by NRA – from the perspective of the entrepreneur. 
 
Block 7 – Unfair competition from informal 
businesses. 
 
Evaluation of unfair competition from informal businesses and cross-detection of informal 
economic activities. 
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Table 5: Analytical survey matrix. 
The following table describes the main purpose of each question and serves as an analytical survey matrix. Secondly, it shows the interconnectivity 
with other questions from the survey and thus reveals the data collection strategy in the light of the gradual approach. Thirdly, any relevance to 
other similar studies is indicated. 
Question 
number 
Main purpose Interconnectivity with other 
questions 
Relevance to other studies 
1.  Acquire an informed consent. 
 
Not applicable Not applicable 
2.  Business subject profiling function. In addition, could contribute 
to detection of probability for informality together with other 
questions. For instance a business trading with goods and not 
using an office/warehouse. At the same time having an 
outstanding debt and not undertaking collection activities. 
 
Questions 3, 5, 9 and 10. 
 
(IFC, 2013) 
3.  Activity profiling question – part of the 6 NRA’s indicators to 
detect high risk of informality. 
 
Questions 2, 5, 9 and 10. 
 
NRA methodology P.5.1 
4.  Business profiling question and informality indicator. Detects 
use of undeclared labour, envelope wages and consequential 
tax evasion – envelope wages could not be claimed as business 
expenses. The reported number of full and part time staff could 
be compared with the officially reported number for a particular 
business available from government registers. 
 
Not applicable Similar questions are 
available in most subject 
related business surveys. 
5.  Business profiling question – part of the 6 NRA’s indicators to 
detect high risk of informality. 
 
Questions 2, 3, 9 and 10. 
 
NRA methodology P.5.1 
6.  Business profiling question – supportive to NRA’s indicators to 




Questions 2, 3, 5, 9 and 10. NRA methodology P.5.1 
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Question 
number 
Main purpose Interconnectivity with other 
questions 
Relevance to other studies 
7.  Start-up informality indicator – evaluation of whether small 
business start-ups test-trade in the informal economy. 
Supplementary to informality risk detection in conjunction with 
NRA’s indicators. 
 
Questions 2, 3, 5, 9 and 10. (Williams et al., 2014b) 
(International Finance 
Corporation, 2014, p. 52) 
8.  Conditional business profiling question – reported year of 
business formalisation could be compared to official state 
registers and potential discrepancies could be appraised 
together with finding from question 7. 
 
Question 7 (IFC, 2013, p. 4) 
9.  Economic activity profiling question – part of the 6 NRA’s 
indicators to detect high risk of informality. Finding out the level 
of outstanding debt and what collection actions (question 10) 
are being performed. Lack of adequate debt collection in 
relation with debt’s size while trading predominantly with goods, 
could indicate informal chain of dependence. 
 
Questions 2, 3, 5, and 10. NRA methodology P.5.1 
10.  Economic activity profiling question – part of the 6 NRA’s 
indicators to detect high risk of informality. Works together with 
the previous question. 
 
Questions 2, 3, 5 and 9. NRA methodology P.5.1 
11.  Economic activity profiling question – part of the 6 NRA’s 
indicators to detect high risk of informality or tax fraud. There 
are two main points: fully formal businesses could rarely 
function without external forms of finance and secondly, using 
external funding with significantly different interest rates (to 




Questions 2, 3, 5, 9 and 10. NRA methodology P.5 
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Question 
number 
Main purpose Interconnectivity with other 
questions 
Relevance to other studies 
12.  Economic activity profiling question – conditional of question 
11. 
 
Questions 10 and 11. NRA methodology P.5 
13.  This is a key question evaluating perceptions for procedural 
fairness and distributive justice – fairness of tax administration 
and public expenditures. Have to be discussed in terms of tax 
morale and tax compliance in similar cultural contexts. 
Together with question 21 and 24 it provides insights on 
institutional asymmetry. 
 
Questions 14, 21 and 24. (Cummings, Martinez-
Vazquez, McKee & Torgler, 
2006) 
(Williams et al., 2015a; 
Williams, Franic & Dzhekova, 
2015c; Williams et al., 
2015d; Williams & Shahid, 
2014c; Williams et al., 
2014d) 
14.  Key informality profiling question evaluating the economic 
motives for informality, but also institutional asymmetry 
determinants. 
 
Questions 14, 21 and 24. (Putnins & Sauka, 2014a, p. 
35) 
(Putnins & Sauka, 2014b) 
15.  Key informality profiling question – engaging in an unofficial 
payments to “get things done” almost inevitably signifies partly 
informal practices. It could be argued that the turnover 
underreporting is at least equal to bribes paid. 
 
Questions 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 
20. 
(Putnins et al., 2014a, p. 32) 
 
16.  Key informality profiling question – to diagnose turnover 
underreporting (tax evasion) including the motives and attitudes 
behind. 
 
Questions 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20. (Putnins et al., 2014a, p. 35) 
 
17.  Key informality profiling question – measurement of turnover 




Questions 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20. (Putnins et al., 2014a, p. 31) 
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Question 
number 
Main purpose Interconnectivity with other 
questions 
Relevance to other studies 
18.  Informality profiling question – part of the 6 NRA’s indicators. 
Detect informality chain of interdependence and attitude to 
formalisation together with question 19 and 20. Businesses who 
are acquiring part of the products/services they need without 
invoices are actually forced to either accept such net loss (to 
the reported value) or achieve similar level of informality to 
offset the costs. 
 
Questions 19 and 20. NRA methodology P.5 
19.  Works together with question 18 and 20 – see the description 
above. 
 
Questions 18 and 20. In support of NRA 
methodology P.5. 
20.  Works together with question 18 and 19 – see the description of 
question 18. 
 
Questions 18 and 19. In support of NRA 
methodology P.5. 
21.  Evaluates perception of NRA's institutional quality and its effect 
on the ease of doing business. Together with the 
interconnected questions appraise attitudes towards corruption. 
 
Questions 14, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28. (International Finance 
Corporation, 2014, p. 16) 
(Putnins et al., 2014a, p. 30) 
 
22.  Evaluates perceptions of the tax and social security burden on 
the cost of doing business. 
 
Questions 23 and 24. (International Finance 
Corporation, 2014, p. 15) 
 
23.  Evaluates acceptable/desired level of taxation. Therefore, 
assumptions could be made about potential risk of tax 
evasion/informality in comparison with the actual tax burden. 
 
Question 22.  
24.  Evaluation of external business environment constraints – 




Questions 22, 23, 25, 27, 28 and 
29. 
(International Finance 
Corporation, 2014, p. 147) 
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Question 
number 
Main purpose Interconnectivity with other 
questions 
Relevance to other studies 
25.  In combination with question 26, it attempts to cost enterprises’ 
time dealing with taxation, regulations and licensing 
frameworks. 
 
Question 26. (IFC, 2013) 
26.  In combination with question 25, it attempts to cost enterprises’ 
time dealing with taxation, regulations and licensing 
frameworks. 
 
Question 25. (IFC, 2013) 
27.  Examines relationship with NRA and potential institutional 
pressure for bribery. Works together with question 28 and 29. 
 
Questions 28 and 29.  
28.  Evaluates cost of doing business due to NRA interventions. 
 
 
Question 26, 27 and 29.  
29.  Examines relationship with NRA and potential institutional 
pressure for bribery. Works together with question 28 and 29. 
 
Question 27 and 28.  
30.  It detects unfair competition from informal businesses. This 
question works together with question 31 and provides insights 
for economic barriers to formalisation. 
 
Question 31. (IFC, 2013) 
(Williams, 2006) 
31.  Evaluation of unfair competition from informal businesses. This 
question supplements question 30 and provides insights for 
economic barriers to formalisation. 
Question 30. In support of (IFC, 2013) 
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Pilot cognitive testing 
 
One of the major challenges in unattended data collection methods (where there is no 
interviewer present) is the cognitive understanding of the actual questions’ meaning. It 
is sufficiently challenging to translate the research aims into meaningful questions 
with avoidance of overly-complex terminologies. However, it is even more difficult to 
ensure that the average cognitive understanding of the questionnaire is similar to 
majority of the respondents. The questions’ clarity, difficulty and assumptions being 
raised have to be designed in a way that the targeted audience see them in very 
uniform way. Even so, the most important factor in sensitive topics’ research (such as 
the informal economy) is the cultural alignment of the questionnaire – what could be 
asked and in what way for a given cultural context, so that the non-answer and drop-
out rate is kept at minimum. Phrasing a question about underreporting of business 
turnover in Eastern Europe has to be without doubt different in comparison with 
Western Europe in order to secure appropriate and relevant engagement. Very few 
studies report any pre-testing process and results accordingly and until recently there 
was little methodological research on pretesting available (Presser, 2004). To improve 
on this aspect of data acquisition, a cognitive testing approach was employed. 
 
Because of the specific role of this phase of instrument development, the interviewer 
had to be present face-to-face at all times of conducting the pilot cognitive testing. All 
pilot participants were in compliance with the pre-determined economic profile. There 
were the following reasons for pilot testing the questionnaire: 
 
 Preliminary evaluation of the questions to avoid any misunderstanding or 
misinterpretation by the targeted audience. 
 Appraisal of the gradual approach in terms of ability to acquire insights about 
evasive activities. 
 Assessment of the preferred data collection (telephone, postal, face to face or 
internet survey). 
 
The survey was pilot tested amongst 10 entrepreneurs recruited via a snowball 
sampling technique. All 10 of them were known to be engaged in partly informal mode 
of doing their business – about 30-50% of their turnover was concealed from the 
authorities. The snowball sample started with 3 entrepreneurs, who then were able to 
assist with information access to some of their business partners with whom they have 
formed the so called informal chain of dependence – mutual strategic double 
accounting techniques for the purpose of tax evasion with limited probability of 
detection. Having been through the entire questionnaire, all entrepreneurs were asked 
whether they would have preferred an alternative interview technique such as the 
same questionnaire deployed via post, telephone, Internet or face-to-face. The main 
concern, which the respondents have raised, was the strict confidentiality they all 
required in order to agree to participate. The interviewed entrepreneurs were 
presented with the following choices and asked to informally discuss the best option 
from their perspective. 
 
 On-site face-to-face interview. 
 Telephone interview. 
 Postal questionnaire. 
 Internet based survey on University of Sheffield branded web address of the 
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The following points and insights were acquired: 
 
 The interviewees wanted extensive and verifiable guarantee that the findings 
of this research will be exclusively used for academic purposes. They 
somehow distinguished the academic research from other types of research 
and did not feel threatened if this point could be proved adequately. 
 
 All of them expressed preference to be able to fill the questionnaire in the best 
possible time and most of the time it would be out of business hours and out of 
the business premises. Later results from the survey indicated exactly that – 
majority of the responses were collected after outside usual business hours, 
not insignificant part of which during unsocial hours and over more than one 
session per completion (the survey not finished at once, but during an 
additional session at a later time). 
 
 Nobody considered the telephone option due the high amount of prank and 
marketing calls and inability to verify the identity of the interviewer. The 
respondents said it is highly likely they would deter such attempts to be 
interviewed and also most probably would ignore the postal questionnaire. 
 
 The internet based survey gathered the biggest support due to satisfying 
majority of the expressed requirements, but most importantly proving the pure 
academic character of this research and related strict ethical procedure 
adherence (explained in the information sheet). The respondents felt most 
comfortable and confident in the internet based version due to the verifiable 
internet address and explicit association with University of Sheffield. 
 
Qualtrics is one of the world-wide leaders in the provision of contemporary tools for 
marketing and academic research and was selected for the purpose of the business 
survey of this study. In conjunction with the agreement between Qualtrics and 
University of Sheffield, internet based surveys could be deployed using verifiable and 
trackable institutionally possessed web domains. This was perceived by the 
respondents as an assurance that the research in question is associated with a 
renowned academic institution. The choice of survey deployment was therefore 
considered most likely to generate the highest response rate as a result of the 
additional credibility in front of prospective participants and its associated functional 
convenience. 
 
 Predictive analytics. 4.5
 
This heading (Predictive analytics) is designed to communicate the advantages of the 
utilised analytical tools and therefore justify their use for the purpose of this study. It 
starts with brief methods discussion and technical explanation of the information 
acquisition functionality of the survey. The next sub-sections include contextual 
introduction and applicability of decision trees and neural networks as appropriate 
analytical tools. Introduction to predictive modelling, its main terms, definitions and the 
modelling workflow framework are then presented, so that the reader is driven to 
sufficiently similar investigative stance as the author. The essence of the methods’ 
application and the emerging findings are presented in chapter 6 (section 6.2). 
 
Purely statistical methods would not be sufficient to reveal all multi-layered 
relationships within the acquired data. Fitting statistical models to the data and 
evaluating the statistical significance as an outcome depends on the knowledge of the 
researcher of the expected effects and/or findings. The researcher has to form a 
theory about a relationship, convert it to a hypothesis and then test it with a statistical 
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model. The purely statistical mode of analysis means that the investigator tests 
hypotheses of some prediction – the alternative hypothesis or the null hypothesis. The 
alternative hypothesis cannot be proved using statistics, but the rejection of the null 
hypothesis provides support for it. Based on the lack or presence of an effect, we are 
led into potential rejection of the null hypothesis, which consequentially provides 
support for the alternative hypothesis. It could be argued that one can fit a large 
number of statistical models to the data even there, where they do not expect any 
meaningful insights and thus actually discover some, which deserve attention. 
Evidently, this is a manual deductive approach. However, this imposes the risk of non-
discovery of statistically significant effects, which obviously translates into loss of 
meaningful research explanations. The more complicated the research data is the 
higher the risk of missing on significant relationships and findings becomes. If the 
research data contains some unusual or unexpected findings, which contradict or at 
least do not conform to current scientific knowledge in the area, then classic 
statistical methods may not be enough to expose them. Or at least the researcher is 
open to failure in their relevant application while they are trying to discover them. 
Obviously, testing research theories through decomposition to statistically testable 
hypotheses is to some degree dependent on the researcher’s scientific bias, 
correlated to their particular knowledge of the studied phenomena. 
 
A more advanced analytical approach is required to put to work in order to surmount 
such deficiencies. A dual mode analytical inquiry into the empirical data combines 
predictive analytics (data mining) techniques with classic statistical models. In other 
words, this is a specialised interrogation of the research data in order to discover 
relationships from which theories could be built and then tested with classic statistical 
methods where necessary. It could be argued that this is an abductive analytical 
approach – an amalgamation between the inductive capabilities of data mining 
(predictive analytics) with the deductive nature of classic statistical models. 
 
In general, advanced data mining techniques are based on mathematical algorithms 
(linear and non-linear) which are packaged in artificial intelligence software solutions. 
The main strength comes from the fact that the software solution, but not the 
researcher, identifies any important features and relations of the data. Any exposed 
insights are then scrutinised by the knowledge of the investigator and adjustments are 
made where necessary into the data mining strategies and techniques. The 
advantages of this approach are self-explanatory – maximum robustness and 
objectivity where the expert’s knowledge is combined with active analysis techniques 
supported by artificial (computer based) intelligence. Independently from the software 
solution used, there are two major stages in data mining with several product specific 
sub-stages. The two major steps are: 
1. Machine learning or the so called modelling. This is where various data mining 
models are deployed into the data and their settings are being tuned until the 
models achieve maximum precision. This is the stage of training the model(s) 
using the available data. The tuning of the data mining models requires the 
expert knowledge of the researcher in order to facilitate the strength of the 
machine learning capabilities. 
2. Deployment of the trained models into the real world (or in new data sets) in 
order to predict outcomes from similar or completely different variable inputs. 
This is the so called predictive analytics aspect of data mining. 
 
IBM SPSS Modeler Premium was employed as one of the two software solutions in 
the qualitative analysis phase of this thesis. At that stage of investigation, its natural 
language processing capabilities were used in combination with text analytics streams 
and models to analyse semi-structured data (the in-depth interviews). IBM SPSS 
Modeler is currently the industry benchmark, which establishes various important 
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standards for data analysis, including the Cross-Industry Standard Process for Data 
Mining (see Figure 8 for CRISP-DM). As explained earlier in the relevant chapter, that 
is the industry-proven way to guide data mining efforts and it is spanned over several 
semi-structured stages. There is a certain level of flexibility in terms of approaching 
and conducting this process, but it is limited to ensure that the analyst follows a 
benchmark industry standard. The quantitative analysis stage relies on IBM SPSS 
Modeler 18 Premium and IBM SPSS Statistics 23 Premium with the advanced 
modelling and analytical options available in these versions accordingly. Both 
products have been employed in dual and/or sequential mode so that the validity and 
robustness of findings are at their best. 
 
One of the viable and easy to demonstrate descriptors of the complexity of the 
acquired research data is the economic profiling function of the business survey 
questionnaire. In the context of the impending quantitative analysis, it is worthwhile to 
remind the reader about the capabilities of the questionnaire to adapt dynamically to a 
given respondent’s profile. This is achieved with the so called display logic questions, 
which are circumstantially relevant questions, based on previous answers provided. 
Therefore, the survey instrument allows for creating substantial amount of different 
economic profiles for respondents with significant precision. This is actually achieved 
via real time automated construction of the questionnaire in front of the respondent 
based on their answers as they advance through it. There are 2048 functionally 
possible variants of the questionnaire. The explanation of how this is technically 
achieved follows below. 
 
The survey questionnaire consists of 19 constant questions and 11 display logic ones. 
In addition, there is an introduction question responsible for the acquisition of 
informed consent. The 19 constant questions were designed to appear in front of all 
respondents independently from their previous replies. The 11 display logic questions 
were developed to appear only in specific circumstances, based on conditional logic 
of the type: if a respondent provides a particular answer to a previous question, then 
they must see a relevant display logic question. To serve their purpose, the display 
logic questions have been staged at 11 specific points throughout the questionnaire 
and they have two functional modes of existence – display or do not display condition 
(see Appendix 18, which shows the embedded display logic in detail). Having in mind 
the binary mode of appearance of every display logic question, the possible variants 
are represented by the following mathematical expression: 2
11 
= 2048. This is the 
symbolic expression of the binary nature of the display logic questions, with the 
intention of demonstrating how the number of all possible combinations is derived. 
 
Display question 1 Display question 2 Display question 3 And so up to 11 
Display = 0 Display = 0 Display = 0 Display = 0 
Do not display = 1 Do not display = 1 Do not display = 1 Do not display = 1 
 
Number 2 in the expression (2
11 
= 2048) accounts for the binary nature of display 
logic questions and the grade, which on this occasion is 11, represents all possible 
combinations between the display logic questions. Evidently, this design of the survey 
allows for great theoretical flexibility in profiling respondents via 2048 different 
versions of the questionnaire. In other words, the survey may create 2048 different 
tools for economic profiling of entrepreneurs. Having in mind the 413 responses in 
total, this means that a maximum of 413 variants has been exhausted out of 2048, but 
only if all utilised paths through the questionnaire are truly unique. It is unlikely to be 
so and most probably, the actual number is smaller through some similar patterns. 
The shortest path through the survey is for a respondent to face only 19 constant 
questions and neither one from the 11 possible display logic ones. The longest path 
through the survey is if a respondent faces all 19 constant question and based on the 
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provided replies trigger all of the 11 display logic questions. This is equal to answering 
all 30 possible questions. These two described combinations are obviously the two 
extremes from all possible versions of the questionnaire. This aspect of the business 
survey demonstrates the actual complexity of the empirical information acquired, the 
possible interconnectivity and potential for significant correlations between variables. 
 
4.5.1 Decision trees – a brief contextual introduction and applicability. 
 
The described level of data complexity requires advanced analytical techniques in 
order to generate reliable models, which could be used for predictive deployment into 
the real world. The major purpose of the business survey is to provide structured data 
to serve the modelling of economic behavioural patterns of entrepreneurs, which 
could be consequentially used by policy makers for precision interventions. One way 
of achieving this purpose is through the so called decision trees. They are based on 
different algorithms ranging from popular statistical tests such as chi-square and 
regressions to combinations of linear and non-linear mathematical modelling via 
decision forests (forests of decision trees). A fundamental benefit to decision and 
policy makers is the fact that all types of decision tree algorithms provide some form 
of significance of their conditional/branching structure. Their approach, which is 
similar to rule induction, is always visible in terms of reasoning – it is available from 
visually browsing the tree. In addition, the decision tree algorithms include only 
predictor variables, which contribute to the accuracy of the model and all others are 
excluded. As a result, they are invaluable instruments in appraising how a particular 
change of a certain condition will affect the dependant ones. This functionality will 
become evident via the demonstrated applications in the coming sections. 
 
The main objective of a decision tree is to expose a distinct pattern of characteristics 
and/or behaviour with the conditional support of a rule structure from the type 
“If/Then”. This is achieved via the logical branches of the tree and the associated rule 
set, which could be derived. The main building components of a decision tree are a 
number of antecedents (predictor variables) and a consequent (the target variable). In 
cases where a statistical algorithm supports the growing or in other words the 
branching of a decision tree, it is its significance, which ensures adequacy of the 
model in relation to the available data. In general, decision trees may have a 
hierarchal visual structure and/or purely conditional expression as a rule set. 
Depending on the type of analysis, both expressions could be utilised to present a 
problem-solution configuration. 
 
As a powerful instrument of analysis, decision trees are popular in many disciplines 
including structuring policy problems (Dunn, 2012, p. 25). It could be argued that their 
particular usefulness in that respect is due to their, as described by Rokach and 
Maimon (2008, p. 3), properties of discovery-orientated approaches in contrast with 
verification-oriented methods such as classic statistical methods. In comparison with 
the extensively used logistic regression, evidence suggests that decision trees retain 
superior accuracy even when research data becomes less accurate (Coussement, 
Van den Bossche & De Bock, 2014, p. 2752). However, decision trees have some 
well-known drawbacks such as “over-sensitivity to the training set, to irrelevant 
attributes and to noise” (Rokach, 2016, p. 114). There are circumvention methods to 
compensate for such weaknesses (like boosting, cross-validation, bagging), but the 
most powerful and perhaps advanced solution is through creation of decision forests. 
After extensive evaluation of various tree algorithms, it has been discovered that 
Exhaustive Chi-squared Automatic Interaction Detector (E-CHAID) trees, 
Classification and Regression Trees (C&RT) and C5 trees are best suited to the type 
of empirical information available. The evaluation process was conducted according 
to IBM CRISP-DM standards and established the following major considerations: 
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 The characteristics of the data satisfy the assumptions of the described 
models. 
 
 The above mentioned tree algorithms tend to produce models with the highest 
meaningfulness and deployability. The predictive analytics power is the highest 
in comparison with other similar algorithms. 
 
Two important properties of decision trees are further supporting the rationale for their 
use in the current analysis. Firstly, their automated interaction identification 
capabilities – this allows detections of significant relationships between variables, 
which is a powerful dimension reduction technique. The so identified relationships 
could be further explored (if necessary) in formal parametric models. It could be 
argued that in highly sophisticated data sets such as the one used here, the 
knowledge of the researcher greatly benefits from such analytical enhancing 
techniques. Secondly and most importantly, the prediction capabilities of decision 
trees which allow forecasting of future behavioural patterns. The following relevant 
examples are offered as target deployment scenarios for decision trees: 
 If a segment of micro and small businesses tend to evade taxes for purely 
economic survival reasons how would changing aspects of their business 
environment do affect evasive patterns. Policy makers will need to know how 
impactful their interventions would be in order to even consider potential 
implementation. 
 
 If a segment of micro and small firms operates in partly informal mode of doing 
business due to a mixture of unfair competition, poor institutional quality and 
being part of informal chain of dependence, then what type of policy efforts 
would have the greatest positive impact towards a higher level of formalisation. 
 
The following paragraphs provide a brief discussion about the most appropriate tree 
algorithms. The CHAID algorithm was originally developed by Kass (1980). It is a very 
powerful statistical model of tree growing based on statistical tests (chi-square or F-
test) as a criterion. The algorithm depends on a built-in significance testing with the 
effect of using the most significant predictor (rather than the most explanatory). This 
is particularly useful for identification of unexpected knowledge patterns and hence 
principally useful to the current research aims. Multi-way splits (in contrast to binary) 
or more than two branches for some splits are also possible. This allows for 
exhaustive descriptive logic of explanation, which is another important feature 
required. As a higher algorithm level, the so called exhaustive CHAID was developed 
later by Biggs, De Ville and Suen (1991, p. 49) to eliminate some of the weaknesses 
of CHAID. “Unlike Kass's algorithm, the algorithm does not favour simple partitions 
(low values of k) nor does it discriminate against free-type (no restriction on order of 
values) predictor variables with many categories.” E-CHAID can find the best split for 
each predictor variable through examination of all possible splits, and then choose 
which predictor to split on by comparing the adjusted p-values (IBM, 2015a, p. 79). In 
the context of all possible versions of the questionnaire and the complex predominant 
categorical structure of the data, this becomes highly relevant functionality. 
Classification and Regression Trees (C&RT) were originally developed in depth in the 
monography of Breiman, Friedman, Stone and Olshen (1984). These algorithms are 
quite robust in the presence of missing data in combination with large amount of 
variable fields. This is exactly the case with the so called system missing information 
in sets of variables (questions) not displayed to respondents due to the display logic 
employed in the questionnaire. Another advantage and suitability in the given 
circumstances is the fact that C&RT trees have very straightforward structure for 
interpretation. The modelling assumption accommodates for continuous as well as 
categorical variables. In those terms, the utilisation of C&RT in the analysis is 
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dependent on their strengths in regards with the research question. 
C5 decision trees are state of the art algorithms. They have been designed to analyse 
substantial data sets with immense amount of numeric, time, date, or nominal fields. 
Ross Quinlan was developing tree based models such as the ID3 in the 1970s which 
later evolved into C4.5 as described in his seminal work (Quinlan, 1986; Quinlan, 
1993). The main strength of the algorithm comes from the inductive inference 
capabilities, which are particularly useful in unusual knowledge discovery. It could be 
argued that due to enhanced handling of missing data and large number of variable 
inputs in combination with reduced errors in tree pruning (Pandya & Pandya, 2015), 
C5 are currently extensively used in critical automated computer-aided diagnosis 
(Azar & El-Metwally, 2012). The described advantages of C5 algorithms obviously 
secure the required level of precision for critical applications. Moreover, they appear 




4.5.2 Neural Networks. 
 
In addition to decision trees, neural networks have been used to take advantage of 
their nonlinear approach to classification and pattern recognition. It is argued that 
traditional linear regression is a special case of neural networks, but it is analytically 
disadvantaged due to the rigid model structure and set of assumptions that are 
imposed before learning from the data (IBM, 2015c, p. 1). Given, the need to unveil 
the complexity of motivations in informal business practices, the best analytical 
technique is to enable unlimited flexible function fitting (Cherkassky, Friedman & 
Wechsler, 1994, p. 107) of various models into the data. This is achieved through 
ensembles of multilayer perceptron (MLP) neural networks using more than two 
layers, which enables generation of arbitrarily complex decision boundaries (Bishop, 
1995). The number of hidden units could create issues with network complexity 
(Ripley, 1996, p. 168) and robustness and this issue is controlled through automating 
the selection via IBM SPSS Modeler. The use of neural networks provides an 
additional analytical advantage in terms of greatly limiting any research bias and prior 
knowledge assumptions, so that the discovery of unusual or unexpected causal 
relationships is greatly enhanced. 
 
The property of neural networks to approximate a wide range of linear and nonlinear 
statistical models depending on variables’ relationships is invaluable for the current 
tax evasion model building. Modelling of economic (tax elusive) behaviour is generally 
nonlinear dynamical system, which aims to predictively simulate social actors’ 
behaviour. Therefore, neural networks are employed here in their natural 
“neurodynamical context” (Haykin, 2009, p. 589) to solve such problems. In order to 
answer some of the research questions of this study (see tables 4 and 5) the 
appraisal of the predictors’ importance through neural networks models served dual 
purpose: 
 Firstly, it reveals what are the strongest influencers for entrepreneurs to 
engage in tax evasive activities. This is achieved with neural computation of 
relationships’ significance between predictor and target variables. 
 Secondly, the current data set was used to train and make available in 
electronic form several neural networks, which could be used for future 
predictive data scoring (in later longitudinal data sets). 
All models with their exhaustive configuration and training details are available as part of this 
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4.5.3 Predictive modelling – terms and definitions. 
 
The purpose of this section is to orientate the reader in the analytical modelling flow 
and therefore it provides explanations of the terms and definitions to be used. As 
described earlier, the two software solutions utilised for this purpose are IBM SPSS 
Modeler Premium version 18 and IBM SPSS Statistics Premium 23. 
 
1. IBM SPSS Statistics is used in the so called mode of a “Helper Application” to IBM 
SPSS Modeler. This could be called a master-slave relationship, where IBM SPSS 
Modeler is the primary analytical solution. This means that for particular analytical 
tasks where further statistical tests would prove beneficial to the research claims, 
IBM SPSS Statistics is being revoked and used from within IBM SPSS Modeler. 
 
2. Both software solutions are considered to represent the industry standard and 
therefore only brief descriptions for the used terms is provided in table 6 below. 
 
3. Table 7 provides images and brief explanation of the most commonly used 
modelling nodes in the analysis. 
 
Table 6: Brief definition of common modelling terms. 
Software Software term Explanation 
IBM SPSS 
Modeler 
Modeling node “A model is a set of rules, formulas, or equations 
that can be used to predict an outcome based on a 
set of input fields or variables.” (IBM, 2015b, p. 5) 
There are several nodes, which employ 









Target When discussed in modelling context a “Target” is 
usually the variable being predicted as a function 




Target field Usually a field in a model, which is designed to 




Input When discussed in modelling context a “Target” is 
usually the variable being predicted as a function 






“To build a stream that will create a model, we 
need at least three elements: 
 A source node that reads in data from some 
external source, in this case an IBM SPSS 
Statistics data file. 
 A source or Type node that specifies field 
properties, such as measurement level (the 
type of data that the field contains), and the 
role of each field as a target or input in 
modeling. 
 A modeling node that generates a model 
nugget when the stream is run.” (IBM, 2015b, p. 
6) 
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“The percentage of records that is correctly 
predicted by the model relative to the total 
number of records.” (IBM, 2015b, p. 60) 
 
 
Table 7: Commonly used modelling nodes in IBM SPSS Modeler. 
Modelling nodes Brief explanation in accordance with (IBM, 2015b) 
 
“The Statistics File node reads data from the .sav or .zsav file 
format used by IBM SPSS Statistics, as well as cache files 




“The Type node specifies field metadata and properties. For 
example, you can specify a measurement level (continuous, 
nominal, ordinal, or flag) for each field, set options for 
handling missing values and system nulls, set the role of a 
field for modeling purposes, specify field and value labels, 
and specify values for a field.” 
 
 
“The Association rules node associates a particular 
conclusion (the purchase of a particular product, for 
example) with a set of conditions (the purchase of several 
other products, for example).” 
 
 
“The Auto Classifier node estimates and compares models 
for either nominal (set) or binary (yes/no) targets, using a 
number of different methods, enabling you to try out a variety 
of approaches in a single modeling run. You can select the 
algorithms to use, and experiment with multiple combinations 
of options. For example, rather than choose between the 
quick, dynamic, or prune methods for a Neural Net, you can 
try them all. The node explores every possible combination of 
options, ranks each candidate model based on the measure 





“The CHAID node generates decision trees using chi-square 
statistics to identify optimal splits. Unlike the C&R Tree and 
QUEST nodes, CHAID can generate nonbinary trees, 
meaning that some splits have more than two branches. 
Target and input fields can be numeric range (continuous) or 
categorical. Exhaustive CHAID is a modification of CHAID 
that does a more thorough job of examining all possible splits 
but takes longer to compute.” 
 
 
“The C5.0 node builds either a decision tree or a rule set. The 
model works by splitting the sample based on the field that 
provides the maximum information gain at each level. The 
target field must be categorical. Multiple splits into more than 
two subgroups are allowed.” 
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Modelling nodes Brief explanation in accordance with (IBM, 2015b) 
 
“A neural network can approximate a wide range of predictive 
models with minimal demands on model structure and 
assumption. The form of the relationships is determined 
during the learning process. If a linear relationship between 
the target and predictors is appropriate, the results of the 
neural network should closely approximate those of a 
traditional linear model. If a nonlinear relationship is more 
appropriate, the neural network will automatically 
approximate the "correct" model structure.” 
 
 
“The Ensemble node combines two or more model nuggets to 
obtain more accurate predictions than can be gained from 
any of the individual models. By combining predictions from 
multiple models, limitations in individual models may be 
avoided, resulting in a higher overall accuracy. Models 
combined in this manner typically perform at least as well as 
the best of the individual models and often better.” 
 
 
“The Table node creates a table that lists the values in your 
data. All fields and all values in the stream are included, 
making this an easy way to inspect your data values or export 
them in an easily readable form. Optionally, you can highlight 
records that meet a certain condition.” 
 
 
“The Analysis node enables you to evaluate the ability of a 
model to generate accurate predictions. Analysis nodes 
perform various comparisons between predicted values and 
actual values (your target field) for one or more model 
nuggets. Analysis nodes can also be used to compare 
predictive models to other predictive models.” 
 
 
4.5.4 Modelling workflow framework. 
 
This section contains the so called Modelling Workflow Framework (Table 8) used for 
the analysis. It was especially developed to serve the current management research 
needs. It is presented here in order to provide full transparency to the reader for the 
logic behind the selection and use of any predictive modelling techniques. As a result, 
it also delivers the logical means for reverse examination and scrutiny of the 
modelling employed. Simultaneously, it could be argued that the suggested MWF is a 
robust methodology, which could be used beyond the management research focus 
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Table 8: Modelling workflow framework (MWF). 
 
Modelling Workflow Framework (MWF) 
 
1. Discovery of the most appropriate and meaningful predictive models to be used. 
 
1.1. Using association algorithms (APRIORI, CARMA, and Association Rules) 
discover patterns and relationships in the data, including any unknown to 
the researcher (if such exist). Based on researcher’s knowledge verify 
which variables’ relationships need analysis. If there are any known 
important relationships missed by the automated association algorithms, 
explore those either with manual modelling or include them in the next step. 
This is the deductive interrogation of the data. In doing so, satisfy any 
particular modelling assumptions – every model has specific requirements 
for the data in terms of targets and inputs’ characteristics. The criterion for 
model selection: if there is more than one model with satisfied assumptions, 
then select the one, which generates the highest accuracy-deployability 
ratio. 
1.2. Using the Auto Classifier and Auto Numeric algorithms perform a structured 
automated model evaluation to explore the relationships identified in 1.1. 
This is the inductive interrogation of the data for the purpose of new 
knowledge discovery. 
1.3. Fine-tune the top performing models from 1.2 based on accuracy-
deployability ratio. 
 
2. Examination of whether models created in stage 1 could be used in the so 
called model ensembles in order to derive a higher level models and research 
findings accordingly. This is the abductive interrogation of the data, as it 
requires the specific knowledge of the researcher in building the model 
ensemble. It also presents a degree of inductive knowledge discovery thanks to 
the automated application of the model ensemble to the empirical data. Model 
ensembles utilise the predictive power of at least two models to achieve more 
accurate predictions than can be gained from any of the individual models if 
engaged on their own. 
 
3. All models from stage 1 and 2 need to be evaluated in several aspects, so the 
investigator could decide to keep or dismiss them. The main question is whether 
these models present any meaningful and significant research findings, which 
are worth reporting. 
 
3.1. If yes, then evaluate the model predictive accuracy and deployability. 
Ensure satisfactory comparability with the initial evaluation by the auto 
classification algorithms. Keep or dismiss the model based on this 
evaluation. Depending on the model and the associated research findings, it 
is a viable compromise between accuracy and deployability. Very high 
model accuracy may result in poor deployability and vice versa 
(generalisable predictive power). 
3.2. If the model does not represent any meaningful and significant research 







– 87 – 
 Ethical and other issues raised by the methods or the approach (e.g. 4.6
language, cultural factors etc.) 
 
The study’s topic requires disclosure of information, which could affect the 
respondents if not handled ethically. In that regard, there is a demand for a greater 
level of trust in the communication between the researcher and the participants in 
comparison with what would be sufficient in other more conventional research 
scenarios. The principal researcher is a native Bulgarian and although he has been 
living in the UK, but not in Bulgaria for the last 5 years prior to the study, he would be 
recognised as a native Bulgarian by the respondents. This would have removed any 
additional cultural and language barriers from the research relationship and will have 





The main ethical principles have been that the researcher: 
 
 While working within the University of Sheffield ethical approval rules, applied 
whichever national ethical standards are the highest between UK (University of 
Sheffield) and Bulgaria. 
 
 Provided information sheet about the study and the relevant research method 
(survey/interview). The information sheet/cover letter will contain confirmation 
that full anonymity and confidentiality will be secured for the informants. 
 
 Report and disseminate results only in aggregate form. 
 
 Particular care has been exercised to inform the respondents about their rights 
(to stop the interview at any time, to share only information they want to share). 
 
 Acquire informed consent from the respondents. 
 
General compliance, scientific integrity and ethical conduct: 
 
This project abided by the University’s ‘Good Research Practice Standards’: and by 
the University’s ‘Ethics Policy Governing Research Involving Human Participants, 
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Chapter Five 
 
5. Findings of semi-structured in-depth interviews. 
 
This thesis employed mixed methods in exploratory sequential design and the current 
chapter addresses the first out of two investigative levels. Indeed, to analyse the in-
depth interviews with key NRA officials and therefore contribute to the comprehensive 
review of the institutional context with a focus on tax policy management. To achieve 
this task, four lines of inquiry have been reported: discovery and exploration of agency 
strategies; agency operational approaches and the predominant type in the mix of 
policy measures; and the triggering procedures and methods of enforcing control and 
compliance – tax audits and inspections. Particularly important is the illuminating 
discovery of the three major environmental pressures (institutional, economic and 
political) which affect NRA’s role in revenue raising policies and the associated 
institutional asymmetry. This line of qualitative investigative analysis (chapter 5) 
complements the quantitative one (chapter 6) and both inform a holistic account of 
the socio-economic influencers of the processes of business tax evasion, 
formalisation and informalisation. 
 
 
 Qualitative analysis – visualisation and discussion. 5.1
 
National revenue agencies face the problem of balancing revenue-raising at sufficient 
rates to enable states to function and doing so at levels regarded as socially 
acceptable among economic actors. If revenue raising policies are deemed 
unacceptable, it can encourage avoidance of the formal economy in favour of 
remaining within, or entering, the informal economy. This balancing act becomes 
particularly acute in economies with weak formal institutions and significant informal 
institutions because operating within the informal economy is a practically-viable 
alternative to operating in the formal economy. Previous research (Williams et al., 
2014d) exposed the so called institutional asymmetry, which affects negatively 
entrepreneurship in Bulgaria. Many transition economies like Bulgaria face just this 
situation, where formal institutions vie for control over informal institutions, but little is 
known about how revenue agency officials work to manage this balancing act. 
 
Institutional asymmetry is now widely recognised as being positively correlated with 
informal economic activities – both at entrepreneurial and employment level (Williams 
et al., 2015a; Williams et al., 2015c; Williams et al., 2015d). The formal institutions of 
a country consist of the political ruling model with its supportive economic and legal 
structures-agencies. The informal institutions are embodied in the fundamental social 
norms in a given society, which translate into various beliefs, value systems and social 
behavioural norms. There is an inherent interconnection between the formal and 
informal institutions, which affects entrepreneurship and economic development in 
general. According to North’s (North, 1990) theory of institutional change, formal 
institutions are representation of informal ones and they both co-evolve. Casson et al. 
(2010) conducted an intriguing critical review of the literature, revealing the intrinsic 
circularity between institutions and economic development. In their view “the quality of 
institutions in a country will influence its development process, while at the same time, 
the process of development will influence the quality of these institutions”. Further 
evidence (Valdez et al., 2013) in support of the relationship between the quality of 
macro-level institutional environment and the sought alignment with people’s norms, 
perceptions, acceptance and experiences, signifies that actually the latter have 
stronger economic benefit for a given country context. This part of the analysis is with 
a particular focus on providing insights on how officials seek to balance their duty to 
enforce the formal tax system while managing the risk that entrepreneurs seek to 
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avoid the formal institutions and operate in the informal sector. Until now, there is no 
such an in-depth study of the National Revenue Agency’s strategic methodology, 
attitudes and policies to counteract tax evasive activities. This qualitative analysis 
aims to present summarised evidence from which some potential lessons will be 
highlighted for other transition economies. 
 
Appendix 15 is a graphical representation of all nodes from within NVivo. All top level 
nodes (9 in total) are represented in rounded rectangular shapes coloured in green. 
It becomes evident, which top nodes possess the biggest number of sub-nodes. It is 
top to bottom order (Appendix 15) where the higher the root level node is located the 
most sub-levels it possesses. However, from the following figure 11 it is visible that, 
although the top node “Risk management” possess the most sub-nodes it is on third 
place in terms of text references – parts of text coded to it. 
 




When working with nodes in a hierarchy, one can gather all the materials from child 
nodes and roll it up to the parent node. This is how the total number of references is 
accumulated in the figure above. For the purpose of the analysis, we can say that 
although “Risk Management” node possesses the biggest number of sub-nodes it is 
on third place in terms of number of references. To identify the significance of a 
theme, the analyst needs to account for both – number of references, and number of 
sub-themes. As is evident, all nodes are actually representing a particular theme 
(topic) of certain importance. 
Cluster analysis is an exploratory technique in NVivo, which could be used to visualize 
patterns in any given project by grouping sources or nodes that share similar words, 
similar attribute values, or are coded similarly by nodes. Cluster analysis diagrams are 
available in different shapes to provide a graphical representation of sources or 
nodes. For the needs of the analysis, the following figure has been developed using 
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Figure 12: Cluster analysis of top nodes (themes). 
 
 
Nodes in the cluster analysis figure that appear closer together are more similar (by 
words similarity) than those that are far apart. In addition, from the node’s location in 
relation with other nodes we could observe the relation between particular themes. In 
the given example, Risk Management is of central position to the other root level 
nodes, which indicates its central importance to what is being done in the NRA. 
The approach called frequency technique is a useful method to visualise the most 
frequently coded words (concepts). This is being done by estimating the intensity of 
coding to a particular concept. As is evident from figure 13 below, some of the most 
frequently coded concepts are: selection, tax, inspections, and audits. If the font being 
used is bigger, then this represents a more frequently coded concept. 
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Table 9 represents the key themes (relating to particular questions), which have 
emerged from the interviews. The in-depth interview (Appendix 7) contained 26 
predetermined (structured) questions and table 9 below presents 13 of them. Thanks 
to the semi-structured nature of the interviews, the researcher had the chance to ask 
relevant clarifying questions and thus capture enriched information about the most 
significant topics. The first column of the table presents selected questions from the 
interview template. The second column provides additional information about the 
research purpose of the question. The third column summarises some of the 
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Table 9: Key interview themes and summary of responses. 
 
Question Research purpose Key accents Illuminating quotes 
What challenges do 
you encounter in the 
implementation of 
your tasks and 
responsibilities? 
 
This question aims to reveal 
what are the difficulties, which 
are currently encountered by 
NRA officials. The question is 
asked in such a way to 
provoke the respondents to 
speak about their real 
professional challenges and 
thus share their impressions 




and pressure, difficult 
organisational 
management, bank 
secrecy as problem, 
need for new data 
management 
systems, need for 
specific training 
 
“Quite а large issue. Too slow response to some external 
stimulus, too difficult change... slow system... Or restriction in 
relation with other organizations that could assist and support 
us. Others are related to... how to say... not just criticism of the 
political environment but rather the political situation. I mean 
the administration is sometimes used for certain purposes other 
than what it should do. But let’s say that this is normal for the 
political situation in Bulgaria.” 
“Another example is bank secrecy... very restrictive regime, it is 
difficult to take bank secrecy which in turn hampers the 
detection of tax fraud.” 
“it was difficult to find the right people for the job” 
 
One of NRA’s 
strategic aims is to 
encourage voluntary 
tax compliance. What 
initiatives and/or 
activities do you 
undertake in that 
regard? 
 
The purpose is to discover how 
NRA satisfies one of its 
strategic aims. Is “encouraging 
voluntary tax compliance” just 
an advertised strategic aim of 
NRA or it is genuinely pursued. 
Based on the collected 
information it could be 
determined to what degree 
indirect policy measures are 
being favoured by NRA. 
 
 






provision of electronic 
services, letter and 
telephone campaigns, 
use of treatment mix 
 
“Here is an example of a very slow things happening in the 
administration.” 
“In addition, our cooperation with business organisations, I 
think, is getting better every year. It's easier to know and to feel 
that the NRA is your partner and not an opponent...” 
“actually in this sense are the efforts of the NRA for 
encouraging voluntary compliance by trying to create more 
clear laws, more access to electronic services, more access to 
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Question Research purpose Key accents Illuminating quotes 
Does NRA have 
specific methods or 
systems in place with 
which you reveal the 
ways and means used 
by the tax payers to 
evade their tax duties 
or lie to you – for 
instance concealment 
of business turnover? 
 
This question is designed to 
reveal facts about the current 
approach in tackling informal 
practices exercised by 
businesses. It is generally 
questioning whether there is 
some level of automation 
(systems) employed to tackle 
tax evasion. 
 








"we have a remote connection to the cash registers, which 
helps a lot to locate places where such income is 
concealed...This can be done automatically and the colleagues 
do it." 
"In general we have a lot of information, but not always process 
it successfully enough. This is one of the problems facing the 
NRA. Now there are works on a new control system, hopefully 
thanks to it things will be happening more successfully." 
"But generally we use some purely statistical methods such as 
regression models, for example, which can be used as risk 
profiling of the individuals." 
 
Are the assignments 
and management of 
tax audits and 
inspections 
automated to some 
extent or not at this 
moment of time? 
 
This is a very topical question 
in regards to the high 
corruption level in Bulgaria – 
affecting institutions and 
administrations of all types. It 
actually aims to expose the 
level of subjectivism and 
opportunities to influence 










"Currently only the distribution is automated, that is, who will 
conduct an audit of a certain taxpayer. But by the middle of 
August the whole process will be automated in this information 
system." 
"In fact, the audit is distributed automatically to an employee at 
random. It is not subjective. Nobody decides, but the system 
decides." 
"Although there are internal rules that are actually able to 
affect this process. It is not fully and completely.... right" 
"if I'm honest, there were some possibilities to circumvent this 
automated distribution. But now with the new system as though 
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Question Research purpose Key accents Illuminating quotes 
In your opinion, is 
there any 
subjectivism in the 
selection, delegation 
and management 
process of tax audits 
and revisions? Or is 
this avoided through a 
level of automation of 
those processes? 
 
This last question from the 
special section is designed to 
collect and confirm personal 
opinion about any subjectivism 
in regards with the 
implementation of tax audits 
and inspections. 
 
available level of 
subjectivism 
"I think that, in theory, subjectivism can be avoided. We live in 
the 21st century. Talking about artificial intelligence. But the 
question is whether we want it to be avoided and whether it 
should be avoided. I think the extremes are always harmful and 
it should not be avoided. It should be limited, the subjectivism. 
That is, subjectivism should be exercised on an objective 
basis." 
"Specifically for the selection I cannot tell you. I would wish 
there not to be." 
"So there is, of course there is. Subjectivism cannot be absent." 
Is there a process for 
analysis of the 
possible measures, 
the implementation 
expenses for them 
and the expected 
effect? 
 
It is an established fact that 
contemporary tax offices are 
deciding upon their 
engagements (such as audits 
and inspections) based on 
embedded cost benefit ratio 
procedures. So, this question 
is looking to find out how it is 
at NRA – operational efficiency 






benefit capability, few 
officials aware about 
the new methodology 
"Yes. This is part of risk management...We try here to evaluate 
how much an inspection will cost us, how much an audit will 
cost us, how much a media campaign will cost us and what 
effect it will have.” 
"there is no such risk which is so small in terms of damage to 
the budget, so that to fail to cover the cost of treatment...We 
can measure what we have achieved, but we still cannot 
predict what we will achieve." 
"There is no procedure. The only thing I know that has been 
developed is an average price how much an audit costs the 
administration, namely that it costs about ten thousand levs.” 
"what costs this control action is worth to the NRA and the 
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Question Research purpose Key accents Illuminating quotes 
How is it decided into 
which areas of tax 
non-compliance to 
invest efforts? Said 
differently, which 




This question relates to two 
other questions (13 and 16). It 
is part of the so called gradual 
approach in extracting related 
information. Again, it seeks 
information about a 
relationship between applied 
compliance measures and 
expected outcome (cost 
benefit relationship). 
 
lack of agreement 
about risk 
management 
"I do not know how it turns out that some risks are prioritized... 
I'm sorry but one of the risks was "a risk of tax evasion by 
individuals conducting driving lessons". That type of risks, 
which simply I do not know how they manage to find such risks! 
How it got such a high priority, that risk!" 
"To be honest I do not know how it is decided. So we have a 
strategic plan, some strategic objectives are laid in it. One of 
these objectives is for example to combat tax fraud." 
"well it is logical to assume that where there are the biggest tax 
losses, we should be directed there and I think this is leading.” 
"Well, generally avoiding to report turnovers, to display revenue. 
This is the main we observe particularly in Risk Management. 
Others already are... non-compliance with labour legislation, 
this is seriously practiced." 
 









The question is after NRA 
opinion about the most 
frequent reasons/motives for 
turnover underreporting by the 




lack of study on the 
topic, unfair 
competition problem, 
most officials were 
interested to know the 
real motives for 
evasion 
"Unfortunately, we do not yet have made such a slender study 
on this topic. So far we have only read external studies..." 
"I think it is a herd behaviour. Just all do it, why not do it myself." 
"Some people do not want to pay taxes because they think that 
they are not spent properly from the budget after that." 
"for me a big role is played by the competition, sometimes 
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Question Research purpose Key accents Illuminating quotes 
If you have noticed 
change in the 
behaviour of firms 
and/or individuals as 
a result of counter 
evasive activities, is 
there any mechanism 
of changing any 
future counter 
activities and if yes 
how is this 
happening? 
 
This question is connected 
with 13, 16, 17, 20, 21 and 22. 
It aims to reveal any 
institutional culture of 
responsiveness. 
 
procedures for risk 
treatment feedback 
are still not fully 
developed, lack of 
real world feedback 
mechanism 
"Yes, because when we see that a risk does not respond or 
there is extremely small effect of our actions, rather we have to 
look to change our impact or to be directed to other risks." 
"it is very fragmented. I can hardly say that such a process 
exists, systematic." 
"There are indicators and benchmarks for evaluating whether it 
is influenced significantly." 
“If we consider the particular risk and we have evaluated it is 
greatly influenced, it may not be treated in the next one or two 
years.” 
 
At this moment of 
time what methods or 
campaigns are being 
used to encourage 
voluntary tax 
compliance of firms 
and traders? 
 
It aims to reveal to what extent 
NRA focuses their action on 
indirect methods. 
 
less emphasis on 
information 
campaigns, lack of 
developed 
campaigning methods 
"There are some campaigns being carried out. Although I would 
not say that they are exactly for the promotion of a correct tax 
behaviour. But there are some campaigns on compliance with 
tax legislation." 
"Informational campaigns are being used. Every year there is 
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Question Research purpose Key accents Illuminating quotes 
From your 
perspective, what are 
the characteristics of 
the firms and traders 
who allow themselves 
to declare lower tax 
base than the real 
one? Is there 
something particularly 
common between 
them or something 
which differentiate 
them from the other 
tax payers who are 
compliant? 
 
The main purpose is to find out 
whether NRA observed 
specific features and patterns 
characterising the informal 
firm or these firms, which 




attitude to evade 
taxes, evasion for 
profit maximisation, 
smaller businesses 
are likely to evade 
more taxes 
"we will not be able to change the stereotypical behaviour of 
Bulgarian folk-psychology." 
"The first thing that comes to my mind is that they are 
Bulgarians. I have already said, the attitude, mentality of the 
people..." 
"These are normal companies. They just do it because others 
are doing it." 
"Yes, there is. For example the size of the certain trader is of 
essential significance. The structure of the trader also, the 
structure of management in sole traders and in the so called 
family firms, where there is little staff and they are related." 
"But for those who actually do business, the only reason I can 
think of to conceal turnovers is to pay less taxes." 
"The business world is very colourful. It is hard to make such a 
generalization. Some common feature, in my opinion, can 
hardly be displayed. They have complex features and they are 
interconnected. In general, those who conceal income are 
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Question Research purpose Key accents Illuminating quotes 
In your view, what 
kinds of difficulties 




their efforts to be tax 
compliant? 
 
It is aimed to discover the 
institutional perspective about 
administrative and other 
difficulties experienced by 
Bulgarian businessmen, which 







level of customer 
service 
"My point is that there are still many documents we require from 
tax payers...And sometimes they have to provide us with quite a 
lot of information and it hampers them." 
"Maybe there are heavy bureaucratic procedures, the way of 
service" 
"I guess one of the reasons is the complexity of the legislation." 
"if the rules cannot change so often." 
"it may be demanded from the administration to be friendlier to 
business. We are not accustomed to this thing." 
"What I’ve heard from the business is that it is easier to conceal 
everything than to conceal one part. It is much easier for you to 
be entirely grey than trying to be compliant and someone came 
to audit you and to still find something." 
 
Is there any 
information, which is 
of particular interest 
to you about the firms 
and traders evading 
taxes, which you 
would like to know? 
This last question has couple 
of implicit purposes: 
 Firstly, it attempts to 
discover what kind of 
information NRA is after in 
regards to informal 
entrepreneurs 
(businesses). Thus, some 
conclusions about their 
approaches could be 
made. 
 Secondly, the question 
aims to collect insights and 
inform the creation of 
question(s) for a business 
survey. 
lack of information 
about motives for 
evasion, need for 
behavioural models of 
evaders, need for 
feedback about NRA 
 
"So what we don’t know here is about the behavioural models 
of the different groups. That is, firstly we do not have a clue i.e. 
do not have stratification of our taxpayers...From a behavioural 
point of view, right." 
"Yes. I wonder for example what they are not satisfied with, to 
receive feedback on what they are not satisfied and what they 
believe needs to be improved in the NRA." 
"I would go even further - what would that thing be, which will 
change them, what would that thing be that will make them not 
do it. Whether the fear of an audit or something else." 
"Now I think that if there is an opportunity, to ask under what 
circumstances they would declare absolutely everything." 
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In order to enable holistic appraisal of NRA methods, policy approaches and attitudes, 
it is required to consider that they are embedded into a specific socio-economic 
context. The next 3 figures (14, 15 and 16) objectively describe some of the key 
indicators characterising the institutional environment in which NRA operates. 
 
Figure 14 below presents the ease of doing business and selected related activities. It 
is based on data from World Bank and IFC (2015b). Instead of using the regular 
ranking indicators to produce the figure, the so called distance to frontier (DTF) score 
was used. DTF is a much more robust indicator due to its capability to demonstrate 
the absolute level of regulatory performance and how it improves over time (World 
Bank & IFC, 2015a) for a particular country. This measure shows the distance of each 
economy to the “frontier,” which represents the best performance observed on each 
of the indicators across all economies in the Doing Business sample since 2005 
(World Bank et al., 2015a). Zero represents the lowest performance and 100 
represents the frontier (best performance) – the higher the DTF score is the closer to 
the frontier a country is. 
We can observe that there is a decrease in majority of the DTF scores (some of them 
preserve the same value) for Bulgaria in the period 2010 to 2015 – the decrease is 
more distinct in the period 2013-2015. The cumulative ranks of 41 for 2014 and 49 in 
2015 (World Bank et al., 2015a) are even more affected (relatively) with a negative 
decrease – there is a decrease of 8 positions. 
 
The methodology used by “Doing Business” report includes small business according 
to the EU definition (European Commission, 2014). Businesses, which qualify as 
small, are actually big in comparison with the average business environment in 
Bulgaria. It could be argued that the ease of doing business has a financial expression 
for a given business – the more bureaucratic the institutional environment is the more 
expensive running a business would be. Majority of the institutional procedures are 
fixed in terms of efforts and costs and the bigger the business is they would be a 
smaller proportion of its earning potential. Therefore, the DTF scores (if calculated) 
for the average firm in Bulgaria are expected to be poorer. 
 
Figure 14: The ease of doing business and related activities in Bulgaria. 
Figure 14 is based on data from the World Bank et al. (2015b). A customised report about the ease of 
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Figure 15 presents the global competitiveness index (GCI) rankings for Bulgaria in the 
period 2010-2015. The Y-axis represent the GCI index – the lower the value the better 
competitiveness a country would have. It could be observed that there is a small 
improvement in the GCI index in that period, but still there are countries in 2015 like 
Puerto Rico and Chillie, which have approximately 70% better GCI – Puerto Rico GCI 
33, Chillie 32, Bulgaria 54 (World Economic Forum, Schwab K, Forum WE, 2015, p. 
13). Taking into consideration that Bulgaria is an EU member since 2007, the value of 
this indicator signifies some serious macroeconomic inefficiencies. 
 
Figure 15: The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) rankings – Bulgaria for 2011-
2015. This figure is produced using data from World Economic Forum (2015) – the data set used is 
available in Appendix 17. 
 
 
Figure 16 is a visual representation of the latest data from the Global Corruption 
Barometer (Transparency International, 2013) for the years 2010-11-2013. The Y-axis 
represents what proportion of the surveyed people thought that a particular institution 
is corrupt/extremely corrupt, while the X-axis provides the values for two 
measurement points – 2010-11 and 2013. It could be observed that disturbingly 
increasing proportion of the surveyed individuals between 2010-11-2013 believe that 
some of the key state institutions are corrupt or extremely corrupt. In appraising the 
link between corruption and entrepreneurial informality, Yalamov (2012) suggests that 
bribery is used primarily when companies are engaged in hidden economic activities 
and circumvention of the law. This means that these phenomena could not be tackled 
separately, but rather they need a holistic approach. 
 
Figure 16: Institutional corruption levels in Bulgaria. 
This figure is produced using data from Transparency International (2013) – the data set used is 
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To summarise the socio-economic indicators, it should be emphasized that Bulgaria 
continue to be the poorest EU member state with the highest share of informal 
economy and corruption. Unsurprisingly, at the same time it is one of the least 
competitive countries. 
 
Williams et al. (2014d) performed a critical analysis of how institutional asymmetry 
affects entrepreneurship in a transition setting. The authors defined institutional 
asymmetry “as the misalignment between formal and informal institutions, with the 
formal being generally supportive of entrepreneurship and the informal, unsupportive. 
The asymmetry develops over time as formal institutions are reformed to support 
entrepreneurship” (p. 2). Further research into institutional asymmetry (Williams et al., 
2015c) finds out that the greater the asymmetry between formal and informal 
institutions is, the greater is the likelihood of participation in the undeclared economy, 
and vice versa. One of the contributing factors for the increasing gap between the 
development of formal and informal institutions in Bulgaria, is the fact of the 
economically early acceptance as an EU member state due to geo-politic reasons 
and consequential inadequate policy transfers. 
 
Several Bulgarian governments attempted to adopt the best EU institutional practices 
at policy and operational bureaucratic level. In these transfer scenarios, little attention 
was paid to the fact that they were borrowed directly from advanced old EU members 
states, where the alignment between formal and informal norms is very high. 
Inevitably, the regulative pressure on the immature micro and small business sectors 
in Bulgaria increased disproportionally to their potential to adapt. This in combination 
with the low levels of social cohesion (see Figure 4), very high levels of corruption and 
mistrust, contributes to the significant and widespread informal economy and related 
phenomena. If a greater focus is granted to a further improvement of the formal 
institutions and their efficiency (without simultaneous development of the informal 
ones), this will inevitably lead to even greater share of the informal practices. As 
Williams et al. (2014d, p. 2) argued informal institutions matters “at least as much as 
formal institutions for fostering entrepreneurial activity” and therefore proportionate 
policy effort must be invested into their advancement. However, it should be 
underlined that policy influence over historically embedded cultural factors is limited 
even if designed appropriately, but this fact does not remove the necessity to create 
and maintain the right policy framework. Unfortunately, to this moment of time, neither 
the right policy framework existed, nor sufficient number of adequate policy transfers 
occurred in Bulgaria. 
 
The socio-economic context of NRA was enlighten, so that the discussion of its policy 
approaches, methods, attitudes and issues could be developed in an interconnected 
line. Figure 17 represents the total number of all types of audits and inspections (for 
businesses and citizens) performed by NRA. A very large number of controlling 
activities by NRA is evident having in mind that population of Bulgaria is only 7.2 
million (approximately). The data available is for the years 2009 – 2011, but there is 
no significant shift in tax policy since then, so it is highly likely that the figures will be 
similar for the years after. This is an indirect expression of the fact that the efforts to 
tackle informal economic activities have been focused on direct policy approaches, 
aiming to increase the risk of detection and cost of informality using disincentives. 
From an institutional perspective, it is intriguing to consider what the cost-benefit ratio 
is for this policy approach. The number of NRA audits has recently decreased to 
nearly 10 000 per year and the cost per audit is almost 10 000 BGN (based on data 
from the interviews). Noting that Bulgaria has the highest share of informal economy 
in the EU (Figure 2), this demonstrates that the aggressive and expensive deterrence 
policy approach is proving inefficient to tackle this problem. There is evidence 
(Williams et al., 2014c) that reducing the asymmetry between the formal and informal 
– 102 – 
institutions will improve the level of formalisation of entrepreneurs. As it is apparent 
from the data presented so far, firstly putting the emphasis onto direct measures is 
highly inefficient and secondly it deepens the institutional asymmetry even further. 
 
Figure 17: All types of audits and inspections performed by NRA. This figure is based 
on data acquired through an information access request as per Appendices 10 and 11. The data 
acquired, contained information for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011. 
 
 
Koettl and Weber (2012) utilised an intriguing standpoint about the role of labour 
taxation and social benefit design in regards to formal/informal work. It is important to 
note that the authors use a legalistic definition which includes the self-employed and 
employers amongst the informally employed if they conceal all their income. Although 
the authors have not conveyed explicitly, their approach belongs to a relatively new 
trend in the literature, which is concentrating on the rationale decision based model – 
social actors taking decisions about participating and to what extent into any form of 
informality. Koettl et al. (2012, p. 2) introduced an innovative measurement called 
formalisation tax rate (FTR) to analyse the disincentives for formal work: “The novelty 
of the latter is that it measures disincentives stemming not only from labour taxation, 
but also from benefit withdrawal due to formalization.” The analysis is implemented 
using data about six Eastern European countries (including Bulgaria). The authors 
argue that the higher the FTR that an individual is facing the higher the chance is that 
they would work informally. This could be considered in accordance with three 
possible policy approaches for NRA (sticks or carrots or a mixed approach) – if the 
government is using deterrence measures predominantly or otherwise in combination 
with incentive measures. It is argued that NRA can positively affect formalisation rates 
much more effectively through adjusting the FTR in Bulgaria. This is possible with an 
increase of the benefits for formalisation in comparison to the current trend in 
exercising intensive deterrence/direct measures approach. 
 
The semi-structured interview questions (to senior NRA executives) utilised a 
graduated approach over three interrelated sections. Considering, the fact that the 
topic of the in-depth interviews connected with information, which is not publicly 
available and is very carefully institutionally guarded, the main aims were: 
 Acquire as much intelligence as lawfully possible (see heading 4.3.2 and Appendix 
10, 11 for additional details). 
 Achieve the above without exposing NRA beyond its duty for transparency and 
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Interview section 1 
 
Gather information about the main tasks, responsibilities and methods being 
used to perform them by the two key NRA directorates. An additional implicit 
purpose of the first interview section is to explore the cohesion level in terms of 
intra-organisational understanding of these tasks, responsibilities and methods 
accordingly. It is aimed to discover the actual level of alignment amongst the key 
decision makers’ opinions and thus to build a picture of departmental role 
cohesion and potential related issues. 
 
Interview section 2 
 
There are seven questions, which are part of the so called “Special block of 
questions” aiming to collect the most sensitive intelligence. This section’s 
purpose is to reveal NRA response upon discovery of non-compliance, but most 
importantly how systematic it is in reality as well as objective and adequate to 
contemporary evasive practices. 
 
Interview section 3 
 
The last part of the questionnaire present an opportunity for cross verification of 
previous and impending questions with the formerly provided answers. This last 
section aims to reveal additional aspects of NRA tackling tactics with an accent 
on the type of action from policy perspective. Furthermore, it also asks some 
questions to be used for later correlation analysis when additional primary data is 
collected from a business survey amongst entrepreneurs. 
 
Therefore, the main purpose of the specific research design was to increase the 
quality and validity of the acquired information. For clarity, a brief summary for each 
interview section is presented below in Figure 18. 
 






































The key interview findings are described in Table 10. The first column from the left 
presents some major categories into which insights have been acquired. The other 
column to the right contains the most important accents, which emerged from the 
analysis of the interviews. The next sections will critically appraise the key findings 
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Table 10: NRA – categorisation of main accents. 
 
Topic category Key accents 
Operational environment  Political pressure 
 
Policy approach  Accent on direct measures (deterrence approach) 
 Less emphasis on information campaigns 
 Lack of developed awareness campaigning methods 





 Systems underdeveloped and underutilised 
 Opportunities to circumvent the automated case 
distribution 
 Available level of subjectivism in case distribution 
 Insufficient system synchronisation 
 Need for new data management systems 
 Lack of systematic information 
 Need for specific training 





 Difficult organisational management 
 Lack of agreement about risk management 
 Low level of customer service 
 
 
Legislative framework  Bank secrecy as problem 
 Frequently changing legal framework 
 Heavy bureaucratic procedures 
 
 
Real world bidirectional 
feedback 
 Newly developed cost-benefit methodology 
 Retrospective cost-benefit capability only 
 Few officials aware about the new methodology 
 Procedures for risk treatment feedback are still 
underdeveloped 
 Most officials are interested to know the real motives 
for evasion, but they do not have information 
acquisition practice 
 Need for behavioural models of evaders 
 Need for feedback about NRA 
 
 Specific cultural attitude to evade taxes 
 Evasion for profit maximisation 
 Smaller businesses are likely to evade more taxes 
 Unfair competition problem 
 
 
As Calciolari, Cristofoli and Maccio (2013) suggest public sector organisations are 
simultaneously subject to three types of environmental pressure: institutional, 
economic and political. Having enlightened the economic setting in which NRA 
operates, it is required to discuss one of the most pressing issues, which emerged 
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through the qualitative study – the fact of strong political pressure over NRA in terms 
of collecting income for the government. In particular, the case when NRA is 
strategically utilised as a revenue generating instrument to fill in political needs – such 
as financing election campaigns (and other improper income expenditures) or 
scrutinising the tax matters of business circles around the potential government in 
shadow. Such practices have been so frequently employed that for some of the high 
level NRA members of staff, they are perceived as “normal for the political situation in 
Bulgaria”. Logically, there are several multifaceted effects from these political 
pressures: 
 
 NRA strategic behaviour becomes dependent on the needs of any current 
government. Consequently, their policy of favoured direct measurement 
approach is even more emphasized, but in a disproportionate and highly 
subjective manner. 
 
 Controlling and punitive policy methods are deployed amongst two types of 
businesses in order to minimise the tax gap, but also to obstruct business 
support for the political opposition. The first categories of affected businesses 
are micro and small ones, which are not politically associated by default. The 
other category is the medium and large businesses, which are connected with 
the non-ruling political parties. This creates the issue of intentional 
asymmetrical closure of the tax gap. 
 
 Furthermore, such institutional practices disturb the social feeling for 
procedural fairness and henceforth increase the institutional asymmetry and 
informality accordingly. As Williams (2014c, p. 26) discuss procedural fairness 
as the extent to which people believe that they are paying their fair share 
compared with others and receive fair treatment by institutions. It is worthwhile 
noting (Williams, Dzhekova, Baric, Franic & Mishkov, 2014a, p. 49) that the 
appreciation of procedural fairness amongst Bulgarian individual and small 
business tax payers is below the acceptable social minimum. 
 
It is an established fact that the state administration in Bulgaria is very subservient to 
the governing political class (Noutcheva et al., 2008, p. 115) and high level public 
officials are often forced to act in greater alignment to political interests than in 
alignment with the legislative framework. Refusal to comply, usually results in position 
dismissal and in some cases disciplinary proceedings against such public servants. 
This is an issue that is even more acute for officials, who already accepted (at least 
once) to act purely as per the political will. In the context of the described phenomena, 
it would be unrealistic to expect efficiency orientated reforms supported by objective 
policy implementation at NRA. That would be only possible if there is genuine and 
appropriate political will to allow it, no matter how good the professional qualities of 
NRA high level executives are. In relation with the need for strategic management 
reforms to the link between NRA and government, it is important to emphasize that the 
current situation undermines what Cerase and Farinella (2009) determine as “public 
service motivation”. Thanks to the qualitative approach employed, it has been 
discovered that this is another significant problem, which is arguably widespread in 
the entire state administration. Obviously, its effects are more distinctive in revenue 
agencies (NRA and Customs). 
 
Amongst the most distinct information technology issues, which hamper NRA’s work is 
fact that the current systems are underdeveloped and underutilised in addition to the 
state of insufficient system synchronisation. The current systems are developed or 
acquired on a modular (ad-hoc and add-on) principle, which makes their 
synchronisation strongly limited. As apparent from the study findings, there are 
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opportunities to subjectively circumvent the automated case management, which 
arguably harms the perceived procedural fairness amongst the targeted tax payers 
(business and individual). This is especially valid for micro and small businesses, 
which bear the biggest proportion of compliance and asymmetrical gap closure 
pressure. As Hartner et al. (2008) discussed in case of perceived unfair treatment and 
processes of unfair decision making, taxpayers resist paying the whole amount of 
their taxes due. Additional issue between the two key NRA departments (Risk 
Management and Control) is the fact that risk management strategy becomes 
increasingly complicated due to the difficult economic situation and intra-organisation 
management issues. Therefore, risk management demands high level of 
standardisation in the development as well as in its enforcement process. As part of 
the difficult organisational management, both departments recognise that there are 
some mutual disagreements in both of these processes. This inevitably translates into 
disproportionate enforcement to tax payers and is also interpreted by them as an 
unfair treatment, which leads to the inter-connected questions of distributive justice 
and customer attitude. That is why it is highly desirable and applicable for NRA to 
achieve greater level of automation and objectivity in its intuitional control and 
enforcement measures, starting from more efficient risk assessment system. 
 
The discussion about political pressure over NRA and how it could be partly 
addressed, lead us to one of the logical ways forward. NRA should equip modern 
business intelligence software like other tax administrations such as HMRC UK and 
ATO in Australia). Such information technology solution would enable: 
 Significantly higher level of automation, which results in greatly reduced 
subjectivity in distribution and management of audits and inspections. 
 
 External auditing of NRA activities (for instance by BNAO) to be much more 
robust and informative. NRA work will be based on a transparent foundation. 
 
 Obstruct political pressure for asymmetrical closure of the tax gap – any tax 
management activities, which are not according to the established rules, would 
leave a visible trace and could be scrutinised at any time. 
 
 Reduction of the non-effective tax management actions – where the cost 
exceeds the potential income. 
 
At the time of writing the implementation of Oracle Business Intelligence Enterprise 
Edition is still ongoing (click here for more details) and the outcome of this innovation 
will become evident in the years to come. The efforts to improve the regulatory 
performance, cost-efficiency and transparency of NRA are based on bottom-up 
approach where the initiative is coming from within the agency. From one perspective, 
NRA high level executives need to address the strategic link between the agency and 
the government – this would make their work more independent through capacity for 
wider public accountability. This would secure much higher price political parties will 
pay if they need to exercise inappropriate institutional pressure. From another 
perspective, NRA feels the need to simplify and modernise their work internally (in 
intra-departmental way) and externally (e-customer service perspective). 
 
In consideration of the financial aspects of similar systems in Italy, Romania and 
Slovenia, Dečman, Stare and Klun (2010) argued that although the cost-benefit ratio 
over short periods (up to 3 years) is not favourable, there are some very important 
non-financial benefits. The reduction of formal control activities (shift in policy), higher 
taxpayer satisfaction and immediate availability of tax return data to mention some, 
could prove very profitable in over 3 years terms. Nevertheless, it is prudent to note 
that software solutions in support of tax administrations are a subject of an intense 
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debate in the literature. It is required to acknowledge that adoption of modern 
information technology solutions to enhance tax compliance is “no substitute for 
political will…computerization can easily serve as a way to absorb technical 
assistance, and camouflage the fact that little or no fundamental progress is being 
made on the reform” (Jenkins, 1996, p. 3). This danger is particularly relevant to the 
Bulgarian institutional environment and specific effort must be made to avoid its 
realisation. 
 
Another important aspect of having a fully integrated business intelligence software 
solution (at NRA) must be appraised here. In particular, the purpose of having 
prospective and retrospective cost-benefit functionality and how this relates to 
responsive regulation and enforcement. It could be suggested that the cost-benefit 
regulative policy approach has distinctive strengths to countries with low distributive 
justice and procedural fairness (like Bulgaria). To put this question into context, it 
should be said that modern tax administrations have two major types of controlling 
approaches: 
1. Enforcement activities applied at risks and in sectors where the expected 
benefit will outweigh the cost of the action(s). 
 
2. Enforcement activities applied at risks and in sectors where the moral effect 
will have wider effect in the society – to support a culture of voluntary 
compliance and tax commitment. These types of actions are undertaken 
predominantly on non-profitable basis – i.e. the expected monetary return is 
smaller than the cost of the action(s). 
 
The latter controlling approach is not usually a subject of cost-benefit analysis, 
because the intangible gains are considered to be worthy to the intended investments 
by revenue agencies. However, the first approach is based on detailed cost-benefit 
evaluation, for a number of reasons. From one perspective, to ensure cost-efficiency 
for tax administration – operational expenses to generated income ratio. From another 
perspective, to ensure that the most harmful tax evasive practices receive appropriate 
enforcement attention. The cost-benefit analysis is done prospectively and 
retrospectively, the results are then compared and changes to evaluation 
methodology implemented. The prospective part is based on the cost of known 
administrative and other resources in addition to prognosis for the expected revenue. 
The retrospective part is based on after treatment data through internal (revenue 
agency information) and external macro-economic information in addition to internal 
cost of the compliance actions. Both parts of the cost-benefit analysis are possible if 
a given tax administration possess real time feedback about its own costing 
procedures and a centralised way of extracting intelligence about tax compliance 
effects. This is only possible through an integrated business intelligence suit, which 
accounts for the default non-linearity of these processes. 
 
From a policy perspective, the cost-benefit approach to enforcement activities 
provides multi-faceted justifiable rationale. Firstly, public money is only spent on 
revenue collection activities, which are deemed to be sufficiently rewarding. Secondly, 
enforcement efforts are fairly allocated to risks and sectors, which deserve 
deterrence approach initially while commitment building resources are preserved for 
other segments of the taxpayers. This is encouraging and rewarding to already 
compliant business and individual taxpayers, strengthening their institutional trust. On 
the contrary, lack of solid cost-benefit reasoning could expose a revenue agency to 
political pressures, external and internal misuse of regulative recourses and 
compromise its reputation amongst the taxpayers. In an intriguing theorisation about 
using the taxpayer choice to target tax enforcement Raskolnikov (2009) propose a 
reform to IRS where taxpayers are forced to reveal their motivations for paying taxes. 
– 108 – 
Those who chose to cheat the system are assigned to deterrence measures and the 
rest to significantly cheaper cooperative enforcement measures. Practically this 
process has cost-benefit stratification characteristics. Precise targeting of 
sophisticated and non-sophisticated evaders versus mass deterrence has much lower 
social price too. It could be suggested that Bulgarian entrepreneurs are quite refined 
evaders when they engage in playing the system and therefore it is even more 
important to use a responsive regulation enforcement approach with them. There is 
evidence (Job, Stout & Smith, 2007, p. 98) in support of the fact that cultural change 
to responsive regulation of tax policy results in greater income for revenue offices. 
This is possible due to the readiness of tax offices to strengthen the taxpayers’ 
motivational posture of “thinking morally” (Braithwaite, 2007; Braithwaite, Murphy & 
Reinhart, 2007). 
In a study of ATO who are the innovator of the responsive regulation approach, Waller 
(2007) discovers that there is strong connection between the perceived institutional 
integrity and the success of a responsive regulation. The author confirms that in order 
for such responsive attitude to be efficient, institutional integrity should be present at 
the level of measures design and their everyday implementation. Unfortunately, NRA 
field officers’ reputation is very questionable amongst Bulgarian tax payers(Pashev, 
2005). However, based on the data from satisfied information access requests 
(Appendix 10 and 11) and the qualitative findings, it could be suggested that the level 
of integrity is high at department and strategy management level. 
 
Due to the lack of holistic information management solution (at the time of study) NRA 
has only recently developed cost-benefit methodology in Risk Management 
department. In general, their methodology is based only on retrospective indicator 
tracking, which diagnose how particular risks reacted to the treatment mix applied and 
how this affected the tax gap. Inevitably, the development and application of such 
evaluation approach is very complicated and resourceful and therefore it signifies the 
strong will of the relevant department to align with modern risk management 
practices. As a result of the methodology’s complexity only few officials are able to 
implement and benefit from it. As it became obvious, there was an agreement that 
actual risk treatment feedback is still underdeveloped. It should be emphasized that 
prospective cost-benefit evaluation function is not currently possible, because there is 
no technical and functional capacity to support it. This organisational shortcoming 
allows for a greater level of subjectivism in risk prioritisation and consequentially 
creates increased chances for enforcement pressure over already sufficiently 
compliant tax payers (asymmetrical tax gap closure). Verboon et al. (2007) conducted 
an intriguing self-interest analysis of distributive justice and tax compliance. The 
authors acknowledge that self-interest considerations are strong determinant of why 
people care about distributive justice. In doing so, they confirm that economic and 
psychological approaches are not necessarily as divergent as is often thought in 
explaining the phenomenon. If we extrapolate their findings to the situation of the 
Bulgarian entrepreneur, it could be suggested that favourable tax treatment outcomes 
would have a positive effect on compliance, while unfavourable treatment will have 
much stronger opposite effects. This would be so, due to the very low social cohesion 
index (Figure 4), which could suggest stronger correlation between self-interest and 
distributive justice in tax compliance. 
 
The new business intelligence suit (more details here), which is expected to be 
deployed at NRA will also prepare the revenue administration for full integration into 
the so prolonged pursued e-government (specifically through the provision of e-
taxation). It is questionable though, to what level such an advanced solution would be 
utilised. The experience from a geographically close regional scenario in Turkey 
(Stafford & Turan, 2011) signifies two important aspects. Firstly, the fact that the e-
revenue function is a paramount to every e-government and secondly the fact that “e-
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government lies in the likelihood of close public scrutiny of revenue-producing and 
revenue-linked e-government systems”. Bulgaria is known with the repeated expensive 
failures to introduce e-government services. It could be argued that this is not due to 
the lack of technical capacity, best practices examples, or legislative basis, but it is 
due to the lack of political will. Government after government demonstrates 
unwillingness to perform transformational paradigm shift and support this process. 
Such significant institutional reform would leave greatly reduced capabilities for 
corruption according to the evident experience in countries, which adopted this 
governance approach. Clearly, NRA will be endangered to politically ground regulative 
and normative pressures during its own way of bottom-up modernisation. 
 
NRA self-critiquing perspective is that their level of customer service should change in 
its attitude and way of delivery – in particular to adopt the customer orientated 
approach and to offer more e-services. The attitude of treating the taxpayers as 
customers is popular amongst contemporary tax administration and is part of the so 
called soft policy approach. In principle, it is a complicated organisational change for 
a regulative agency to address the “users” of its services in practice as customers in 
reality. Via an impactful policy study of this contemporary question Tuck, Lamb and 
Hoskin (2011) outline the main difficulties, which public institutions may encounter, 
specifically the regulative ones such as HMRC in the UK. The main obstacle to such 
attitudinal paradigm shift comes out of the fact that tax administrations must regulate 
taxpayers/customers in accordance with the law and they cannot choose the way they 
are regulated or choose which rules and legislation apply to them. But, still consumer 
orientation change in tax administration and the balance between control and service 
continue to be developed over the past decades. It would be much easier to treat the 
taxpayers as clients in countries where the share of informal economy and tax 
evasion in general is relatively low (<15%). This would be so, due to the greatly 
decreased necessity for enforcement activities in comparison with countries with 
share of informal economy in excess of 15%. In a comparative study of American and 
Norwegian tax systems Aberbach and Christensen (2007) finds out that 
administrations such as IRS, which adopt the doctrine of consumer friendliness 
aggressively, are environmentally forced to balance their approach due to the fact 
that they still need to collect revenue. But if IRS is one the positive side of extreme 
consumer orientation while Norwegian tax administration occupies a position in the 
middle, then it could be suggested that NRA has a significant capacity towards 





To sum up, it should be emphasized that NRA functions under great environmental 
pressures. The most significant one is the political influence to asymmetrical gap 
closure and the consequential misuse of collected revenue. NRA is forced to 
eradicate non-compliance from sectors and businesses left without government 
protections while, others who enjoy protectionism are left to sustain much lower 
compliance levels. Consequentially, the tax administration is pushed to a state of 
unjustifiable regulative formalism, which is both lacking adequate information 
technology support and is based to debatable cost-benefit rationale. This has 
significant negative effects to procedural fairness and distributive justice, which is 
suggested to be below the acceptable social minimum for entrepreneurs. 
 
As evident from the qualitative findings from the interviews, the current NRA policy 
approach is distinctively deterrence orientated, although there are some commitment 
campaigns, which start to gain internal and external popularity. Although, NRA officials 
feel that the level of customer service and friendliness should improve, the 
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organisational culture has still much to evolve in order to prepare for a responsive 
regulation approach. NRA officials are keen to acquire knowledge about the real 
motives and behavioural models of tax evaders, but they still do not have an 
established practice to do so (except some very limited attempts). NRA’s perspective 
on evasion is that this is culturally embedded phenomenon, it is being done (at 
business level) for profit maximisation and that, smaller businesses are likely to evade 
more taxes. Generally, NRA suffers from information deficiency in regards to real 
evasive motives and the reasons for that are in the limited institutional resources, but 
not due to the lack of research interest. Therefore, NRA’s compliance measures are 
predominantly being informed by very inflexible regulative and legislative framework, 
but not by evidence based approach. In order to acquire enriched picture of the 
situation, it will be explored (at entrepreneurial level) what Bulgarian businessmen 
think about the level of customer service and policy approach they are facing. 
 
Based on the qualitative findings it became evident that another big obstacle to NRA 
tax compliance methodology is the so called bank secrecy. In order to match declared 
income with financial and non-financial assets, access to bank accounts is required. 
In general, such access could be acquired in the presence of good reasons and 
granted accordingly by a court of law. This makes NRA’s work very difficult, slow and 
on certain occasions prohibitively expensive (from institutional perspective). In order 
to resolve this issue legislative changes are required. That would allow much more 
efficient expenditure of institutional efforts and will make NRA’s work significantly less 
intrusive. 
 
An important correlation between the shadow economy size and the overall index of 
social cohesion (OISC) was demonstrated where the lower OISC of a society is a 
higher level of informality exists. This link could provide rationale for a policy shift 
towards indirect measures of influencing two important socio-economic aspects – the 
OISC and the institutional asymmetry to decrease the size of the informal economy. 
The economic and institutional environments are amongst the worst in the EU in terms 
of socio-economic indicators. Furthermore, the state administration in Bulgaria is 
traditionally subjugated by the governing political class through illegitimate methods –
public officials are often forced to act in greater alignment to political interests than in 
alignment with the legislative framework. Although, this has harmful effects on public 
service motivation, it was found out that NRA has some very promising management 
potential. Some key officials exercise “bottom to top” initiative of internal reformation 
in order to modernise NRA’s practices and secure a greater level of operational 
independence. However, NRA’s reforms should overcome strong political resistance in 
order to align the strategic power relationship with ruling governments. It is only time, 
which will prove whether genuine institutional reforms could be successful in Bulgaria 
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Chapter Six 
 
6. Findings of business survey. 
 
The previous chapter addressed the first out of two investigative levels (institutional 
and entrepreneurial), describing the specifics of the utilised CAQDAS qualitative 
analysis and the findings. It revealed the three major environmental pressures 
(institutional, economic and political) affecting NRA’s role in revenue raising policies 
and the associated institutional asymmetry. Chapter 6 advances the study in the 
development of a holistic account of the socio-economic influencers of the processes 
of business tax evasion, formalisation and informalisation. The second investigative 
level (entrepreneurial) has been attained through the analysis of the business survey. 
Applying proven multi-disciplinary analytical methods (Decision trees, MLP Neural and 
TAN Bayesian networks, Multinomial Logistic Regression), the quantitative analysis 
advances an innovative predictive socio-economic profiling of business tax evaders. 
This chapter is entirely concentrated on the technicalities of the analysis itself and 
does not offer a discussion of findings in relation to the extant literature, which 
happens in the last chapter 7. 
This chapter is consisted of two main sub-headings as follows: 
1. Summary statistics for individual variables. 
2. Modelling. 
 
Part 1 contains traditional summary statistics for every individual variable from the 
business survey. It follows the structure of the questionnaire and reveals the main 
meaningful characteristics of the sampled population. In doing so, important inter-
variables’ relationships become evident and consequently underpin the elevated 
modelling inquiries, which emerge in Part 2. It provides advanced form of analysis and 
modelling looking into the complex relationships between interconnected variables 
and the associated findings. As findings materialise naturally from the analysis they all 
exist in the relevant sections of part 1 and 2 accordingly rather than being separated 
from the analysis. It is intentionally designed to be so and as a result enabling the 
readers to track how any given analytical method generated a particular finding. The 
findings presented in part 1 and 2 satisfy the quantitative research aims of this thesis 
(see tables 4 and 5). 
 
 
 Summary statistics for individual variables. 6.1
 
The first step in the statistical data analysis is to perform descriptive statistics for the 
individual variables and check for any unusual or unexpected values. This initial task 
reveals the main meaningful characteristics of the sampled population. It creates the 
basis for inferential statistics regarding the strength of the observed findings in 
relation with the studied population. The statistical frequencies are presented below 
following the order from the questionnaire for all variables accordingly. In terms of 
variables’ naming convention, it should be noted that variable Q2 corresponds to 
question 2 from the business survey, variable Q3 to question 3 and so on. Every 
variable has been described in a table format for clarity and they have been grouped 
together by type. All descriptive statistic summaries precede the relevant cumulative 
tables for every variable. The key points are described within one paragraph per 
variable and at the end of it is indicated the corresponding table and variable number 
accordingly. There are two terms used to indicate whether a particular variable has 
missing values – user missing values and system missing values. The first term 
indicates that a respondent was presented with the question, but for some reason they 
have not provided a response. The second term (system missing) indicates that 
according to the display logic of the questionnaire, a particular question was not 
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asked accordingly to a group of respondents. Therefore, there is a number of missing 
answers. 
 
As is evident (Table 11, variable Q2), the predominant type of businesses amongst the 
surveyed entrepreneurs are those trading with services at 50.6 percent. Trading with 
goods and services is 23.2 percent, while trading with goods only is 13.3 percent. 
 
13.3 percent of the entrepreneurs stated that their main business subject is trading 
with goods only. 29.1 percent from them (3.9% out of total) require substantial stock 
and 56.4 percent (7.5% out of total) require non-substantial stock in order to operate 
(Table 11, variable Q3). 
 
93.7 percent of the businesses employ up to 10 full time workers and 97.3 percent 
employ up to 10 part time workers. Companies employ on average 4 full time and 1 
part time workers (Table 11, variable Q4). 
 
In total 62.7 percent of the businesses are operated from within an office, while 31.2 
are run from home (Table 11, variable Q5). 
 
47.9 percent of the entrepreneurs run their business from a rented office and 13.1 
percent own it. 37.3 percent operate their business from home. The system missing 
values indicate the cases where the question was not applicable based on 
respondents’ earlier reply (Table 11, variable Q6). 
 
89.3 percent of the businesses reported that they have been formally registered from 
the very beginning while 9.4 said that this has happened at a later stage (Table 11, 
variable Q7). 
 
9.2 percent of all entrepreneurs reported that their business has been formally 
registered at a later stage (not simultaneously with commencement of trade). (Table 
11, variable Q8). 
 
28.1 percent of the entrepreneurs report that the debt to their business is in 
medium/acceptable amounts, while for 25.2 percent it is only small debt. For 8.2 
percent the debt to their business is in substantial amounts (Table 11, variable Q9). 
 
36.3 percent (28.1+ 8.2) of the entrepreneurs reported that there was debt to their 
businesses in medium or substantial amounts (variable Q9). From within this group, 
26.7 percent (9.7% out of total) do not undertake debt recovery activities in that 
regard while 68 percent (24.7% out of total) do undertake (Table 11, variable Q10). 
 
51.8 percent of the entrepreneurs do not use any forms of external business funding. 
26.9 percent use business loans from banks, 21.5 percent use friends and family 
financial support, 15.3 percent use funding from non-bank organisations, 14 percent 
are utilising loans from business partners (suppliers and/or clients) and only 4.1 
percent use credit cards. This is a multiple answer question and therefore the % out of 
total sum is greater than 100% (Table 11, variable Q11). 
 
30.5 percent of the entrepreneurs were using business loans from banks and 
managed to achieve on average 7.39 percent interest rate. 13.4 percent of them 
reported interest rates of up to 6%. 23.7 percent of the entrepreneurs were using 
credit cards as external business funding and managed to achieve on average 7.21 
percent interest rate. 39.8 percent of them reported interest rates not higher than 17% 
for this type of funding. 5.8 percent of the entrepreneurs were using business loans 
from non-bank organisations and managed to achieve on average 1.59 percent 
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interest rate. 7.7 percent of them reported interest rates not higher than 10%. 10.2 
percent of the entrepreneurs were using business loans from their business partners 
and managed to achieve on average 1.41 percent interest rate. 16.8 percent of them 
reported interest rates not higher than 6%. 9.7 percent of the entrepreneurs were 
using business loans from friends and family and managed to achieve on average 
1.88 percent interest rate (Table 12, variable Q12). 
 
60 percent of the entrepreneurs either disagree or strongly disagree that the tax 
money is fairly spent. 19.6 percent either agree or strongly agree that the tax money is 
fairly spent. 20.1 percent of the entrepreneurs neither agree, nor disagree with the 
fairness in spending the tax money. 41.4 percent of the entrepreneurs either disagree 
or strongly disagree that NRA has fair professional attitude and treatment approach. 
At the same time, 30.8 percent either agree or strongly agree that NRA has fair 
professional attitude and treatment approach. 27.4 percent of the entrepreneurs 
neither agree, nor disagree. 54.3 percent of the entrepreneurs either disagree or 
strongly disagree that the state institutions have fair professional attitude and 
treatment approach. 21.1 percent either agree or strongly agree that the state 
institutions have fair professional attitude and treatment approach. 24.2 percent of the 
entrepreneurs neither agree, nor disagree (Table 13, variable Q13). 
 
60.6 percent of the entrepreneurs either agree or strongly agree that doing business 
according to the rules is too expensive. 19.6 percent either disagree or strongly 
disagree that doing business according to the rules is too expensive. 19.4 percent of 
the entrepreneurs neither agree, nor disagree that doing business according to the 
rules is too expensive. 50.6 percent of the entrepreneurs either agree or strongly 
agree that tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies. 28.1 percent either disagree or strongly disagree that tax 
evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and administrative policies. 
20.6 percent of the entrepreneurs neither agree, nor disagree. 32.2 percent of the 
entrepreneurs either agree or strongly agree that tax evasion is an acceptable 
phenomenon in the current business environment. 44.5 percent either disagree or 
strongly disagree that tax evasion is an acceptable phenomenon in the current 
business environment. 22.5 percent of the entrepreneurs neither agree, nor disagree. 
24.2 percent of the entrepreneurs either agree or strongly agree that using bribes is 
an acceptable phenomenon in the current business environment. 61.7 percent either 
disagree or strongly disagree that using bribes is an acceptable phenomenon in the 
current business environment. 13.3 percent of the entrepreneurs neither agree, nor 
disagree (Table 13, variable Q14). 
 
Only 10.2 percent of the entrepreneurs reported that businesses from their sector are 
not pushed to pay informally “to get things done” – such as administrative services, 
tenders, licensing, regulative permissions and alike. According to 57.9 percent, the 
activity of paying "to get things done" costs between 1 to 35 percent of the business 
turnover (Table 14, variable Q15). 
 
82.2 percent (29.3 + 19 + 17.4 + 15.6 + 0.9) of all responses are distributed amongst 
the first 5 possible answers (Q16_1, Q16_2, Q16_3, Q16_4 and Q16_5), indicating 
that for one reason or another there is turnover underreporting in order to evade 
taxes. 316 cases out of 413 have selected at least one of the first 5 possible answers 
(Q16_1, Q16_2, Q16_3, Q16_4 and Q16_5). This means that according to 76.5 
percent of the entrepreneurs other businesses from their sector underreport turnovers 
in order pay less tax with varying motives. The three most frequent reasons for 
underreporting turnovers are paying less tax in order to survive (29.3% of responses, 
45.7% of all cases), reducing costs to increase profits (19% of responses, 29.7% of all 
cases) and to pay less tax (17.4% of responses, 27.3 of all cases). In 65.7 percent 
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(29.3 + 19 + 17.4) of all turnover underreporting cases, this is caused by one of the 
previously described three top reasons or a random combination between them. 
Question 16 from the business survey is a multiple choice one with up to three 
possible answers. There are 59.3 percent of the respondents who selected one 
answer, 24.5 percent who selected 2 answers and 15.7 percent who selected 3 as the 
maximum allowed number of answers (Table 15, variable Q16). 
 
Those who stated that there is underreporting of turnovers in their sector (N = 304) 
assessed that on average the concealing is 37.8 percent of the actual turnovers 
(Mean = 37.82, SD = 19.64). Variable Q17 represent question 17. There are no user 
missing values, but only system ones, due to the fact that this question was only asked 
to some of the respondents based on display logic (Table 14, variable Q17). 
 
Variable Q18 represent question 18. There are only 2 user missing values. The 
question has been asked to all respondents. 58.6 percent of the entrepreneurs have 
bought goods or services for their businesses without the lawfully compulsory receipt 
or had purchased from suppliers who were not formally registered. 38.7 percent did 
not have such experience (Table 11, variable Q18). 
 
Variable Q19 represent question 19. This question has been only asked to some of 
the respondents, based on their previous answers and associated display logic (N = 
251). 33.5 percent of the entrepreneurs who experience purchasing of goods and 
services without a receipt manage to acquire invoices for up to 80% of their 
consumption as businesses. The entrepreneurs who experience purchasing of goods 
and services without a receipt, do usually receive fiscal document on average for 
81.51 percent of what they buy as a business (M = 81.51, SD = 19.46). (Table 14, 
variable Q19). 
 
Variable Q20 represent question 20. This question has been only asked to some of 
the respondents, based on their previous answers (N = 218). 87.2 percent of the 
respondents to this question would prefer all of their suppliers to provide them with 
invoices. Those who answered the question this way constitute 46 percent of all cases 
(Table 11, variable Q20). 
 
Variable Q21 and Q21_Text represent question 21, which is a multiple choice single 
answer type and has been asked to all respondents. 28.4 percent of the 
entrepreneurs consider that NRA's procedures and administrative capacity has 
medium hampering effect on their businesses. 21.7 percent (12.7 + 9) consider the 
hampering effect to be from significant to enormous. 19.1 percent of the respondents 
reported only small hampering effect, while for 19.1 percent there was no such effect 
(Table 11, variable Q21). 
 
Variable Q22 and Q22_Text represent question 22, which is a multiple choice single 
answer type and has been asked to all respondents. 79.8 percent of all entrepreneurs 
consider the current tax rates and social security contributions to be impediment to 
their business to varying degree. 12.2 percent of the respondents do not consider 
these to have negative impact on their business, while for 4.2 percent the tax rates 
have a stimulating effect (Table 11, variable Q22). 
 
Variable Q23 represent question 23, which is a slider scale one from 0% to 100% – it 
has been asked to all respondents. According to the entrepreneurs the tax rate on 
business profit should be on average 9.92 percent (M = 9.92, SD = 6.64). (Table 14, 
variable Q23). 
 
Variables Q24_1 to Q24_10 including Group and Rank variable modes represent 
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question 24, which is a complex pick, group and rank type of question. It has been 
asked to all respondents. The top three business impediments creating the most 
difficulties for entrepreneurs are as follows: 
 For 53.9 percent of all cases it is the unfair competition from the informal 
sector. 
 The corruption in the state administration – 49.9 percent of all cases. 
 Low efficiency of the state administration – 42.1 percent of all cases. 
Respondents were able to select and rank up to three business impediments on a 
scale of 1 to 3 where 1 signified the most obstructing factor and 3 the least 
obstructing factor. 
 Where unfair competition from the informal sector was one of the three 
possible factors, it was most frequently ranked 1 as the most obstructing one. 
 Where corruption in the state administration was one of the three possible 
factors, it was most frequently ranked 1 as the most obstructing one. 
Where low efficiency of the state administration was one of the three possible factors, 
it was most frequently ranked 2 as the second most obstructing one (Table 16, 
variable Q24). 
 
Variable Q25 represent question 25, which is a slider scale one from 0 to 20 days – it 
has been asked to all respondents. 74.7 percent of all entrepreneurs spend on 
average from 1 to 5 days per month to deal with administrative requirements and 
regulations (N = 407, Mode = 5, Mean = 4.93, SD = 4.02). For 25.1 percent of the 
entrepreneurs it takes 5 days per month to deal with administrative requirements and 
regulations (N = 407, Mode = 5, Mean = 4.93, SD = 4.02). For 16.7 percent it is 2 days 
and for 14.3 it is 3 days per month. These are the three top highest frequency 
responses (Table 14, variable Q25). 
 
Variable Q26 represent question 26, which is a slider scale one from 0 to 3000 BGN 
per day. The question has been asked to all respondents. The average cost of doing 
business per day is 466.5 while the most frequent value is 100 (N = 402, Mode = 100, 
Mean = 466.48, Median = 253, SD = 613.9). (Table 14, variable Q26). 
 
Variable Q27 represent question 27, which is a single answer one. The question has 
been asked to all respondents. 62.5 percent of the entrepreneurs have been 
inspected by NRA tax office officials while 32.9 percent have not (Table 11, variable 
Q27). 
 
Variable Q28 represent question 28, which is a slider scale one (from 0 to 30 days). 
The question has been asked to specific respondents only, based on their previous 
answers. Entrepreneurs spent on average 8 days to deal with an audit by NRA 
officials, 68.7 percent reported from 0 to 8 days expenditure in that regard. (N = 252, 
Mode = 2, Mean = 8.11, Median = 5, SD = 8.47). (Table 14, variable Q28). 
 
Variable Q29 represent question 29, which is a multiple choice single answer one. 
The question has been asked to specific respondents only, based on their previous 
answers (N = 375). 59.5 percent of the entrepreneurs who answered this question 
(54% out of total) have not been expected or encouraged to provide informal benefits 
(bribes) to NRA officials regarding the conducted inspections. 10.4 percent said that 
they have been expected to behave that way, while 20.3 percent preferred not to 
answer this question. 9.9 percent of the entrepreneurs opted to use the free text box. 
4 respondents out of the 37 (9.9 percent) confirmed that they have been expected to 
provide bribes – this is 1 percent from all respondent who answered the question 
(Table 11, variable Q29). 
 
Variable Q30 represent question 30, which is a multiple choice single answer one. 
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The question has been asked to all respondents. 68 percent of the entrepreneurs 
reported that they are exposed to unfair competition from informal businesses while 
26.6 percent were not (Table 11, variable Q30). 
 
Variable Q31 represent question 31, which is a multiple choice single answer one. 
The question has been asked to specific respondents only, based on their previous 
answers (N = 281). 32.4 percent (from N = 281, or 22 percent from N = 413) of the 
entrepreneurs stated that they experience significant difficulties in regards with 
exposure to unfair competition from informal businesses. 61.2 percent experience 
difficulties, but they are able to cope with them. It could be argued that strictly formal 
businesses are supposed to suffer most from unfair competition from informal 
businesses. This is so, because they lack capabilities to deal with informal 
competitors due to the fact that they function according to rules and therefore pay the 
full cost of doing business formally. Their grey competitors do not pay the full price 
though. Enterprises, which function in partly informal mode with predominant 
adherence to the rules of business and tax, are also experiencing difficulties due to 
unfair competition. However, they are likely to cope with them much better in 
comparison with fully formal businesses. It could be argued that businesses, which 
experience significant difficulties due to unfair competition, do not engage in illicit 
compensatory strategies and are most likely operating in a fully formal mode (22% of 
all businesses). Following this line of thought, it could be suggested that 78 percent 
(100%-22%) of all entrepreneurs are functioning in partly informal mode (being in an 
informal chain of dependence). The value of 78 percent corresponds to a finding from 
variable Q16 that 76.5 percent of the entrepreneurs underreport turnovers in order 
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The first column from the left (Table 11 below) indicates the variable’s number in 
accordance with the business questionnaire (see Appendix 18). 
 
Table 11: Summary statistics. 
 
No Variable Number (%) 
2 What is your main business subject?  
 
Trading with goods. 55 (13.3) 
Trading with services.* 209 (50.6) 
Trading with goods and services. 96 (23.2) 
Something else – free text. 53 (12.8) 
 Total 413 (100) 
 *Mode = 2  
3 Do you need to keep stock and in what quantities?  
 
Yes, the nature of our business requires maintenance of 
substantial stock availability. 
16 (3.9) 
Yes, but not substantial stock availability.* 31 (7.5) 
No, the nature of our business does not require maintenance of 
stock supplies. 
8 (1.9) 
 Total 55 (13.3) 
 *Mode = 2  
5 Does your business have an office or you run it from home?  
 
Yes, there is an office.* 259 (62.7) 
No, there is no office – it is run from home. 129 (31.2) 
Something else – free text box. 25 (6.1) 
 Total 413 (100) 
 *Mode = 1  
6 Is the office owned by the business or is it rented?  
 
The office is owned by the business/the company. 54 (13.1) 
The office is rented.* 198 (47.9) 
Something else – free text box. 7 (1.7) 
 System missing 154 (37.3) 
 Total 413 (100) 
 *Mode = 2  
7 Have you formally registered your business since it began 
operating or this has happened at a later stage? 
 
 
Yes, from the very beginning of business operations.* 369 (89.3) 
No, this has happened at a later stage. 39 (9.4) 
Something else – free text box below. 5 (1.2) 
 Total 413 (100) 
 *Mode = 1  
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No Variable Number (%) 
9 Are there any outstanding debts to your business and 
approximately what their size is? 
 
 
Yes, there are, but in small/insignificant amounts. 104 (25.2) 
Yes, there are in medium/acceptable amounts. 116 (28.1) 
Yes, there are in substantial amounts. 34 (8.2) 
No.* 157 (38) 
Something else – free text box. 2 (0.5) 
 Total 413 (100) 
 *Mode = 4  




Yes.* 102 (24.7) 
No. 40 (9.7) 
Something else – free text box. 8 (1.9) 
System missing. 263 (63.7) 
 Total 413 (100) 
 *Mode = 1  
11 Do you use any forms of business finance/credit?  
 
Business loans from banks. 111 (26.9) 
Business finance/credit such as credit cards. 17 (4.1) 
Business loans from non-bank institutions/organisations. 63 (15.3) 
Loans from your business partners (suppliers or clients). 58 (14) 
Loans from friends and family. 89 (21.5) 
Do not use any forms of external funding.* 214 (51.8) 
 Total 552 (133.7) 
 Mode = 6  
18 Have you ever bought goods or services for your business 
without an invoice or from suppliers not formally registered? 
 
 
Yes.* 242 (58.6) 
No. 160 (38.7) 
Something else. 9 (2.2) 
 User missing 2 (0.5) 
 Total 413 (100) 
 *Mode = 1  




Yes.* 190 (46) 
It does not matter. 16 (3.9) 
No. 7 (1.7) 
Something else. 5 (1.2) 
 System missing 195 (47.2) 
 Total 413 (100) 
 *Mode = 1  
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No Variable Number (%) 
21 How would you assess NRA’s work (procedures) and in 




There is stimulating effect on the business. 2 (0.5) 
It does not hamper the business. 111 (27.1) 
There is small hampering effect. 78 (19.1) 
There is medium hampering effect.* 116 (28.4) 
There is significant hampering effect. 52 (12.7) 
There is enormous hampering effect. 37 (9) 
Something else – free text box. 13 (3.2) 
 User missing 4 (47.2) 
 Total 413 (100) 
 *Mode = 4  
22 What is your perception about the way the current tax rates and 
social security contributions affect your business? 
 
 
They constitute small impediment to the business. 55 (13.4) 
They constitute medium impediment to the business.* 155 (37.9) 
They constitute significant impediment to the business. 88 (21.5) 
They constitute enormous impediment to the business. 32 (7.8) 
They do not constitute impediment to the business. 50 (12.2) 
The tax rates have stimulating effect on the business. 17 (4.2) 
Something else – free text box. 12 (2.9) 
 User missing 4 (1) 
 Total 413 (100) 
 *Mode = 2  
27 Have you ever been inspected by NRA tax officials?  
 
Yes.* 258 (62.5) 
No. 136 (32.9) 
Something else. 14 (3.4) 
 User missing values 5 (1.2) 
 Total 413 (100) 
 *Mode = 1  
29 During these inspection(s) visits have you been expected or 




Yes. 39 (9.4) 
No.* 223 (54) 
I prefer to leave this question unanswered. 76 (18.4) 
Something else. 37 (9) 
 System missing values 38 (9.2) 
 Total 413 (100) 
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No Variable Number (%) 
30 Do you experience unfair competition from unregistered or 
informal businesses (grey economy businesses)? 
 
 
Yes.* 281 (68) 
No. 110 (26.6) 
Something else. 17 (4.1) 
 User missing values 5 (1.2) 
 Total 413 (100) 
 *Mode = 1  
31 What level of difficulties does your business experience due to 
unfair competition from the informal sector? 
 
 
There are no any difficulties being experienced. 15 (3.6) 
We experience only difficulties, which we manage to cope 
with.* 
172 (41.6) 
We experience significant difficulties. 91 (22) 
Something else – free text box. 3 (0.7) 
 System missing values 132 (32) 
 Total 413 (100) 
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The first column from the left (Table 12 below) indicates the variable’s number in 
accordance with the business questionnaire (see Appendix 18). 
 
Table 12: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables. 





4 How many people are working 
for your business? 
    
 
Full-time workers. not 
applicable 
8.16 4.27 0-50 
Part-time workers. not 
applicable 
3.91 1.58 0-50 
8 When was the business 
registered? 
    
 
Registered after start of trade. 38 (9.2) 3.5 2008 1997- 
2013 
System missing 375 (90.8)    
Total 413 (100)    
12 What is approximately the 
lowest interest rate, which you 
have managed to achieve for 
the finance type you have 
used? 
    
 
Business loans from banks. 126 (30.5)  7.39% 0%-100% 
Credit cards. 98 (23.7)  7.21% 0%-24% 
Loans from non-bank 
institutions/organisations. 
24 (5.8)  1.59% 0%-46% 
Loans from your business 
partners (suppliers or clients). 
42 (10.2)  1.41% 0%-45% 
Loans from friends and family. 40 (9.7)  1.88% 0%-100% 
























– 122 – 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics of variables 13 and 14. 
 
 What is your 
opinion about 
the correct and 
fair expenditure 
of tax money? 






What is your 
opinion about fair, 
professional 
attitude and 
treatment by the 
state institutions? 
 
 Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)  
Strongly agree. 49 (11.9) 49 (11.9) 38 (9.2)  
Agree. 32 (7.7) 78 (18.9) 49 (11.9)  
Neither agree, 
nor disagree. 
83 (20.1) 113 (27.4) 100 (24.2)  
Disagree. 110 (26.6) 89 (21.5) 113 (27.4)  
Strongly 
disagree. 
136 (32.9) 82 (19.9) 111 (26.9)  
Missing 3 (0.7) 2 (0.5) 2 (0.5)  
Total 413 (100) 413 (100) 413 (100)  
Mean 3.61 3.19 3.51  
Median 4 3 4  
Mode 5 3 4  
Minimum 1 1 1  
Maximum 5 5 5  
Strongly agree = 1 
Strongly disagree = 5 
 
 Doing business 
entirely 
according to the 
rules is too 
expensive? 
Tax evasion is 
the answer from 
the business to 




In the current 
business 
environment, tax 
evasion is an 
acceptable 
phenomenon? 
In the current 
business 
environment, 
using bribes is 
an acceptable 
phenomenon? 
 Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) 
Strongly agree. 177 (42.9) 119 (28.8) 69 (16.7) 61 (14.8) 
Agree. 73 (17.7) 90 (21.8) 64 (15.5) 39 (9.4) 
Neither agree, 
nor disagree. 
80 (19.4) 85 (20.6) 93 (22.5) 55 (13.3) 
Disagree. 39 (9.4) 54 (13.1) 72 (17.4) 57 (13.8) 
Strongly 
disagree. 
42 (10.2) 62 (15) 112 (27.1) 198 (47.9) 
System missing 2 (0.5) 3 (0.7) 3 (0.7) 3 (0.7) 
Total 413 (100) 413 (100) 413 (100) 413 (100) 
Mean 2.26 2.63 3.23 3.71 
Median 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
Mode 1 1 5 5 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 5 5 5 5 
Strongly agree = 1 
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Table 14: Descriptive statistics. 
No Variable Number Mean Mode Std. 
deviation 
Min-Max 
Valid System and Total 
User missing 
15 In your view, what percentage of the turnover do other 
businesses from your sector are pushed to pay informally “to get 
things done” – such as administrative services, tenders, 
licensing, regulative permissions and alike? 
404 8 413 27.6 10 26.6 0%-100% 
0% from turnover 10.2% 1 
Between 1% and 35% of turnover 57.9% 
         
17 According to your judgement, with what percentage usually the 
declared turnovers are lesser in comparison with the actual 
ones? 
304 109 413 37.8 30 19.6 0%-100% 
0 
         
19 For what part of the goods and services, which you need as a 
business, do you usually receive an invoice? 
251 162 413 81.5 90 19.5 9%-100% 
Up to 80% 33.5% 0 
         
23 What would be the acceptable level of tax on business profit? 408 0 413 9.9 10 6.6 0%-70% 
5 
         
25 Approximately how many days per month do you spend to cope 
with administrative requirements imposed by various state 
regulations (such as business permissions, tax return, 
communication with NRA, NSSI and others)? 
407 0 413 4.9 5 4 0-20 
6 
1 to 5 days 2 days 3 days 5 days 
74.7% 16.7% 14.3% 25.1% 




No Variable Number Mean Mode Std. 
deviation 
Min-Max 
Valid System and Total 
User missing 
26 Approximately what is your cost of doing business per day (all 
business expenses including cost of salaries and others)? 
402 9 413 466.5 100 613.9 0-3000 
2 
         
28 How much time approximately did you spend in this connection? 252 161 413 8.1 2 8.5 0-30 
From 0 to 8 days 68.7% 0 
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Table 15: Descriptive statistics of variable Q16. 
 
Tax evasive motivations. 
 
Responses % out of 
total Number Percent 
Q16_2 Businesses from your sector underreport their 
actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax in 
order to survive?* 
188 29.3% 45.7% 
Q16_3 Businesses from your sector underreport their 
actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax in 
order to reduce their costs and increase their 
profits? 
122 19% 29.7% 
Q16_1 Businesses from your sector underreport their 
actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax? 
112 17.4% 27.3% 
Q16_5 Businesses from your sector underreport their 
actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax, 
because they are forced to do so and they do not 
have another choice? 
100 15.6% 24.3% 
Q16_7 You do not know whether businesses from your 
sector underreport their actual turnovers with the 
purpose to pay less tax? 
70 10.9% 17% 
Q16_6 Businesses from your sector do not underreport 
their actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less 
tax? 
30 4.7% 7.3% 
Q16_8 There is something else about businesses from 
your sector, which underreport their actual 
turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax? 
14 2.2% 3.4% 
Q16_4 You do not see anything wrong in the fact that 
businesses from your sector underreport their 
actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax? 
6 0.9% 1.5% 
Total 642 100% 156.2% 
*Mode 
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Table 16: Descriptive statistics of variable Q24. 
 
Which three factors create the most difficulties for your business? 
 Answers 
Responses % out of 
total 
Mean Mode Min-Max 
Number Percent 
Q24_3 Unfair competition from 
the informal sector.* 
215 18.6% 53.9% 1.59 1 1-3 
Q24_4 Corruption in the state 
administration. 
199 17.3% 49.9% 1.81 1 1-3 
Q24_5 Low efficiency of the 
state administration. 
168 14.6% 42.1% 2.04 2 1-3 
Q24_9 Lack of adequately 
educated/skilled labour 
force. 
145 12.6% 36.3% 2.3 3 1-3 
Q24_8 Difficult and expensive 
access to financing. 
143 12.4% 35.8% 2.15 3 1-3 
Q24_6 The laws and regulations. 101 8.8% 25.3% 2.2 3 1-3 
Q24_7 Licenses and regulative 
regimes. 
73 6.3% 18.3% 2.16 2 1-3 
Q24_2 The tax rate. 60 5.2% 15% 1.82 1 1-3 
Q24_1 The National Revenue 
Agency (NRA). 
39 3.4% 9.8% 1.9 1 1-3 
Q24_10 
 
Something else. 10 0.9% 2.5% 2.1 3 1-3 
Total 1153 100% 289%    





The previous section (6.1 Summary statistics for individual variables) provided initial 
insights into the collected empirical information while summarising every individual 
variable with the relevant descriptive statistics. This heading provides an advanced 
level of analysis looking into the complex relationships between interconnected 
variables (survey questions) and the associated findings. In doing so, it satisfies the 
research aims of the second empirical method used in the thesis – the business 
survey. In particular, the analysis emerges from the correspondence between the 
structure of the survey with its gradual information extraction approach and the 
research aims (see tables 4 and 5). The analytical approach being used here employs 
a variety of modelling methods taken from machine learning, artificial intelligence and 
statistics. In order to fulfil the research aims, this part of the quantitative analysis 
provides answers to the main objectives of the business survey as specified in 
Questionnaire development and rationale section. The two tables in heading 4.4.2 
offer detailed explanation of each survey block and in particular, what the questions 
sought to discover, including inter-variable dependencies. This part of the quantitative 
analysis does not follow the structure of the questionnaire, but rather the research 
logic behind it. As it was already described, the questionnaire used gradual 
information extraction technique, where many questions were leading in and profiling 
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the respondents. This approach has been used in order to escalate progressively to 
the major questions seeking to discover the most important information. Therefore, an 
appropriate analytical method of data inquiry is to present the findings starting from 
these fundamental themes of interest (headings 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4) 
 
 
6.2.1 Tax evasion diagnostics and motivations. 
 
One of the key survey questions is number 16 (Appendix 18). It is from the 
questionnaire’s “Block 4 – Diagnostics of informality, motivations and perceptions”. 
This question was developed to diagnose turnover underreporting, as an indicator for 
partial mode of informality, including capture of motives and attitudes behind such 
economic behavioural patterns. Question 16 contains 8 possible answers in total, from 
which the first 5 are confirmatory of turnover underreporting simultaneously offering 
associations with different motivations. The essence of the findings is presented at the 
end of section 6.2.1. 
 
Conceptual description of the predictive modelling approach: 
1. Based on MWF creation of 5 predictive models as decision trees (for each of 
the 5 confirmatory answers) with the capability to predict or classify future real 
world observations based on sets of decision rules. Effectively, this is 
economic profile modelling of partial mode of informality. 
 
2. Evaluation if a higher level model (from all 5) is possible using ensembles to 
increase predictive accuracy at a viable model deployability level. 
 
Implications for policy development and scientific value: 
A decision tree model in such context provides invaluable information to policy makers 
in two aspects: 
 
1. Firstly, it shows what the characteristics of entrepreneurs involved in tax 
evasion are. This is achieved via very clear reasoning process based on either 
relevant statistical tests’ significance or alternative algorithms such as C5 
trees. 
 
2. Secondly, it shows (through the predictive power of the model) what policy 
changes could potentially influence evasive practices and to what extent. 






1. Step 1: 
Using the Auto Classifier node, 432 models have been automatically tested and 
classified based on the best overall accuracy achievable. The 432 models exhausted 
several settings’ combinations in each of the following decision tree models: CHAID, 
C5, C&R tree and QUEST. More details are available in “Auto Classifier – Training 
summary for Q16_1” in Appendix 19. 
 
The best overall accuracy of 80.3% has been achieved by a model named E-CHAID 
Model Q16_1. The model naming convention is the modelling method first, followed 
by the variable it concerns. The model is a decision tree based on the use of 10 fields 
(variables). 
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2. Step 2: 
 
The model from step 1 has been evaluated using the analysis node after some 
adjustment in the settings, which resulted in a small overall accuracy gain. The 
predictive power of the model secures correct prediction in 80.6 percent of all cases. 
Appendix 19 provides the performance evaluation, coincidence matrix and the visual 
representation. 
 
3. Step 3: 
 
Targeting value 1 (Yes) from variable 16_1, a rule set has been generated with 84.6% 
confidence (see the symbolic expression in Appendix 19). According to this rule set, 
entrepreneurs who answered with “Yes” (1
st
 of 8 options on question 16) have the 
following profile characteristics: 
 
1. They underreport their turnovers with 21% to 65%. 
2. They spend up to 10 days per month to cope with administrative requirements 
imposed by various state regulations (such as business permissions, tax return, 
communication with NRA, NSSI and others). 
3. Have been inspected by NRA officials and during these inspection(s) have been 
expected or encouraged to provide forms of informal benefit to the official(s). 
4. Do not agree that doing business entirely according to the rules is too expensive. 
 
The above rule set is only one of the many possible, which could be derived from this 
E-CHAID decision tree. Every rule set, as a decision tree’s derivative, is only a partial 
expression of the predictive power of a tree. Given the specific purpose of the 
analysis, this rule set is considered relevant and worthy to discuss. The same 






1. Step 1: 
 
Using the Auto Classifier node, 570 models have been automatically tested and 
classified based on the best overall accuracy achievable. The 570 models exhausted 
several settings’ combinations in each of the following algorithms: CHAID, C5, C&R 
tree, QUEST, Decision List, Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Nearest Neighbour 
Analysis (KNN). More details are available in “Auto Classifier – Training summary for 
Q16_2” in Appendix 20. 
 
The best overall accuracy of 81.1% has been achieved by a CHAID decision tree, 
which used 13 fields for the model development. Another model, which was E-CHAID 
decision tree (E-CHAID Model Q16_2) achieved 80.6%, however it used 14 fields. It 
was selected due to the higher explanatory power against negligible loss of overall 
accuracy. 
 
2. Step 2: 
 
The model from step 1 has been evaluated using the analysis node. The predictive 
power of the model secures correct prediction in 80.6 percent of all cases. Appendix 
20 provides the performance evaluation, coincidence matrix and the visual 
representation. 
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3. Step 3: 
 
Targeting value 1 (Yes) from variable 16_2, a rule set has been generated with 92.6% 
confidence (see the symbolic expression in Appendix 20). According to this rule set, 
entrepreneurs who selected option 2 “Yes, in order to survive” (2
nd
 out of 8 options on 
question 16) have the following profile characteristics: 
 
1. According to their judgement, the declared turnovers are lesser with up to 30% in 
comparison with the actual ones. 
2. They do not use loans from friends and family as forms of business funding. 
3. Have experienced unfair competition from the informal sector, but they have been 
managing to cope with it. 
4. The low efficiency of the state administration is either the first or the second (out 
of three) most significant impediments to their business. 
5. Their opinion about the fact that doing business entirely according to the rules is 
too expensive varies between strong agreements to neutral. 
6. The cost of doing their business per day is more than 103BGN. 






4. Step 1: 
 
Using the Auto Classifier node, 570 models have been automatically tested and 
classified based on the best overall accuracy achievable. The 570 models exhausted 
several settings’ combinations in each of the following algorithms: CHAID, C5, C&R 
tree, QUEST, Decision List, Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Nearest Neighbour 
Analysis (KNN). More details are available in “Auto Classifier – Training summary for 
Q16_3” in Appendix 21. 
 
The best overall accuracy of 82.6% has been achieved by a CHAID decision tree, 
which used 13 fields for the model development. Another model, which named E-
CHAID decision tree (E-CHAID Model Q16_3), achieved 79.7%. The predictive power 
of that model for “Yes” response type was better, so it was selected. 
 
 
5. Step 2: 
 
The model from step 1 has been evaluated using the analysis node. The predictive 
power of the model secures correct prediction in 79.7 percent of all cases. Appendix 
21 provides the performance evaluation, coincidence matrix and the visual 
representation. 
6. Step 3: 
 
Targeting value 1 (Yes) from variable 16_3, a rule set has been generated with 79.2% 
confidence (see the symbolic expression in Appendix 21). According to this rule set, 
entrepreneurs who selected option 3 “Yes, they do it in order to reduce their costs and 
increase their profits” (3
rd
 out of 8 options on question 16) have the following profile 
characteristics: 
 
1. According to their opinion, the declared turnovers are lesser in comparison with 
the actual ones with 29% to 40%. 
2. Some of these entrepreneurs have been inspected by NRA. Some of the inspected 
– 130 – 
were encouraged to provide bribe(s) to the officials. 
3. Have been pushed to pay informally “to get things done” with up to 39% of their 
turnovers or refused to answer this question. 
4. The low efficiency of the state administration is either one of the three biggest 
business impediments ranked 3
rd
 or is not selected amongst the possible options. 





7. Step 1: 
 
Using the Auto Classifier node, 570 models have been automatically tested and 
classified based on the best overall accuracy achievable. The 570 models exhausted 
several settings’ combinations in each of the following algorithms: CHAID, C5, C&R 
tree, QUEST, Decision List, Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Nearest Neighbour 
Analysis (KNN). More details are available in “Auto Classifier – Training summary for 
Q16_4” in Appendix 22. The best overall accuracy of 99.5% has been achieved by a 
C5 decision tree, which used 14 fields for the model development. 
 
8. Step 2: 
 
The model from step 1 has been evaluated using the analysis node. The predictive 
power of the model secures correct prediction in 99 percent of all cases. Appendix 22 




9. Step 3: 
 
Targeting value 1 (Yes) from variable 16_4, a rule set has been generated with 91.3% 
confidence (see the symbolic expression in Appendix 22). According to this rule set, 
entrepreneurs who selected option 4 “Yes and I do not see anything wrong in this” (4
th
 
out of 8 options on question 16) have the following profile characteristics: 
 
1. There are between 2 and 4 people working full time for the business. 
2. Loans from business partners (suppliers or clients) are not used as a form of 
business finance. 
3. Using bribes in the current business environment is considered normal or at least 
have not been rejected as unacceptable practice. 
4. These firms consume goods and services in order to operate, but receive invoices 





1. Step 1: 
Using the Auto Classifier node, 570 models have been automatically tested and 
classified based on the best overall accuracy achievable. The 570 models exhausted 
several settings’ combinations in each of the following algorithms: CHAID, C5, C&R 
tree, QUEST, Decision List, Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Nearest Neighbour 
Analysis (KNN). More details are available in “Auto Classifier – Training summary for 
Q16_5” in Appendix 23. Similarly to Q16_4, the best overall accuracy here has been 
achieved by a C5 decision tree with 95.6%, which used 12 fields for the model 
development. 
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2. Step 2: 
 
The model from step 1 has been evaluated using the analysis node. The predictive 
power of the model secures correct prediction in 95.6% percent of all cases. Appendix 
23 provides the performance evaluation and coincidence matrix. 
 
 
3. Step 3: 
 
Targeting value 1 (Yes) from variable 16_5, a rule set has been generated with 86.4% 
confidence (see the symbolic expression in Appendix 23). According to this rule set, 
entrepreneurs who selected option 5 “Yes, because they are forced to do so and they 
do not have another chance” (5
th
 out of 8 options on question 16) have the following 
profile characteristics: 
 
1. They disagree that NRA has professional attitude and treatment. 
2. These entrepreneurs fully disagree that tax money are being spent in a fair way. 
3. Credit cards have not been used as a form of business finance. 
4. Have been inspected by NRA. 
5. There is at least 1 person working full time for the business. 
6. Their opinion about NRA’s procedures and in particular its administrative capacity 
in regards with their business, varies from neutral effect to medium hampering 
effect. 
 
In order to provide clarity and comparability Table 17 summarises the results from the 
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Table 17: Decision tree modelling of entrepreneurs’ tax evasive motivations (variable Q16). 








actual turnovers with 








At 84.6% accuracy: 
1. They underreport their turnovers with 21% to 65%. 
2. They spend up to 10 days per month to cope with administrative requirements 
imposed by various state regulations (such as business permissions, tax 
return, communication with NRA, NSSI and others). 
3. Have been inspected by NRA officials and during these inspection(s) have 
been expected or encouraged to provide forms of informal benefit to the 
officials. 






actual turnovers with 
the purpose to pay 




CHAID, C5, C&R tree, 
QUEST, Decision List, 
Support Vector 





At 92.6% accuracy: 
1. According to their judgement, the declared turnovers are lesser with up to 30% 
in comparison with the actual ones. 
2. They do not use loans from friends and family as forms of business funding. 
3. Have been experiencing unfair competition from the informal sector, but they 
have been managing to cope with it. 
4. The low efficiency of the state administration is either the first or the second 
(out of three) most significant impediments to their business. 
5. Their opinion about the fact that doing business entirely according to the rules 
is too expensive varies between strong agreements to neutral. 
6. The cost of doing their business per day is more than 103BGN. 
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actual turnovers with 
the purpose to pay 
less tax in order to 
reduce their costs 




CHAID, C5, C&R tree, 
QUEST, Decision List, 
Support Vector 





At 79.2% accuracy: 
1. According to their opinion, the declared turnovers are lesser in comparison 
with the actual ones with 29% to 40%. 
2. Some of these entrepreneurs have been inspected by NRA. Some of the 
inspected were encouraged to provide bribes to the officials. 
3. Have been pushed to pay informally “to get things done” with up to 39% of their 
turnovers or refused to answer this question. 
4. The low efficiency of the state administration is either one of the three biggest 
business impediments ranked 3
rd
 or is not selected amongst the possible 
options. 
5. They experience forms of unfair informal competition. 
You do not see 
anything wrong in 




actual turnovers with 




CHAID, C5, C&R tree, 
QUEST, Decision List, 
Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) and 
Nearest Neighbour 
Analysis (KNN) 
C5 at 99% At 91.3% accuracy: 
1. There are between 2 and 4 people working full time for the business. 
2. Loans from business partners (suppliers or clients) are not used as a form of 
business finance. 
3. Using bribes in the current business environment is considered normal or at 
least have not been rejected as unacceptable practice. 
4. These firms consume goods and services in order to operate, but receive 




actual turnovers with 
the purpose to pay 
less tax, because 
they are forced to do 
so and they do not 
have another choice. 
570 models’ 
configurations from: 
CHAID, C5, C&R tree, 
QUEST, Decision List, 
Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) and 
Nearest Neighbour 
Analysis (KNN) 
C5 at 95.6% At 86.4% accuracy: 
1. They disagree that NRA has professional attitude and treatment. 
2. These entrepreneurs fully disagree that tax money are being spent in a fair 
way. 
3. Credit cards have not been used as a form of business finance. 
4. Have been inspected by NRA. 
5. There is at least 1 person working full time for the business. 
6. Their opinion about NRA’s procedures and in particular its administrative 
capacity in regards with their business, varies from neutral effect to medium 
hampering effect. 
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The next modelling steps involve development and testing of 5 MLP Neural Networks 
for each variable accordingly: Q16_1, Q16_2, Q16_3, Q16_4 and Q16_5. As 
described earlier in the text, this analytical step has dual purpose – to suggest neural 
net models for description of the current data set and make them available in 
electronic form for analysing future longitudinal data sets. In doing so, to identify and 
rank each input field based on the strength of its relationship to the specified target 
variable. The results are presented in figures 59, 60, 61, 62 and 63 accordingly. Each 
figure shows the top 5 strongest influencers (predictor variables), which contributed to 
a particular answer by respondents. Table 18 unites the results from all figures in a 
tabular format, however only the top three predictors are summarised in descending 
order for clarity. 
 
In order to build the 5 MLP Neural Networks all input variables from the 5 decision 
trees were taken cumulatively into the modelling for each of the target variables (from 
Q16_1 to Q16_5). Therefore, the Neural Networks have been pruned and purified by 
initial design, concentrating on their pattern recognition capability on the most 
important input variables. Because all input variables from the 5 decision trees are 
taken into the modelling of each of the 5 target variables simultaneously, any 
research bias and preliminary knowledge have been eliminated even before the 
training of the networks began. The neural network model for Q16_1 has been 
provided with the input variables from all decision trees (Appendix 24). The same 
method was employed for Q16_2 to Q16_5 inclusive. As a result, each neural network 
had the chance to capture patterns and relationships while being trained, which might 
not have been exposed by the decision tree modelling stage. Coincidence matrices, 
model accuracy summaries and stream details for each of the 5 neural networks are 
provided in Appendix 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 accordingly. To increase the predictive 
accuracy and models’ robustness, the following parameters were applied: 
 
Neural network model: Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) 
Hidden Layers: Automatically compute number of units 
 
Overfit prevention set(%): 30.0 
Replicate Results: true 
Random seed: 229176228 
Missing values in predictors: Impute missing values 
 
Stopping Rules 
Use maximum training time (per component model): false 
Customize number of maximum training cycles: false 
Use minimum accuracy: false 
 
Ensemble 
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Figure 19: Neural Network – relative predictors' importance for target variable Q16_1. 
 





Note: Neural network modelling details are available in Appendix 25. 






Relative predictor importance 
What level of difficulties does your business experience due to unfair
competition from the informal sector?
According to your judgement, with what percentage usually the declared
turnovers are lesser in comparison with the actual ones?
Approximately how many days per month do you spend to cope with
administrative requirements imposed by various state regulations (such as
business permissions, tax return, communication with NRA, NSSI and others)?
During these inspection(s) visits have you been expected or encouraged to
provide any form of informal benefit to the official(s)?
How would you rank the low efficiency of the state administration in terms of
creating the most difficulties for your business in comparison with the other two
factors possible for selection?
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Figure 20: Neural Network – relative predictors' importance for target variable Q16_2. 
 



















Relative predictor importance 
What level of difficulties does your business experience due to unfair
competition from the informal sector?
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and administrative
policies in Bulgaria?
In the current business environment, tax evasion is an acceptable phenomenon?
Do you use any forms of business finance/credit such as loans from friends and
family?
Doing business entirely according to the rules is too expensive?
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Figure 21: Neural Network – relative predictors' importance for target variable Q16_3. 
 
















Relative predictor importance 
What level of difficulties does your business experience due to unfair
competition from the informal sector?
In your view, what percentage of the turnover do other businesses from your 
sector are pushed to pay informally “to get things done” – such as administrative 
services, tenders, licensing, regulative permissions and alike? 
Have you ever been inspected by NRA tax officials?
Approximately how many days per month do you spend to cope with
administrative requirements imposed by various state regulations (such as
business permissions, tax return, communication with NRA, NSSI and others)?
During these inspection(s) visits have you been expected or encouraged to
provide any form of informal benefit to the official(s)?
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Figure 22: Neural Network – relative predictors' importance for target variable Q16_4. 
 

















Relative predictor importance 
Do you experience unfair competition from unregistered or informal businesses
(grey economy businesses)?
What level of difficulties does your business experience due to unfair
competition from the informal sector?
Approximately how many days per month do you spend to cope with
administrative requirements imposed by various state regulations (such as
business permissions, tax return, communication with NRA, NSSI and others)?
For what part of the goods and services, which you need as a business, do you
usually receive an invoice?
In the current business environment, using bribes is an acceptable
phenomenon?
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Figure 23: Neural Network – relative predictors' importance for target variable Q16_5. 
 




















Relative predictor importance 
What level of difficulties does your business experience due to unfair
competition from the informal sector?
In the current business environment, tax evasion is an acceptable
phenomenon?
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and administrative
policies in Bulgaria?
How would you assess NRA’s work (procedures) and in particular its 
administrative capacity in regards with your business? 
Doing business entirely according to the rules is too expensive?
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Table 18: Results from MLP Neural Network modelling of tax evasive motivations. 
 
Variable Selected answer Predictors’ relative importance in descending order 
Q16_1 Yes. What level of difficulties does your business experience due to unfair competition from the informal sector? 
According to your judgement, with what percentage usually the declared turnovers are lesser in comparison 
with the actual ones? 
Approximately how many days per month do you spend to cope with administrative requirements imposed by 
various state regulations (such as business permissions, tax return, communication with NRA, NSSI and 
others)? 
 
Q16_2 Yes, in order to survive. What level of difficulties does your business experience due to unfair competition from the informal sector? 
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and administrative policies in Bulgaria? 
In the current business environment, tax evasion is an acceptable phenomenon? 
 
Q16_3 Yes, they do it in order 
to reduce their costs 
and increase their 
profits. 
 
What level of difficulties does your business experience due to unfair competition from the informal sector? 
In your view, what percentage of the turnover do other businesses from your sector are pushed to pay 
informally “to get things done” – such as administrative services, tenders, licensing, regulative permissions 
and alike? 
Have you ever been inspected by NRA tax officials? 
 
Q16_4 Yes, and I do not see 
anything wrong in this. 
 
Do you experience unfair competition from unregistered or informal businesses (grey economy businesses)? 
What level of difficulties does your business experience due to unfair competition from the informal sector? 
Approximately how many days per month do you spend to cope with administrative requirements imposed by 
various state regulations (such as business permissions, tax return, communication with NRA, NSSI and 
others)? 
 
Q16_5 Yes, because they are 
forced to do so and 
they do not have 
another choice. 
What level of difficulties does your business experience due to unfair competition from the informal sector? 
In the current business environment, tax evasion is an acceptable phenomenon? 
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and administrative policies in Bulgaria? 
– 141 – 
Given the research aims of the study, it is important to discover the most powerful 
predictors (characteristics) of those respondents who think that tax evasion is an 
acceptable phenomenon. To answer this question a Multinomial Logistic Regression 
(MLR) has been employed for variable Q14_3. The reference category is the last one 
– “Strongly disagree”. Of particular interest for the research aims are the respondents 
who answered with “Strongly agree” or “Agree” accordingly that tax evasion is an 
acceptable phenomenon. As evident from the case processing summary on the next 
page, there were 69 (“Strongly agree”) and 64 (“Agree”) observations. The distribution 
of observations amongst the factor (predictor) variables is also visible. The full 
distribution of observations for variable Q14_3 is available in table 13. 
The chi-square test indicates a significant decrease (p = .000) of unexplained 
variance (850.91 – 644.95 = 205.95) in comparison with the baseline model (850.91). 
This means that the final model explains a significant amount of original variability, so 
it is a better fit than the original model. The Pearson and Deviance statistics are 
simultaneously strongly insignificant, which indicates that the predicted values are not 
significantly different from the observed ones – therefore, the model is a good fit to 
the data. The Cox and Snell’s measure (.40) and Nagelkerke’s adjusted value (.41) 
are similar and both indicate strong-sized effects. 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC BIC -2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 858.906 874.961 850.906    





Square df Sig. 
Pearson 485.214 460 .201 
Deviance 403.875 460 .972 
 
Pseudo R-Square 




The three most significant predictors (Table 19) of whether entrepreneurs strongly 
agree that tax evasion is an acceptable phenomenon are: 
1. They strongly support that tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor 
tax and administrative policies (p = .000). 
2. Support that tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies (p = .002). 
3. They believe that underreporting of business turnovers is with the purpose to 
survive economically (p = .003). 
The next subpopulation is defined by those who agree that tax evasion is an 
acceptable phenomenon (Table 19). As evident, there is little explanatory difference 
with the first group above. Their most significant predictors are: 
1. The first three most significant predictors include the entrepreneurs who think that 
tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and administrative 
policies. Strongly agree, agree and neither agree, nor disagree are all significant 
at p = .000, p = .000 and p = .007 accordingly. 
2. They believe that underreporting of business turnovers is with the purpose to 
survive economically (p = .016). 








Case Processing Summary 
Multinomial logistic regression of variable Q14_3 








In the current business environment, 
tax evasion is an acceptable 
phenomenon? 
Strongly agree. 69 16.9% 
Agree. 64 15.6% 
Neither agree, nor 
disagree. 
93 22.7% 
Disagree. 72 17.6% 
Strongly disagree. 111 27.1% 
Businesses from your sector 
underreport their actual turnovers with 
the purpose to pay less tax in order to 
survive? 
Yes. 188 46.0% 
User not selected 
221 54.0% 
Tax evasion is the answer from the 
business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? 
Strongly agree. 119 29.1% 
Agree. 90 22.0% 
Neither agree, nor 
disagree. 
84 20.5% 
Disagree. 54 13.2% 
Strongly disagree. 62 15.2% 
What is your opinion about the correct 
and fair expenditure of tax money? 
Strongly agree. 49 12.0% 
Agree. 32 7.8% 
Neither agree, nor 
disagree. 
82 20.0% 
Disagree. 110 26.9% 
Strongly disagree. 136 33.3% 
What is your opinion about fair, 
professional attitude and treatment by 
the state institutions? 
Strongly agree. 38 9.3% 
Agree. 49 12.0% 
Neither agree, nor 
disagree. 99 24.2% 
Disagree. 112 27.4% 
Strongly disagree. 111 27.1% 
Valid 409 100.0% 
Missing 4  
Total 413  
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Table 19: Multinomial Logistic Regression for variable Q14_3. 
Parameters estimates – Multinomial Logistic Regression for variable Q14_3 
The dependent variable is Q14_3. 
Strongly agree that in the current business environment, tax evasion is 
an acceptable phenomenon. 
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept -2.412 .600 16.155 1 .000    
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Strongly agree. 
3.258 .606 28.856 1 .000 25.990 7.918 85.311 
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Agree. 
2.027 .669 9.169 1 .002 7.591 2.044 28.191 
Businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers with the 
purpose to pay less tax in order to survive? = Yes. 
1.113 .372 8.967 1 .003 3.045 1.469 6.310 
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Neither agree, nor disagree. 
1.109 .659 2.836 1 .092 3.033 .834 11.031 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Neither agree, nor disagree. 
-.690 .552 1.560 1 .212 .502 .170 1.481 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Disagree. 
-.583 .516 1.275 1 .259 .558 .203 1.536 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Strongly agree. 
.880 .968 .827 1 .363 2.411 .362 16.064 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Agree. 
-.776 1.020 .579 1 .447 .460 .062 3.398 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Disagree. 
-.366 .518 .498 1 .480 .694 .251 1.916 
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Disagree. 
.360 .801 .202 1 .653 1.433 .298 6.893 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Neither agree, nor disagree. 
.132 .563 .055 1 .814 1.141 .379 3.439 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Agree. 
-.049 .725 .005 1 .946 .952 .230 3.940 




-.052 .864 .004 1 .952 .949 .175 5.157 
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Parameters estimates – Multinomial Logistic Regression for variable Q14_3 




Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept -2.933 .702 17.455 1 .000    
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Strongly agree. 
3.192 .719 19.716 1 .000 24.329 5.947 99.535 
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Agree. 
3.360 .725 21.478 1 .000 28.784 6.951 119.195 
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Neither agree, nor disagree. 
1.946 .726 7.181 1 .007 7.001 1.687 29.060 
Businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers with the 
purpose to pay less tax in order to survive? = Yes. 
.874 .363 5.803 1 .016 2.397 1.177 4.882 
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Disagree. 
1.348 .803 2.816 1 .093 3.848 .797 18.572 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Neither agree, nor disagree. 
-.735 .549 1.792 1 .181 .480 .164 1.406 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Neither agree, nor disagree. 
.254 .541 .220 1 .639 1.289 .446 3.721 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Agree. 
.311 .833 .139 1 .709 1.365 .267 6.988 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Strongly agree. 
-.270 1.145 .056 1 .813 .763 .081 7.195 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Disagree. 
-.064 .495 .017 1 .897 .938 .355 2.476 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Disagree. 
.036 .477 .006 1 .939 1.037 .407 2.644 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Agree. 
-.020 .691 .001 1 .977 .980 .253 3.798 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Strongly agree. 
 
-.021 .944 .000 1 .982 .979 .154 6.232 
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Parameters estimates – Multinomial Logistic Regression for variable Q14_3 
Neither agree, nor disagree that in the current business environment, 
tax evasion is an acceptable phenomenon. 
B Std. 
Error 
Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept -2.634 .626 17.722 1 .000    
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Strongly agree. 
3.221 .650 24.561 1 .000 25.060 7.010 89.589 
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Agree. 
3.217 .656 24.027 1 .000 24.951 6.894 90.304 
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Neither agree, nor disagree. 
2.618 .616 18.061 1 .000 13.707 4.098 45.844 
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Disagree. 
1.576 .690 5.223 1 .022 4.836 1.252 18.687 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Agree. 
-1.403 .717 3.828 1 .050 .246 .060 1.003 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Agree. 
1.441 .743 3.764 1 .052 4.223 .985 18.099 
Businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers with the 
purpose to pay less tax in order to survive? = Yes. 
.530 .330 2.589 1 .108 1.700 .891 3.244 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Neither agree, nor disagree. 
-.610 .481 1.611 1 .204 .543 .212 1.394 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Disagree. 
.533 .431 1.532 1 .216 1.704 .733 3.965 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Neither agree, nor disagree. 
.520 .500 1.079 1 .299 1.681 .631 4.482 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Disagree. 
-.277 .455 .370 1 .543 .758 .311 1.849 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Strongly agree. 
.510 1.084 .221 1 .638 1.665 .199 13.933 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Strongly agree. 
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Parameters estimates – Multinomial Logistic Regression for variable Q14_3 




Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept -3.426 .745 21.117 1 .000    
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Agree. 
3.669 .715 26.319 1 .000 39.220 9.654 159.329 
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Neither agree, nor disagree. 
2.729 .687 15.792 1 .000 15.324 3.988 58.887 
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Disagree. 
2.645 .695 14.490 1 .000 14.079 3.607 54.952 
Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? = Strongly agree. 
2.195 .804 7.456 1 .006 8.976 1.858 43.371 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Disagree. 
.675 .483 1.953 1 .162 1.963 .762 5.056 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Agree. 
.940 .786 1.431 1 .232 2.561 .549 11.950 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Neither agree, nor disagree. 
.616 .533 1.335 1 .248 1.852 .651 5.267 
What is your opinion about the correct and fair expenditure of tax money? = 
Strongly agree. 
.493 .955 .267 1 .605 1.638 .252 10.644 
Businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers with the 
purpose to pay less tax in order to survive? = Yes. 
.008 .359 .001 1 .982 1.008 .499 2.037 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Strongly agree. 
.468 1.102 .181 1 .671 1.597 .184 13.840 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Agree. 
-.066 .704 .009 1 .925 .936 .235 3.722 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Neither agree, nor disagree. 
-.039 .558 .005 1 .945 .962 .322 2.873 
What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment by the 
state institutions? = Disagree. 
.347 .530 .428 1 .513 1.415 .501 3.997 
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As is evident from the modelling with decision trees and neural networks (summarised 
in Table 17 and 19), unfair competition from informal businesses is the most frequent 
and strongest predictor of tax evasion. It is highly likely that entrepreneurs who 
experience such competition would compensate their losses via turnover 
underreporting. In addition, entrepreneurs exercise tax evasion as a corresponding 
response to the poor tax and administrative policies, which cause them to spend more 
valuable resources than deemed acceptable. This finding was supported by the 
multinomial logistic regression according to which surviving economically is the 
second most significant predictor of tax evasion. On some occasion there were bribes 
demanding inspections from NRA, which appeared as a determinant of tax evasive 
behaviour. 
 
The modelling workflows in this section (6.2.1), including the decision trees and neural 
networks, have been aimed at inter-variables’ relationships between one target 
variable and several input variables. In order to fully exhaust this line of analytical 
enquiry (revealing tax evasive motivations), one more modelling technique has been 
utilised – a two-step cluster evaluation analysis based on log-likelihood as distance 
measure and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). It has the advantage to test several 
cluster solutions selecting the best ones and to automatically estimate the optimal 
number of clusters for the training data (IBM, 2015b, p. 25). This method of clustering 
is necessary to unveil what is the associative pattern of respondents who provided 
more than one answer to question 16 (up to three out of 8 options). In particular, what 
is the pattern of answers if their selection is within the first 5 options, which are all 
indicating tax evasion with various possible motivations. The analysis is pointed only at 
those respondents who exercised their right to select 2 or 3 answers and all of them 
were within the first 5 options of question 16. Appendix 30 provides full details of the 
two step clustering. Nine clusters in total have been discovered and the model 
achieved average silhouette coefficient of 0.9. Considering that the silhouette 
coefficient is a “dimensionless quantity which is at most equal to 1” (Kaufman, 
Rousseeuw PJ, 1990, p. 87-88), evidently this cluster model is very robust in exposing 
the real patterns in the data. Figure 24 is an illustration of the cluster comparison. The 
upper section of the figure shows the patterns’ distribution between the variables in a 
graphical form. For instance, it is visible that cluster 7 contains members 
(respondents) who provided two answers out of the maximum 3 allowed – two light 
blue circles. Members of cluster 9 provided 3 answers respectively – three green 
circles. The lower section of figure 24 is a table quantification of the very same data. 
Emerging from the cluster modelling, it is argued that the entrepreneurs who have 
provided more than one motive for tax evasion simultaneously have some important 
coincidence of their answer patterns. Firstly, turnover underreporting is exercised, so 
that entrepreneurs can survive economically and secondly, this illicit activity is 
practiced because they do not have another choice. Thirdly, tax evasion is performed 
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Figure 24: Cluster comparison for variables Q16_1 to Q16_5 inclusive. 
 
Variable  Clusters Members Clusters Members 
Q16_4 You do not see anything wrong in the fact that businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers with the purpose to pay 
less tax? 
0 0 7, 1, 2, 9, 8 117 
Q16_5 Businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax, because they are forced to do so and 
they do not have another choice? 
7, 9, 8 79 1, 2 38 
Q16_2 Businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax in order to survive? 7, 2, 9, 8 98 1 19 
Q16_1 Businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax? 1, 9 38 7, 2, 8 79 
Q16_3 Businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax in order to reduce their costs and 
increase their profits? 
1, 2, 8 56 7, 9 61 
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6.2.2 Institutional quality, procedural fairness and distributive justice. 
 
Question 13 is from the business survey’s “Block 3 – Institutional quality and fair use 
of public money (see Appendix 18). Procedural fairness and distributive justice.” It is 
represented with three sub-variables – Q13_1, Q13_2 and Q13_3. As is evident from 
the summary statistics for variable Q13, the bigger proportion of entrepreneurs 
disagree with the way tax money are being spent. The state institutions’ services, 
including NRA, are deemed unfair and unprofessional from their perspective, which 
harms the perceived procedural fairness, and obstruct distributive justice accordingly. 
Most entrepreneurs spend on average more than 4 days per month to cope with 
administrative requirements imposed by various state regulations. There is a dual 
pattern of dissatisfaction amongst the entrepreneurs – simultaneously with the state 
institutions’ quality, including NRA and the way tax money is spent. Evidently from the 
decision tree modelling below, entrepreneurs are likely to be pushed into evasive 
economic behaviour by the apparent poor quality of state institutions and NRA. The 
experience of unfair competition from informal businesses is an additional influencer. 
However, the same entrepreneurs still disapprove the use of bribes in the current 
business environment as a coping strategy and have registered their businesses 
formally from the very beginning of trading. Individual modelling for each of the three 






1. Step 1: 
 
Using the Auto Classifier node, 3104 models have been automatically tested and 
classified based on the best overall accuracy achievable. The automated 
classification exhausted several settings’ combinations in each of the following 
models: C5, Neural Networks, C&R Tree and CHAID tree. More details are available in 
“Auto Classifier – Training summary for Q13_1” in Appendix 31. The best overall 
accuracy of 81.5% has achieved by a C5 decision tree model. It is based on the use of 
31 variables and is 17 levels in depth. 
 
2. Step 2: 
 
The model from step 1 has been evaluated using the analysis node. The predictive 
power of the model secures correct prediction in 80.9 percent of all cases. Appendix 
31 provides the performance evaluation, coincidence matrix and the symbolic 
representation of the model. 
 
3. Step 3: 
 
Following the study’s analytical line of enquiry, it is necessary to profile respondents 
who exhibited disagreement with the way tax money is being spent. Therefore, the 
target values of variable Q13_1 are “Disagree” and “Fully disagree” – mode 4 and 
mode 5 accordingly. Based on a rule set with 81.5% accuracy, the following table 
contains the most representative profile characteristics of those entrepreneurs (who 
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Profile characteristics Q13_1 value 
Have registered their businesses formally from the very 
beginning. 
“Disagree.” 
Doing business entirely according to the rules is too expensive. 
Experience unfair competition from informal businesses. 
Disagree that in the current business environment, using bribes is 
an acceptable phenomenon. 
Have been inspected by NRA tax officials. 
Disagree that NRA has fair and professional attitude. 
  
They strongly disagree that state institutions, including NRA have 
fair and professional attitude. 
“Fully disagree.” 
They spend on average more than 7 days per month to cope with 
administrative requirements imposed by various state regulations 
(such as business permissions, tax return, communication with 
NRA, NSSI and others. 
In the current business environment, are supportive to tax 
evasion behaviour as an appropriate response, but disagree with 
the use of bribes. 
Doing business entirely according to the rules is not perceived as 






4. Step 1: 
 
Using the Auto Classifier node, 3104 models have been automatically tested and 
classified based on the best overall accuracy achievable. The automated 
classification exhausted several settings’ combinations in each of the following 
models: C5, Neural Networks, C&R Tree and CHAID tree. More details are available in 
“Auto Classifier – Training summary for Q13_2” in Appendix 32. Similarly to variable 
Q13_1, the best estimated accuracy of 83.7% has been achieved by a C5 decision 
tree model. It is based on the use of 34 variables and is 14 levels in depth. 
 
5. Step 2: 
 
The model from step 1 has been evaluated using the analysis node. The predictive 
power of the model secures correct prediction in 94.2 percent of all cases. Appendix 
32 provides the performance evaluation, coincidence matrix and the symbolic 
representation of the model. 
 
6. Step 3: 
 
In order to profile the respondents who think that NRA does not treat them in 
professional and fair way, mode 4 and 5 were the targeted ones – corresponding 
values “Disagree” and “Fully disagree” accordingly. Based on a rule set with 74.2% 
accuracy, the following table contains the most representative profile characteristics 
of those entrepreneurs. The logic of the question is reversed, so an answer 
“Disagree”, means that a respondent disagrees that NRA has fair and professional 
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Profile characteristics Q13_2 value 
Disagree that the state institutions have fair and professional 
attitude. 
“Disagree.” 
Spend more than 7 days per month on average to cope with 
administrative requirements imposed by various state 
regulations (such as business permissions, tax return, 
communication with NRA, NSSI and others). 
Have registered their businesses from the very beginning of 
trading. 
Strongly disagree that in the current business environment, 
using bribes is an acceptable phenomenon. 
Experience unfair competition from informal businesses. 
 
Disagree or strongly disagree that the state institutions behave 
in fair and professional way. 
“Fully disagree.” 
Think that NRA’s work and procedures have medium to 
enormous hampering effect on their business. 
Strongly disagree that tax money are being spent in a correct 





7. Step 1: 
 
As with the previous two variables, the same types and number of models have been 
automatically tested and classified for Q13_3. The tested models were: C5, Neural 
Networks, C&R Tree and CHAID tree. More details are available in “Auto Classifier – 
Training summary for Q13_3” in Appendix 33. The best estimated accuracy has been 
achieved again by a C5 decision tree model at 94.6%. It is based on the use of 55 
variables and is 17 levels in depth. 
 
8. Step 2: 
 
The model from step 1 has been evaluated using the analysis node. The predictive 
power of the model secures correct prediction in 82.8 percent of all cases. Appendix 
33 provides the performance evaluation, coincidence matrix and the symbolic 
representation of the model. 
 
9. Step 3: 
 
In order to profile the respondents who think that the state institutions do not treat 
them in professional and fair way, mode 4 and 5 were the targeted ones – 
corresponding values “Disagree” and “Fully disagree” accordingly. Based on a rule set 
with 73.4% accuracy, the following table contains the most representative profile 
characteristics of those entrepreneurs. The logic of the question is reversed, so an 
answer “Disagree”, means that a respondent disagrees that the state institutions have 
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Profile characteristics Q13_3 value 
The laws and regulations are the first out of three factors 
creating the most difficulties to their businesses. 
“Disagree.” 
They disagree that tax money are being spent in a correct and 
fair way. 
Have been inspected by NRA and on average spend more than 4 
days monthly to cope with administrative requirements imposed 
by various state regulations (such as business permissions, tax 
return, communication with NRA, NSSI and others). 
Disagree that NRA has fair and professional attitude. 
Experience unfair competition from informal businesses. 
 
Have been inspected by NRA and have been encouraged to 
provide forms of informal benefit to the officials. 
“Fully disagree.” 
Disagree that NRA has fair and professional attitude. 
In the current business environment, are supportive to tax 
evasion behaviour as an appropriate response. 
They disagree that tax money are being spent in a correct and 
fair way. 
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Table 20: Decision tree modelling of entrepreneurs’ perceptions of procedural fairness and institutional quality. 









































C&R Tree and 
CHAID tree 








 Have registered their businesses formally from the very beginning. 
 Doing business entirely according to the rules is too expensive. 
 Experience unfair competition from informal businesses. 
 Disagree that in the current business environment, using bribes is an acceptable phenomenon. 
 Have been inspected by NRA tax officials. 











  They strongly disagree that state institutions, including NRA have fair and professional attitude. 
 They spend on average more than 7 days per month to cope with administrative requirements 
imposed by various state regulations (such as business permissions, tax return, communication 
with NRA, NSSI and others. 
 In the current business environment, are supportive to tax evasion behaviour as an appropriate 
response, but disagree with the use of bribes. 











































C&R Tree and 
CHAID tree 








 Disagree that the state institutions have fair and professional attitude. 
 Spend more than 7 days per month on average to cope with administrative requirements imposed 
by various state regulations (such as business permissions, tax return, communication with NRA, 
NSSI and others). 
 Have registered their businesses from the very beginning of trading. 
 Strongly disagree that in the current business environment, using bribes is an acceptable 
phenomenon. 













 Disagree or strongly disagree that the state institutions behave in fair and professional way. 
 Think that NRA’s work and procedures have medium to enormous hampering effect on their 
business. 
 Strongly disagree that tax money are being spent in a correct and fair way. 
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C&R Tree and 
CHAID tree 








 The laws and regulations are the first out of three factors creating the most difficulties to their 
businesses. 
 They disagree that tax money are being spent in a correct and fair way. 
 Have been inspected by NRA and on average spend more than 4 days monthly to cope with 
administrative requirements imposed by various state regulations (such as business permissions, 
tax return, communication with NRA, NSSI and others). 
 Disagree that NRA has fair and professional attitude. 













 Have been inspected by NRA and have been encouraged to provide forms of informal benefit to 
the officials. 
 Disagree that NRA has fair and professional attitude. 
 In the current business environment, are supportive to tax evasion behaviour as an appropriate 
response. 
 They disagree that tax money are being spent in a correct and fair way. 
 Have formally registered their business since it began trading. 
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6.2.3 Informality chains of interdependence – economic barriers to formalisation. 
 
Block 5 from the survey contains three questions and is designed to detect the so 
called informality chains of interdependence a business might be part of. This is a 
complex economic situation where an enterprise satisfies a proportion of their trade 
needs for goods and/or services without receiving invoices accordingly. In doing so, 
the participating firm cannot claim eligible expenses and develops strong motivation to 
offset the loss with a reciprocal action – not providing invoices to conceal taxable 
income. The informality chain of interdependence could be caused by pressure from 
other enterprises on the supply or the demand side of the business, or by both. To 
illustrate how it works in practice the following example is provided: 
 
1. Firm A manufactures cardboard packaging. Firm A sells various cardboard 
packaging sets to firms B and C, which are French croissant manufacturers). 
They need the packaging in order to sell their products to their end customers. 
Firm A buys raw material to produce the cardboard packaging from firm D. 
 
2. After a period of mutually beneficial business relationship, firm D suggest to firm 
A that they need to increase the price of the raw material with X%. However if 
firm A agrees to accept 30% of the monthly supply of raw material without 
invoice from firm D, then the prices would remain unchanged. 
 
3. Firm A would be out of their competitive market niche if they have to transfer the 
raw material price increase with X% into their product (cardboard packaging). 
Firm A’s clients (firm B and C) will not accommodate such an increase and will 
look to replace their supplier. Firm A, also considers if they are able to introduce 
any production optimisation to achieve lower cost of production, but they do not 
have the capital to do that. Therefore, firm A agrees to accept 30% of their 
monthly supply from firm D without invoice. It is either accepting that or losing 
market position and the financial feasibility of the entire business operation. 
 
4. Firm A successfully negotiates a similar deal with firms B and C in order to 
offset the loss of eligible business expense claim. In the new trade mode, firms 
B and C acquire their usual supply of packaging, but approximately 30% of it is 
without invoice from firm A. 
 
5. Firms B and C supply their croissants to small food shops and cafés. They try to 
persuade them with similar proposal for a proportion of the monthly supply 
without invoices. 
 
6. Firms A, B, C and D start to exist in an informal chain of interdependence and 
therefore apply constant pressure up and down their relevant supply chains. 
 
An enterprise consuming a proportion of their business goods and/or services without 
invoices could genuinely support this trade status for various reasons amongst which: 
1. Exercising a similar level of informality together with their supplier(s) and evading 
taxes at the preferred level to increase profits. 
 
2. Unable to achieve market competitive product or service if they start to acquire all 
their products and services with invoices (i.e. higher prices) from alternative fully 
formal suppliers. 
 
3. Not having the resources or willingness to find alternative fully formal suppliers 
prepared to always issue invoices. 
The corporate tax in Bulgaria is 10%. It could be argued that enterprises, which 
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manage to acquire invoice for less than 80% of their business needs, would be 
strongly incentivised to pursue compensatory strategies. Based on variable Q18 and 
Q19 (see Summary statistics of individual variables), it is evident that from the 58.6% 
who experience purchasing of goods and services without invoices, 33.5% acquire 
invoices not exceeding 80% of their consumption as businesses (Table 14). For that 
reason, this group of enterprises could be considered to function in informality chain 
of interdependence with varying magnitude of tax concealment and degree of 
complexity. As a matter of relevant importance to the research instrument’s design, it 
should be noted that that any business customer in Bulgaria is lawfully entitled to 
receive an invoice and associated fiscal receipt (where applicable). The business 
supplier is lawfully obliged to invoice every sale. Claiming eligible business expense 
without the relevant paperwork is not possible. 
 
The third question (out of three for survey’s block 5) is represented by variable Q20. 
This question seeks to identify an important characteristic of an informality chain of 
interdependence. In particular, this is the conditional probability with which a firm 
would endeavour towards a higher level of formalisation as a function of the 
involvedness’ level with partly informal suppliers. To resolve this analytical task a Tree 
Augmented Naïve (TAN) Bayesian Network has been utilised – the modelling steps are 
presented below. According to the survey’s display logic, question 20 was asked to all 
respondents who reported that they are not receiving invoice for more than 5% of their 
business needs. As it is evident from the summary statistics of variable Q20, 87.2% of 
the respondents to this question would prefer all of their suppliers to provide them with 
invoices. The conditional probability, that a firm would prefer to receive invoices for all 
the business goods and services it needs to trade, increases together with the share 
of properly invoiced expenditures (see Table 21 below). The higher the proportion of 
goods and services for which a firm receives invoices, the more likely it is for such 
firm to demand invoices from all its suppliers and vice versa. If a firm is managing to 
obtain invoices for 45.4%-63.6% of the consumed business goods and services, then 
the conditional probability is only 8%. The next band (63.6%-81.8%) represents the 
first significant increase – to 29% accordingly. Firms with more than 81.8% of their 
business needs properly invoiced, represent conditional probability of 56% to demand 
invoices from all of their suppliers (formalisation pressure on the supply chain). The 
observed causal correlation demonstrates the coercive power, which an informality 
chain of interdependence exercises over its enterprise members – up and down the 
supply chain. Effectively, clusters of firms, which exist in informality chain of 
interdependence, act as enablers of informalisation processes and simultaneously as 
barriers to formalisation to both inside and outside firms. Explanation of the modelling 
stages follows below. 
 
Variable Q20_1 – endeavour to formalisation 
 
1. Step 1: 
Using the Auto Classifier node, 64 configurations of TAN and Markov Blanket 
Bayesian Networks have been tested and ranked accordingly. More details are 
available in “Auto Classifier – Training summary for Q20_1” in Appendix 34. The best 
estimated accuracy has been achieved by TAN Bayesian Network at 87.16%. 
 
 
2. Step 2: 
The model from step 1 has been evaluated using the analysis node. The predictive 
power of the model secures correct prediction in 85.23 percent of all cases. The 
performance evaluation is in Appendix 34. 
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3. Step 3: 
Table 21 summarises the findings from TAN Bayesian Network modelling of variable 
Q20_1 as a function of variable Q19. The conditional probabilities are presented in 
the last row of the table (4% to 56%). 
 
Table 21: Effort to formalise from within an informality chain of interdependence. 
Target variable Q20_1 Input variable Q19 
For what part of the goods and services, which you 
need as a business, do you usually receive an 
invoice? 
Would you prefer all of 
your suppliers to provide 









Yes. 4% 2% 8% 29% 56% 
 
The next important line of inquiry is to establish the characteristics and attitudes of 
firms, which operate in an informal chain of interdependence, but are striving towards 
full formalisation mode. This analytical task has been achieved through TAN Bayesian 
Network deployment over a set of pre-selected special cases. These firms 
underreport their turnover to varying extent and simultaneously manage to acquire 
invoices for only up to 80% of their business needs. However, all of them would prefer 
their suppliers to provide invoices for all transactions. The strongest predictor of such 
informal chain of interdependence status is the firm’s full disagreement with fair 
expenditure of tax money. The conditional probabilities for such firms to disagree or 
fully disagree that NRA has fair and professional attitude are 29% and 50% 
accordingly. This means that 79% of all firms with the studied status will have the 
discussed characteristics. Similar conditional probabilities of 25% (disagree) and 61% 
(fully disagree) accordingly exist in regards with fair and professional attitude from the 
state institutions. This means that 86% of all firms with the studied status will be 
strongly dissatisfied with the state institutions. Unsurprisingly, the firms which would 
like to fully formalise breaking free from informality chain of interdependence, 
possess conditional probabilities to agree (29%) or fully agree (57%) that tax evasion 
is the answer from the business to the poor tax and administrative policies. This is 
equal to 86% of all firms. Explanation of the modelling stages follows below. 
 
Variable Q20_1 – characteristics of informal chain of interdependence’ firms. 
 
1. Step 1: 
Using the Auto Classifier node, 256 configurations of TAN and Markov Blanket 
Bayesian Networks have been tested and ranked accordingly. More details are 
available in “Auto Classifier – Training summary for Q20_1” in Appendix 35. The best 
estimated accuracy has been achieved by TAN Bayesian Network at 69.62%. 
 
2. Step 2: 
The best model from step 1 was not sufficiently accurate and therefore further 
training has been implemented. The predictive power of the improved model reached 
correct prediction in 96.2 percent of all cases. The performance evaluation and 
coincidence matrix are presented in Appendix 35. 
 
3. Step 3: 
Table 22 summarises the findings from TAN Bayesian Network modelling of variable 
Q20_1 as a function of several variables. The conditional probabilities are presented 
in the last row of the table’s sections. 
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Table 22: Informality chain of interdependence, institutional quality and fair use of public money. 
This table summarises modelling with TAN Bayesian Network. Conditional probabilities are expressed in percentages. 
 
Target variable Q20_1 What is your opinion about correct and fair expenditure of tax money? Input variable 
Q13_1. 
Would you prefer all of your suppliers to 
provide you with invoices? Fully agree Agree 
Neither agree, 
nor disagree 
Disagree Fully disagree 
Yes. 9% 6% 17% 28% 41% 
 
Target variable Q20_1 Input variable Q13_1 What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment 
by the NRA? Input variable Q13_2. 
Would you prefer all of your 
suppliers to provide you with 
invoices? 
What is your opinion about 
correct and fair expenditure of 
tax money? 







Yes. Fully disagree. 7% 0% 14% 29% 50% 
 
Target variable Q20_1 Input variable Q13_1 What is your opinion about fair, professional attitude and treatment 
by the state institutions? Input variable Q13_3. 
Would you prefer all of your 
suppliers to provide you with 
invoices? 
What is your opinion about 
correct and fair expenditure of 
tax money? 







Yes. Fully disagree. 0% 4% 11% 25% 61% 
 
 
Target variable Q20_1 Input variable Q13_1 Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and 
administrative policies in Bulgaria? Input variable Q14_2. 
Would you prefer all of your 
suppliers to provide you with 
invoices? 
What is your opinion about 
correct and fair expenditure of 
tax money? 







Yes. Fully disagree. 57% 29% 11% 4% 0% 
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6.2.4 Unfair competition and turnover underreporting. 
 
Block 7 from the survey (Appendix 18) contains two questions and is designed to 
detect consequences from unfair competition from informal businesses. Unfair 
competition constitutes a strong incentive for formal businesses to engage in informal 
compensatory strategies. Usually it results in turnover underreporting, which formal 
businesses might employ as a compensatory strategy against unfair competition. 
From an economic perspective unfair competition is simultaneously enabler of 
informality and barrier to formalisation. The enabling aspect is in the economic market 
force rendering a fully formal business unable to compete against one or more unfair 
competitors. To preserve competitiveness a formal business might need to informalise 
to a level corresponding to the unfair competitors. Unfair competition is also a barrier 
to formalisation due to the same inherent aspect. Assuming that a partly informal 
business operates as such mainly to cope with unfair competition, it could only fully 
formalise if a higher economic competitiveness in comparison with the unfair 
competitors is achievable. That economic competitiveness should be sufficiently 
higher to accommodate the full cost of formal mode of doing business. 
Understandably, it is a hardly attainable business target especially in typically low 
margin trades with non-specialised goods. 
Evidently, from the individual summary statistics of variable Q31, 63.6% (263) of all 
firms (see Table 11) experience difficulties due to unfair competition from informal 
businesses. It was argued that 76.5% of all firms are functioning in partly informal 
mode. To establish a relationship between unfair competition and turnover 
underreporting it is important to find out how many firms of those experiencing 
difficulties due to unfair competition (N=263, 63.6% from N=413) also engage in 
turnover underreporting and by what motive. The first part of this analytical task is 
resolved by conditional case selection syntax via the Select Node. The modelling 
details are presented in Appendix 36. The second part is addressed via the use of a 
two-step cluster evaluation analysis based on log-likelihood as distance measure and 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). This particular cluster model was selected through 
appraisal of 504 possible model configurations from within Kohonen, K-Means and 
Two Step clustering algorithms. The modelling details are presented in Appendix 36. 
Seven clusters in total have been discovered and the model achieved average 
silhouette coefficient of 1. Considering that the silhouette coefficient is a 
“dimensionless quantity which is at most equal to 1” (Kaufman, Rousseeuw PJ, 1990, 
p. 87-88), evidently this cluster model is 100% accurate representation of the real 
patterns in the data. Figure 25 is an illustration of the cluster comparison. The upper 
section of the figure shows the patterns’ distribution between the variables in a 
graphical form – only the first 5 clusters are shown. The lower section of Figure 25 is 
a table quantification of the very same data, but includes data from all clusters. The 
interpretation of both modelling techniques is as follows: 
 
1. 83.27% from all firms (N=263) which experience difficulties due to unfair 
competition from informal businesses engage in turnover underreporting with 
various motivations. This amounts to 53% from the entire studied population 
(N=413). Clearly, this finding confirms strong causal relationship between 
exposure to unfair competition and tax evasion via turnover underreporting. 
 
2. Firms, which experience difficulties due to unfair competition and use turnover 
underreporting as a compensatory strategy, have the survival motive as the 
strongest determinant of their tax evasive behaviour (62.4%, N=219, see the 
lower section of Figure 25). 
Note: It should be noted that Question 16 from the business survey is a multiple choice multiple 
answer one and therefore respondents may select up to 3 possible answers. Hence, the 
percentages overlap in the cluster modelling. 
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Figure 25: Cluster analysis of unfair competition and turnover underreporting. 
 
Variable Variable label Clusters Members 
Q16_2 Businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax in order to survive? 1, 2, 3, 4 111 = 62.4% 
Q16_3 Businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax in order to reduce their costs and increase 
their profits? 
3, 5, 6 55 = 30.9% 
Q16_1 Businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax? 2, 6, 7 55 = 30.9% 
Q16_5 Businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax, because they are forced to do so and they do 
not have another choice? 
1, 2 45 = 25.3% 
Q16_4 You do not see anything wrong in the fact that businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers with the purpose to pay less tax? 0 0 = 0% 
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Chapter Seven 
 
7. Discussion of findings and contributions. 
 
Shadow economies are multi-faceted socio-economic structures, with a level of 
systemic dynamism and cultural embeddedness. For this reason, it is very difficult to 
conduct comprehensive studies of these economies and, consequently, current policy 
approaches to tackling shadow economies lack deep understanding of the root 
motivations of participants. It is widely accepted that the informal economy is not only 
a widespread phenomenon and growing relative to the formal sector in emerging 
markets, but also in Western societies (Thai et al., 2013, p. 14). Almost two thirds (1.8 
billion) from all 3 billion workers in the world are, in this sense, informal (Jütting & 
Laiglesia, 2009, p.17-26), while informal commercial activities account for an 
estimated 30% of economic activity around the world (Thai et al., 2013). From a more 
regional perspective, the cumulative informal economy share amongst EU countries in 
recent years is estimated to be approximately 20% from their GDP by MIMIC method 
(see Figure 3). In light of the reported facts, governments across the world have 
strong incentives to tackle their informal economies in an attempt to foster economic 
development and international competitiveness. 
However, at present policy approaches to tackling shadow economies experience 
three major obstacles: context appropriate definition, measurement of the size and 
exhaustive appraisal of the root causes. It has been argued that the development of 
adequate policy approaches is subservient on precise locally relevant definition, 
comprehensive understanding of the root causes of informality at a national level and 
accurate measurement. Still, one of the biggest obstacles in tackling the informal 
economy has often been the fact that it was being “conceptually framed as a “tame” 
problem (i.e. a problem that is complicated but easily solvable, often with a discrete 
response that can be replicated anywhere)” (Williams, 2014c, p. 3). Governments tend 
to underestimate how sophisticated this socio-economic phenomenon is and fail to 
appraise the full scale of micro and macro participatory motivations. This is so, due to 
the lack of regular deployment of appropriate empirical inquiries seeking to establish 
what a country’s specific root causes of informality are. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that neither of the current informal economy explanatory paradigms are 
sufficiently adequate. A group of scholars started to address the need for a new 
holistic theorisation, suggesting the institutional asymmetry paradigm (Williams et al., 
2015a; Williams et al., 2015d; Williams et al., 2014d). Adopting IAP, this study aims to 
address its empirical challenges – indeed, how to measure empirically the intrinsic 
circularity between tangible and intangible phenomena, affecting tax evasive 
behaviour. The contribution to the literature is via appraisal of these issues, proposing 
an economic model of partly informal entrepreneurship through innovative socio-
economic profiling of business tax evaders. The provision of solid empirically verified 
answers for the main research questions has been offered from within what is 
considered the most distinctive for this type of study EU member state. Indeed, 
Bulgaria is uniquely characterised by the lowest overall index of social cohesion-OISC 
(Dragolov et al., 2013, p. 41) and the highest informal economy share (see Figure 2, 3 
and 4). 
 
The main research aim in this study was to develop a holistic account of the socio-
economic influencers of the processes of business tax evasion, formalisation and 
informalisation and as a result to inform adequate policy responses. This task 
required emergence of two investigative levels – institutional and entrepreneurial. The 
first research level was attained with a qualitative method to achieve an in-depth 
understanding of the institutional context with a focus on tax policy management. In 
particular, revealing how the three major environmental pressures (institutional, 
economic and political) affect NRA’s role in revenue raising policies and the 
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associated institutional asymmetry. The main qualitative research question pursued in 
this thesis can be expressed as follows: How does a national revenue agency try to 
tackle tax evasion in an institutional context that makes operating within the informal 
economy a practically-viable alternative to operating in the formal economy? To 
explore this central question, four lines of inquiry have been reported: discovery and 
exploration of agency strategies; agency operational approaches and the predominant 
type in the mix of policy measures; and the triggering procedures and methods of 
enforcing control and compliance – tax audits and inspections. The analysis and 
findings have been presented in chapter 5. The second investigative level was 
attained with a quantitative method (a business survey) deployed amongst 
entrepreneurs. The main quantitative research questions can be expressed as follows: 
What the strongest determining factors of business tax evasion are and whether the 
intrinsic circularity between tangible and intangible socio-economic phenomena is 
affecting tax evasive behaviour? This research task required the development of an 
empirical instrument capable to appraise the root causes for partial informality 
amongst micro and small businesses. In doing so, the employed questionnaire and 
associated analysis contribute in two main aspects. Firstly, it advances the so called 
predictive economic profiling of business tax evaders exploiting an innovative 
application of proven multi-disciplinary analytical methods. This approach enables 
detection of business informality with certain probability based on indirect questions 
(indicators). The strength of the approach is in its capability to reveal the strongest, 
root cause determinants of tax evasive behaviours. Secondly, the quantitative 
empirical instrument enriches the literature debates about informal economy 
measurement’s approaches – still arguing about the superiority of either macro or 
micro-economic methods. This has been achieved with the reported measurement of 
informality, indicating that the proportion of GDP in the informal economy is much 
higher than current macro-measurement methods report for Bulgaria. The research 
design and particularly the quantitative method aimed to address the “extraordinary 
challenges”, which this field faces (Slemrod & Weber, 2012, p. 31). Indeed, to avoid 
the weaknesses of macro-measurement approaches and measure the unmeasurable 
indirectly. Given the very sensitive research topic, great effort was invested in utilising 
the experience of previous studies with accent on gradual and indirect information 
extraction approach. The empirical strategy in this regard benefited from the 
incorporation of NRA’s extensive experience in detecting and measuring informality. 
For maximum clarity, the relevant analysis and findings have been presented in 
chapter 6. However, the discussion in regards with the extant literature takes place in 
this last chapter 7 and so offers a holistic research account of the qualitative and 
quantitative findings. 
 
Recent progress in deeper understanding of tax evasion and informal economy 
phenomena exposed their extremely complex dynamic nature. Indeed, that tax 
compliance decisions involve not only the socio-economic characteristics, but also the 
tax payers’ morale and beliefs (Braithwaite, 2007; Braithwaite et al., 2007) as well as 
a degree of rational economic behaviour. Such an advanced level of knowledge 
drives the need of multi-disciplinary integrative research inquiries and this study 
attempts to address this necessity. The utilised analytical approaches relate to 
relatively new methodological paradigms in researching tax evasion and compliance, 
which are starting to gain popularity. Some notable examples are the use of agent-
based modelling of tax compliance to explain the connection between governance 
modes of tax authorities and the resulting behaviour of taxpayers (Hashimzade, 
Myles, Page & Rablen, 2015; Hokamp, 2014; Pickhardt & Seibold, 2014). In similar 
fashion, the study of Warner et al. (2015) applies elements of computer science, 
economics and theoretical biology to tax compliance in the form of modelling tax 
evasion with genetic algorithms. In doing so, it offers unique insights to auditors 
seeking to reduce the US national tax gap, which is estimated to exceed $450 billion. 
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Utilising proven multi-disciplinary methods (Decision trees, Neural and Bayesian 
networks), this study advances predictive socio-economic profiling of business tax 
evaders. The findings are discussed in regards with the extant literature within the 
next 5 sub-sections. 
 
 Tax evasion diagnostics and motivations. 7.1
 
Firstly, it has been discovered that 76.5% of the surveyed entrepreneurs underreport 
their turnovers and as a result evade taxes with various motivations (see variable Q16 
and Table 15). This amounts to a significant proportion of the country’s GDP and 
suggests that the proportion of GDP in the informal economy is much higher than 
current macro-measurement (indirect) methods report for Bulgaria – 31.2% of GDP 
according to Schneider (2013). Secondly, the three most frequent motivations for 
underreporting turnovers are paying less tax in order to survive (29.3% of responses 
to a multi-set, 45.7% of all cases), reducing costs to increase profits (19% of 
responses, 29.7% of all cases) and just to pay less tax without a particular reason 
expressed (17.4% of responses, 27.3% of all cases). Xheneti, Smallbone and Welter 
(2013) argued that cross-border informal entrepreneurship developed in response to 
the regional disparities and social inequalities experienced during the post-communist 
transformation period. Where the limited effect of EU regional policies made this type 
of informal activities essential for individual survival. Given, that the most significant 
motivation for tax evasion in the capital of Bulgaria is also survival, this constitutes an 
intriguing research question. Indeed, to what extent these phenomena could correlate 
to EU policies linked to enlargement and regional development. 
 
It is important to note that the reported tax evasion measurement was amongst the 
small businesses exercising partial mode of informality in Sofia. Due to more 
favourable economic environment there, it is argued that the level of partial informality 
would be higher in the rest of the country, because small businesses would be less 
profitable and under reduced compliance control. The evaluation stated in this study 
does not include the share of undeclared work in combination with envelope wages 
and the evasive footprint of fully informal businesses. For the described reasons, 
there are grounds for believing that the reported finding (76.5%) could be on the 
conservative continuum in comparison with a nationally representative study. 
Calculation to what proportion of the GDP all these relevant phenomena would 
cumulatively account to is beyond the scope of the present study. 
 
However, the described findings are simultaneously alarmingly concerning and 
significant for this field of research. There is convincing evidence that higher 
informality is recognised to increase income inequality, lower average GDP growth 
and reduce international trade (ILO et al., 2009, p. 88). Therefore the suggested much 
bigger share of informal economy appear to be the biggest impediment for economic 
development of the poorest EU member state (Dragolov et al., 2013, p. 41). 
Obviously, one of the contributions of this thesis is to serve as a justification for the 
resurrection of the debate about measurement method’s superiority and applicability 
to different countries. Appraising the current trends in measurement methods Williams 
(2014a) reports that there is “an emergent consensus to use indirect measurement 
methods to estimate the size of the shadow economy and direct survey methods for 
unravelling the nature of the shadow economy.” It should be noted that the application 
of macro methods is considered even implausible for transition economies by some 
scholars (Palda, EconWPA, 2004). Based on the discovered research insights (both 
methodological and knowledge related) in this study, it is argued that indirect methods 
are better suited to advanced economies with relatively small share of informal 
economy. Direct measurement methods, such as the micro-economic one developed 
and utilised in this thesis, tend to be superior in transitional economic settings or 
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countries with bigger shares of informal economy. 
 
Another worthy aspect of the findings of this thesis relates to the very core structure 
of informality in a given society. The main argument is that from policy tackling 
perspective, the most important is not so much the share of the informal economy, but 
its fine composition. Illustratively, two similar in size informal economies (in two 
different countries) might have completely different structures (explanation follows). It 
is argued that understanding the proportion and features of participatory 
characteristics is of paramount importance for the design of adequate policy 
responses to informality. To explain this, two new conceptual terms are being 
introduced: 
 
Conceptual terms’ definitions: 
1. Frequency of societal involvedness in the informal economy: How many 
members of a given society are involved in exercising tax evasion of some 
form. An indicator, expressed as a percentage from the total number of 
members. 
2. Intensity of societal involvedness in the informal economy: What is the average 
amount of tax evasion per member of society, amongst those who are involved 
in evasion. 
 
For descriptive purpose – if we assume that the share of informal economy as a 
percentage of the GDP for a given society is X%, then it might have very different 
composition theoretically. The same share of informal economy as a percentage from 
a given country’s GDP could be achieved in two possible scenarios (theoretical 
scenarios 1 and 2 below): 
 
Theoretical scenario 1 for X% share of informal economy as a percent from the 
GDP 
 
Higher Frequency of societal involvedness in the informal economy 
multiplied by 
Lower Intensity of societal involvedness in the informal economy 
 
 
Theoretical scenario 2 for X% share of informal economy as a percent from the 
GDP 
 
Lower Frequency of societal involvedness in the informal economy 
multiplied by 
Higher Intensity of societal involvedness in the informal economy 
 
 
To utilise the new conceptual terms into the researched context, it is emphasized that 
Bulgaria has very large share of informal economy, characterised by: 
High 





Entrepreneurs conceal 37.8% of their turnovers on average (Mean = 37.8%) 
 
Looking at the two possible scenarios above, it could be theorised that given the same 
X% share of informal economy, a status of institutional asymmetry applies to bigger 
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proportion of the society (scenario 1), while in the second it affects smaller number of 
social actors. Transition economies with large informal sectors (such as Bulgaria) are 
characterised by high Frequency of societal involvedness in the informal economy 
multiplied by high Intensity of societal involvedness in the informal economy. 
Therefore, the institutional asymmetry applies to big part of the society and to a much 
deeper degree in every instance. Unsurprisingly, informal economies with such 
characteristics are particularly challenging to tackle and in the case of Bulgaria, it is 
evident how so many consecutive governments failed. The theoretical implication in 
comparative appraisals of institutional asymmetry in two different economies, 
characterised by the same share of informality, becomes an important consideration 
from policy perspective. Indeed, depicting scenario 1, where fewer tax payers engage 
in tax evasive behaviours, to a much deeper degree though, requires targeting 
tackling efforts towards that social stratum. Aligning the moral values and beliefs of 
that social group to the formal institutional framework is a much easier in comparison 
with doing the same in scenario 2. Where, albeit that institutional asymmetry leads to 
lesser evasion per member of society, it affects much wider group of the same 
society. It has been already shown that generally the size of informal economies 
correlates with the overall index of social cohesion (OISC) for a given society (see 
Figure 4). Emerging from the new insights, it could be hypothesised (for future 
research) that countries with the same OISC, but bigger shadow economies have 
similar Frequency of societal involvedness in the informal economy, but higher 
Intensity of societal involvedness in the informal economy. 
 
It has been demonstrated via multi-layered analysis (decision trees, neural networks 
and two-step cluster modelling), that unfair competition from informal businesses is 
the most frequent and strongest predictor of tax evasion (to be reviewed in a section 
below). Evidently, from the findings, it is highly likely that entrepreneurs who 
experience such competition would compensate their losses via turnover 
underreporting. In addition, entrepreneurs exercise tax evasion as a corresponding 
response to the poor tax and administrative policies, which cause them to spend more 
valuable resources than deemed acceptable. On some occasions, bribes demanding 
inspections from NRA, appear to be the cause of tax evasive responses. In general, 
when profits or potential profits are taken away from firms through regulation, 
taxation, or corruption (Johnson, Kaufmann, Shleifer, Goldman & Weitzman, 1997), an 
offsetting attitude through unofficial activity is highly likely. Emerging from the cluster 
modelling (see Figure 24, Appendix 30), it is argued that the entrepreneurs who have 
provided more than one motive for tax evasion simultaneously have some important 
coincidence of their answer patterns. Firstly, turnover underreporting is exercised, so 
that entrepreneurs can survive economically and secondly, this illicit activity is 
practiced because they do not have another choice. Thirdly, tax evasion is performed 
for the reduction of operation costs and increasing profits. This particular tripartite 
motivational pattern, suggests that the most distinctive cases of business tax evasion 
are being developed under a set of economic coercion forces, which are 
environmentally enforced (see Figure 26 for more details). 
 
There are several theoretical and policy implications stemming from these findings. 
Various scholars (Round et al., 2008; Williams et al., 2010b; Williams et al., 2007b) 
proclaim that different explanatory theories of informal entrepreneurship applies more 
in some populations and countries’ contexts than others. The findings of this thesis 
support their argument revealing some intriguing theory related aspects. Indeed, the 
presented empirical evidence suggests that the neo-liberal theory, with emphasis on 
the economic rationale behind tax evasive behaviours (Bayer & Sutter, 2009; Djankov 
et al., Belev B, 2003; Koettl et al., 2012; Perry et al., Arias O, Fajnzylber P, Maloney 
WF, et al., 2007), appear to be the most relevant one to transition economies. 
Bulgarian entrepreneurs experience very high cost of doing business according to the 
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rules and this has manifold basis. One aspect is rooted in the formal institutional 
framework: due to the poor tax and administrative policies which impose hefty 
financial burden on businesses. Another aspect is due to the so called informal chains 
of dependences, which have serious economic coercive powers over entrepreneurs 
inhibiting them with prohibitively high exit costs (towards full formalisation). Third 
aspect relates to the intense and wide spread unfair competition, clearly 
interconnected with institutional quality, procedural fairness and distributive justice. 
These phenomena will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections. 
 
 
 Institutional quality, procedural fairness and distributive justice. 7.2
 
Evidently from previous studies (Bitzenis et al., 2005; Valdez et al., 2013) macro-level 
institutional environment is significantly associated with entrepreneurial patterns in a 
given country’s context. At the same time the likelihood of small firms to engage in 
corrupt activities is strongly influenced by low institutional efficiencies (Tonoyan et al., 
2010) particularly in Central-Eastern Europe. Xheneti et al. (2012, p. 618) argued that 
entrepreneurs who successfully learn to weave their way through a corrupt 
institutional environment, acquire a competitive advantage over others and experience 
business growth as a result of corruption. Obviously, this illustrates very well one of 
the self-perpetuating aspects of large informal sectors, such as the Bulgarian one, in 
respect of poor formal institutional framework. 
 
As already summarised (see 3 and 5.1), the Bulgarian socio-economic reality is the 
worst amongst EU member states in various aspects including GDP, OISC, GCI, 
informal economy share and institutional corruption level. It was discussed (see 
section 2.4) that institutional asymmetry perspective is a contemporary explanatory 
theory of tax evasion in societies with significant misalignment between formal and 
informal institutions. Therefore, the status of large institutional asymmetry is argued to 
be guaranteed by default in transition economies (such as Bulgaria), which logically 
leads to significant tax evasion. This study reveals the main determinants of 
entrepreneurs’ tax evasive decisions emerging from the socio-economic environment 
in which the studied small firms operate. In doing so, it contributes by showing that 
institutional quality, procedural fairness and distributive justice all have tangible share 
in the real cost of doing business for entrepreneurs. Therefore, the high real cost of 
doing business due to the inadequate business environment is not surprising. It is 
discovered to be a significant driver for informality amongst enterprises (see section 
4.4.1). The voice of the entrepreneurs sounds quite disturbingly: 60.6% of them either 
agree or strongly agree that doing business according to the rules is too expensive 
(Table 13). Simultaneously, 50.6% either agree or strongly agree that tax evasion is 
the answer from the business to the poor tax and administrative policies (Table 13). A 
viable public policy should be targeted at the creation and cultivation of trust in 
procedural fairness (Torgler & Schneider, 2009; Van Dijke et al., 2010) in order to 
influence positively the tax compliance will. 
Decision tree modelling of entrepreneurs’ perceptions of procedural fairness and 
institutional quality has been used in order to explore additional interdependence with 
evasive practices and associated phenomena (see section 6.2.2 and Table 20). The 
state institutions’ services, including NRA, are deemed to be unfair and unprofessional 
from their perspective, which harms the perceived procedural fairness, and obstruct 
distributive justice accordingly. Most entrepreneurs spend on average more than 4 
days per month to cope with administrative requirements imposed by various state 
regulations. Considering that the average cost of doing business per day for the 
studied entrepreneurs is 466.5BGN (Mode = 100, Mean = 466.5, see Table 14), this 
constitute a substantial monthly expense. There is a dual pattern of dissatisfaction 
amongst the entrepreneurs – simultaneously with the state institutions’ quality, 
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including NRA and the way tax money is being spent. Evidently, from the decision tree 
modelling, entrepreneurs are likely to be pushed into evasive economic behaviour by 
the apparent poor quality of state institutions and NRA (percentages presented in the 
box below). The reported findings correspond with previous studies (Cummings et al., 
2006; Hartner et al., 2008) such as the fact that tax compliance depends on individual 
perceptions that the tax system is fair and that the government is providing valued 
goods and services with the revenues. The decision tree modelling of entrepreneurs’ 
perceptions of procedural fairness and institutional quality (Table 20, Appendix 31, 32 
and 33) provides a conditional probability map to interested policy makers. Indeed, if a 
targeted policy intervention is applied to change attitudes, then it could be predicted 
what proportion of business tax payers it would affect and what this effect would be 
on their tax evasive motivations. 
 
 59.9% of the entrepreneurs either disagree or strongly disagree that the tax 
money is fairly spent (Table 13). 
 
 54.3% of the entrepreneurs either disagree or strongly disagree that the 
state institutions have fair professional attitude and treatment approach 
(Table 13). 
 
 41.4% either disagree or strongly disagree that NRA has fair professional 
attitude and treatment approach (Table 13). 
 
 
 Informality chains of interdependence – enablers of informality and barriers to 7.3
formalisation. 
 
Informality chains of interdependence (ICOI) constitute complex economic situation 
where an enterprise satisfies a proportion of their trade needs for goods and/or 
services without receiving invoices accordingly. In doing so, the participating firm 
cannot claim eligible expenses and develops strong motivation to offset the loss with a 
reciprocal action – not providing invoices to conceal taxable income. That is why 
some authors call them an “informality trap” (Institute for Market Economy, 2004, p. 
61-70). An informality chain of interdependence could be initiated by economic 
pressure from other enterprises (including clients) on the supply or the demand side 
of the business, or by both at the same time. Section 6.2.3 provides an illustrative 
example how this works in practice. To further enhance the description, it should be 
noted that a cluster of firms might exist in an informal chain of interdependence, 
where different members could have a varying degree of informality, not excluding 
fully formal enterprises. A fully formal enterprise within such an economic 
dependency, which wants to remain tax compliant, would have a dualistic choice. That 
would be to either absorb the financial losses or exit the interdependence chain if they 
can afford that retaining commercial viability. 
 
The corporate tax in Bulgaria is 10%. It is argued that enterprises, which manage to 
acquire invoice for less than 80% of their business needs, would be strongly 
incentivised to pursue compensatory strategies. That is to offset the loss due to 
inability to claim legitimate business expenses (≥20% of their cost of sales). Based on 
variable Q18 and Q19 (within section Summary statistics of individual variables), it is 
evident that from the 58.6% of firms which experience purchasing of goods and 
services without invoices, 33.5% acquire invoices not exceeding 80% of their 
consumption as businesses (Table 11 and Table 14). For that reason, this group of 
enterprises could be considered to function in informality chain of interdependence 
with varying magnitude of tax concealment and degree of complexity. Taking into 
consideration that 76.5% of all firms are partly informal (see variable Q16 and Table 
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15) this is rather conservative finding, which needs further research to be established 
precisely. The most frequent reason for firms to enter into such economic 
dependency is that cost of foreign informality takes over in the mix of real cost of 
doing business (see Figure 26). Therefore, some enterprises attempt to offset the 
increased real cost of doing business through reducing one of its components – the 
cost of foreign informality. One such strategy is to become partly informal, thus 
becoming members of ICOI. There are cases where fully informal enterprises are also 
part of informal chains of interdependence by their own choice or simply due to 
inability to develop sufficiently profitable business model from the very beginning. 
However, as elaborated earlier, this thesis is interested mainly in the most difficult to 
detect and tackle: the registered partly informal businesses exercising a varying 
degree of tax evasion. For that reason, when analysing informal chains of 
interdependence the focus is on partly formal enterprises and the associated effects 
for them, as well as for the fully compliant ones. In particular, the analytical effort here 
is to appraise the processes of informalisation and formalisation as a function of the 
so called ICOIs. 
 
Informal chains of interdependence are sophisticated dynamic eco systems, which 
tend to attract new members through powerful economic coercion. One mechanism 
has been explained earlier in section 6.2.3. Another mechanism of such powerful 
economic coercion is via the strong unfair competition an informal chain of 
interdependence creates for other firms in any given industry sector. Given the fact 
that every ICOI involves a varying level of informality for its members, this inevitably 
provides them with an unfair advantage in comparison with outside fully formal 
businesses. Ultimately, the real cost of doing business and its structure (see Figure 
26) is affected in contrary directions for both – members of an informal chain of 
interdependence and the immediate economic environment (other prospective 
businesses suppliers and clients from the sector). In that respect, the powerful forces 
of economic coercion act in multiple directions depending on the object: whether it is 
fully formal, partly formal or fully informal enterprise. To fully appraise the complexity 
of ICOI’s coercive forces, it is important to review the inter-correlated nature of “cost 
of formality”, “cost of informality” and real cost of doing business to firms. In particular, 
the economic compulsion towards informalisation and capacity to formalise 
accordingly. Such a discussion (offered below) is necessary to enlighten the 
economic behavioural patterns under pressure from ICOIs. It is followed by defining 
two of the toughest policy challenges and suggesting empirically informed solutions. 
 
The concept cost of doing business should be reviewed in a multi-perspective fashion 
to reflect its complex underlying significance to entrepreneurs and enlighten turnover 
underreporting. One of the research aims of this study was to establish the 
relationship between tax evasive decisions as functions of cost of doing business. The 
first aspect of this relationship is whether high cost of doing business pushes 
entrepreneurs into partly informal modes in order to offset what they deem 
unacceptable. Another aspect is whether high cost of doing business serves as an 
impediment to those who would like to increase their level of formalisation and/or fully 
formalise their operations. However, the real cost of doing business could have 
different composition depending on the mode of business. An additional complication 
is the fact that actually “cost of formality” and “cost of informality”, as De Soto defined 
them (1989, p. 132-177), both form the real cost of doing business. Figure 26 is 
developed to illustrate the complexity of the relationship between these concepts and 
a business entity, depending on its economic status. The aim of the figure is rather to 
illuminate and clarify, but not to descriptively exhaust all sophisticated connections 
and dependencies. For the purpose of this analysis and by mode of doing business, 
enterprises could exist in three forms: fully formal, partly formal and fully informal 
mode (Figure 26). The effects of real cost of doing business on firms’ tax evasive 
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behavioural models are discussed below. 
 
 
Fully formal enterprises: real cost of doing business and behavioural effects 
 
The fully formal enterprises are registered, wholly compliant ones, reporting actual 
turnovers and paying the full amount of tax due. As such, they meet the full costs of 
doing business according to the rules. Consequently, such firms enjoy all privileges 
and benefits any legitimate business is entitled to utilise. These enterprises do not 
have to absorb any “cost of informality” in De Soto’s sense, however they are exposed 
to cost of informality in the form of unfair competition and other related phenomena. In 
general, firms from this group could have two sub-modes of operation: with intent to 
remain fully formal or with intent to partly informalise. It is also theoretically possible to 
cease formal operations and convert to fully informal mode, but this is very rare and 
thus insignificant for the purpose of this discussion. The two possible sub-modes are 
of dynamic nature as the choice of any enterprise may change over different 
circumstances and time. This is also applicable to the sub-modes of operation 
observed in the other two groups (partly and fully informal ones). The two possible 
sub-modes of operation, could be exercised either by own choice of the firm or 
become environmentally imposed (see the first section of Figure 26 from the left). For 
instance, a firm might be subjected to unfair competition. In order to keep their market 
niche and remain fully formal, they will be forced to accept reduced profits in such 
circumstances. If the given firm is sufficiently profitable, they could afford such 
strategy by their own choice. However, the unfair competition could develop over time 
to a level, which is so severe that the formal enterprise could not overcome it with just 
surrendering their profits. In that case, the firm either should cease operations or 
choose a corresponding level of informalisation to keep its financial viability and 
remain in business. The latter option would be the so called environmentally imposed 
choice for the purpose of the analysis. 
 
Returning to the concept of real cost of doing business and its composition (cost of 
formality and cost of informality), it should be noted that the latter component is 
actually two dimensional one. Indeed, that is the cost of foreign informality and the 
cost of own informality, but it only becomes visible when a firm is either partly or fully 
informal (reviewed below). To clarify for the reader, cost of foreign informality is for 
instance unfair competition or other forms of economic damages due to interaction 
with partly or fully informal enterprises. Cost of own informality is for instance the lack 
of proper commercial contract enforcement due to the unreported nature of such 
transactions. Or another example would be limited access to commercial credit due to 
business turnover underreporting and the associated inability to advertise it to lenders 
such as banks. 
 
From the perspective of fully formal enterprise, their real cost of doing business is 
quite simple – it has only two sub-components. Indeed, that is the cost of formality 
(doing business according to the rules) and cost of foreign informality. Such 
enterprises would be willing to maintain their fully compliant mode of doing business 
as long as the cost of foreign informality is lower than the cost of formality (doing 
business according to the rules, see the first section of Figure 26 from the left). In 
such scenarios, an acceptable level of financial viability could be preserved. However, 
if there is an increased pressure from informal firms in the form or unfair competition 
or informal chain of interdependence, then the cost of foreign informality will take over 
the cost of formality. Therefore, the real cost of doing business may deprive the fully 
compliant firm to a level of lacking financial viability, unless the firm agrees to offset 
the losses via partial informalisation. So, such process would be obviously an 
environmentally imposed one. 
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Partly formal enterprises: real cost of doing business and behavioural effects 
 
The partly formal enterprises are registered and operate exactly as the fully formal 
firms with the only difference that they underreport a proportion of their turnovers with 
the purpose to evade taxes. The underreporting motivations vary according to specific 
circumstances as it was shown in earlier parts of the thesis (see section 6.2.1). Given 
the fact that such firms are registered, they also enjoy almost all privileges and 
benefits such as legitimate businesses do. Illuminating the concept of real cost of 
doing business through the prism of partly formal enterprise, poses greater challenge 
in terms of depicting one more underlying business cost. While the fully formal 
enterprises need to pay the cost of formality and cost of foreign informality only, the 
partly formal enterprises need to absorb one more layer of costs – cost of own 
informality (see the middle part of Figure 26). The partly formal enterprises with intent 
to formalise achieve this state of will due to the cost of their own informality becoming 
the highest in the mix of real cost of doing business. Therefore, in order to sustain or 
realise the desired financial viability they need to fully formalise. For instance, their 
business environment (suppliers, clients, formal institutional environment) may require 
a full compliance mode in order to continue transacting business with them. An 
illustrative example of this process is provided in the box below: 
 
A small manufacturing firm X is involved in relatively small turnover underreporting 
(≤25% from their turnover). Other than conducting this form of tax evasion, all 
other business aspects are in accordance with the rules. Some of the suppliers of 
the firm are also partly formal entities with similar evasive patterns and function 
together in “informality chain of interdependence” (see section 6.2.3 for detailed 
description). The operations of firm X become a gradual success and they start to 
participate effectively in tenders supplying local government structures. In doing 
so, the external business environment (suppliers, clients, formal institutional 
environment) starts to pose formalisation pressure. Firm X needs to demonstrate 
bigger turnover and detailed fully formal supply chain in order to qualify for more 
tendering positions (resulting in bigger sales). At this moment in time, the cost of 
own informality takes over the other two components of real cost of doing business 
(see the middle section of Figure 26). It happens that full formalisation would 
secure a greater financial viability for firm X even after losing its gain from current 
turnover underreporting. However, in practicable terms it is difficult for a firm in an 
“informality chain of interdependence” to secure a market position capable to 
cover the costs of exiting the chain. 
 
The next sub-group from the middle section of Figure 26 are the enterprises with the 
intent to keep their level of partial formality unchanged. In their mix of real cost of 
doing business, the cost of foreign informality is the highest from the 3 sub-
components. Usually such firms are partly formal for the very same reason – 
offsetting the losses due to the foreign informality. As long as the cost of foreign 
informality remains constant, these enterprises are highly likely to keep their level of 
partial informality. This is so, because they do not perceive the formalisation benefits 
to be worthwhile (Thai et al., 2013). However, if there were further increase of the cost 
of foreign informality, then such firms would seek to compensate via increasing the 
level of their own informality. Obviously, this would be under environmental pressure 
towards further increase of informalisation. 
 
 
Fully informal enterprises: real cost of doing business and behavioural effects 
 
The fully informal enterprises are unregistered and not paying any tax and therefore 
bear the full cost of their own informality (see the right section of Figure 26). Usually 
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such enterprises start unregistered for various reasons. The real cost of doing 
business for them accommodates two sub-components: cost of own informality and 
cost of foreign informality. Fully informal firms still need to meet the cost of foreign 
informality, although they are much more capable to deal with it in comparison with 
fully or partly formal enterprise. As long as the cost of foreign informality exceeds the 
cost of own informality for a given enterprise, there is little chance it would want to 
formalise. It is only when cost of own informality takes over when there is sufficient 
formalisation incentive. Fully informal enterprises were not subject of this study and 
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Figure 26: Cost of doing business. 
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The strong negative effects of unfair competition on legitimate businesses have been 
studied extensively (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Schneider et al., 2013; Small Business 
Council, 2004; Williams, 2010b; Williams, 2014a) and there is agreement that 
appropriate tackling effort is required to address the consequences. Logically, it is 
important to establish what the effects of unfair competition are on turnover 
underreporting (i.e. tax evasion). To achieve this task, a multi-layered analysis 
(decision trees, neural networks and two-step cluster modelling) was employed (see 
section 6.2.4, Figure 25, Appendix 36). It was shown that unfair competition from 
informal businesses is the most frequent and strongest predictor of tax evasion. 
Evidently, from the findings, it is highly likely that firms, which experience such 
competition, would compensate their losses via turnover underreporting. 
 
83.27% from all firms (N=263) which experience difficulties due to unfair competition 
from informal businesses engage in turnover underreporting with various motivations. 
This amounts to 53% from the entire studied population (N=413). Having argued that 
76.5% of all firms evade taxes via turnover underreporting, it is clear that there is 
strong relationship in this respect. Indeed, that unfair competition causes tax evasion 
via turnover underreporting. To compare the reported finding with data available for an 
advanced EU economy, it should be noted that only 14% of UK small businesses feel 
negatively affected by informality and just 0.56% of all businesses view informal 
entrepreneurs as the primary threat to their business development (Webb, Bruton, 
Tihanyi & Ireland, 2012, p. 11). Empirical evidence based on data from 30 countries 
indicate that good competition laws are one of the significant factors affecting tax 
compliance internationally (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004). At the same time, there is an 
increasing body of evidence that unfair competition is one of the most intense barriers 
to firm’s performance in transition business environment (Krasniqi, 2007, p. 79). 
 
Given the fact that unfair competition is highly damaging to legitimate businesses 
(Evans et al., 2006; Gërxhani, 2004a), it becomes important to reveal what the main 
motive behind turnover underreporting due to unfair competition is. This analytical task 
has been achieved utilising a two-step cluster evaluation analysis based on log-
likelihood as distance measure and Akaike Information Criterion (see for details 
Figure 25 and Appendix 36). Considering that the silhouette coefficient achieved the 
maximum value possible (Kaufman, Rousseeuw PJ, 1990, p. 87-88), the cluster model 
is 100% accurate representation of the real patterns in the data. The significant 
finding is that firms, which experience difficulties due to unfair competition and use 
turnover underreporting as a compensatory strategy, have the survival motive as the 
strongest determinant of their tax evasive behaviour (62.4%, N=219, the lower section 
of Figure 25). 
 
Unfair competition from informal businesses is effectively the cost of foreign 
informality (see Figure 26) for these firms, which are experiencing it. It could increase 
so much so that the real cost of doing business becomes unattainable unless firms 
engage in compensatory strategy in order to offset its effects and survive. From an 
economic perspective, unfair competition is simultaneously enabler of informality and 
barrier to formalisation. The enabling aspect is in the economic market force 
rendering a fully formal business unable to compete against one or more unfair 
competitors. To preserve competitiveness a formal business might need to informalise 
to a level corresponding to the unfair competitors. The same logic applies to partly 
informal businesses, which might need to deepen their level of informality in order to 
survive economically. Unfair competition is also a barrier to formalisation due to the 
same inherent aspect and has detrimental effect on legitimate businesses (Institute 
for Market Economy, 2004; Krasniqi, 2007; Oviedo, 2009; Pashev, 2005; Thai et al., 
2013; Tonoyan et al., 2010). Assuming that a partly informal business operates as 
such mainly to cope with unfair competition, it could only fully formalise if a higher 
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economic competitiveness in comparison with the unfair competitors is achievable. 
That economic competitiveness should be sufficiently higher in order to accommodate 
the real cost of doing business (see Figure 26). Understandably, it is a hardly 
attainable business target especially in typically low margin trades with non-
specialised goods within transition economies. The findings support the argument that 
similarly to other transition economies such as Albania (Bitzenis et al., 2005, p. 572) 
unfair competition is a major obstacle to sustaining healthy entrepreneurship 
environment with appropriate level of formalisation. 
 
Unfair competition (due to unfair advantage) could have two forms when looked at 
from the perspective of informality. The first type (type one) is created by partly 
informal enterprises acting on their own without being part of ICOI. Obviously, this 
poses a problem for fully formal businesses, as they need to pay the full price of 
compliance and still earn a share of the market. The second type of unfair 
competition is the one created by an informal chain of interdependence – it is like type 
one, but illustratively speaking on steroids (i.e. much stronger). The example shown in 
section 6.2.3 draws a picture of fairly short supply chain, however it is evident how 
savings (due to partial informality/no invoicing) could transfer to upper members of 
the supply chain, which on this case is functioning as ICOI as well. Therefore, the final 
product (for instance a box of croissants, see section 6.2.3) already benefited from 
partial informality exercised at different stages of its production up to the delivery to 
the end user (for instance a local café). At this point of product manufacturing 
(sophistication), the unfair advantage takes the form of multiplied form of unfair 
competition. The production cost for this box of croissants (at the end of ICOI) is so 
low that very few fully compliant businesses could achieve a counter competitive 
offering. Evidently, the unfair competition from type two (via ICOI) is much stronger 
than unfair competition from type one (via partly informal firms not members of ICOI). 
As such, unfair competition of type two should be a priority target for tackling policies. 
 
It has been already discussed that larger informal economies (for instance the 
Bulgarian one) tend to have self-perpetuating nature due to their degenerative effects 
on social cohesion, procedural fairness and distributive justice (see sections 2.5 and 
2.5.1). One of the problematic circularity effects is that the individual cost of being 
honest in a corrupt society becomes significantly higher in comparison with societies 
where most individuals are honest (Andvig et al., 1990). This easily transfers to the 
world of small business, entrepreneurship and tax evasion. In particular, when the 
socio-economic environment is very difficult (see 3, Figure 14, 15, 16, Appendices 2 
and 3) and most small businesses must exercise huge effort to just maintain 
economic viability. Informality chains of interdependence are therefore one of the 
significant self-perpetuating mechanisms of spreading informality and simultaneously 
obstructing formalisation. This turns them effectively into enablers of informality and 
barriers to formalisation, which as known in the literature (Johnson et al., 2000) could 
overlap particularly in transition economies. For that reason, it is obvious why tackling 
this double-edge negative effect of ICOIs is a significant policy challenge. While from 
small firms’ perspective, resisting the joining force (informalisation pressure) 
emanated by ICOI could be very difficult financially, a potential exit is highly unlikely to 
be even feasible without an external possibly institutional help. Having revealed the 
mechanisms of economic coercion, which ICAOs generate, it becomes clear that 
there are two major policy challenges in this respect: 
 
1. Policy challenge 1. Tackle formalisation resistance of the economic coercion 
forces – where an enterprise is already a member of ICAO and it seeks exit if 
financially feasible. 
2. Policy challenge 2. Tackle the informalisation coercion forces – where ICAOs 
draw in new members or deepen informalisation levels of existing ones. 
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The following two sub-sections will review the policy challenges in question and 
suggest possible solutions based on the analysed empirical data. 
 
Policy challenge 1 – tackle formalisation resistance 
 
The strength and elegance of the proposed tackling approach is to indirectly 
manipulate the formalisation effort of each individual member of ICOI via reasonably 
affordable tax easement. The suggested policy response does not need to collect any 
more data different from what is already available in this study. The rationale behind 
the policy solution in question is presented below. It has been already shown (section 
6.2.3) what the conditional probability with which a firm would endeavour towards a 
higher level of formalisation is as a function of the involvedness’ level with partly 
informal suppliers (expanded further below). In practicable terms, this is very 
important characteristic of an informality chain of interdependence from policy 
perspective. The analysis conducted in section 6.2.3 reveals the connection between 
an individual firm’s effort to formalise from within an ICOI and the dependence to 
partly informal suppliers. If a firm is member of ICOI and receives invoices only for 
part of its business needs how this is going to affect its will to formalise. To resolve 
this analytical task a Tree Augmented Naïve (TAN) Bayesian Network has been 
utilised. As it is evident from the summary statistics of variable Q20, 87.2% of the 
respondents to this question would prefer all of their suppliers to provide them with 
invoices (Table 11). The first important aspect of this finding signifies that big majority 
of ICOI members are willing to formalise should they have a chance to do so. The 
second important aspect is that most probably membership of ICOI was enforced 
through economic coercion and was not acquired by own choice. 
 
The third important aspect is the conditional probability, under which a firm would 
prefer to receive invoices for all the business goods and services it needs to conduct 
business. The finding is that this probability increases together with the share of 
properly invoiced expenditures (see Table 21). The higher the proportion of goods and 
services for which a firm already receives invoices, the more likely it is for such firm to 
demand invoices from all its suppliers and vice versa. If a firm is managing to obtain 
invoices for 45.4%-63.6% of the consumed business goods and services (cost of 
sales), then the conditional probability is only 8%. The next band (63.6%-81.8%) 
represents the first significant increase – to 29% accordingly (see Table 21). Firms 
with more than 81.8% of their business needs properly invoiced, represent conditional 
probability of 56% to demand invoices from all of their suppliers. Therefore, such firms 
are likely to exercise formalisation pressure on the supply chain, which in this case is 
also ICOI. The formalisation pressure is expressed through the increased demand for 
invoices up and down the supply chain. The observed causal correlation 
demonstrates the economic coercive power, which an informality chain of 
interdependence exercises over its enterprise members. Effectively, clusters of firms, 
which exist in informality chain of interdependence, act as enablers of informalisation 
processes and simultaneously as barriers to formalisation to both inside and outside 
firms. Emerging from the analysis with Bayesian Network (summary of findings in 
Table 21 and section 6.2.3) a solution to policy challenge one is suggested. The 
development approach rests on the following assumptions: 
 
1. A majority of ICOI members (87.2%) are willing to fully formalise should they 
have a chance to do so. 
 
2. Most probably membership of ICOI was enforced through economic coercion 
and was not acquired by own choice, otherwise the observed formalisation 
effort (point 1 above), would not be so widely present. 
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3. Inability to claim legitimate business expenses due to lack of invoices is a 
strong predictor of reduced formalisation efforts – judging from the correlation 
between formalisation effort and properly invoiced business expenses (Table 
21). 
 
4. The potential policy solution should be an indirect one – aiming to deprive 
ICOIs of their formalisation resistance through initiation of formalisation effort 
from inside. 
 
A tax allowance could be offered to any small firm for up to 20% of their reported 
business expenses. They should be allowed to claim business expenses 20% higher 
than what they are able to prove with available invoices. Effectively, it would mean 
that a revenue agency such as NRA in Bulgaria should offer to decrease the taxable 
base with 20% for small firms and therefore lose income from taxes in the short term. 
Such tax easement should be offered upon specific request and on “No questions 
asked” basis for a period of 1 to 2 years only, once in the lifetime of a firm. Every 
small firm should be enabled to claim the tax easement in front of the tax office with 
their choice of how much exactly (from >0% to ≤20%). The available empirical data 
and analysis contain the answer why precisely 20% business expenses allowance – it 
is elaborated below. 
 
It has been already argued that 33.5% of the firms function in informality chain of 
interdependence. The predominant share of these firms (22.4%) receives invoices for 
only 60-80% of their business needs (Table 14). Suggesting 20% tax easement on 
business expenses achieves a couple of aims. Firstly, it addresses the predominant 
share of ICOI members who would like to fully formalise. Firms, which acquire 
invoices for only 60%-80% of their business needs, are given the chance to claim 
another 20% without being able to prove the expenses. Obviously, the same applies to 
all other firms (<60% and >80%). Secondly, the suggested tax easement doubles the 
formalisation pressure within ICOIs, because it effectively changes formalisation effort 
through the amount of claimable business expenses (in the context of the discussion 
and Table 21. From tax income revenue perspective and central government, the 
short term relatively small loss of taxes should be considered a worthwhile investment. 
It is going to deprive ICOIs nationwide from their formalisation resistance coercion to a 
significant degree. It is highly probable that the short term loss (tax income) would be 
recovered through significant positive impact on formalisation rates and the 
associated increased tax base. Intervening with such policy is effectively an indirect 
manipulation of the economic logic of every ICOI and as such, it means depriving that 
logic from the element of financial coercion. Consequently, many small firms would 
be able to escape their ICOI and find viable business existence with fully formal 
suppliers and clients during the grace period of 1-2 years. Furthermore, the tax office 
would acquire highly refined picture of the ICOIs in the country thanks to the small 
firms coming forward to take advantage of the tax easement. This would enable 
combination of indirect and direct policy approaches where applicable. It is expected 
that non genuine tax easement business claimants would be a minority as they are 
clearly aware of advertising themselves to the tax authorities and in doing so possibly 
becoming subject to a greater level of tax scrutiny. 
 
Policy challenge 2 – tackle the informalisation coercion forces 
 
The dynamic correlation between the formalisation effort of each individual member 
of ICOI and the ability to claim legitimate business expenses has been discussed 
above. Expressed differently, this is the conditional probability with which a firm would 
struggle towards a higher level of formalisation as a function of reduced involvedness’ 
level with partly informal suppliers in ICOI. The discovered correlations and associated 
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findings provided rationale for the proposed policy solution above. This section 
advances the level of discussion, involving additional socio-economic characteristics. 
Indeed, the next important line of elevated inquiry is to appraise what the effects of 
institutional quality, procedural fairness and use of public money are on those ICOI 
enterprise members striving to formalise. This is an important group from policy 
perspective, because although engaged in varying degree of turnover underreporting, 
these firms would keenly work to fully formalise should an opportunity arise. 
Therefore, a policy effort in this direction is considered to be a rewarding investment. 
 
It is important to acknowledge the existence of two types of informalisation coercion 
forces of ICOIs depending on their objects – existing ICOI’s members and outside 
firms usually from the same sector or supply chain. In the first configuration, existing 
ICOI’s member firms are drawn into increasing level of informalisation. In the second 
configuration, outside fully formal firms are exposed to all negative effects and forms 
of unfair competition as already discussed. Consequently, they might be enforced to 
accept a level of informalisation or otherwise perish economically. Although different 
by their objects, both types of informalisation coercion forces of ICOIs are similar in 
their compulsion methods and as a consequence require similar tackling methods 
from policy perspective. 
 
The analytical base for this discussion stream has been achieved through TAN 
Bayesian Networks deployment over a set of pre-selected special cases – members 
of ICOIs, evading taxes, but willing to formalise (details in section 6.2.3, Table 22 and 
Appendix 35). The line of analysis deals with informalisation coercion forces within 
ICOIs. The strongest predictor of such firms’ behaviour is their disagreement with fair 
expenditure of tax money. The next analytical step is to establish the attitudes of the 
firms in question in regards with institutional quality, procedural fairness and tax 
evasion behaviour. As evident (details in section 6.2.3, Table 22 and Appendix 35), the 
conditional probabilities for such firms to disagree or fully disagree that NRA has fair 
and professional attitude are 29% and 50% accordingly. This means that 79% of all 
firms willing to formalise from within ICOI will have the discussed characteristics – full 
disagreement with how tax money are spent and opinion that they are not treated in a 
fair and professional manner by NRA. Similar conditional probabilities of 25% 
(disagree) and 61% (fully disagree) accordingly exist in regards with fair and 
professional attitude from the state institutions. This means that 86% of all firms with 
the studied status will be strongly dissatisfied with the state institutions and 
expenditure of tax money. Unsurprisingly, the firms which would like to fully formalise 
breaking free from informality chain of interdependence, possess conditional 
probabilities to agree (29%) or fully agree (57%) that tax evasion is the answer from 
the business to the poor tax and administrative policies. This is equal to 86% of all 
firms with such status. 
 
Evidently, this is a key finding in respect with the functional characteristics of ICOI and 
economic behavioural modelling of members willing to fully formalise from within. The 
poor tax and administrative policies in Bulgaria, lack of fair and professional attitude 
by the state institutions and most importantly unfair expenditure of tax money, appear 
to have very pronounced effect on tax evasion by enterprises. Small businesses utilise 
tax evasion as a compensatory strategy to offset their perceived financial losses due 
to the described phenomena. Emerging from the empirical data and analysis so far, it 
is theorised that low institutional quality, hampered procedural fairness and unfair use 
of public money have clearly financial expression in the real cost of doing business 
(cost of formality) in transition economies (such as Bulgaria). 
 
The suggested solution to policy challenge one above was designed to tackle 
formalisation resistance of ICOI and while it would also have some positive effect on 
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informalisation coercion forces, it would not be sufficiently adequate. A more 
integrative solution should be employed to address policy challenge two. As evident 
from previous studies (Barone & Mocetti, 2011) public spending inefficiency shapes 
tax morale and the negative effect is even larger if there is lower level of spending in 
general. Transition economies have typically less resources to spend (in comparison 
with advanced ones), which are even further reduced by phenomena such as high 
institutional corruption, which is further fuelling evasion (Çule & Fulton, 2009; Johnson 
et al., 2000; Sandmo, 2012). In the case of Bulgaria, the connection between low tax 
morale and dissatisfaction with fair public expenditure is very pronounced. Further 
evidence (Williams et al., 2014c, pp. 16-17) reveals the three primary reasons for 
entrepreneurs having lower tax morality and resistance to the state. Indeed this is due 
to a lack of perceived tax fairness, redistributive and procedural justice. It has been 
already argued (section 6.2.3, Table 22, Appendix 35) that the strongest predictor for 
participation in ICOI is the disagreement with fair expenditure of tax money. 86% of all 
firms willing to formalise from within ICOI have full disagreement with how tax money 
is being spent and opinion that they are not treated in a fair and professional manner 
by the state institutions. Relating this to the relevant findings in this part of the thesis, 
an upgraded policy response should involve firstly, changing the perceptions of how 
tax money is being spent. Secondly, shifting the perceptions of professional and fair 
treatment by the state institutions including NRA lastly, but not least accordingly. 
 
Evidently (Figure 16), key state institutions are being increasingly perceived as corrupt 
or extremely corrupt in Bulgaria. Predictably, this casts shadows on the trust that tax 
money is fairly invested in public goods and services, thus affecting tax compliance 
levels. Given the conclusive evidence that corruption levels are significantly higher in 
transition economies than those in mature market economies (Tonoyan et al., 2010), 
the tackling challenge is proportionally complicated. Reducing the perceived levels of 
state corruption would positively affect the belief that tax money is fairly spent and 
consequently, this is expected to increase voluntary tax compliance. In consideration 
of the extant literature on state capture and counteracting corruption, one particular 
legal approach could be a credible solution for largely corrupted economies. Indeed, 
the adoption of asymmetric legal design, shattering some of the confidence that 
corrupt favours will be reciprocated and fostering denunciation (Lambsdorff & Nell, 
Kreutner M, 2006). In practicable terms, this means that lawful sanctions for 
accepting forms of gifts or bribes by state officials should be low and those for illicitly 
providing favours in return high. Simultaneously, expected penalties for providing gifts 
by tax payers aimed at achieving influence and economic gains should be severe, 
while those for accepting illegal favours by state officials mild. This is supposed to 
disturb the dualistic logic of a corrupted transaction and decrease corruption in 
general. 
The secondary aspect concerns changing the perceptions of professional and fair 
treatment by the state institutions. Two of the most viable methods are the so called 
‘‘service and client” approach (Hofmann et al., 2008), as well as the “slippery slope 
framework” (Kirchler, Hoelzl & Wahl, 2008), within a responsive regulation response. 
The first method (‘‘service and client”) cultivates collaborative, supportive and serving 
environment, where state institutions clarify, help and assist the tax payers to achieve 
what they want within the law. This way state institutions gain legitimacy and induce 
tax payers to respond with reciprocity and compliance. The latter method, clearly 
distinguishes the two methods of compliance namely voluntary and enforced 
compliance. It assumes that institutional power and trust are equally and dynamically 
important. They should be engaged accordingly giving advantage to the development 
of cooperative, voluntary compliance. Punitive, enforcement measures should be 
reserved only for cases where this is not possible. To facilitate perceptions for equal 
treatment, state institutions could provide greater publicity, particularly so about their 
enforcement activities. 
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 Contributions and conclusions. 7.4
 
With almost a quarter of the regional (South-East Europe) national income (Schneider 
et al., 2013, p. 56) hidden from the authorities and a similar share of undeclared 
employment, Bulgaria was selected as a distinctively important case to study. The 
country has one of the lowest GDP in the EU (Appendices 2 and 3), which correlates 
simultaneously to the lowest overall index of social cohesion-OISC (Dragolov et al., 
2013, p. 41) and the highest informal economy share (see Figure 2, 3 and 4). As a 
percent from the GDP by MIMIC method, the size of the informal economy is 12.7% to 
13.8% higher in comparison with 27 EU countries' averages during 2003-2013 
(Schneider, 2012; Schneider, 2013). The reported socio-economic factors and the 
intrinsic circularity between institutions and economic development (Casson et al., 
2010) provided rationale for the necessity of this research in transition setting. 
 
This thesis employed mixed methods in exploratory sequential design to achieve its 
research aims. A qualitative method (in-depth semi-structured interviews) has been 
used to collect primary data from key revenue officials. The key finding is that while 
operating in the most challenging EU economic environment, NRA experiences 
political influence for asymmetrical tax gap closure, which leads to unjustifiable 
regulative formalism within an outdated deterrence orientated approach. The 
collected intelligence via the interviews has been analysed to inform the creation of a 
quantitative method – a survey was used to collect data from entrepreneurs and small 
business owners. Researching tax evasion is particularly challenging and sensitive 
subject at both institutional and firm level. The institutional strategies and approaches 
are understandably protected by law and the required empirical access is notoriously 
difficult. Formally registered firms involved in tax evasive models could face severe 
penalties if exposed by the revenue authorities. Such administrative and financial 
punishments are very different in comparison with individual tax evaders – such as 
undeclared workers for instance. In consideration of these facts and to fulfil the aims 
of the thesis, an advanced empirical strategy and methods of analysis had to be 
utilised. As part of the development of the semi-structured questionnaire for NRA, a 
successful information access request was applied for and granted by BNAO (see 
section 4.3.1 and Appendices 10 and 11). It provided access to a special audit report 
of NRA and the related extensive documents’ base (about 440 documents in excess 
of 55 000 words), which served for its inter-organisational creation. Some of the 
documents were protected by the so called institutional secret by law (Bulgarian 
National Assembly, 2013, article 14, paragraph 14). This special report was used to 
acquire expert understanding of NRA activities and strategies, which in turn shaped 
the interview questions. Firstly, the utilised empirical approach itself reveals a good 
practice for deep research in similar sensitive topics particularly in transition economy 
setting such as Bulgaria. Secondly, it enabled the development of the quantitative 
questionnaire, integrating established institutional tax evasion diagnostics with the 
best practices currently available in the literature. It is argued that the questionnaire is 
a methodological contribution in diagnosing and measuring tax evasion for Bulgaria. It 
could be easily adapted to other transition economies. As a result, this study acquired 
original and significant findings in the domain of tax evasion management, which in 
the view of the author could influence the management and research of informal 
economies. 
 
When appraising tax evasion management from institutional perspective in countries, 
which transformed from socialism to capitalism, it is important to account for the 
inherently disturbed social contract. It is consequential to the fundamental conflict 
“with the common opinion and interests of the people leaving extensive distrust of the 
government” (Vihanto, 2000). Given the findings regarding the most difficult EU 
economic environment for NRA, accompanied with political pressure for asymmetrical 
– 180 – 
tax gap closure, it is obvious what fuels the self-perpetuating capacity of the largest 
informal sector. As evident, the institutional architecture and quality seems to be a key 
component in understanding the shadow economy (Torgler et al., 2009). Therefore, it 
is argued that the formal institutional behaviour should be studied, re-designed and 
guided as the symmetry’s facilitator with the tax payers’ informal norms and beliefs to 
reduce informality. The qualitative part of this thesis aimed to do exactly that – to 
provide a critical viewpoint on risk management and tackling tax non-compliance from 
government agency perspective. The main qualitative research question pursued in 
this study can be expressed as follows: “How does a national revenue agency try to 
tackle tax evasion in an institutional context that makes operating within the informal 
economy a practically-viable alternative to operating in the formal economy?” To 
explore this central question, four lines of inquiry have been reported: discovery and 
exploration of agency strategies; agency operational approaches and the predominant 
type in the mix of policy measures; and the triggering procedures and methods of 
enforcing control and compliance – tax audits and inspections. 
 
Being at the forefront of tax collection and non-compliance management, NRA is in a 
very challenging position of playing catch up in a transitioning economy. It has quite 
limited resources to deliver on objectives and it appears that ruling governments are 
not willing to account these factors. As Calciolari et al. (2013) suggests public sector 
organisations are simultaneously subject to three types of environmental pressure: 
institutional, economic and political. The key qualitative contribution of this research is 
unveiling the three major environmental pressures upon NRA’s strategic and 
operational approaches in tax policy management characterised by institutional 
incongruence status. While the first two – economic and institutional environments are 
amongst the worst in socio-economic terms within the EU, the political influence for 
asymmetrical tax gap closure as well as consequential misuse of collected revenue, 
appear to have the most significant impact on the agency work. In particular, this 
creates two major types of difficulties – firstly, this impedes the work of senior officials 
who want to modernise tax policy in order to secure greater level of operational 
independence and thus higher procedural fairness. Based on the in-depth interviews, 
some key officials are genuinely involved in “bottom to top” initiative for internal 
reformation striving to improve the agency performance through employment of 
modern and less subjective information technology solutions. 
 
Secondly, my results indicate that current institutional practices disturb the social 
feeling for procedural fairness to such a degree that the institutional asymmetry and 
entrepreneurial informality are being progressively deepened. While reducing the 
asymmetry between the formal and informal institutions will improve the level of 
formalisation amongst SMEs (and generally the share of informal economy), this 
could be achieved only if revenue agencies in transition economies are granted 
sufficient political independence from ruling governments. It also became apparent 
that the described issues create the so called unjustifiable regulative formalism within 
the traditionally deterrence orientated approach of NRA. 
 
Based on compelling literature evidence in the institutional regulatory studies with a 
focus on tax compliance and procedural fairness (Hartner et al., 2008; Murphy, 2005; 
Murphy, International Center for Public Policy AYSoPS, Georgia State University, 
2007; Murphy, 2008; Murphy, 2016; Verboon et al., 2007), it is clear that deterrence-
based enforcement strategies are counterproductive. However, only in recent years 
has there been a fundamental shift in tax compliance research with moving the accent 
from enforcement approaches to such ones inducing and nurturing voluntary 
cooperation (Alm, Kirchler & Muehlbacher, 2012). The later work of Williams 
(Williams, 2014a; Williams, 2014b; Williams, 2015b) is a notable example in this 
respect and the fact that the current debate is not so much over whether to use direct 
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or indirect controls to tackle informal economies, but rather which specific policy 
measures are most effective and in what combination. In his development of the 
European Platform on Tackling Undeclared Work, Williams (2016) suggests a holistic 
policy approach to member states, which “uses in a strategic and coordinated manner 
the full range of both the direct and indirect policy approaches and measures 
available to increase the power of, and trust in, authorities respectively”. In order to 
develop such sophisticated approaches, the initial requirement is to acquire an in-
depth understanding of the institutional context and interactions with the tax payers for 
every country. The qualitative part of this thesis was designed to serve this purpose 
for Bulgaria and study the key agency (NRA) in that regard. 
 
In consideration of the substantial amount of interview data (in excess of 41 000 
words) and for the purpose of achieving maximum validity of findings, transparency 
and objectivity, a dual software solution approach was employed with two of the 
industry benchmark solutions. In particular, IBM SPSS Modeler and NVivo as key 
representatives of CAQDAS, have been utilised from the perspective of being 
analytical research enhancer tools. In the context of this research, it was imperative to 
create “auditable ‘footprint’ of the progressive dialogue between the researcher and 
their data” (Sinkovics et al., 2012, p. 5). All findings and the software inquiries to 
derive them have been double and triple verified via software to software logic 
comparison and software to researcher’s logic and knowledge simultaneous 
appraisal. The more traditional statistical techniques (NVivo) were amalgamated with 
the progressive natural language processing (NLP) algorithms (IBM SPSS Modeler) in 
the qualitative analysis (chapter 5). It is the author’s view that this dual solution 
approach is in itself a methodological contribution to the way qualitative analysis might 
be conducted independently of the subject. It allows quicker, deeper and higher level 
analysis to be implemented in a very visible and trustworthy way. 
 
The main research aim in this study was to develop a holistic account of the socio-
economic influencers of the processes of business tax evasion, formalisation and 
informalisation and as a result to inform adequate policy responses. This task 
required emergence of two investigative levels – institutional (chapter 5) and 
entrepreneurial (chapter 6). The qualitative research question pursued in this thesis 
can be expressed as follows: “How does a national revenue agency try to tackle tax 
evasion in an institutional context that makes operating within the informal economy a 
practically-viable alternative to operating in the formal economy?” Operating in the 
most challenging EU economic environment, NRA experiences political influence for 
asymmetrical tax gap closure, which leads to unjustifiable regulative formalism within 
an outdated deterrence orientated approach. The results indicate that current state 
institutional practices disturb the social feeling for procedural fairness to such a 
degree that the institutional asymmetry and entrepreneurial informality are being 
progressively deepened. While reducing the asymmetry between the formal and 
informal institutions will improve the level of formalisation amongst SMEs (and 
generally the share of informal economy), this could be achieved only if revenue 
agencies in transition economies are granted sufficient political independence from 
ruling governments. 
 
The quantitative part of this mixed method thesis appraised several interconnected 
phenomena (sections 6.2, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3), which affect entrepreneurs’ tax evasive 
models of behaviour. The main quantitative research questions can be expressed as 
follows: “What are the strongest determining factors of business tax evasion and 
whether the intrinsic circularity between tangible and intangible socio-economic 
phenomena is affecting tax evasive behaviour.” The research narrative aimed to build 
a holistic account of these socio-economic influencers discovered to affect the 
processes of tax evasion, formalisation and informalisation. To achieve this task some 
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innovative analytical methods have been used, hence enabling the so called 
predictive economic profiling of business tax evaders. It was discovered that 76.5% of 
the surveyed entrepreneurs are underreporting their turnovers with the purpose to 
evade taxes. This amount to a significant proportion of the country’s GDP and 
suggests that the proportion of GDP in the informal economy is much higher than 
current macro-measurement methods report for Bulgaria (31.2% of GDP). Although 
there is no definitive evidence in support of the supremacy of a particular data 
collection technique (Williams, 2015a, p. 6) for evaluating the undeclared economy, 
the employed method here managed to yield a higher estimate in comparison with 
macro-economic measurements available so far. Micro-economic (direct) 
approaches are criticised that they lead to estimation of only part of the shadow 
activities, which then should be extrapolated to the entire population (Schneider, 
2005, pp. 619-620). Capitalising on that particular measurement weakness and the 
utilisation of a few conservative assumptions in the deployment of the quantitative 
method, this study provides arguments that the actual share of the informal economy 
is alarmingly higher from what is currently known. It is argued that the indirect 
appraisal technique in the business survey, which also embeds NRA’s experience, is a 
viable example of good measurement practice applicable to transition economies. 
Moreover, the findings of this approach serve as foundation for further research into 
which methods (micro or macro) are superior for detecting and measuring informality, 
depending on the deployment socio-economic context. Sadly (from authorship 
perspective), it also informs a research challenge to other scholars willing to discover 
the real share of the formal economy in Bulgaria. In particular, which is the 
scientifically correct question to ask “What is the share of the informal economy in 
Bulgaria?” or “What is the share of the formal economy in Bulgaria?” 
 
The reported qualitative and quantitative findings enlightened some unknown 
characteristics of the Bulgarian informal sector and as such led to coining new 
descriptive terms of the very core structure of informality in a given society. Indeed, 
that transition economies with large informal sectors (such as Bulgaria) are 
characterised by high Frequency of societal involvedness in the informal economy 
multiplied by high Intensity of societal involvedness in the informal economy (see 
section 7.1). Therefore, it has been argued here that the institutional asymmetry 
applies to big part of the society and to a much deeper degree in every instance. 
Unsurprisingly, informal economies with such characteristics are particularly 
challenging to tackle from policy perspective and in the case of Bulgaria, it is evident 
how such efforts remain unsuccessful. 
 
The literature appraisal conducted for the purpose of this thesis did not identify other 
studies, which use proven multi-disciplinary analytical methods (Decision trees, MLP 
Neural and TAN Bayesian Networks) in holistic modelling and predicting of tax evasive 
behaviour. Therefore, their integrative utilisation here could be considered as a 
qualitatively new approach. Decision trees are popular and powerful approach 
(Rokach, 2016; Rokach et al., 2008) in many disciplines, including structuring policy 
problems (Dunn, 2012, p. 25; Holzinger, 2015). Although decision trees are 
considered to retain superior accuracy in comparison with logistic regression 
(Coussement et al., 2014) the most important findings have been double verified with 
both methods. The predictive economic profiling capability for the given context 
emanates from the fact that both neural networks and decision trees have the 
functionality to discover the strongest influencers for entrepreneurs to engage in tax 
evasive activities. This is achieved with neural computation of relationships’ 
significance between predictor and target variables (Neural Networks) and 
examination of all possible single or multi-way tree splits based on statistical 
significance tests (decision trees). The current quantitative data set was used to 
develop and train several models, which are now ready for predictive re-deployment 
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into longitudinal data sets or real world applications such as analysis of revenue 
offices’ data flows. While the current models have been fine-tuned to transition 
economy context (namely Bulgaria), they could be re-configured to work in different 
countries simply by introducing relevant training data sets. 
 
The quantitative analysis (based on the second investigative method) of this thesis 
advances an innovative predictive economic profiling of business tax evaders utilising 
decision trees, neural and TAN Bayesian networks. A variety of modelling methods 
taken from machine learning, artificial intelligence and statistics have been used. 
Emerging from IBM Cross-Industry Standard Process for Data Mining (CRISP-DM), a 
Modelling Workflow Framework (MWF) was specifically developed and applied to this 
management research inquiry. Consequently, this enabled structured automated 
evaluation and ranking of several thousand statistical and data mining algorithms 
against criteria for precision, accuracy and findings’ meaningfulness (chapter 6). It is 
argued that the automated simultaneous appraisal of linear and non-linear analytical 
models against the available research data is a robust approach, which is particularly 
useful in the domain of tax evasion management. The main strengths of the approach 
are based on the discovery-orientated properties of the utilised techniques in contrast 
with verification-oriented methods such as conventional statistical tests. MLR has 
been used to verify the most important aspects of the quantitative findings. 
Furthermore, the software solution (IBM SPSS Modeler), but not the researcher, 
identifies any important features and relations of the data. This is possible due to the 
artificial intelligence algorithms. Any exposed insights have been then scrutinised by 
the knowledge of the investigator and adjustments had been made where necessary 
into the data mining strategies and techniques. The advantages of this approach are 
self-explanatory – maximum robustness and objectivity where the expert’s knowledge 
is combined and enhanced with active analysis techniques supported by artificial 
(computer based) intelligence. This important capability allows the inductive 
interrogation of research data in a predictive manner. Facilitating economic profiling 
of tax evaders in this thesis is exactly that – it is achieved through deriving new 
meaningful research explanations with decision trees and neural networks, but not 
limited to just confirming statistically significant hypotheses. The automated 
interaction identification capabilities of decision trees enable efficient detection of 
significant relationships between variables, which is a powerful dimensional reduction 
technique. The relationships identified through this technique could be further 
explored (if necessary) in formal parametric models. It is argued that in highly 
sophisticated data sets such as the one used in this study (see section 4.4), the 
knowledge of the researcher greatly benefits from such analytical enhancing 
techniques. 
A fundamental associated benefit to policy makers is the fact that all types of decision 
tree algorithms provide some form of significance of their conditional/branching 
structure. Their approach, which is similar to rule induction, is always visible in terms 
of reasoning – it is available from visually browsing the tree. In addition, the decision 
tree algorithms include only predictor variables, which contribute to the accuracy of 
the model; all others are excluded. As a result, decision-tree algorithms are invaluable 
instruments in appraising how a particular change of a certain condition will affect the 
dependent ones. In the context of this study, they have been used for predictive 
profiling of tax evaders utilising a business survey from within a European transition 
economy, namely Bulgaria. Therefore, the utilised level of automated modelling 
constitutes a qualitative change in how informal economy and tax evasive issues 
could be appraised and tackled via targeted public policy interventions. In particular, 
the modelling with logically clear and transparent decision trees and neural networks 
provides the opportunity for unproblematic and relatively cheap prospective policy 
evaluation in the domain of tax evasion. The modelling approach could be also 
integrated with appropriate tuning into the data streams of interested revenue offices 
– 184 – 
across the world and in consequence benefit the policy makers and local business 
environments simultaneously. 
 
It was illustrated that Bulgarian entrepreneurs experience very high real cost of doing 
business according to the rules and this has manifold basis. One aspect is rooted in 
the formal institutional framework: due to the poor tax and administrative policies 
which impose hefty financial burden on businesses. Another aspect is due to 
phenomenon described by the newly coined term informal chains of interdependency. 
ICOIs have serious economic coercive powers over entrepreneurs, simultaneously 
attracting new members and inhibiting them with prohibitively high exit costs (towards 
formalisation). Third aspect relates to the intense and wide spread unfair competition 
(types one and two, see section 7.3), clearly interconnected with institutional quality, 
procedural fairness and distributive justice. A key argument in this discussion was that 
intangible phenomena (such as institutional quality, procedural fairness and 
distributive justice) transform into tangible economic impacts on the profitability of 
small businesses. The most frequent motive for tax evasion is to simply survive 
economically. To demonstrate the dynamics of the described socio-economic 
influencers of informality, a model was developed and discussed (Figure 26). It 
presented how the real cost of doing business affects firms’ economic behaviour 
depending on their economic status with the view to advance an improved 
understanding amongst interested scholars and policy makers. 
 
In terms of cost of doing business, there are four substantial drivers of tax evasion, 
which develops as a responsive-compensatory strategy at entrepreneurial level. 
Firstly, unfair competition from fully informal or partly informal businesses is the most 
frequent and strongest predictor of business tax evasion. The current institutional 
capacity to tackle this issue and provide a levelled business environment is clearly 
inadequate. Secondly, the problem with institutional corruption at all levels, which 
causes unfair and expensive public service delivery – the so called significant costs of 
“getting things done” from entrepreneurial perspective. Thirdly, the high cost of doing 
business according to the rules due to bureaucratic inefficiencies as a result of poor 
tax and administrative policies. It is important to note that development of enterprise 
policy in Bulgaria experienced the so called policy implementation gap – where 
consecutive governments failed to transfer and align working EU programs to the 
local context. Similarly to another transition economy, various programmes have been 
adopted for the wrong rationales (Xheneti, 2017; Xheneti et al., 2011) doing little in 
solving the problems of the business community. Lastly, there is a political influence 
for asymmetrical tax gap closure at macro policy level. This causes guided unequal 
enforcement of the existing tax laws and regulations, where many entrepreneurs are 
exposed to unjustified regulative formalism and tax payment scrutiny. At the same 
time, they observe exactly the opposite status for privileged businesses and attempt to 
compensate with turnover underreporting where possible. 
 
Having identified the strongest influencers of tax evasion practices through the 
modelling with decision trees, neural networks and MLR regression, it was revealed 
where government efforts would be most fruitful. In order to increase tax compliance 
and reduce the share of the informal economy, a qualitatively new policy approach is 
required to reduce the institutional asymmetry. As evident, cultivating trust in the tax 
authorities (Kirchler et al., 2008; Kogler, Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 2015) appear to be 
the way forward to shift from the less efficient enforced compliance to much more 
financially and socially efficient voluntary compliance. The focus has to be moved 
from direct punitive and deterrence oriented controls to indirect, high trust, high 
commitment culture, so as to align the informal and formal institutions (Williams et al., 
2015a). Effectively this is an establishment of the minimum preconditions of voluntary 
tax compliance (Hofmann et al., 2008). Given the poor status of the social contract 
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from entrepreneurs’ perspective, the widely perceived institutional corruption in 
combination with poor performance, a transformation has to start with the formal 
institutions first. Increasing the perceived fairness of treatment would change the 
motivational posture on compliance (Hartner et al., 2008). To achieve that, a 
fundamental institutional reform is required in two aspects. Firstly, to achieve widely 
acceptable level of procedural fairness, namely equivalent treatment of everybody 
trough equal rules enforcement in the tax management domain. Secondly, that is to 
address the major deficiencies in the distributive justice mechanisms and in particular 
the perceived value of public goods and services as a function of the collected taxes. 
In order to achieve appropriately sustainable social and economic system, the 
taxpayer should feel that they bear a reasonable tax burden (Sandmo, 2012) within an 
acceptable real cost of existence in relation to others. Effective delivery at these two 
levels satisfies the prerequisites for addressing the institutional asymmetry via change 
of the formal institutions, hence achieving greater symmetry with the informal ones 
and consequently reducing tax evasion and informality. 
 
 
 Limitations and future directions. 7.5
 
While measurement of the informal economy share was not one of the primary 
research aims of this study, the developed and applied micro-economic approach 
contributes to the relevant literature debates in this respect. The empirical strategy 
and particularly the quantitative method aimed to address the “extraordinary 
challenges”, which this field faces (Slemrod et al., 2012, p. 31). Indeed, to avoid the 
weaknesses of macro-measurement approaches and measure the unmeasurable 
indirectly. In doing so, one of the limitations is the fact that the reported extent of tax 
evasion was amongst the small businesses exercising partial mode of informality in 
Sofia. Therefore, this is not a nationally representative study, but it clearly justifies one 
in respect of the reported findings. Due to more favourable economic environment in 
the capital, it has been argued that the level of partial informality would be higher in 
the rest of the country. The evaluation stated in this study does not include the share 
of undeclared work in combination with envelope wages and the evasive footprint of 
fully informal businesses. For the described reasons, there is ground to believe that 
the reported finding (76.5%) could be on the conservative continuum in comparison 
with a nationally representative study. Calculation to what proportion of the GDP all 
these relevant phenomena would cumulatively account is definitely an important 
future research direction worth pursuing. 
 
Some of the employed analytical approaches (Decision trees, Neural and Bayesian 
networks, NLP) bias this thesis towards relatively new methodological paradigms in 
researching tax evasion and compliance, which are starting to gain popularity. Some 
notable examples include the use of agent-based modelling of tax compliance 
(Hashimzade et al., 2015; Hokamp, 2014; Pickhardt et al., 2014), as well as the 
utilisation of genetic algorithms for tax evasion management (Warner et al., 2015). 
Because of the fact that this study advances an innovative predictive socio-economic 
profiling of business tax evaders in transition setting, the approach needs verification 
in multiple economic contexts. This is necessary to establish the robustness and 
validity of the applied methods in various environments. Nevertheless, if this research 
contributed to making the point for the inevitable utilisation of artificial intelligence in 
tax evasion management and more broadly in formulating and resolving public policy 
issues, then it has fulfilled its purpose. 
 
At present, the use of artificial intelligence and co-evolutionary approaches could be 
broadly considered taking into two parallel, but independent directions. Approaches 
based on tax evasion modelling without mining primary data, but instead, using 
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simulations to generate and explore tax schemes and policy reactions (Hemberg, 
Rosen, Warner, Wijesinghe & O’Reilly, 2016). And approaches such as the one 
employed in this study. Indeed, utilising primary data and training artificial cognition 
algorithms on real world data, thus advancing predictive economic profiling of tax 
evaders. Currently, there is no clear cut answer, which type of approaches would 
prove superior in future research. It is the view of the author that the advocated 
methods in this study, might offer the better match to the needs of contemporary 
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8. Abbreviations. 
 





1.  ADP Anomaly Detection Procedure 
2.  AIC Akaike Information Criterion 
3.  ATO Australian Taxation Office 
4.  BEEPS Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
5.  BNAO Bulgarian National Audit Office 
6.  BSP Bulgarian Socialist Party 
7.  C&RT Classification and Regression Trees 
8.  CAQDAS Computer aided qualitative data analysis software 
9.  CAQDAS Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
10.  CASM Cognitive Aspects of Survey Methodology 
11.  CHAID Chi-squared Automatic Interaction Detector 
12.  CITUB Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria 
13.  CLP Confederation of Labour Podkrepa 
14.  CRISP-DM Cross-Industry Standard Process for Data Mining 
15.  DIY Do It Yourself 
16.  DTF Distance to frontier 
17.  EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
18.  E-CHAID Exhaustive Chi-squared Automatic Interaction Detector 
19.  EIB European Investment Bank 
20.  EIF European Investment Fund 
21.  
EUROFOUND 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions 
22.  GCI Global Competitiveness Index 
23.  GDP Gross Domestic Product 
24.  GLI General Labour Inspectorate 
25.  GLI General Labour Inspectorate 
26.  GNP Gross National Product 
27.  IAP Institutional asymmetry paradigm 
28.  IBMWDC IBM Watson Developer Cloud 
29.  ICOI Informal chain of interdependence 
30.  ILD Instituto Libertad Democracia 
31.  ILO International Labor Office 
32.  IR Information request 
33.  IRS Internal Revenue Service 
34.  KNN Nearest Neighbor Analysis 
35.  MIMIC Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes 
36.  MLP Multilayer perceptron 
37.  MLR Multinomial Logistic Regression 
38.  MWF Modelling Workflow Framework 
39.  NLP Natural Language Processing 




40.  NRA National Revenue Agency 
41.  NSSI National Social Security Institute 
42.  OB Optimal Binning 
43.  OBA Open Book Accounting 
44.  OISC Overall Index of Social Cohesion 
45.  PPS Purchasing Power Standards 
46.  QUEST Quick, Unbiased, Efficient Statistical Tree 
47.  SBC Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion 
48.  SLR Systematic literature review 
49.  SLS Scoping Literature Screenings 
50.  SMA Strategic Management Accounting 
51.  SVM Support Vector Machine 
52.  TAN Tree Augmented Naïve – type of Bayesian network 
53.  TAP Text Analysis Package 
54.  TCMP Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program 
55.  
TPDPVT 




9. List of figures. 
 
1. Figure 1: Literature review of Entrepreneurship in Europe. 
 
2. Figure 2: Size of the shadow economies of 27 European Countries over 2002 – 
2013 in % of GDP by MIMIC. 
 
3. Figure 3: The Bulgarian informal economy in comparison with 27 EU countries' 
averages – % of GDP by MIMIC. 
 
4. Figure 4: Simple correlation between shadow economy size and overall index of 
social cohesion. 
 
5. Figure 5: Research aims and objectives. 
 
6. Figure 6 – research aims – NRA. 
 
7. Figure 7 – IBM SPSS Modeler workflow. 
 
8. Figure 8 – The data mining life cycle. 
 
9. Figure 9: Text analytics with IBM SPSS Modeler – key concepts representation. 
 
10. Figure 10: Top categories from interview analysis. 
 
11. Figure 11: Descending classification of root level nodes according to number of 
coding references. 
 
12. Figure 12: Cluster analysis of top nodes (themes). 
 
13. Figure 13: Coding by concepts’ frequency. 
– 189 – 
14. Figure 14: The ease of doing business and related activities in Bulgaria. 
 
15. Figure 15: The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) rankings – Bulgaria for 2011-
2015. 
 
16. Figure 16: Institutional corruption levels in Bulgaria. 
 
17. Figure 17: All types of audits and inspections performed by NRA. 
 
18. Figure 18: Summary of the in-depth semi-structured interview’s sections. 
 
19. Figure 19: Neural Network – relative predictors' importance for variable Q16_1. 
 
20. Figure 20: Neural Network – relative predictors' importance for variable Q16_2. 
 
21. Figure 21: Neural Network – relative predictors' importance for variable Q16_3. 
 
22. Figure 22: Neural Network – relative predictors' importance for variable Q16_4. 
 
23. Figure 23: Neural Network – relative predictors' importance for variable Q16_5. 
 
24. Figure 24: Cluster comparison for variables Q16_1 to Q16_5 inclusive. 
 
25. Figure 25: Cluster analysis of unfair competition and turnover underreporting. 
 
26. Figure 26: Real cost of doing business and firms’ economic behaviour. 
 
 
10. List of tables. 
 
1. Table 1: Advantages and disadvantages of systematic literature review. 
 
2. Table 2: Systematic literature review – key search words and expressions. 
 
3. Table 3: List of peer-reviewed journals containing “key expressions” articles. 
 
4. Table 4: Relevance of the survey to the research aims and questionnaire’s 
rationale. 
 
5. Table 5: Analytical survey matrix. 
 
6. Table 6: Brief definition of common modelling terms. 
 
7. Table 7: Commonly used modelling nodes in IBM SPSS Modeler. 
 
8. Table 8: Modelling workflow framework (MWF). 
 
9. Table 9: Key interview themes and summary of responses. 
 
10. Table 10: NRA – categorisation of main accents. 
 
11. Table 11: Summary statistics. 
 
12. Table 12: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables. 
 
– 190 – 
13. Table 13: Descriptive statistics of variables 13 and 14. 
 
14. Table 14: Descriptive statistics. 
 
15. Table 15: Descriptive statistics of variable 16. 
 
16. Table 16: Descriptive statistics of variable 24. 
 
17. Table 17: Decision tree modelling of entrepreneurs’ tax evasive motivations 
(variable Q16). 
 
18. Table 18: Results from MLP Neural Network modelling of tax evasive motivations. 
 
19. Table 19: Multinomial Logistic Regression for variable Q14_3. 
 
20. Table 20: Decision tree modelling of entrepreneurs’ perceptions of procedural 
fairness and institutional quality. 
 
21. Table 21: Effort to formalise from within an informality chain of interdependence. 
 



































– 191 – 
11. Appendices. 
 





– 192 – 








– 193 – 





– 194 – 





– 195 – 
 Appendix 4 – Table 1. 11.5
 
Advantages and disadvantages of systematic literature review (note – the table 
entries are listed in a non-particular order). 
 
Advantages of SLR Disadvantages of SLR 
Reduced review bias due to rigorous 
criteria. 
Could limit the review scope and omit 
important review themes. 
Transparency to other readers to judge 
the review process and its results. 
Requires significant planning and re-
design with justification throughout the 
entire study. 
Higher level or relevancy (more 
pragmatic). 
Could reduce creativity of the review and 
affect cross-disciplinary perspective. 
It is more evidence based compared to 
non SLR. 
It is more complex to account for others’ 
biases against each other. 
Identifying of knowledge gaps is easier 
and more thorough. 
Searches in electronic databases could 
omit important articles or books. 






 Appendix 5 – Table 2. 11.6
 
Table 2: Systematic literature review – key search words and expressions 
(alphabetical order) 
Narrower focus Broader focus 
 
Cost of formality 
Cost of informality 
Cost-benefit analysis of informality 













Legal tax avoidance 
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 Appendix 6 – Table 3. 11.7
 
List of peer-reviewed journals containing “key expressions” articles 
The generated search results (journal articles) were screened to ensure that each 
included journal contain at least one thematically relevant publication, which has a 
discussion in regards to a key expression. Most of the journals contained several 
relevant papers. Some articles and journals accordingly, have been excluded, 
because the discussion of the topic was only marginal. The results are presented in 
the following tables. 
 













Full list of all the databases included in 






Table 3: List of peer-reviewed journals containing “key expressions” articles 
(alphabetical order). 
1. Academy of Management 
Perspectives 
2. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability 
3. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 
4. Africa 
5. American Anthropologist 
6. American Behavioral Scientist 
7. Annals Of The American Academy 
Of Political And Social Science 
8. Annals Of Tourism Research 
9. Antipode 
10. Applied Economics 
11. Carnegie-Rochester Conference 
Series on Public Policy 
12. Cities 
13. Conservation Biology 
14. Crime, Law And Social Change 
15. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 
16. Eastern European Economics 
17. Ecological Economics 
18. Economic Modelling 
19. Economic Systems 
20. Economics Letters 
21. Economics of Transition 
22. Empirical Economics 
23. Engineering Economics 
24. Entrepreneurship & Regional 
51. International Tax and Public Finance 
52. Journal Of Business Ethics 
53. Journal of Business Venturing 
54. Journal of Development Economics 
55. Journal of Developmental 
Entrepreneurship 
56. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 
57. Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control 
58. Journal of Economic Psychology 
59. Journal of Economic Studies 
60. Journal of Economics and Business 
61. Journal of Financial Stability 
62. Journal of Government Information 
63. Journal Of International Business 
Studies 
64. Journal of Macroeconomics 
65. Journal of Management Studies 
66. Journal Of Monetary Economics 
67. Journal of Policy Modelling 
68. Journal Of Public Economics 
69. Journal of Socio-Economics 
70. Journal Of Youth Studies 
71. Labour Economics 
72. Local Government Studies 
73. New Political Economy  
74. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and 
its Applications 
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Development 
25. European Economic Review 
26. European Journal of Law and 
Economics 
27. European Journal of Political 
Economy 
28. European Journal Of Public Health 
29. European Journal Of Social Work  
30. European Management Journal 
31. European Societies 
32. Europe-Asia Studies 
33. Expert Systems With Applications 
34. Futures 
35. Geoforum 
36. Geographical Review 
37. Geography Compass 
38. German Economic Review 
39. Habitat International 
40. Health Policy 
41. International Entrepreneurship And 
Management Journal 
42. International Journal of Educational 
Development 
43. International Journal of 
Entrepreneurial Behaviour & 
Research 
44. International Journal of Human 
Resource Management 
45. International Journal of Social 
Economics 
46. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 
47. International Review of Economics & 
Finance 
48. International Review of Law and 
Economics 
49. International Small Business Journal 
50. Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 
 
75. Post-Communist Economies 
76. Procedia - Economics and Finance 
77. Procedia - Social and Behavioral 
Sciences 
78. Progress In Development Studies 
79. Public Choice 
80. Regional Studies 
81. Research in Economics 
82. Research in Social Stratification and 
Mobility 
83. Research Policy 
84. Resources, Conservation and 
Recycling 
85. Review Of African Political Economy 
86. Revue Économique 
87. Science 
88. Security Dialogue 
89. Social & Cultural Geography 
90. Social Forces 
91. Social Science & Medicine 
92. Socio-economic Review 
93. Sociological Perspectives 
94. Sociological Perspectives 
95. Structural Change and Economic 
Dynamics 
96. Technological and Economic 
Development of Economy 
97. Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change 
98. Textual Practice 
99. The economics of transition 
100. The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 
101. The Journal of Socio-Economics 
102. Urban Forum 
103. Women's Studies International 
Forum 
















– 198 – 
 Appendix 7 EN – semi-structured interview with NRA officials template. 11.8
 
Semi-structured interview with NRA officials – EN template 
 
1. What are the main tasks and responsibilities of your department? 
 
2. What challenges do you encounter in the implementation of your tasks and 
responsibilities? 
 
3. One of NRA’s strategic aims is to encourage voluntary tax compliance. What 
initiatives and/or activities do you undertake in that regard? 
 
4. Does NRA have specific methods or systems in place with which you reveal the 
ways and means used by the tax payers to evade their tax duties or lie to you – for 
instance concealment of business turnover? 
 
 
Special Block of Questions 
 
 
5. Do you have a process for selection in regards to tax audits and inspections? If 
yes, then what types of selection do you exercise and to what extent are they 
automated. 
 
6. What kind of events could initiate the selection processes – for example, a 
particular risky business behaviour, means/ways of business funding? In order 
to attract a selection the business subjects should possess certain type of 
characteristics – what are they?  
 
7. Are your selection criteria dynamic or static? I mean whether they are 
preliminary defined without an option to change or could they change in 
accordance with the type and quality of gathered information about the tax 
subjects? 
 
8. How these criteria and principles are being developed? Is it happening in your 
department? 
 
9. If a high risk of tax non-compliance has been suspected or diagnosed, what are 
the next diagnostics and control activities? 
 
10. Are the assignments and management of tax audits and inspections automated 
to some extent or not at this moment of time? 
 
11. In your opinion, is there any subjectivism in the selection, delegation and 
management process of tax audits and inspections? Or is this avoided through a 




12. What are the different types of investigations, which you undertake when you 




13. Is there a process for analysis of the possible measures, the implementation 
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expenses for them and the expected effect? 
 
 
14. Do you cooperate with other institutions and agencies in regards with the tax 
audits and inspections, which are undertaken by NRA and if yes with whom? 
 
 
15. What penalties are being imposed when you find out infringements? 
 
 
16. How many risk subjects (firms) are identified and analysed approximately on 
average annually – for instance in years 2012 and 2013? How many of these 
identified firms are actually audited (checked)? 
 
 
17. How is it decided into which areas of tax non-compliance to invest efforts? Said 
differently, which types of tax infringements attract most attention? 
 
 
18. What is being aimed to achieve with the application of counter-activities against 
real or potential tax law offences? Are these measures directed towards specific 
groups breaking the law or against particular people – business owners or physical 
persons? 
 
19. What are the most frequent reasons/motives for turnover underreporting by the 
Bulgarian businessmen (entrepreneurs)? 
 
20. Is there any data collection and interest about consequential behavioural changes 
after applied control by NRA – tax audits, inspections and alike. If yes, what is 
being done in this connection? 
 
21. If you have noticed change in the behaviour of firms and/or individuals as a result 
of counter evasive activities, is there any mechanism of changing any future 
counter activities and if yes how is this happening? 
 
22. How is it being decided/analysed which tax law counter activities would have led to 
the behavioural change of the targeted groups or individuals? In other words, how 
is being evaluated, which measures have been effective, if such practices exist at 
this moment of time? 
 
23. At this moment of time what methods or campaigns are being used to encourage 
voluntary tax compliance of firms and traders? 
 
24. From your perspective, what are the characteristics of the firms and traders who 
allow themselves to declare lower tax base than the real one? Is there something 
particularly common between them or something which differentiate them from the 
other tax payers who are compliant? 
 
25. In your view, what kinds of difficulties are being faced by the Bulgarian 
businessmen (entrepreneurs) in their efforts to be tax compliant? 
 
26. Is there any information, which is of particular interest to you about the firms and 
traders evading taxes, which you would like to know? 
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 Appendix 8 – justification of each question – semi-structured interview with 11.9
NRA officials. 
 
1. What are the main tasks and responsibilities of your department? 
 
This question collects information about the main tasks and responsibilities of the 
department from the individual perspectives of the key people. It aims to discover the 
actual level of alignment in the different opinions and thus to build a picture of 
departmental role cohesion and potential related issues? 
 
 
2. What challenges do you encounter in the implementation of your tasks and 
responsibilities? 
 
This question aims to reveal what are the difficulties which are currently encountered 
by NRA officials. The question is asked in such a way to provoke the respondents to 
speak about their real professional challenges and thus share their impressions about 
things that needs addressing. 
 
 
3. One of NRA’s strategic aims is to encourage voluntary tax compliance. What 
initiatives and/or activities do you undertake in that regard? 
 
The purpose of question 3 is to discover how NRA satisfies one of its strategic aims. Is 
“encouraging voluntary tax compliance” just an advertised strategic aim of NRA or it is 
genuinely pursued. Based on the collected information it could be determined to what 
degree indirect policy measures are being favoured by NRA. 
 
 
4. Does NRA have specific methods or systems in place with which you reveal the 
ways and means used by the tax payers to evade their tax duties or lie to you – for 
instance concealment of business turnover? 
 
Question 4 is designed to reveal facts about the current approach in tackling informal 
practices exercised by businesses. It is generally questioning whether there is some 
level of automation (systems) employed to tackle tax evasion. This is the introductory 
question to the so called Special Block of Questions. 
 
This special section of the questionnaire asks a set of particular questions about: 
 How the so called selection criteria work for discovery and diagnostics or tax 
evasion. 
 
 The development principles of those criteria – this may provide information for 
analysis of the rational of the selection process and how it is institutionally 
installed – what is the connection with the real world and how potential 
feedback could affect the process. 
 
 What is the level of subjectivism in the selection, delegation and management 
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Special Block of Questions 
 
5. Do you have a process for selection in regards to tax audits and inspections? If 
yes, then what types of selection do you exercise and to what extent are they 
automated. 
 
Aims to discover whether there is a systematic selection process and any level of 
automation. 
 
6. What kind of events could initiate the selection processes – for example, a 
particular risky business behaviour, means/ways of business funding? In order 
to attract a selection the business subjects should possess certain type of 
characteristics – what are they? 
 
This question is asked to learn the triggering characteristics of a selection process. 
Collecting such information is beneficial for analysing the effectiveness and 
adequacy of such processes in comparison with contemporary evasive practices. 
 
7. Are your selection criteria dynamic or static? I mean whether they are 
preliminary defined without an option to change or could they change in 
accordance with the type and quality of gathered information about the tax 
subjects? 
 
The main purpose here is to reveal any feedback mechanism with the real world. To 
what extent NRA considers their tactics (in terms of selection process) based on 
genuine correlation with tax evasive practices they observe – adequacy of their 
response. 
 
8. How these criteria and principles are being developed? Is it happening in your 
department? 
 
Further elaboration on the above matters and discovery to what degree each of the 
two key departments are being involved in the criteria development. 
 
9. If a high risk of tax non-compliance has been suspected or diagnosed, what are 
the next diagnostics and control activities? 
 
This question’s purpose is to reveal NRA response upon discovery of non-
compliance, but most importantly how systematic it is in reality. 
 
10. Are the assignments and management of tax audits and inspections automated 
to some extent or not at this moment of time? 
 
This is a very topical question in regards to the high corruption level in Bulgaria – 
affecting institutions and administrations of all types. It actually aims to expose the 
level of subjectivism and opportunities to influence impending or on-going audits 
and inspections. For instance HMRC are having almost full automation of this 
process while this is not the case for NRA. 
 
11. In your opinion, is there any subjectivism in the selection, delegation and 
management process of tax audits and inspections? Or is this avoided through a 
level of automation of those processes? 
 
This last question from the special section is designed to collect and confirm 
personal opinion about any subjectivism in regards with tax audits and inspections. 
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12. What are the different types of investigations, which you undertake when you 
suspect tax law non-compliance or simply you would like to find out if that is the 
case? 
 
This question relates to question 9 and being asked 3 questions later in the interview, 
it aims to confirm and reveal additional aspects of NRA tackling tactics – such ones 
that might not be disclosed during question 9. 
 
13. Is there a process for analysis of the possible measures, the implementation 
expenses for them and the expected effect? 
 
It is a well-known fact the most contemporary tax offices are deciding upon their 
engagements (such as audits and inspections) based on embedded cost benefit ratio 
procedures. So, this question is looking to find out how it is at NRA – operational 
efficiency and real world feedback. 
 
14. Do you cooperate with other institutions and agencies in regards with the tax 
audits and inspections, which are undertaken by NRA and if yes with whom? 
 
Implicitly, how well NRA cooperates with other institutions. There is an existing 
agreement between NRA, GLI and NSSI for cooperation, but it is a strategic level only. 
The question aims to provide inside information of what is actually being done and 
how. 
 
15. What penalties are being imposed when you find out infringements? 
 
It is rather technical question and its main purpose is to find out about the general 
approach – types of penalties for non-compliance. 
 
16. How many risk subjects (firms) are identified and analysed approximately on 
average annually – for instance in years 2012 and 2013? How many of these 
identified firms are actually audited (checked)? 
 
One of the pressing issues with NRA is the huge number of audits and inspections 
(based on publicly available data) they are conducting nationwide. This (apart from 
the huge administrative cost) has a repressive nuance speaking from a policy 
perspective. Thus, the question aims to find out an internal NRA way of work issue – 
the correlation between high risk firms and actually audited ones. 
 
 
17. How is it decided into which areas of tax non-compliance to invest efforts? Said 
differently, which types of tax infringements attract most attention? 
 
This question relates to two previous questions (13 and 16). It is part of the so called 
gradual approach in extracting related information. Again, it seeks information about a 
relationship between applied compliance measures and expected outcome (cost 
benefit relationship). 
 
18. What is being aimed to achieve with the application of counter-activities against 
real or potential tax law offences? Are these measures directed towards specific 
groups breaking the law or against particular people – business owners or physical 
persons? 
 
This is a two-fold question. Firstly, it aims to discover the accent on policy measures. 
Which one is more important from NRA perspective – investing efforts to prevent tax 
– 203 – 
evasion or to treat it. Secondly, does NRA project the measures in question towards 
specific groups with something in common or they are individually tailored to particular 
tax subjects. In other words, what is the scope of the tackling response. 
 
19. What are the most frequent reasons/motives for turnover underreporting by the 
Bulgarian businessmen (entrepreneurs)? 
 
Clearly, the question is after NRA opinion about the most frequent reasons/motives for 
turnover underreporting by the Bulgarian entrepreneurs. At a later stage, after the 
business survey, it would be possible to analyse the entrepreneurs’ motives to evade 
taxes and how this corresponds to NRA’ views. 
 
20. Is there any data collection and interest about consequential behavioural changes 
after applied control by NRA – tax audits, inspections and alike. If yes, what is 
being done in this connection? 
 
This question is a further elaboration about the efficiency of NRA operations the 
recourses they spend to undertake them. The question is designed to function 
together with questions 13, 16 and 17. Positioning all these questions (13, 16, 17, 20, 
21 and 22) in that specific order and intervals during the interview serves two 
purposes: 
 These questions need to be asked according to the research questions. 
 The questions are being asked in a specific sequence and formulated in a 
manner, which allows information accumulation and cross-verification based 
on respondents’ answers. 
 
21. If you have noticed change in the behaviour of firms and/or individuals as a result 
of counter evasive activities, is there any mechanism of changing any future 
counter activities and if yes how is this happening? 
 
Question 21 is connected with 13, 16, 17, 20, 21 and 22. In addition to the above 
explanation, it aims to reveal any institutional culture of responsiveness. This aspect 
will be important in discussing the results from the entrepreneurs’ survey. 
 
22. How is it being decided/analysed which tax law counter activities would have led to 
the behavioural change of the targeted groups or individuals? In other words, how 
is being evaluated, which measures have been effective, if such practices exist at 
this moment of time? 
 
This is the last question from a special series (13, 16, 17, 20, 21 and 22). The purpose 
of the series has been explained above. 
 
23. At this moment of time what methods or campaigns are being used to encourage 
voluntary tax compliance of firms and traders? 
 
This question is extension of question 3 and aims to collect some more information in 
that regard. 
 
24. From your perspective, what are the characteristics of the firms and traders who 
allow themselves to declare lower tax base than the real one? Is there something 
particularly common between them or something which differentiate them from the 
other tax payers who are compliant? 
 
The main purpose of this question is to find out whether NRA observed specific 
features characterising the informal firm or these firms, which regularly exercise 
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partially informal practices. This information will be used in the cross-analysis of the 
business survey, which will aim to provide some meaningful insights in this regard. 
 
25. In your view, what kinds of difficulties are being faced by the Bulgarian 
businessmen (entrepreneurs) in their efforts to be tax compliant? 
 
Question 25 would like to discover the opinion of key NRA officials about 
administrative and other difficulties experienced by Bulgarian businessmen, which 
drive them into informal practices. At a later stage, this would provide interesting 
ground for analysis when the results from the business survey are available – the 
perspective of the entrepreneurs. 
 
26. Is there any information, which is of particular interest to you about the firms and 
traders evading taxes, which you would like to know? 
 
This last question has couple of implicit purposes: 
 Firstly, it attempts to discover what kind of information NRA is after in regards to 
informal entrepreneurs (businesses). Thus, some conclusions about their 
approaches could be made. 
 
 Secondly, the question aims to collect insights and inform the creation of 
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 Appendix 9 – NRA organisational structure. 11.10
NRA Headquarters organigram retrieved on 26.09.14 from: http://www.nap.bg/en/document?id=135 
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ДО 
ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЯ НА СМЕТНАТА 




З А Я В Л Е Н И Е 
 





(трите имена на физическото лице, съотв. наименованието и седалището на юридическото 





Актуален адрес  за кореспонденция: Улица „Гео Милев“ 132, ет. 2, ап. 28, София 
 
Служебен адрес: Management School Doctoral Centre, Room 8, 169-171 
Northumberland Road, Sheffield, S10 1DF, UK 
 





УВАЖАЕМИ ПРОФ. ДИМИТРОВ, 
 
 
На основание Закона за достъп до обществена информация, моля да ми 
бъде предоставена следната информация (ако прецените, че мога да получа 
достъп до тази информация): 
 
до долуизброените одитните доказателства по Одитен Доклад на 
Сметната палата (№ 0300000412 за извършен одит на изпълнението на 
контролните и принудителни действия за спазване на данъчното и 
осигурителното законодателство в Националната агенция за приходите за 
периода от 01.01.2009 г. до 31.12.2011 
г.)...................................................................................... 
 
Съобразно „ОПИС НА ОДИТНИТЕ ДОКАЗАТЕЛСТВА“ (страници 102-104 от 
Одитен Доклад № 0300000412) 
 
1.4. Данъчно-осигурителна методология 
1.7. Управление на риска 
1.8. Разследване на особени случаи 
1.10.  Моделиране и проектиране на бизнес процесите 
Точка 5 Годишна програма за спазване на законодателството и 
минимизиране на риска в НАП за 2010 г., 2011 г. и 2012 г. 
Точка 6 Справки за извършените проверки за периода 2009-2011 г. 
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(включително за извършените оперативни проверки) 
Точка 7  Стратегия за управление на риска в НАП от 2011 г. 
Точка 8 Политика по информационна сигурност в НАП 
Точка 9  Правила за правата и задълженията на потребителите, 
ползващи информационните активи в НАП 
Точка 13 20 броя извършени анализи от дирекция УР за периода 2009-2011 
г. 
Точка 14 Анализ на оценката и управлението на риска в НАП  
Точка 19 Анализ на резултатите от анкетното проучване. Препоръки и 
предложения за подобрение – 2010 г. 
8: Работен документ за обобщаване на резултатите от проведената 
анкета № РД-И-40, с приложен диск с електронни таблици за обработка на 
данните 
11: РД-И-7 от 25.04.2012 г. Протокол от проведено наблюдение на ПП 
Селекция, с приложени към него извлечения за част от основните 
функционалности 
11: РД-И-7 от 25.04.2012 г. Протокол от проведено наблюдение на ПП 




Причини за молбата ми: в момента правя докторантура във връзка със 
сивата икономика и избягване на данъци в Университета Шефийлд и се 
нуждая от тази информация във връзка с анализ, който искам да направя. 
Това са линкове към страници на университета, където има информация за 
мен, но ако е необходимо мога да поискам и представя официално писмо от 
Университета: 
http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/management/doctoral_researchers/lyubomir_mishkov 
http://www.shef.ac.uk/creed/crisp (член съм на Cluster for Research on the Informal 






Моля да получа исканата информация в следната форма: 
        (отбелязва се предпочитаната форма) 
1. Електронна поща или CD, a при невъзможност за технически 
носител то тогава на хартиен носител. 
 
 
Дата......10.04.14...................................   
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 Appendix 11 – information access request 2 of 2. 11.12
 
ДО 
ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЯ НА СМЕТНАТА 




З А Я В Л Е Н И Е 
 





(трите имена на физическото лице, съотв. наименованието и седалището на юридическото 





Актуален адрес  за кореспонденция: Улица „Гео Милев“ 132, ет. 2, ап. 28, София 
 
Служебен адрес: Management School Doctoral Centre, Room 8, 169-171 
Northumberland Road, Sheffield, S10 1DF, UK 
 





УВАЖАЕМА Г-ЖО ЛИДИЯ РУМЕНОВА, 
 
 
Във връзка с предоставения ми достъп – преглед на информация, за 
което благодаря, моля да ми бъде предоставена следната информация в 
електронна форма: 
 
до долуизброените одитните доказателства по Одитен Доклад на 
Сметната палата (№ 0300000412 за извършен одит на изпълнението на 
контролните и принудителни действия за спазване на данъчното и 
осигурителното законодателство в Националната агенция за приходите за 
периода от 01.01.2009 г. до 31.12.2011 
г.)...................................................................................... 
 
Съобразно „ОПИС НА ОДИТНИТЕ ДОКАЗАТЕЛСТВА“ (страници 102-104 от 




1.4. Данъчно-осигурителна методология 
1.7. Управление на риска 
1.8. Разследване на особени случаи 
1.10.  Моделиране и проектиране на бизнес процесите 
Точка 5 Годишна програма за спазване на законодателството и 
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минимизиране на риска в НАП за 2010 г., 2011 г. и 2012 г. 
Точка 6 Справки за извършените проверки за периода 2009-2011 г. 
(включително за извършените оперативни проверки) 
Точка 7  Стратегия за управление на риска в НАП от 2011 г. 
Точка 8 Политика по информационна сигурност в НАП 
Точка 9  Правила за правата и задълженията на потребителите, 
ползващи информационните активи в НАП 
Точка 11 
Точка 13 20 броя извършени анализи от дирекция УР за периода 2009-2011 
г. 
Точка 14 Анализ на оценката и управлението на риска в НАП 
Точка 15 Анализ на действията на публичните изпълнители от функция 
«Събиране»и на органите по приходите от функция «Контрол» при 
производството по налагане на предварителни обезпечителни мерки през 
2010 г.  
Точка 16 Анализ на процеса по установяване на нарушенията, образуване 
на административнонаказателни производства и издаване на наказателни 
постановления при извършване на проверки от органите по приходите от 
отдел «Оперативни проверки» 
Точка 19 Анализ на резултатите от анкетното проучване. Препоръки и 
предложения за подобрение – 2010 г. 
8: Работен документ за обобщаване на резултатите от проведената 
анкета № РД-И-40, с приложен диск с електронни таблици за обработка на 
данните 
11: РД-И-7 от 25.04.2012 г. Протокол от проведено наблюдение на ПП 
Селекция, с приложени към него извлечения за част от основните 
функционалности 
 
Съобразно моето предишно заявление вх. № 94-00-108/11.04.2014 съм получил 
достъп преглед на информация до всички гореизброени доказателства с 
изключение на тези по точки 1.1, 1.2, Точка 15 и Точка 16, които са допълнени 
в сегашната ми молба. Поради големия обем на изброените документи Ви 
моля любезно да получа достъп в електронна форма (в каквато форма 
Сметната Палата разполаг и аз се запознах), а за точки 8 и 9 на хартиен 
носител (съответно по 15 и 9 страници). 
 
Причини за молбата ми: в момента правя докторантура във връзка със 
сивата икономика и избягване на данъци в Университета Шефийлд и се 
нуждая от тази информация във връзка с анализ, който искам да направя. 
Това са линкове към страници на университета, където има информация за 
мен, но ако е необходимо мога да поискам и представя официално писмо от 
Университета: 
http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/management/doctoral_researchers/lyubomir_mishkov 
http://www.shef.ac.uk/creed/crisp (член съм на Cluster for Research on the Informal 
Sector and Policy) 
 
 
Моля да получа исканата информация в следната форма: 
        (отбелязва се предпочитаната форма) 
1. Електронен носител. 
 
 
Дата......09.05.14...................................   
 Подпис........ .......... 
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 Appendix 12 – IBM SPSS Modeler categorisation techniques. 11.13
 









The concept inclusion method uses algorithms to create categories 
by taking a term and finding other terms that include it. When 
determining inclusion, word order and the presence of such words as 
in or of are ignored. As an illustration, if you have the term skill, term 
inclusion will group terms such as computer skills and skill set in a 
skill category. The root term used to create the category can have 
words before it, after it, or both before and after (computer skill set). 
As an example of how word order is ignored, the term advanced 
spanish course will be included with course in spanish. 
 
Concept inclusion may give better results when the responses 
contain a lot of domain-specific terminology or jargon. This is 
especially true if you have tuned the dictionaries beforehand so that 







The semantic networks method creates categories using a 
semantic/lexical network based on WordNet, a linguistic project 
based at Princeton University. WordNet is a reference system of 
―English nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverb organized into 
synonym sets, each representing one underlying lexical concept.‖ 
WordNet uses the word ―synonym‖ in a broader sense than the 
usual meaning (information on WordNet can be found at 
http://wordnet.princeton.edu). 
 
This technique begins by identifying extracted terms that are known 
synonyms (in the usual sense) and hyponyms. A hyponym is a word 
that is more specific than the category represented by a term. Thus, 
if animal is a term, cat, dog and kangaroo are hyponyms of animal; 
that is, things that are examples of an animal. 
 
Thus, if we extracted terms cat, dog and kangaroo, a category 
containing all these terms could be created representing animals. If 
we than had the terms of oak tree and sunflower, a second category 
could be created representing plants. These two categories could 
then be combined in another representing living things. 
 
Taken individually, many terms, especially single words, are 
ambiguous in meaning. For example, the term buffet can denote a 
type of meal or a piece of furniture. If a set of terms to be 
categorized includes buffet, meal and furniture, then the semantic 
network will have to choose between grouping buffet with one of the 
other two (because they are more generic). The choice made by the 
software may not be appropriate for your project, so results need to 
be reviewed carefully.  The semantic network is mainly restricted to 
synonym and hyponym relationships. The technique can also group 
terms representing place names in part/whole relationships (terms of 
type Location). Thus, the technique will group U.S. states into a 
category representing the United States. 
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The semantic network approach can yield better results than term 
inclusion with two types of data. First, when you expect to have terms 
that are related (computer and hard drive), and are interested in the 
relationships, the semantic network method is ideal. Second, when 
the open-ended responses are longer and contain more complex 
phrases, this method can often capture this information. The 







The concept derivation method groups terms by looking at the 
endings (suffixes) of each component in a term and finding other 
terms that have corresponding components with a related ending 
(suffix). It uses a set of linguistic derivation rules to accomplish this. 
For example, there is a rule that says that a term component ending 
with the suffix ―ical‖ might be derived from a term having the same 
stem and ending with the suffix ―ic.‖ Using this rule, the algorithm 
would be able to group the terms geological study and geologic 
studies. 
 
Concept derivation ignores function words (such as in and of) and 
component order. Thus, by using another rule relating components 
ending in ―y‖ to those ending in ―ical,‖ the algorithm would also be 
able to group the terms studies in geology and geological studies. 
 
The set of component derivation rules has been chosen so that most 
of the terms grouped by this algorithm are synonyms. To increase 
completeness, there are some derivation rules that allow the 
algorithm to group terms that are situationally related. For example, 
the algorithm can group terms such as career builder and career 
building. 
 
You can use concept derivation on any sort of text. It produces fairly 
few categories, and each category tends to contain few terms. You 
may find it helpful to use this algorithm even if you are building 
categories manually; the synonyms it finds may be synonyms of 
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 Appendix 13 – full categorisation list of interviews’ analysis with IBM SPSS Modeler. 11.14
– 213 – 
– 214 – 
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– 216 – 
– 217 – 
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voluntary tax compliance 9 38
tax management 9 27
tax infringеments - highest attention 9 30
tax fraud 3 12
tax evasion 9 48
tax concealment 5 18
obligations and liabilities 7 19
evasion motives 9 43
Risk management 0 0
Аpproach 0 0
risk prioritisation 9 34
procedure 5 17
operational level 4 12
macro level 4 11





VI tax infingements 9 35
strategy 9 20
Selection 0 0
selection criteria 9 42
selection 9 66
passive selection 3 3
active selection 9 32
risky individuals 5 13
Management 0 0
risks 8 23






cost-benefit - measures 9 73





new information system 9 50
automation and subjectivism 9 56
automated selection 9 58
automated case distribution 9 51
Political situation 1 2
NRA 9 27
seniour officials 4 9
regional and territorial directorates 1 3
NRA services 5 12
institutional cooperation 9 23









targeted groups 9 36
inspections 9 24
control measures 9 51
control actions 9 47
cash registers 4 10
audit 4 27
Business 0 0
small business 4 12
sales monitoring 3 7
restaurants 3 3
construction sector 3 13
Behaviour 0 0
behaviour change 6 17
attitude 3 3
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 Appendix 16 – ease of doing business. 11.17
 
This table represents comparative data about ease of doing business, paying taxes and enforcing contracts. It is exclusively based on data 
available from World Bank (World Bank et al., 2015b). 
 
Additional notes: 
1. All Doing Business 2014 rankings have been recalculated to reflect changes to the methodology and revisions of data due to new information. For further details on changes, 
please refer to the data notes page (hyperlink embedded). 
2. Please note that the data above may not reflect the full numeric precision of the data point, as the numbers are rounded. For the dataset containing full numeric precision, 










Cost (% of 
income per 
capita)
Paid-in min. capital 










coverage (% of 
adults)
Credit bureau 


























DB2004 .. .. .. 70.66 11 32 10.4 86.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 60.23 564 23.8 39
DB2005 .. .. .. 70.99 11 32 10.3 81.6 .. 56.25 9 0 1.3 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 60.23 564 23.8 39
DB2006 .. .. .. 71.62 11 32 9.6 73 .. 81.25 9 4 13.6 0 .. 47.23 29 616 .. .. .. 45.2 .. 60.23 564 23.8 39
DB2007 .. .. .. 75.34 9 32 7.9 63.9 .. 81.25 9 4 20.7 3 .. 49.01 29 616 .. .. .. 41.6 .. 60.23 564 23.8 39
DB2008 .. .. .. 76 9 32 6.4 56.3 .. 81.25 9 4 25.4 3 .. 59.56 15 616 .. .. .. 35.8 .. 60.23 564 23.8 39
DB2009 .. .. .. 80.17 4 49 2 47.8 .. 93.75 9 6 30.7 5 .. 60.48 15 616 .. .. .. 33.9 .. 61.27 564 23.8 38
DB2010 .. 68.45 .. 89.68 4 18 1.7 20.7 .. 93.75 9 6 34.8 6.2 .. 62.1 15 616 .. .. .. 30.4 .. 61.27 564 23.8 38
DB2011 .. 68.58 .. 90.99 4 18 1.6 0 .. 93.75 9 6 37 13.1 .. 63.24 15 616 .. .. .. 28 .. 61.27 564 23.8 38
DB2012 .. 68.26 .. 91 4 18 1.5 0 .. 81.25 9 4 52.8 0 .. 69.6 15 500 .. .. .. 27.2 .. 61.27 564 23.8 38
DB2013 .. 68.76 .. 91.05 4 18 1.1 0 .. 81.25 9 4 56.3 0 .. 72.83 13 454 .. .. .. 27.7 .. 61.27 564 23.8 38
DB2014 36 71.72 41 91.06 4 18 1 0 19 70 9 5 61 0 84 73.18 13 454 5 20.2 1.7 27 74 61.27 564 23.8 38
DB2015 38 71.8 49 91.09 4 18 0.8 0 23 70 9 5 62.9 0 89 73.18 13 454 5 20.2 1.7 27 75 61.27 564 23.8 38
Enforcing Contracts
Year
Ease of Doing 
Business 
Rank Overall DTF
Starting a Business Getting Credit Paying Taxes
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 Appendix 17 – GCI index and institutional corruption levels for Bulgaria. 11.18
 
 
The following table is produced using data from (World Economic Forum, Schwab K, Forum WE, 2015) 
 









GCI Rank 74 62 57 54 
Score (1 of 7) 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.37 
 
 
This following table is produced using data from (Transparency International, 2013) 
 
Institutional corruption levels in Bulgaria 
Institution Corrupt/Extremely corrupt Corrupt/Extremely corrupt 
 
2010-11 2013 
Parliament/legislature 21.40% 71.00% 
Political parties 10.80% 76.00% 
Judiciary 28.70% 86.00% 
Police 19.50% 65.00% 
Public officials and civil cervants 17.40% 64.00% 
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 Appendix 18 – business survey questionnaire. 11.19
 
Explanatory notes: 
1. The business survey was performed using Qualtrics Research Suite. 
 
2. This is a translation from Bulgarian to English. Best possible effort has been made 
to a meaningful and correct translation however, it has to be noted that certain 
questions differ in their actual cultural meaning when asked to Bulgarian 
respondents. 
 
3. The exact design and outlook of the survey cannot be precisely replicated in 
Microsoft Word, however the best possible effort is made to make it closer to the 
original. 
 
4. The business survey structure (set of blocks) was not visible to the respondents. It 
is entirely dedicated to support the aims of this academic research only. For clarity 
and transparency it is presented in the box below. 
 
5. The questionnaire employed sophisticated display, skip and flow logic, which will 
be indicated in blue boxes nearby the questions, where relevant. This is to 
visualise the survey logic – what happens when a respondent selects a particular 
response. 
 
6. If there were questions’ instructions available to the respondents, they are 
presented in green text nearby the question they were intended for. 
 
 
Business survey – structure (not visible to the respondents) 
 
Block 1 – Informed consent. 
Block 2 – General business profile and initial informality indicators. 
Block 3 – Institutional quality and fair use of public money. Procedural fairness 
and distributive justice. 
Block 4 – Diagnostics of informality, motivations and perceptions. 
Block 5 – Interdependence of informal businesses (informality chain of 
interdependence). 
Block 6 – External business environment and cost of doing business. Taxation, 
regulations and licensing framework. 
Block 7 – Unfair competition from informal businesses. 




11.19.1 Block 1 – Informed consent. 
 
1. Do you agree to participate in this business survey? 
a. Yes, I agree to participate. 
Display first question from Block 2. 
 
b. No, I do not agree to participate. 
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11.19.2 Block 2 – General business profile and initial informality indicators. 
 
2. What is your main business subject? 
a. Trading with goods. 
b. Trading with services. 
c. Trading with goods and services. 
d. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
 
Display logic: if the answer to question 2 is “Trading with goods”, then display 
question 3 below. 
3. Do you need to keep stock and in what quantities? 
a. Yes, the nature of our business requires maintenance of substantial stock 
availability. 
b. Yes, but not substantial stock availability. 
c. No, the nature of our business does not require maintenance of stock supplies. 
d. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
 
4. How many people are working for your business? Please use the sliders to 
indicate. 
a. Full-time. (0 to 50) 
b. Part-time. (0 to 50) 
 
 
5. Does your business have an office or you run it from home? 
a. Yes, there is an office. 
b. No, there is no office – it is run from home. 
c. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
 
Display logic: if the answer to question 5 is “Yes, there is an office”, then 
display question 6 below. 
6. Is the office owned by the business or is it rented? 
a. The office is owned by the business/the company. 
b. The office is rented. 
c. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
 
7. Have you formally registered your business since it began operating or this has 
happened at a later stage? 
a. Yes, from the very beginning of business operations. 
b. No, this has happened at a later stage. 
c. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
 
Display logic: if the answer to question 7 is “No, this has happened at a later 
stage”, then display question 8 below. 
8. When was the business registered – please type the year of registration? 
 
 
9. Are there any outstanding debts to your business and approximately what their 
size is? 
a. Yes, there are, but in small/insignificant amounts. 
b. Yes, there are in medium/acceptable amounts. 
– 225 – 
c. Yes, there are in substantial amounts. 
d. No. 
e. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
 
Display logic: if the answer to question 9 is “Yes, there are in 
medium/acceptable amounts” or “Yes, there are in substantial amounts.”, then 
display question 10 below. 
10. Do you undertake debt recovery activities to collect the outstanding amounts? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
c. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
 
11. Do you use any forms of business finance/credit? You may select multiple options. 
a. Business loans from banks. 
b. Credit cards. 
c. Business loans from non-bank institutions/organisations. 
d. Loans from your business partners (suppliers or clients). 
e. Loans from friends and family. 
f. No external forms of funding. 
 
Display logic: if the answer to question 11 is a, b, c, d or e, then display 
question 12 below. 
12. What is approximately the lowest interest rate, which you have managed to 
achieve for the finance type you have used? Please use the sliders. It is a 
percentage scale from 0% to 100%. Please write 0 against these finance options, 
which you have not used. 
a. Business loans from banks. 
b. Credit cards. 
c. Business loans from non-bank institutions/organisations. 
d. Loans from your business partners (suppliers or clients). 
e. Loans from friends and family. 
 
 
11.19.3 Block 3 – Institutional quality and fair use of public money. Procedural 
fairness and distributive justice. 
 
13. What is your opinion about: 
I fully agree = 1 
I fully disagree = 5 
a. Correct and fair expenditure of tax money. 
b. Fair, professional attitude and treatment by NRA. 
c. Fair, professional attitude and treatment by the state institutions. 
 
 
11.19.4 Block 4 – Diagnostics of informality, motivations and perceptions. 
 
14. Your opinion about: 
I fully agree = 1 
I fully disagree = 5 
a. Doing business entirely according to the rules is too expensive. 
b. Tax evasion is the answer from the business to the poor tax and administrative 
policies in Bulgaria. 
c. In the current business environment, tax evasion is an acceptable phenomenon. 
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15. In your view, what percentage of the turnover do other businesses from your 
sector are pushed to pay informally “to get things done” – such as administrative 
services, tenders, licensing, regulative permissions and alike? It is a percentage 
scale from 0% to 100%. 
 
 
16. In your opinion, do businesses from your sector underreport their actual turnovers 
with the purpose to pay less tax? You may select up to three options below. 
a. Yes. 
b. Yes, in order to survive. 
c. Yes, they do it in order to reduce their costs and increase their profits. 
d. Yes and I do not see anything wrong in this. 
e. Yes, because they are forced to do so and they do not have another choice. 
f. No. 
g. I do not know. 
h. Something else. 
 
 
Display logic: if the answer to question 16 is a, b, c, d or e, then display 
question 17 below. 
17. According to your judgement, with what percentage usually the declared turnovers 
are lesser in comparison with the actual ones? Please use the slider – it is a 
percentage scale from 0% to 100%. 
 
 
11.19.5 Block 5 – Interdependence of informal businesses (informality chain of 
interdependence). 
 
18. Have you ever bought goods or services for your business without an invoice or 
from suppliers not formally registered? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
c. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
 
Display logic: if the answer to question 18 is a, or c, then display question 19 
below. 
19. For what part of the goods and services, which you need as a business, do you 
usually receive an invoice? Please use the slider – it is a percentage scale from 
0% to 100%. 
 
 
Display logic: if the answer to question 19 is less or equal to 95%, then display 
question 20 below. 
20. Would you prefer all of your suppliers to provide you with invoices? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
c. It does not matter. 
d. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
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11.19.6 Block 6 – External business environment and cost of doing business. 
Taxation, regulations and licensing framework. 
 
21. How would you assess NRA’s work (procedures) and in particular its administrative 
capacity in regards with your business? 
a. There is stimulating effect on the business. 
b. It does not hamper the business. 
c. There is small hampering effect. 
d. There is medium hampering effect. 
e. There is significant hampering effect. 
f. There is enormous hampering effect. 
g. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
 
22. What is your perception about the way the current tax rates and social security 
contributions affect your business? 
a. They constitute small impediment to the business. 
b. They constitute medium impediment to the business. 
c. They constitute significant impediment to the business. 
d. They constitute enormous impediment to the business. 
e. They do not constitute impediment to the business. 
f. The tax rates have stimulating effect on the business. 
g. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
 
23. What would be the acceptable level of tax on business profit? Please use the 
slider – it is a percentage scale from 0% to 100%. 
 
 
24. Which three factors create the most difficulties for your business? You may select 
up to three options in descending order and drag them into the box on the right – 
the most obstructive ones on the top. 
a. National Revenue Agency (NRA). 
b. The tax rate. 
c. Unfair competition from the informal sector (the grey economy). 
d. The corruption in the state administration. 
e. Low efficiency of the state administration. 
f. The laws and regulations 
g. Licenses and regulative regimes. 
h. Difficult and expensive access to financing. 
i. The lack of adequately educated/skilled labour force. 
j. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
 
25. Approximately how many days per month do you spend to cope with administrative 
requirements imposed by various state regulations (such as business permissions, 
tax return, communication with NRA, NSSI and others)? Please use the slider – the 
scale is in days. 
 
 
26. Approximately what is your cost of doing business per day (all business expenses 
including cost of salaries and others). Please use the slider – the scale is from 0 to 
3000BGN per day. 
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27. Have you ever been inspected by NRA tax officials? 
a. Yes. 
b. No 
c. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
Display logic: if the answer to question 27 is a, then display question 28 below. 
28. How much time approximately did you spend in this connection? Please use the 
slider – the scale is in days. 
 
 
Display logic: if the answer to question 27 is a or c, then display question 29 
below. 
29. During these inspection(s) visits have you been expected or encouraged to 
provide any form of informal benefit to the official(s)? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
c. I prefer to leave this question unanswered. 
d. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
 
11.19.7 Block 7 – Unfair competition from informal businesses. 
 
30. Do you experience unfair competition from unregistered or informal businesses 
(grey economy businesses)? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
c. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
 
Display logic: if the answer to question 30 is a, then display question 31 below. 
31. What level of difficulties does your business experience due to unfair competition 
from the informal sector? 
a. There are no any difficulties being experienced. 
b. We experience only difficulties, which we manage to cope with. 
c. We experience significant difficulties. 
d. Something else – please specify in the free text box below. 
 
 
11.19.8 Block 8 – End of the survey – free text submission. 
 
32. Thank you for taking part in this survey. If you want to share something, which you 
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 Appendix 19 – modelling of variable Q16_1. 11.20
 
Click here to go to variable Q16_1 in the main body of the thesis. 
 
11.20.1 Auto Classifier – training summary for Q16_1. 
Auto Classifier – training summary for Q16_1 
Target Q16_1 
Inputs All variables, excluding free text fields and 
Q16. 
Planned models 432 
Completed models 424 
Retained models 100 
Models discarded from final results 324 
Models which failed to build or score 8 
 
 




11.20.3 Performance evaluation and coincidence matrix for E-CHAID Model 
Q16_1. 
1 = Yes, 2 = User not selected, 999 = User non response 
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11.20.4 E-CHAID tree model Q16_1 – visual representation. 
 
As it obvious from the graphic image of this decision tree, it is too complex to be 
visualised properly on A4 page. The full detail (high-resolution) image is available as 
part of this PhD thesis data store to examiners and supervisors or otherwise upon an 
authorised request. Q17, Q9, Q25 and such alike, shown beneath nodes are related 




11.20.5 Symbolic rule expression derived from E-CHAID Model Q16_1. 
Rule 1 for “Yes” at Q16_1 (84.6% confidence) 
if Q17 > 20 
and Q17 <= 65 
and Q25 <= 10 
and Q29 = 1 or Q29 = 4 
and Q14_1 > 2 
then “Yes” at 16_1 
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 Appendix 20 – modelling of variable Q16_2. 11.21
 
Click here to go to variable Q16_2 in the main body of the thesis. 
 
11.21.1 Auto Classifier – training summary for Q16_2. 
Auto Classifier – training summary for Q16_2 
Target Q16_2 
Inputs All variables, excluding free text fields and 
Q16. 
Planned models 570 
Completed models 440 
Retained models 100 
Models discarded from final results 340 
Models which failed to build or score 130 
 
 




11.21.3 Performance evaluation and coincidence matrix for E-CHAID Model 
Q16_2. 
1 = Yes, 2 = User not selected, 999 = User non response 
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11.21.4 E-CHAID tree model Q16_2 – visual representation. 
As it obvious from the graphic image of this decision tree, it is too complex to be visualised properly on A4 page. The full detail (high-resolution) 
image is available as part of this PhD thesis data store to examiners and supervisors or otherwise upon an authorised request. Q17, Q11_5, Q24_7 
and such alike, shown beneath nodes are related variables indicating decision tree splits by related significance. 
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11.21.5 Symbolic rule expression derived from E-CHAID Model Q16_2. 
 
Rule set for 1.0 “Yes” at Q16_2 (92.6% confidence) 
  if Q17 <= 30 
  and Q11_5 = 2 
  and Q31 <= 2 or Q31 IS MISSING 
  and Q24_5_Rank <= 2 or Q24_5_Rank IS MISSING 
  and Q14_1 <= 3 
  and Q26 > 103 
  and Q13_1 > 2 
  and Q13_1 <= 4 
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 Appendix 21 – modelling of variable Q16_3. 11.22
 
Click here to go to variable Q16_3 in the main body of the thesis. 
 
11.22.1 Auto Classifier – training summary for Q16_3. 
Auto Classifier – training summary for Q16_3 
Target Q16_3 
Inputs All variables, excluding free text fields and 
Q16. 
Planned models 570 
Completed models 432 
Retained models 100 
Models discarded from final results 332 
Models which failed to build or score 138 
 
 




11.22.3 Performance evaluation and coincidence matrix for E-CHAID Model 
Q16_3. 
1 = Yes, 2 = User not selected, 999 = User non response 
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11.22.4 E-CHAID tree model Q16_3 – visual representation. 
A high-resolution image is available as part of this PhD thesis data store to examiners and supervisors or otherwise upon an authorised request. 
Q17, Q9, Q29 and such alike, shown beneath nodes are related variables indicating decision tree splits by related significance. 
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11.22.5 Symbolic rule expression derived from E-CHAID Model Q16_3. 
 
Rule set for 1.0 (Yes) at Q16_3 (79.2% confidence) 
if Q17 > 29 
and Q17 <= 40 
and Q29 = 2 or Q29 = 4 or Q29 IS MISSING 
and Q15 <= 39 or Q15 IS MISSING 
and Q24_5_Rank > 2 or Q24_5_Rank IS MISSING 
and Q30 = 1 or Q30 = 3 
then 1.00 (Yes) at Q16_3 (“Yes, they do it in order to reduce their costs and 
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 Appendix 22 – modelling of variable Q16_4. 11.23
 
Click here to go to variable Q16_4 in the main body of the thesis. 
 
11.23.1 Auto Classifier – training summary for Q16_4. 
Auto Classifier – training summary for Q16_4 
Target Q16_4 
Inputs All variables, excluding free text fields and 
Q16. 
Planned models 570 
Completed models 396 
Retained models 100 
Models discarded from final results 296 
Models which failed to build or score 174 
 
 




11.23.3 Performance evaluation and coincidence matrix for Q16_4 C5 Model. 
1 = Yes, 2 = User not selected, 999 = User non response 
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11.23.4 Q16_4 C5 tree model – visual representation. 
A high-resolution image is available as part of this PhD thesis data store to examiners and supervisors or otherwise upon an authorised request. 
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11.23.5 Symbolic rule expression derived from Q16_4 C5 model. 
 
Rule set for 1.0 (Yes) at Q16_4 (91.3% confidence) 
if Q4_1 > 1 
and Q4_1 <= 4 
and Q11_4 = 2.00 
and Q14_4 <= 3 
and Q19 <= 81 
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 Appendix 23 – modelling of variable Q16_5. 11.24
 
Click here to go to variable Q16_5 in the main body of the thesis. 
 
11.24.1 Auto Classifier – training summary for Q16_5. 
Auto Classifier – training summary for Q16_5 
Target Q16_5 
Inputs All variables, excluding free text fields and 
Q16. 
Planned models 570 
Completed models 440 
Retained models 100 
Models discarded from final results 340 
Models which failed to build or score 130 
 
 




11.24.3 Performance evaluation and coincidence matrix for Q16_5 C5 Model. 
1 = Yes, 2 = User not selected, 999 = User non response 
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11.24.4 Q16_5 C5 tree model – visual representation. 
The tree depth is 15 levels and therefore only the symbolic expression is presented below. A high-resolution tree image is available as part of this 
PhD thesis data store to examiners and supervisors or otherwise upon an authorised request. 
Q21 in [ 5.00 6.00 7.00 ] [ Mode: 1 ] (122.014) 
 Q21 in [ 5.00 6.00 ] [ Mode: 1 ] (115.554) 
  Q7 = 1.00 [ Mode: 2 ] (103.835) 
   Q11_2 = 1.00 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (5.87; 0.861) 
   Q11_2 = 2.00 [ Mode: 2 ] (97.965) 
    Q4_2 <= 3 [ Mode: 1 ] (92.211) 
     Q13_2 <= 3 [ Mode: 2 ] (14.025) 
      Q11_5 = 1.00 [ Mode: 2 ] (8.55) 
       Q26 <= 300 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (4.475; 1.0) 
       Q26 > 300 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (4.075; 0.726) 
      Q11_5 = 2.00 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (5.475; 1.0) 
     Q13_2 > 3 [ Mode: 1 ] (78.186) 
      Q27 = 1.00 [ Mode: 1 ] (52.742) 
       Q11_3 = 1.00 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (7.85; 0.749) 
       Q11_3 = 2.00 [ Mode: 2 ] (44.892) 
        Q4_2 <= 1 [ Mode: 1 ] (39.572) 
         Q13_2 <= 4 [ Mode: 2 ] (13.686) 
          Q21 in [ 5.00 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (5.629; 0.71) 
          Q21 in [ 6.00 ] [ Mode: 2 ] (8.057) 
           Q4_1 <= 6 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (4.805; 1.0) 
           Q4_1 > 6 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (3.252; 0.586) 
         Q13_2 > 4 [ Mode: 1 ] (25.886) 
          Q21 in [ 5.00 ] [ Mode: 2 ] (10.326) 
           Q4_1 <= 3 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (6.325; 0.86) 
           Q4_1 > 3 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (4.001; 0.835) 
          Q21 in [ 6.00 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (15.56; 0.756) 
        Q4_2 > 1 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (5.319; 1.0) 
      Q27 = 2.00 [ Mode: 1 ] (23.223) 
       Q12_2 <= 10 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (9.062; 0.832) 
       Q12_2 > 10 [ Mode: 2 ] (14.16) 
        Q11_3 = 1.00 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (2.614; 1.0) 
        Q11_3 = 2.00 [ Mode: 1 ] (11.547) 
         Q21 in [ 5.00 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (4.673; 1.0) 
         Q21 in [ 6.00 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (6.874; 0.757) 
      Q27 = 3.00 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (2.222; 1.0) 
    Q4_2 > 3 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (5.754; 1.0) 
  Q7 = 2.00 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (8.733; 1.0) 
  Q7 = 3.00 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (2.986; 1.0) 
 Q21 in [ 7.00 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (6.461; 1.0) 
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Q21 in [ 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 ] [ Mode: 2 ] (278.987) 
 Q13_2 <= 4 [ Mode: 2 ] (240.416) 
  Q13_1 <= 4 [ Mode: 2 ] (177.383) 
   Q11_2 = 1.00 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (4.48; 1.0) 
   Q11_2 = 2.00 [ Mode: 2 ] (172.903) 
    Q11_3 = 1.00 [ Mode: 2 ] (25.863) 
     Q7 = 1.00 [ Mode: 2 ] (23.033) 
      Q27 = 1.00 [ Mode: 2 ] (16.469) 
       Q12_2 <= 15 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (5.824; 0.613) 
       Q12_2 > 15 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (10.644; 0.918) 
      Q27 = 2.00 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (5.655; 0.869) 
      Q27 = 3.00 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (0.909; 1.0) 
     Q7 = 2.00 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (2.83; 1.0) 
     Q7 = 3.00 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (0) 
    Q11_3 = 2.00 [ Mode: 2 ] (147.04) 
     Q12_2 <= 8 [ Mode: 2 ] (114.879) 
      Q13_2 <= 2 [ Mode: 2 ] (45.478) 
       Q26 <= 807 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (28.946; 0.967) 
       Q26 > 807 [ Mode: 2 ] (16.532) 
        Q21 in [ 1.00 2.00 3.00 ] [ Mode: 2 ] (12.177) 
         Q26 <= 1,158 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (3.398; 0.885) 
         Q26 > 1,158 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (8.779; 0.904) 
        Q21 in [ 4.00 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (4.355; 1.0) 
      Q13_2 > 2 [ Mode: 2 ] (69.401) 
       Q4_1 <= 6 [ Mode: 2 ] (62.979) 
        Q4_2 <= 9 [ Mode: 2 ] (58.777) 
         Q7 = 1.00 [ Mode: 1 ] (46.765) 
          Q13_2 <= 3 [ Mode: 1 ] (20.784) 
           Q4_1 <= 3 [ Mode: 2 ] (14.297) 
            Q13_1 <= 2 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (2.935; 0.962) 
            Q13_1 > 2 [ Mode: 2 ] (11.362) 
             Q11_5 = 1.00 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (3.91; 0.679) 
             Q11_5 = 2.00 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (7.452; 1.0) 
           Q4_1 > 3 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (6.487; 0.905) 
          Q13_2 > 3 [ Mode: 1 ] (25.981) 
           Q4_1 <= 3 [ Mode: 1 ] (23.429) 
            Q26 <= 227 [ Mode: 2 ] (17.827) 
             Q21 in [ 1.00 2.00 3.00 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (7.058; 0.762) 
             Q21 in [ 4.00 ] [ Mode: 1 ] (10.77) 
              Q4_1 <= 2 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (7.553; 0.632) 
              Q4_1 > 2 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (3.216; 1.0) 
            Q26 > 227 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (5.601; 1.0) 
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           Q4_1 > 3 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (2.553; 1.0) 
         Q7 = 2.00 [ Mode: 2 ] (12.011) 
          Q11_5 = 1.00 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (4.556; 0.699) 
          Q11_5 = 2.00 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (7.456; 1.0) 
         Q7 = 3.00 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (0) 
        Q4_2 > 9 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (4.202; 1.0) 
       Q4_1 > 6 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (6.422; 1.0) 
     Q12_2 > 8 [ Mode: 2 ] (32.161) 
      Q7 = 1.00 [ Mode: 2 ] (30.109) 
       Q26 <= 143 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (13.279; 0.844) 
       Q26 > 143 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (16.83; 0.787) 
      Q7 = 2.00 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (2.052; 1.0) 
      Q7 = 3.00 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (0) 
  Q13_1 > 4 [ Mode: 2 ] (63.033) 
   Q11_2 = 1.00 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (3.239; 1.0) 
   Q11_2 = 2.00 [ Mode: 2 ] (59.794) 
    Q27 = 1.00 [ Mode: 1 ] (40.983) 
     Q4_1 <= 0 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (4.613; 1.0) 
     Q4_1 > 0 [ Mode: 1 ] (36.371) 
      Q13_2 <= 3 [ Mode: 1 ] (25.255) 
       Q4_1 <= 7 [ Mode: 2 ] (18.835) 
        Q26 <= 199 [ Mode: 1 ] (10.093) 
         Q21 in [ 1.00 2.00 3.00 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (5.086; 0.711) 
         Q21 in [ 4.00 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (5.007; 1.0) 
        Q26 > 199 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (8.742; 1.0) 
       Q4_1 > 7 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (6.421; 1.0) 
      Q13_2 > 3 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (11.115; 0.864) 
    Q27 = 2.00 [ Mode: 2 ] (15.938) 
     Q13_2 <= 3 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (6.809; 1.0) 
     Q13_2 > 3 [ Mode: 1 ] (9.128) 
      Q21 in [ 1.00 2.00 3.00 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (2.144; 1.0) 
      Q21 in [ 4.00 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (6.984; 0.755) 
    Q27 = 3.00 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (2.873; 1.0) 
 Q13_2 > 4 [ Mode: 2 ] (38.571) 
  Q4_2 <= 4 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2.0 (33.047; 0.932) 
  Q4_2 > 4 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1.0 (5.524; 0.803) 
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11.24.5 Symbolic rule expression derived from Q16_5 C5 rule set model. 
 
Rule set for 1.0 (Yes) at Q16_5 (86.4% confidence) 
if Q13_2 <= 4 
and Q13_1 > 4 
and Q11_2 = 2.00 
and Q27 = 1.00 
and Q4_1 > 0 
and Q13_2 > 3 
and Q21 in [ 3.00 2.00 4.00 ] 
then 1.00 (Yes) at Q16_5 (“Yes, because they are forced to do so and they 
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 Appendix 24 – decision trees’ input variables for Q16_1 to Q16_5. 11.25
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 Appendix 25 – neural network for Q16_1. 11.26
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 Appendix 26 – neural network for Q16_2. 11.27
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 Appendix 27 – neural network for Q16_3. 11.28
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 Appendix 28 – neural network for Q16_4. 11.29
 


















– 250 – 
 Appendix 29 – neural network for Q16_5. 11.30
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 Appendix 30 – two step clustering for variables Q16_1 to Q16_5. 11.31




11.31.2 Model summary and evaluation. 
 
 
Average silhouette = 0.9 
 
11.31.3 Clusters’ characteristics. 
Inputs sorted in descending order by overall importance. 
 
 
Cluster characteristics Number of members Percent 
Size of smallest cluster 5 3.2% 
Size of largest cluster 42 27.3% 
Ratio of size (largest to smallest cluster) 8.4 
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 Appendix 31 – modelling of variable Q13_1. 11.32
Click here to go to variable Q13 in the main body of the thesis. 
 
11.32.1 Auto Classifier – training summary for Q13_1. 
Auto Classifier – training summary for Q13_1 
Target Q13_1 
Inputs All variables, excluding free text fields and 
Q13_1 
Planned models 3104 
Completed models 2750 
Retained models 100 
Models discarded from final results 2650 
Models which failed to build or score 354 
 
 
11.32.2 Q13_1 C5 – modelling stream. 
 
 
11.32.3 Performance evaluation and coincidence matrix for Q13_1 C5 Model. 
1 = Fully agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neither agree, nor disagree, 4 = Disagree, 5 = Strongly 
disagree, 999 = User non response 
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11.32.4 Q13_1 C5 tree model – symbolic representation. 
The tree depth is 17 levels and therefore only the symbolic expression is presented below. A high-resolution tree image is available as part of this 
PhD thesis data store to examiners and supervisors or otherwise upon an authorised request. 
Rule 1 - estimated accuracy 81.5% [boost 39%] 
 Q13_3 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1 (38; 0.921) 
 Q13_3 in [ 2 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (372) 
  Q13_2 in [ 1 2 3 4 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (290) 
   Q13_3 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 2 ] (49) 
    Q4_1 <= 0 [ Mode: 4 ] (12) 
     Q23 <= 10 [ Mode: 4 ] (10) 
      Q21 in [ 1 2 3 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (8) 
       Q16_7 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (3; 1.0) 
       Q16_7 = 2 [ Mode: 4 ] (5) 
        Q14_1 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (2; 1.0) 
        Q14_1 in [ 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (3; 0.667) 
      Q21 in [ 4 5 6 7 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1 (2; 1.0) 
     Q23 > 10 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (2; 1.0) 
    Q4_1 > 0 [ Mode: 2 ] (37) 
     Q13_2 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (30; 0.6) 
     Q13_2 in [ 3 4 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (7) 
      Q4_1 <= 2 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (3; 1.0) 
      Q4_1 > 2 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (4; 0.75) 
   Q13_3 in [ 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (241) 
    Q7 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] (216) 
     Q13_3 in [ 3 4 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (178) 
      Q16_6 = 1 [ Mode: 3 ] (9) 
       Q14_4 in [ 1 2 3 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1 (3; 0.333) 
       Q14_4 in [ 4 5 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (6; 0.833) 
      Q16_6 = 2 [ Mode: 4 ] (169) 
       Q13_2 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (12) 
        Q14_4 in [ 1 2 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (2; 1.0) 
        Q14_4 in [ 4 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (10) 
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         Q21 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (8) 
          Q11_5 = 1 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (2; 0.5) 
          Q11_5 = 2 [ Mode: 5 ] (6) 
           Q30 = 1 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1 (4; 0.75) 
           Q30 = 2 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (2; 1.0) 
           Q30 = 3 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1 (0) 
         Q21 in [ 3 4 5 6 7 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (2; 1.0) 
       Q13_2 in [ 2 3 4 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (157) 
        Q21 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (35.224) 
         Q9 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 2 ] (20) 
          Q25 <= 7 [ Mode: 2 ] (18) 
           Q16_5 = 1 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (2; 1.0) 
           Q16_5 = 2 [ Mode: 3 ] (16) 
            Q11_3 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (2; 1.0) 
            Q11_3 = 2 [ Mode: 3 ] (14) 
             Q13_2 in [ 2 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (12) 
              Q4_1 <= 3 [ Mode: 3 ] (8) 
               Q16_3 = 1 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (3; 
0.667) 
               Q16_3 = 2 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (5; 0.8) 
              Q4_1 > 3 [ Mode: 2 ] (4) 
               Q4_2 <= 2 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (2; 1.0) 
               Q4_2 > 2 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (2; 1.0) 
             Q13_2 in [ 4 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (2; 1.0) 
          Q25 > 7 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (2; 1.0) 
         Q9 in [ 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (15.224) 
          Q11_6 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] (12.224) 
           Q23 <= 8 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (3.056; 0.982) 
           Q23 > 8 [ Mode: 4 ] (9.168) 
            Q14_3 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (2; 1.0) 
            Q14_3 in [ 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (7.168; 1.0) 
          Q11_6 = 2 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (3; 1.0) 
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        Q21 in [ 3 4 5 6 7 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (121.776) 
         Q27 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] (76.11) 
          Q30 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] (58.772) 
           Q14_4 in [ 1 2 3 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (19) 
            Q9 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (8) 
             Q11_4 = 1 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (2; 0.5) 
             Q11_4 = 2 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (6; 0.833) 
            Q9 in [ 2 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (11) 
             Q22 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (2; 1.0) 
             Q22 in [ 2 3 4 5 6 7 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (9; 0.778) 
           Q14_4 in [ 4 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (39.772) 
            Q14_3 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (2; 0.5) 
            Q14_3 in [ 2 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (37.772) 
             Q18 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (22.772; 0.834) 
             Q18 = 2 [ Mode: 4 ] (13.999) 
              Q13_2 in [ 2 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (8.999) 
               Q14_3 in [ 2 3 4 ] [ Mode: 3 ] 
(6.625) 
                Q16_7 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 
(2.625; 0.762) 
                Q16_7 = 2 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 
(4; 1.0) 
               Q14_3 in [ 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 
(2.374; 1.0) 
              Q13_2 in [ 4 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (5; 1.0) 
             Q18 = 3 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (1; 1.0) 
          Q30 = 2 [ Mode: 3 ] (14.279) 
           Q23 <= 8 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (3.019; 0.662) 
           Q23 > 8 [ Mode: 3 ] (11.259) 
            Q11_3 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (4; 0.75) 
            Q11_3 = 2 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (7.259; 0.852) 
          Q30 = 3 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (3.06; 0.654) 
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         Q27 = 2 [ Mode: 5 ] (41.607) 
          Q14_1 in [ 1 2 3 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (35.342) 
           Q4_2 <= 1 [ Mode: 4 ] (28) 
            Q11_1 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (3; 1.0) 
            Q11_1 = 2 [ Mode: 4 ] (25) 
             Q2 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (4; 0.75) 
             Q2 = 2 [ Mode: 4 ] (12) 
              Q21 in [ 3 4 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (10) 
               Q13_3 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (6; 
0.667) 
               Q13_3 in [ 4 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (4; 
1.0) 
              Q21 in [ 5 6 7 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (2; 1.0) 
             Q2 = 3 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (6; 0.833) 
             Q2 = 4 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (3; 0.667) 
           Q4_2 > 1 [ Mode: 3 ] (7.342) 
            Q16_1 = 1 [ Mode: 1 ] => 1 (2; 1.0) 
            Q16_1 = 2 [ Mode: 3 ] (5.342) 
             Q5 = 1 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (3.342; 1.0) 
             Q5 = 2 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (2; 1.0) 
             Q5 = 3 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (0) 
          Q14_1 in [ 4 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (6.265; 0.958) 
         Q27 = 3 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (4.059; 0.747) 
     Q13_3 in [ 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (38) 
      Q14_1 in [ 1 2 3 4 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (35) 
       Q22 in [ 1 2 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (33; 0.667) 
       Q22 in [ 6 7 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1 (2; 0.5) 
      Q14_1 in [ 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (3; 1.0) 
    Q7 = 2 [ Mode: 4 ] (23) 
     Q14_3 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (7) 
      Q11_5 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (2; 1.0) 
      Q11_5 = 2 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (5; 1.0) 
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     Q14_3 in [ 2 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (16) 
      Q4_2 <= 0 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (6.4; 0.781) 
      Q4_2 > 0 [ Mode: 3 ] (9.6) 
       Q20 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (7.6) 
        Q21 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (3; 1.0) 
        Q21 in [ 3 4 5 6 7 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (4.6; 0.652) 
       Q20 in [ 2 4 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (0) 
       Q20 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (2; 0.5) 
    Q7 = 3 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (2; 0.5) 
  Q13_2 in [ 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (82) 
   Q13_3 in [ 2 3 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (5; 0.8) 
   Q13_3 in [ 4 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (77) 
    Q16_7 = 1 [ Mode: 5 ] (10) 
     Q11_5 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (3; 1.0) 
     Q11_5 = 2 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (7; 0.714) 
    Q16_7 = 2 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (67; 0.821) 
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 Appendix 32 – modelling of variable Q13_2. 11.33
Click here to go to variable Q13_2 in the main body of the thesis. 
 
11.33.1 Auto Classifier – training summary for Q13_2. 
Auto Classifier – training summary for Q13_2 
Target Q13_2 
Inputs All variables, excluding free text fields and 
Q13_2 
Planned models 3104 
Completed models 2697 
Retained models 100 
Models discarded from final results 2597 
Models which failed to build or score 407 
 
 
11.33.2 Q13_2 C5 – modelling stream. 
 
 
11.33.3 Performance evaluation and coincidence matrix for Q13_2 C5 Model. 
1 = Fully agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neither agree, nor disagree, 4 = Disagree, 5 = Strongly 
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11.33.4 Q13_2 C5 tree model – symbolic representation. 
The tree depth is 14 levels and therefore only the symbolic expression is presented below. A high-resolution tree image is available as part of this 
PhD thesis data store to examiners and supervisors or otherwise upon an authorised request. 
 
Rule 1 - estimated accuracy 74.21% [boost 41.5%] 
 Q13_3 in [ 1 2 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (187) 
  Q13_3 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 1 ] (38) 
   Q7 in [ 1 3 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1 (35; 0.829) 
   Q7 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (3; 0.667) 
  Q13_3 in [ 2 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (149) 
   Q13_3 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 2 ] (49) 
    Q21 in [ 1 2 3 ] [ Mode: 2 ] (34) 
     Q29 in [ 1 2 4 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (32.938; 0.909) 
     Q29 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (1.062; 0.941) 
    Q21 in [ 4 5 6 7 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (15) 
     Q27 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (13) 
      Q9 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (7; 0.429) 
      Q9 in [ 2 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (6; 0.833) 
     Q27 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (2; 1.0) 
     Q27 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (0) 
   Q13_3 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (100) 
    Q11_3 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] (14) 
     Q14_4 in [ 1 2 3 4 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (7; 0.714) 
     Q14_4 in [ 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (7; 0.571) 
    Q11_3 = 2 [ Mode: 3 ] (86) 
     Q16_7 = 1 [ Mode: 2 ] (21) 
      Q25 <= 4 [ Mode: 3 ] (14) 
       Q2 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (10) 
        Q14_1 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1 (5; 0.4) 
        Q14_1 in [ 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (5; 1.0) 
       Q2 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1 (1; 1.0) 
       Q2 in [ 4 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (3; 0.667) 
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       Q2 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (0) 
      Q25 > 4 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (7; 0.714) 
     Q16_7 = 2 [ Mode: 3 ] (65) 
      Q18 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (43) 
       Q19 <= 72 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (6; 0.5) 
       Q19 > 72 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (37; 0.757) 
      Q18 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (20) 
       Q26 <= 103 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (5; 0.6) 
       Q26 > 103 [ Mode: 3 ] (15) 
        Q5 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (14; 0.786) 
        Q5 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1 (1; 1.0) 
      Q18 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (2; 1.0) 
 Q13_3 in [ 4 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (224) 
  Q13_3 in [ 4 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (113) 
   Q7 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (109) 
    Q21 in [ 1 2 3 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (49.454) 
     Q11_4 = 1 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (7; 0.429) 
     Q11_4 = 2 [ Mode: 4 ] (42.454) 
      Q25 <= 7 [ Mode: 4 ] (36.389) 
       Q16_5 = 1 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (5; 0.6) 
       Q16_5 = 2 [ Mode: 3 ] (31.389) 
        Q23 <= 9 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (5.063; 0.605) 
        Q23 > 9 [ Mode: 4 ] (26.326) 
         Q14_3 in [ 1 2 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (14; 0.5) 
         Q14_3 in [ 4 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (12.326) 
          Q14_3 in [ 4 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (7; 0.714) 
          Q14_3 in [ 5 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (5.326; 0.563) 
      Q25 > 7 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (6.065; 0.824) 
    Q21 in [ 4 5 6 7 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (59.546) 
     Q23 <= 8 [ Mode: 5 ] (19.176) 
      Q14_4 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (5; 1.0) 
      Q14_4 in [ 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (14.176) 
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       Q13_1 in [ 1 2 3 4 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (7.176; 0.557) 
       Q13_1 in [ 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (7; 0.571) 
     Q23 > 8 [ Mode: 4 ] (40.37) 
      Q23 <= 12 [ Mode: 4 ] (35.324) 
       Q16_1 = 1 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (9; 0.556) 
       Q16_1 = 2 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (26.324; 0.874) 
      Q23 > 12 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (5.046; 0.594) 
   Q7 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (3; 1.0) 
   Q7 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (1; 1.0) 
  Q13_3 in [ 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (111) 
   Q21 in [ 1 2 3 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (35) 
    Q16_8 = 1 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (5; 0.4) 
    Q16_8 = 2 [ Mode: 5 ] (30) 
     Q14_1 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (13) 
      Q15 in [ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 23 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (6; 0.667) 
      Q15 in [ 25 27 28 29 30 33 34 35 39 40 43 49 50 51 52 57 58 60 61 65 66 69 70 71 73 75 79 80 81 85 
86 90 91 92 97 98 100 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (7; 1.0) 
     Q14_1 in [ 2 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (17) 
      Q13_1 in [ 1 2 3 4 ] [ Mode: 2 ] (10) 
       Q26 <= 213 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (5; 0.6) 
       Q26 > 213 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (5; 0.8) 
      Q13_1 in [ 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (7; 0.714) 
   Q21 in [ 4 5 6 7 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (76) 
    Q21 in [ 4 5 6 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (71) 
     Q21 in [ 4 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (25) 
      Q4_2 <= 1 [ Mode: 4 ] (20) 
       Q30 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (17) 
        Q5 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (11) 
         Q18 in [ 1 3 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (6; 1.0) 
         Q18 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (5; 0.4) 
        Q5 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (5; 0.6) 
        Q5 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (1; 1.0) 
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       Q30 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (3; 0.667) 
       Q30 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (0) 
      Q4_2 > 1 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (5; 1.0) 
     Q21 in [ 5 6 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (46; 0.804) 
    Q21 in [ 7 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (5; 0.6) 
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 Appendix 33 – modelling of variable Q13_3. 11.34
Click here to go to variable Q13_3 in the main body of the thesis. 
 
11.34.1 Auto Classifier – training summary for Q13_3. 
Auto Classifier – training summary for Q13_3 
Target Q13_3 
Inputs All variables, excluding free text fields and 
Q13_3 
Planned models 3104 
Completed models 2344 
Retained models 100 
Models discarded from final results 2244 
Models which failed to build or score 840 
 
 
11.34.2 Q13_3 C5 – modelling stream. 
 
 
11.34.3 Performance evaluation and coincidence matrix for Q13_3 C5 Model. 
1 = Fully agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neither agree, nor disagree, 4 = Disagree, 5 = Strongly 
disagree, 999 = User non response 
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11.34.4 Q13_3 C5 tree model – symbolic representation. 
The tree depth is 17 levels and therefore only the symbolic expression is presented below for ruleset 1 (at 73.4% accuracy). A high-resolution tree 
image is available as part of this PhD thesis data store to examiners and supervisors or otherwise upon an authorised request. 
 
Rule 1 - estimated accuracy 73.36% [boost 96.6%] 
 Q13_1 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 1 ] (49.12) 
  Q13_2 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1 (33; 0.909) 
  Q13_2 in [ 2 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 1 ] (16.12) 
   Q27 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 1 ] (11) 
    Q29 in [ 1 3 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (3; 1.0) 
    Q29 in [ 2 4 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1 (8; 0.375) 
   Q27 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (5.12; 0.586) 
   Q27 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 1 ] => 1 (0) 
 Q13_1 in [ 2 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (361.88) 
  Q13_2 in [ 1 2 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (195.88) 
   Q13_1 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 2 ] (29.131) 
    Q13_2 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (23; 0.826) 
    Q13_2 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (6.131; 0.652) 
   Q13_1 in [ 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (166.75) 
    Q7 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (151.75) 
     Q25 <= 12 [ Mode: 3 ] (146.716) 
      Q21 in [ 1 2 3 4 5 6 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (139.67) 
       Q16_6 = 1 [ Mode: 5 ] (12) 
        Q13_2 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (7; 0.429) 
        Q13_2 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (5; 0.6) 
       Q16_6 = 2 [ Mode: 3 ] (127.67) 
        Q2 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (17) 
         Q11_5 = 1 [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (5; 0.6) 
         Q11_5 = 2 [ Mode: 3 ] (12) 
          Q15 in [ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ] [ Mode: 2 ] => 2 (5; 0.4) 
          Q15 in [ 9 10 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 23 25 27 28 29 30 33 34 35 39 
40 43 49 50 51 52 57 58 60 61 65 66 69 70 71 73 75 79 80 81 85 86 90 91 92 97 98 100 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (7; 0.571) 
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        Q2 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (64.92) 
         Q24_6_Rank in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (22.913) 
          Q13_1 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (9.118; 0.503) 
          Q13_1 in [ 4 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (13.795; 0.493) 
         Q24_6_Rank in [ 2 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (42.007) 
          Q13_1 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (16.882; 0.557) 
          Q13_1 in [ 4 5 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (25.125) 
           Q13_1 in [ 4 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (14.89) 
            Q22 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (7.108; 0.364) 
            Q22 in [ 3 4 5 6 7 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (7.782; 0.622) 
           Q13_1 in [ 5 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (10.235; 0.42) 
        Q2 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (30) 
         Q14_1 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (23) 
          Q18 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (13) 
           Q19 <= 82 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (7; 0.714) 
           Q19 > 82 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (6; 0.833) 
          Q18 in [ 2 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (10; 0.5) 
         Q14_1 in [ 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (7; 0.714) 
        Q2 in [ 4 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (15.75; 0.571) 
      Q21 in [ 7 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (7.046; 0.71) 
     Q25 > 12 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (5.033; 0.993) 
    Q7 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 3 ] (14) 
     Q18 in [ 1 3 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (12; 0.833) 
     Q18 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (2; 1.0) 
    Q7 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (1; 1.0) 
  Q13_2 in [ 4 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (166) 
   Q13_2 in [ 4 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (85) 
    Q30 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (63.75) 
     Q14_3 in [ 1 2 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (22) 
      Q9 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (8; 0.75) 
      Q9 in [ 2 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (14; 0.714) 
     Q14_3 in [ 3 4 5 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (41.75) 
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      Q11_3 = 1 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (8; 0.75) 
      Q11_3 = 2 [ Mode: 4 ] (33.75) 
       Q27 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 4 ] (22.75) 
        Q25 <= 4 [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (5; 0.8) 
        Q25 > 4 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (17.75; 0.831) 
       Q27 in [ 2 3 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (11; 1.0) 
    Q30 in [ 2 3 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (21.25; 0.859) 
   Q13_2 in [ 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (81) 
    Q13_1 in [ 2 3 4 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (20) 
     Q23 <= 7 [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (5; 0.6) 
     Q23 > 7 [ Mode: 5 ] (15) 
      Q7 in [ 1 3 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (12; 0.917) 
      Q7 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 3 ] => 3 (3; 0.667) 
    Q13_1 in [ 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (61) 
     Q16_7 = 1 [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (6; 0.667) 
     Q16_7 = 2 [ Mode: 5 ] (55) 
      Q23 <= 9 [ Mode: 5 ] (22) 
       Q14_3 in [ 1 2 3 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (15) 
        Q18 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 5 ] (13) 
         Q27 in [ 1 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (9; 0.556) 
         Q27 in [ 2 3 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (4; 1.0) 
        Q18 in [ 2 ] [ Mode: 4 ] => 4 (2; 1.0) 
        Q18 in [ 3 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (0) 
       Q14_3 in [ 4 5 ] [ Mode: 5 ] => 5 (7; 1.0) 
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 Appendix 34 – endeavour to formalisation, variable Q20_1 with Q19. 11.35
 
Click here to go to variable Q20_1 modelling section in the body text. 
 
11.35.1 Auto Classifier – training summary for Q20_1. 
Auto Classifier – training summary for Q20_1 
Target Q20_1 
Inputs Q19 
Planned models 64 
Completed models 64 
Retained models 64 
Models discarded from final results 0 
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 Appendix 35 – characteristics of informal chain of interdependence’ firms. 11.36
Click here to go to variable Q20_1 modelling section in the body text. 
 
11.36.1 Auto Classifier – training summary for Q20_1. 
Auto Classifier – training summary for Q20_1 
Target Q20_1 
Initial set of input variables Q7, Q13_1, Q13_1, Q13_2, Q13_3, 
Q14_1, Q14_2, Q14_3, Q14_4, Q15, 
Q16_1, Q16_2, Q16_3, Q16_4, Q16_5, 
Q19, Q29, Q30, Q31 
Bayesian automated set of selected 
input variables 
Q13_1, Q13_1, Q13_2, Q13_3, Q14_1, 
Q14_2, Q14_3, Q14_4, Q15, Q19, Q29, 
Q31 
Select node conditional syntax (Q19 <= 80) and (Q16_1 = 1 or Q16_2 = 1 
or Q16_3 = 1 or Q16_4 = 1 or Q16_5 = 1) 
Planned models 256 
Completed models 256 
Retained models 100 
Models discarded from final results 156 
Models which failed to build or score 0 
 
 




11.36.3 Performance evaluation for Q20_1 model. 
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 Appendix 36 – unfair competition and turnover underreporting. 11.37
Click here to go to the relevant section in the body text. 
 
11.37.1 Identification of turnover underreporting due to unfair competition. 
 
This modelling stream identifies firms which experience difficulties due to exposure to 






Select node case 
selection syntax 
(Q30 = 1 and Q31 = 2 or Q31 = 3) and (Q16_1 = 1 or 
Q16_2 = 1 or Q16_3 = 1 or Q16_4 = 1 or Q16_5 = 1) 
 
 
11.37.2 Auto Cluster Classifier – training summary for Q31. 
Auto Cluster Classifier – training summary for Q31 
Target (evaluation variable) Q31 
Input variables Q16_1, Q16_2, Q16_3, Q16_4, Q16_5 
Select node conditional syntax (Q30 = 1 and Q31 = 2 or Q31 = 3) and 
(Q16_1 = 1 or Q16_2 = 1 or Q16_3 = 1 or 
Q16_4 = 1 or Q16_5 = 1) 
Planned models 504 
Completed models 496 
Retained models 100 
Models discarded from final results 396 
Models which failed to build or score 8 
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11.37.4 Model summary and evaluation – two-step cluster. 
 
 
Average silhouette = 1 
 
11.37.5 Clusters’ characteristics. 
Inputs sorted in descending order by overall importance. 
 
 
Cluster characteristics Number of members Percent 
Size of smallest cluster 14 7.9% 
Size of largest cluster 52 29.2% 
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 Appendix 37 – EUROFOUND database on policy measures. 11.38
 
The figures, table and analysis in this appendix have been adapted from Marie Curie 
GREY project working paper 5 (Williams et al., 2014a). Data source EUROFOUND – 
retrieved on 10.07.2014 from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu) 
 
The EUROFOUND database consists of 186 policy measures to tackle undeclared 
work in 33 countries. The majority of the policy measures are classified to more than 
one type (see the table at the end of the appendix). For instance a policy measure 
could be assigned to types: awareness raising, commitment to tax morality and 
prevention. Some of the policy initiatives do not have an assigned type. The following 
figures represent an overall picture for the distribution of policy initiatives by type and 
country. The countries are represented on the X-axis of each figure. The Y-axis 




 Policy initiatives which encourage commitment to tax morality are only 16 in 
total from within 186. Estonia and Italy are the countries, which have 
implemented more than 2 measures – 3 and 4 accordingly. Twenty two out of 
thirty three countries do not have any commitment to tax morality measures. 
 
 Policy initiatives raising awareness are 27 in total and it is only Estonia where 
there more than 2 of this type. 
 
 Policy measures of preventative type are 64. In comparison with the other 
countries, Poland, Estonia and Italy are those with most of these measures 
available. 
 
 Policy initiatives towards legitimising undeclared work are 45 in total and it is 
only Finland which has more that 3 – 7 measures in place. There 11 countries 
without any of this type. 
 
 Policy measures, which improve detection, are 56. Ireland, Germany, Sweden 
and Belgium have the highest number in comparison with the other countries. 
 
 Policy initiatives, orientated towards increased penalties are 23. Sixteen 
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Distribution of policy initiatives (type = commitment to tax morality) per country. 
 
 
Distribution of policy initiatives (type = awareness raising) per country. 
 
 
Distribution of policy initiatives (type = prevention) per country. 
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Distribution of policy initiatives (type = improve detection) per country. 
 
 
Distribution of policy initiatives (type = increase penalties) per country. 
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All types of policy initiatives per country using data from EUROFOUND (Retrieved on 10.07.2014 from http://www.eurofound.europa.eu). 
 
Commitment to tax 
morality 








1: Austria 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 
2: Belgium 0 0 2 2 5 0 2 
3: Bulgaria 0 2 1 0 2 1 2 
4: Czech Republic 0 1 3 0 3 1 0 
5: Croatia 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 
6: Cyprus 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 
7: Denmark 0 1 1 3 0 0 2 
8: France 0 0 3 0 0 2 3 
9: FYR Macedonia 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 
10: Germany 0 1 1 2 4 0 0 
11: Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
12: Hungary 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
13: Ireland 0 2 3 1 4 2 0 
14: Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
15: Malta 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
16: Netherlands 0 0 0 0 3 2 3 
17: Poland 0 0 5 3 2 0 4 
18: Romania 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 
19: Slovakia 0 0 2 1 2 2 1 
20: Spain 0 0 2 3 1 2 0 
21: Sweden 0 0 2 2 4 2 0 
22: Turkey 0 0 2 2 2 1 0 
23: Iceland 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 
24: Finland 1 1 4 7 2 0 0 
25: Montenegro 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
26: Norway 1 1 3 0 2 0 3 
27: Lithuania 1 1 0 0 2 1 3 
28: Portugal 1 2 0 2 3 0 0 
29: UK 1 1 4 3 2 0 3 
30: Latvia 1 2 2 1 0 1 2 
31: Slovenia 1 1 2 2 0 0 3 
32: Estonia 3 4 5 1 1 0 0 
33: Italy 4 1 8 2 3 1 6 
Total per type: 16 27 64 45 56 23 49 
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